Hi James,

You write, "I believe that I address everything that needs to be addressed in a single sentence that I have repeatedly repeated: All properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence must be expressible in the same terms as is the evidence from which its existence was inferred."

Good. May we deconstruct that statement into quantitative measure?

If f = m is generalized to E = m and the empirical evidence shows conservation of mass-energy such that rest mass-energy = 0, then the terms of the results from empirical evidence that show conservation of mass-energy under acceleration to the limit of a constant (c), are identical to the theoretical prediction.

Can you cite an instance of experimental result in which mass-energy is not conserved?

Tom

Tom,

"If f = m is generalized to E = m and the empirical evidence shows conservation of mass-energy such that rest mass-energy = 0, then the terms of the results from empirical evidence that show conservation of mass-energy under acceleration to the limit of a constant (c), are identical to the theoretical prediction."

Yes this is true. It does not, as a quantitative approach, contradict what I am saying. My sentence "All properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence must be expressible in the same terms as is the evidence from which its existence was inferred." sets the criteria for anchoring physics equations to empirical evidence. Your example making use of mass, energy, and force uses these properties after they have been usurped by theoretical speculation. Your example uses properties that are not expressible in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which their existence has been inferred. They are expressed as theoretical ideas of which went astray, from that which empirical evidence communicates to us, with the first invasion of theory onto physics equations. That first invasion was the decision that either force or mass had to be arbitrarily made an indefinable property joining the two naturally indefinable properties of length and duration. That act began the practice of inserting invented properties into physics equations.

My sentence, with regard to both force and mass, is stating that both of those properties must be established as definable properties in f=ma. Definable properties are properties that are defined in terms of pre-existing properties. Definable units of measurement are units that are definable in terms of pre-existing units of measurement. It is the units that represent properties in physics equations. If those units are artificially indefinable, then so are the properties that they represent. When mass was assigned the artificially indefinable units of kilograms, mass became an artificially indefinable property. In other words, mass became an invented theoretical property instead of a property defined by its empirical evidence. The units of mass must be defined in terms of the units of its empirical evidence. Those units are meters and seconds only. Mass must have units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds only. Force then also receives units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds. That is how those two properties are expressed in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which their existence was inferred.

Maybe my response can be piecemeal after all. I am not clear about that yet. I felt that I had a better chance of being understood if I told the whole story in one presentation. However, it all starts with getting mass properly defined, meaning empirically justified. Theory must not be a part of this act. My last essay gave my example of how mass is definable in the same terms as the empirical evidence from which its existence was inferred. Once mass is established as a defined property, all other properties in mechanics follow suit.

James Putnam

"Your example making use of mass, energy, and force uses these properties after they have been usurped by theoretical speculation."

No, James. My example shows that the theoretical prediction is identical to the experimental (empirical) result. The terms match. If they did not, one would expect that mass-energy is not conserved, and therefore Noether's theorem is wrong. I can live with "Bell's theorem" being wrong, based on a wrong choice of topology (the hidden variable); I can't live with Noether's theorem being wrong -- for that would imply that the same laws of physics are not uniform in time. (It would also contradict your own assertion that Newtonian time is the true measure of time.)

Your assumption that there is an absolute rest mass (at rest relative to what?) is, I acknowledge, a deep question -- it goes back to Lemaitre's unasked question of whether the universe as a whole was ever at rest. We would never know that answer *in principle* by empirical methods, because empirical evidence reveals to us only relative motion. We can soundly reason Noether's generalized symmetry of universal dynamics from this empirical fact.

"Mass must have units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds only."

It does. One need not assume that the hammer has mass until it is translated to motion in spacetime resulting in force. Meters are measures of space (rods); seconds are measures of time (clocks).

"Force then also receives units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds. That is how those two properties are expressed in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which their existence was inferred."

The empirical evidence tells us that the existence of force follows the existence of mass -- just as you claim -- though we do not find it necessary to make your assumption of the prior existence of mass in an absolute rest state, which is a metaphysical assumption incorporated neither into the physical (empirical) result nor the theory (kinetic theory of matter).

"Once mass is established as a defined property, all other properties in mechanics follow suit."

True. Your definition is not a definition, however; it is a metaphysical assumption. It is entirely equivalent to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover.

Tom

Tom,

""Your example making use of mass, energy, and force uses these properties after they have been usurped by theoretical speculation.""

"No, James. My example shows that the theoretical prediction is identical to the experimental (empirical) result. The terms match. If they did not, one would expect that mass-energy is not conserved, and therefore Noether's theorem is wrong."

The terms do match because they are designed to match. Whether they are defined properly or not, they will match whether one choses three indefinable fundamental properties or two indefinable fundamental properties. Predictions will follow so long as the form of the equations accurately models the patterns observed in empirical evidence. The difference is not the numbers. The difference is learning what physics looks like when invented properties are disallowed.

Mass is a real property but its definition is artificial. It is made up. It is arbitarily made to be an indefinable property. There is no justification for this act. It was done only because theorists did not see how to pursue defining all properties in the same terms as the empirical evidence. That connection was broken without justification. The penalty paid ever since is disunity.

"I can live with "Bell's theorem" being wrong, based on a wrong choice of topology (the hidden variable); I can't live with Noether's theorem being wrong -- for that would imply that the same laws of physics are not uniform in time. (It would also contradict your own assertion that Newtonian time is the true measure of time.)"

Getting the definition of mass correct does not lead to contradiction in the operation of the universe. It can't. What it does do is establish the existence of unity right from the beginning of analyses.

"Your assumption that there is an absolute rest mass (at rest relative to what?) is, I acknowledge, a deep question -- it goes back to Lemaitre's unasked question of whether the universe as a whole was ever at rest. We would never know that answer *in principle* by empirical methods, because empirical evidence reveals to us only relative motion. We can soundly reason Noether's generalized symmetry of universal dynamics from this empirical fact."

I do not have an assumption that there is an absolute rest mass. Mass is always varying. Even with all other things being equal and constant, mass is still a variable. It varies with distance. With all other things being not equal and not constant, mass is varying both with and without distance.

""Mass must have units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds only.""

"It does. One need not assume that the hammer has mass until it is translated to motion in spacetime resulting in force. Meters are measures of space (rods); seconds are measures of time (clocks)."

Kilograms remains an indefinable unit. My point of making it a definable unit has nothing to do with needing relativity theory or any other theory for justification. It has to do with getting f=ma right at the beginning. Newton's f=ma must have mass and force defined in terms of length and duration. Both properties must begin their role in f=-ma with units that consist only of combinations of meters and seconds. Both force and mass must be and are definable using only the terms of empirical evidence.

"Force then also receives units that are formed from some combination of meters and seconds. That is how those two properties are expressed in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which their existence was inferred."

"The empirical evidence tells us that the existence of force follows the existence of mass -- just as you claim -- though we do not find it necessary to make your assumption of the prior existence of mass in an absolute rest state, which is a metaphysical assumption incorporated neither into the physical (empirical) result nor the theory (kinetic theory of matter)."

I don't have an absolute rest mass. I have an explanation for what mass is. That explanation comes from maintaining a direct conenection between empirical evidence. The manner in which that connection is maintained is to define mass and force in the terms of their empirical evidence.

""Once mass is established as a defined property, all other properties in mechanics follow suit.""

"True. Your definition is not a definition, however; it is a metaphysical assumption. It is entirely equivalent to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover."

This is a strange conclusion considering that my definition is solidly empirically based. I chose to not invent the definition of mass as an indefinable property. Mass is currently undefined. It doesn't have a definition. It isn't defined in terms of force because force is defined using an indefinable mass. It can't be defined in terms of energy. Having a relationship between mass and energy does not tell us what either one is unless we first know what one of them really is. I define mass. I define it right from its start of use in f=ma. Force and energy are then definable based upon an understanding of what mass is right from the start. Right from the beginning of Newton's f=ma.

Tom

Empirical evidence consists of patterns in changes of velocity of objects. It consists solely of effects. Changes of velocity consist of measurements of length and duration. Length is not space and duration is not time. Length occupies space, Duration occurs while time passes. The object and its changes of velocity tell us only about the object. If an object does not exhibit changes of velocity, an impossibility, then we know nothing about the object. If objects do exhibit changes of velocity then we learn only about the properties of the objects. The fundamental equation modeling patterns in changes of velocity is f=ma. The empirical vidence is represented by a. The variations of patterns in that evidence tells us that there is a cause and there is a resistance to that cause. The cause is called force and the resistance to cause is called mass. No one knows what cause is and no one knows what mass is. We only know the roles they play in forming patterns of changes of velocity of objects. Everything that is to be learned about the roles they play must be discerned from patterns in changes of velocity. Everything that is said to be true about either cause or resistance to cause must be communicated by use of terms of empirical evidence only. Anything else added into that communication is imagined.

James Putnam

Theory is the practice of imagining what cause and resistance to cause may be. In the beginning they are given names only. Cause is called force and resistance to cause is called mass. In the equation f=ma, theorists imagine that neither force nor mass can be defined based upon the empirical evidence only. It is imagined that either force or mass must be given an invented identity in the equation. Mass was chosen to receive the invented identity. That identity was declared to be indefinable in terms of the empirical evidence. That decision changed f=ma from an empirically based equation to one subservient to the theory of an indefinable nature of mass. The manner in which that theory is forced onto f=ma is through the invention of the indefinable units of kilograms. The property of mass is represented in f=ma by its units. The introduction of kilograms into f=ma forces the equation to become theoretical. It began as an empirical equation modeling empirical evidence. That was its most useful form. It was changed into a theoretical equation losing some of its usefulness. The usefulness that was lost was its natural unity. In its empirical form, it could teach us about the existence of fundamental unity. In its theoretical form, it can no longer do this. The reason is because the choice to make mass an indefinable property forced disunity onto the equation. The equation no longer communicates that which we learn from empirical evidence in its pure state. Instead, it communicates theory to us. It communicates back to us that which we forced it to be.

James Putnam

We do not know what cause is. We can know that there is a single cause for all effects. We do know that those effects consist of everything that ever has happened or will happen in the universe. The most important effect that has occurred is human free-will. We can know that the cause, that same original cause for all efects, of human free-will contained the full potential for it right from the beginning of the universe. The answers are provided to us through empirical evidence so long as that evidence is kept free of forced imaginings. We may imagine whatever we wish, but, empirical evidence must be modeled in as pure a form as is possible. It must be understood in the form in which it is initially received. We can only know that which it carries with it in its pure form. We cannot learn more from it, in fact we will learn less from it, by forcing it to conform to our guesses.

James Putnam

Patterns of changes of velocity can be measured with respect to distance or with respect to time. The a in f=ma represents changes of velocity with respect to time called acceleration. The evidence appears in f=ma only as combination of units of meters and seconds. We have only meters and seconds to work with for the purpose of defining force and mass. If we arbitrarily add, for whatever reason, other units or anything invented we interfere with the meaning of the patterns of accelerations of objects. If we leave the equation in its empirical form, meaning before we interfere with it, then we find that there are choices available to us about how to proceed to define mass and force using only the empirical evidence. The logical possibilties are to try either property as periods of time, or lengths of distance, or as a velocity, or as an acceleration. Each of these possibilities arise purely from the empirical evidence. One will prove to be the correct choice and reveal itself by its usefulness. It, possibly with modifications due to that which we learn from more patterns of acceleration, will prove to be sufficient, along with length and duration, to derive the rest of mechanics. Nothing will need to be added. This can be known because all other units are derivable from those of mass, assumming that mass is chosen to be the first property to be interpreted, length and duration.

James Putnam

James,

"The fundamental equation modeling patterns in changes of velocity is f=ma. The empirical evidence is represented by a."

No it isn't. The evidence is the differential measure between mass at relative rest, and mass in relative motion. I'm seeing your problem now -- you think that the variability of the acceleration curve determines states of mass at rest relative to the value of the variation -- that isn't true. States of rest mass are determined relative to states of accelerated mass, not to the acceleration curve, which is not a physically real quantity. As I said before, the *meaning* of f = ma does not change when we truncate the statement to f = m.

You're confusing the physical concepts of "speed" and "velocity." We can speak of an instantaneous measure of speed, which is always a positive value; velocity, which averages speeds over a given interval, can consist of both positive and negative acceleration. So there's no sense in which one can say that acceleration is a physically real phenomenon -- it is not independent of the instantaneous energy content (the speed) of the body (the mass).

A universal constant for speed, OTOH, symbolized by c, IS independent of the properties of velocity.

"The variations of patterns in that evidence tells us that there is a cause and there is a resistance to that cause."

No, it doesn't. I consider it a travesty of the essay contest that Vesselin Petkov's entry did not get near the attention it deserves -- it is brilliant -- and if one understands what it means that bodies do not resist their motion, one understands the true depth of relativity theory's contribution to physics. Gravity is primary.

"The cause is called force and the resistance to cause is called mass."

No. We don't know what causes mass (the standard model favors the Higgs field), and we don't know that mass and inertia are related, though the equivalence principle does identify that inertial and gravitational mass are equivalent.

"No one knows what cause is and no one knows what mass is. We only know the roles they play in forming patterns of changes of velocity of objects."

I hope I have convinced you that the patterns of changes in velocity are not physically real. They are abstract representations of physically real phenomena.

"Everything that is to be learned about the roles they play must be discerned from patterns in changes of velocity. Everything that is said to be true about either cause or resistance to cause must be communicated by use of terms of empirical evidence only. Anything else added into that communication is imagined."

What we know about speed, velocity and inertia IS empirical. What you call "imagined" -- i..e, the theoretical explanation -- is how we communicate the evidence, not something we made up in a knowledge vacuum.

Cheers,

Tom

"Theory is the practice of imagining what cause and resistance to cause may be."

Not true. There is no "theory of cause." E.g., one of physics' most seminal theories -- the kinetic theory of matter -- has nothing to say about what causes motion. And as Petkov profoundly explained, bodies do not resist motion, whatever one imagines the cause to be.

Tom

Hi Tom,

I read your last two messages several times. My opinion: We are going nowhere with this. I maintain that I have not written anything confused. I know the difference between speed and velocity. I know that we receive information about change of velocity only. Acceleration is physically real. We would receive no information without it. Acceleration is the empirical evidence. That is what photons communicate to us. There is nothing to say about changes of mass until several patterns of changes of velocity of objects is observed. Petkov was mistaken. Objects resist acceleration. Gravity is a force that causes acceleration. Objects resist the force of gravity. That resistance is called mass. Gravity is not primary. It is just another effect of force. Force is the name we have given to represent cause. No one knows what cause is. We only can know that there is just one cause for all effects. Theory consists of speculating about the nature of cause. An example: The misrepresentation that "Spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve." is a statement about speculation about the nature of cause. Theory cannot be used to justify theory. Theory cannot be a starting point for analyses. Theory is something added on to physics equations when lack of knowledge or misunderstanding exists yet the theorist feels compelled to move forward anyway. The starting point for learning about mechanics is patterns in changes of velocity of objects. The first two things this empirical evidence demonstrates is that there is force and resistance to force. Knowing that there can be only one cause for all effects tells us that force and resistance to force are different aspects of the same single cause. Learning that variations of force have variations of effects and that resistance to force has variations of effects results from studying many different patterns in changes of velocity of objects. What we learn are patterns of changes in the effects of force and patterns of changes of resistance to force. We do not learn what force is nor do we learn what resistance to force is. We only learn their patterns of variation. Etc.

I recognize that you represent an established professional theoretical viewpoint. The point of my messaages was to introduce the idea that returning to the starting point and re-examining the fundamentals offers an ooportunity to change that viewpoint. It is my view that that viewpoint needs changing. My viewpoint is that removing theoretical inventions from physics equations, beginning with f=ma leads immediately to better answers based firmly on empirical evidence. The method by which this is achieved is to express all properties inferred to exist from observation of empirial evidence only in the same terms as is that empirical evidence itself expressed. Adherence to this practice blocks efforts to theoretically describe the operation of the universe. Etc.

So I guess we have to agree to disagree with you holding the current professionally developed viewpoint. Thank you for sharing your viewpoint with the purpose of trying to help me understand. I do like reading your messages. They are helpful to me.

James Putnam

"I maintain that I have not written anything confused."

I've no doubt that *you* aren't confused, James. If you wish others to be not confused, you have to pay some deference to the usage of common terms, because as much as you speak of "definition," that's what "definition" *means*: common usage of terms.

"My viewpoint is that removing theoretical inventions from physics equations, beginning with f=ma leads immediately to better answers based firmly on empirical evidence."

Since f = ma is based firmly on nothing *but* empirical evidence, you can't see how confusing -- even contradictory -- this statement is to someone else?

"The method by which this is achieved is to express all properties inferred to exist from observation of empirial evidence only in the same terms as is that empirical evidence itself expressed."

Likewise, who -- including you -- expresses the meaning of evidence in any terms other than theory, i.e., natural language and equations? How would anyone discern that there is anything objective in what you are trying to communicate? Or is there, after all? -- is objective communication an impossible ideal? -- if so, how?

Best,

Tom

Tom,

"Since f = ma is based firmly on nothing *but* empirical evidence, you can't see how confusing -- even contradictory -- this statement is to someone else?"

Yes f=ma is a model of patterns of changes of velocity. But that model has parts that are not based on empirical knowledge. You cannot find information in that empirical evidence that tells you that mass is an indefinable property. My point all along is that it must be definable in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which its existence is inferred. That is straight forward and crystal clear. Either you define mass using its empirical evidence or you give up that direct link to empirical knowledge and make it an unexplained 'given' of the universe.

""The method by which this is achieved is to express all properties inferred to exist from observation of empirial evidence only in the same terms as is that empirical evidence itself expressed.""

This bears repeating over and over again until physicists try it.

"Likewise, who -- including you -- expresses the meaning of evidence in any terms other than theory, i.e., natural language and equations? How would anyone discern that there is anything objective in what you are trying to communicate? Or is there, after all? -- is objective communication an impossible ideal? -- if so, how?"

Defining mass in the terms of its empirical evidence is as objective as one can get. Its current treatment is not objective. Its current status as an indefinable property has burdened theoretical physics with theoretical disunity that begins at the beginning of theory and is pervasive throughout its development. Every use of mass carries its mistaken identity over into other properties. Every use extends theoretical disunity into higher level theory. That disunity cannot be regained until mass is properly defined. The attempts to force unity onto theoretical physics as an afterthought is the reaon why theoretical physics reaches for invented properties that make their appearance only on chalkboards.

James Putnam

"Yes f=ma is a model of patterns of changes of velocity. But that model has parts that are not based on empirical knowledge. You cannot find information in that empirical evidence that tells you that mass is an indefinable property. My point all along is that it must be definable in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which its existence is inferred. That is straight forward and crystal clear."

To whom, James? Certainly not to me. If you can locate anyone who finds this point "straight forward and crystal clear," I am willing to listen to them explain it in terms that I can understand.

Tom

Tom,

Ok, then for others:

The eqation f=ma contains the letter 'a' as representing empirical evidence because it is the effects observed. Nothing else is observed other than patterns of changes of velocity for objects (This applies to the mechanical interpretation of the operation of the universe as defined by the fundamentals of theoretical physics). The 'm' means nothing to the equation. The name 'mass' means nothing to the equation. Those two are symbols to be read by humans. The property of mass is represented by its units. The units are the identity of mass in the equation f=ma. The units tell us how the theorist interprets the property of mass. If the units are made up, then the identity of the property is made up. The property is still real, but, its identity is artificial. Its identity is a theory. The means by which this dilemma is avoided is to define mass in some combination of the units of its empirical evidence. Those units are meters and seconds. They are the only two naturally indefinable units. They are indefinable because there are no units existing before them by which they may be defined. The empirical evidence tells us about the existence of mass. It tells us this through patterns in changes of velocity. The units of changes of velocity consist of a combination of meters and seconds. The property of acceleration is represented in f=ma only by that combination of meters and seconds. Those meters and seconds are its language. Whatever the patterns of acceleration tell us, it must be communicated in the language of acceleration. The language of acceleration consists of two words for two units 'meters' and 'seconds'. Any other words or units introduced beyond meters and seconds add a new story line that did not exist in the meaning of the empirical evidence. The new added-on meaning is an invention of the theorist. The theorist invents it because they failed to find the meaning in the empirical evidence. The new word invented for mass is kilograms. Its meaning is that mass is not understood in terms of the empirical evidence from which its existence was inferred. That lack of understanding has saddled theoretical phyhsics with invented units causing mass to have an invented identity in f=ma. The property of mass is still a real property. It is a real property with an artificial identity. That artificial identity is solidified into physics equations by the invention of kilograms. All additional theory that makes use of kilograms is infected with this articiality in its equations.

James Putnam

Clausius' Legacy:

Physicists do not know what thermodynamic entropy, as originally discovered and defined by Clausius, is. It is glossed over in texts as if it is a minor stepping stone to other definitions of entropy. There are a few weak attempts to say its a measure of this or that but those attempts fail. They fail because Clausius' defintion is air tight. It is a precise inflexible definition involving the properties of energy-in-transit, called heat, and temperature. The word 'transit' means that time is also a part of the definition. Each property involved in the precise inflexible definition are precisely and inflexibly involved in an ideal physical event. That physical event remains unexplained to this day by theoretical physicsts.

Clausius' legacy, for me, is partly this: There are many problems with theoretical physics that are indications that there are errors in it. There are a few though that have resisted all attempts at 'fixing'. One is the disunity that exists between quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Usually 'fixes' have consisted of adding theoretical properties onto empirical properties. That is the path being followed by theoretical attempts to 'fix' this disunity. Yet in the background there remains a problem that has not been 'fixed'. It is thermodynamic entropy.

It cannot be 'fixed'. The reason it cannot be fixed is that it consists of an inflexible definition involving basic properties. Those properties cannot be touched, meaning changed, without undermining almost every part of theoretical physics. The definition is so simple, clear and its properties are so fundamental that even the practice of adding theoretical properties onto empirical properties will not work. There is no room in the definition for adding anything. Yet its physical meaning is not understood. There is something wrong in the definitions of the properties involved that prevents physicists from making sense of the pieces. The puzzle goes together because all pieces are modeled to fit with the forms of empirical evidence. But something about their identities in equations prevents our understanding of what thermodynamic entropy is.

Their identities in equations are their units. Their units have problems that cannot be theoretically ixed' at such a simple level. In order to understand the physical meaning of thermodynamic entropy theorist must look backwards to the definitions of the units involved. There they will find that mass was improperly declared to be an indefinable property with indefinable units. It should have units that consist of some combination of the units of the empirical evidence. Those units are meters and seconds. Taking this corrective action brings unity to fundamental physics equations and the properties represented in them. One benefit among many is that Clausius' thermodynamic entropy is explained for the physical event that it models.

Clausius' legacy, for me, is this: He discovered a property that reveals fatal errors caused by the theoretical inventions that were forced onto the fundamentals of physics by theorists.

James Putnam

Dear James,

Last summer I mentioned I would offer you a free ebook version of book on innerta and gravitation:

http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/inertia.html

as a thank you for your time and effort to comment on my essay. If you interested, please contact me at vpetkov@minkowskiinstitute.org

All the best fot the holidays,

Vesselin

    Vesselin Petkov,

    12 years ago you had ideas fatal for Einsteiniana:

    Vesselin Petkov: "It has been overlooked that the wavelength of a photon in the gravitational redshift experiment cannot change along with its frequency (...) As both frequency and velocity change in this experiment the measurement of a change in a photon frequency is in fact an indirect measurement of a change in the photon local velocity. (...) The very existence of the gravitational redshift, however, shows that it is the local velocity of a photon that changes along with the change of its frequency. (...) In such a way the gravitational redshift essentially shows that two photons emitted at points of different gravitational potential have different local velocities at the same observation point..."

    Do you discuss, in your new book, the variation/constancy of frequency, wavelength and velocity of light in a gravitational field?

    Pentcho Valev

    Dear James,

    I apologize for repeating my offer. The reason is that in the summer I mentioned the book would be published by the end of September, but for a number of reasons it was completed and posted on MIP's site and Amazon hardly yesterday. Simply, I was concerned that you might think I forgot about my offer.

    I am sorry for the typos in my previous post; I was in a hurry.

    All the best,

    Vesselin