Tom,
You: "I will never be able to get my mind around your philosophy that " ... the correction of physics equations calls for the removal of the invented properties ... " because physics equations -- mathematics in general -- is an artificial, hence "invented" language. It's as if you believe that the equations have some independent reality that requires interpretation by some other unspecified language. This only leads to an infinite regress of interpreting the intepretation. (This is the main premise of the postmodern worldview, BTW.)"
Me: I am not sure about having said that 'invented language' part. It doesn't look familiar. Here is what I do say:
Mathematics is the practice of cataloguing shortcuts for counting. That which is to be counted is not mathematics. If the things that are counted are real, then mathematics is a tool used to serve the purpoe of counting real things. If the things that are counted are not real, then even though mathematics remains real, its use in this case lacks scientific value. Rather it is confined to serving a belief system.
You: "And while that regress may actually be true -- my opinion is reserved -- it doesn't advance our understanding of the physical world. Conventional science, as practiced for the past 300 or so years, has progressed by identifying phenomena within domain boundaries and then breaching the boundaries incrementally. This would not be possible -- progress would not be possible -- unless we were able to make those closed logical judgments that the mathematics of limit and function allow."
Me: Progress is the accumulation of useful real results made possible by the processing of real information. Space-time is not progress and does not contribute to it. It is an invention that limits the usefulness of physics equations. Physics equations must contain only information about real properties as made known to us by empirical evidence, if they are to have maximum usefulness in serving progress. You insist in one of these messages that I explain my concern about e=mc^2 or the even more muddled form e=m. I have explained my view on this. You don't accept it. I have shown why and how to correct it. You didn't read it. It was in the first part of my essay 'Our Analogue Universe'.
You: "Data don't interpret themselves, and the phenomena which generate the data also is hidden behind that, using your word, "fog." I agree with Bronowski's profound statement, "All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses."
Me: Yes I understand the attractiveness of 'hidden' likenesses for theorists. They invent and they believe in their inventions. You are correct that data does not interpret itself. Intelligence interprets data. There is the biggest challenge faced by the mechanical interpretation of the universe. It can't account for intelligence and even by assuming the eistence of intelligence, it can't account for how intelligence interprets data. That profound occurence is not due to theory. The evidence that the mechanical view cannot understand the nature of intelligence is its inability to discuss intelligence without assming intelligence.
You: "It is not true that " ... unempirically supportable properties are no longer needed to be invented and forced onto physics equations ... " because this was never the case. Equations describing physical properties either predict empirical results (such as in mathematically complete theories of relativity), or are derived from empirical results (such as in quantum mechanical explanations of the 2-slit experiment)."
Yes equations predict empirical results. Competently formed equations are designed to mimic patterns in empirical results thereby inherently having the ability to extrapolate or interpolate further empirical results. Yes equations are derived from empirical results. That is how f=ma became formed. The corruptive effects of theoretical intervention begins when unempirically supported guesses are made about the terms in equations; and, to the great detreiment of progress, are solidified into the equations by their units.
That kind of theoretical distortion occurred when it was guessed that mass should be declared, without empirical support, to be an indefinable property. It is essential that you understand the significance of a property being either defined or undefined. I understand that that difference is not longer stressed in physics texts. The words primary properties and secondary properties are now used to obfuscate the physicists' lack of correctly identifying which properties are definable and which are not. We have paid a high price for this incorrectness. The evidence of that incorrectness is the existence of theory.
James Putnam