Relativity Is Not About Spacetime by Edward J. Gillis

Ed,

Thanks for the appreciation.

Unfortunately physics will have to look beyond its current static modeling to really understand the relationship between time and thermodynamics. That's why I keep droning on about this particular point about time not being an essentially static vector from past to future, but the dynamic process by which the future becomes past.

Edward,

I agree, human intuition has played a very active part in our understanding of nature. Human intuition is partially due to our human knowledge as well as fundamental facts of nature as they appear in different context in human observations.

The main task of physics/ Pico-physics is to bring forward the facts of nature in such a fashion that they are universally applicable (and not contradicted in any context). This may result into one or more set of universally applicable laws. The completion of the set is determined by complete explanation of human knowledge.

Historically, it is seen that collection of human knowledge has preceded the formulation of laws. Scientists are trying there best to change this sequence, being upbeat on observation. Cold fusion, neutrino traveling faster than light, Higgs boson are all examples of this urge to be able to change the sequence (laws follow collection and organization of knowledge). This will be possible when the set of laws is complete.

For Cat and laser pointer, and relationship to continuity of path, I believe it is due to conservation as seen in collected knowledge base, that intuitively brain even in animals with limited memory has a strong perception of continuity of path. It is not other way round; continuity of path is due to human intuition. The example only proves the point; universal laws are independent of object and observer.

Thanks and Regards,

Vijay Gupta

Ed,

Re: locality. As you're probably aware, the Bell's Theorem debate has found its way here, as was doubtless inevitable, with the JC and THR ensemble noisily unreconstructed. The best response to this intransigence IMO is to double down.

Do you see the Leggett inequality violations in the experiments by the Zeilinger and Gisin groups, coupled with the long and vast history of Bell violations, as relevant to your own thesis? If you want you could also bring in the Gisin group's moving reference frame experiment(s) specifically directed at relativistic Bohm, and Antoine Suarez' Before-Before gedankens. Also there's Charles Tresser's papers which argue that the locality assumption is unnecessary for violation of Bell.

The above pretty much exhausts my knowledge of the avant-garde stuff. Quite conceivably there's more. I don't know what essayist apart from yourself in the current crop thus far might both want and be able to address even part of it.

"But it does not appear that he fully grasped the need to explain the nonlocal correlations that Bell (later) clearly identified."

No he did not. Bell, however, did. In his last paper (1991) he scoffs at reconciliatory attitudes towards quantum non-locality and points to a GRW type resolution of the quantum measurement problem.

In my view, however, the resolution of quantum non-locality comes from identifying the error Bell made in the very first equation of his famous paper. You can find a full discussion of Bell's error in my book, and a one-page refutation of his theorem in the attached paper.

Good luck with the essay contest.

Joy ChristianAttachment #1: 17_disproof.pdf

Dear Edward J. Gillis,

Yours is a most impressive essay, well thought out and well argued. It assumes Bell's inequality is valid -- an assumption I reject -- but yet I agree with your conclusion that "in order to make current theory logically coherent, we need ... indeterminism...".

You point out that our brains, "figuring out what we can control" have biased our intuition in favor of determinism. Again, I agree to an extent, but I do not find free will fitting into a deterministic view and yet my intuition is comfortable with it.

As I recall Bernard d'Espagnat noted three assumptions: realism, inductive reasoning, and locality (linked to speed of light). Believers in Bell tend to retain logical inference at the expense of local realism. Perhaps this should be reconsidered.

Several essays in this contest suggest that space-time, locality, unitarity, and causality are "emergent", that is, not fundamental, but artefactual, emerging from deeper fundamentals, akin to temperature emerging from statistical ensembles of particles. Yet they apparently assume that logic and math survive even when space-time, locality, and causality have vanished (coming 'as close to "nothing" as possible').

I have presented logic and math as emergent from real structure (in 'The Automatic Theory of Physics') and if I am correct, then one cannot assume that one can banish spacetime, locality, and causality and yet retain logic and math. [To do so one must be a 'Platonist', having a religious belief in some realm of 'math' not unlike religious belief in a 'Heavenly realm'.]

Thus my intuition and my experience tell me that reality is both 'real' and 'local' while they also inform me that logical coherency is not universal. For instance this FQXi contest contains a number of 'logical maps' that span various regions of the 'territory' [physics], but they are logically inconsistent with each other [and potentially contain logical inconsistencies within themselves.] If anything, this problem grows worse daily, as new math and new physics ideas branch in new directions. Despite the claims of various schools of physics, there is no coherent 'Theory of Everything', nor does one seem to be in sight. Many deny even the possibility of such. Given this state of affairs, I am ever more inclined to believe that the Bell'ists have made the wrong bet, trading local realism for logic, and losing on both counts.

Although is is incompatible [to that extent] with your essay, I invite you to read my essay, The Nature of the Wave Function, for one approach that assumes local realism is fundamental.

Best of luck in the contest,

Edwin Eugene Klingman

E.E.K.:

"As I recall Bernard d'Espagnat noted three assumptions: realism, inductive reasoning, and locality (linked to speed of light). Believers in Bell tend to retain logical inference at the expense of local realism. Perhaps this should be reconsidered."

It'd be neat to see some cites for this other than the insistence of Tom Ray and Joy Christian. Here's from page 6 of "An experimental test of non-local realism," the concluding paragraph of the Zeilinger group's experiment which violated the Leggett Inequality (and those guys are nothing if not Bell aficionados ... Leggett can be thought of, roughly, as an extension of Bell):

"We believe that the experimental exclusion of this particular class indicates that any non-local extension of quantum theory has to be highly counterintuitive. For example, the concept of ensembles of particles carrying definite polarization could fail. Furthermore, one could consider the breakdown of other assumptions that are implicit in our reasoning leading to the inequality. These include Aristotelian logic, counterfactual definiteness, absence of actions into the past or a world that is not completely deterministic[.]"

Also if you checked out the link I posted on your thread to David Harrison's U of Toronto site (he's another one of them) you'd discover that he specifically brings up the logic assumption and notes that it too may fail in Bell tests. You really ought to familiarize yourself more with the thinking and writing of people who believe in BT instead of accepting on faith what its detractors say about those people and their opinions.

Hi nmann,

I'm happy to hear that others are thinking the same way that I am. I try to keep up with Nature, Science, and Phys Rev Lett every week,and arXiv's as I become aware of them, but if I waited until I thought I was up-to-date on every last word, I would never post. I'm spending most of my time working out the details of the work in my essay. You are mistaken to imply that I am following Joy and Tom's lead, as I don't accept his model, only his framework (as do his harshest critics).

And as happy as I am to hear that others are questioning even logic, I am, as far as I know the only one who has developed a theory of emergent logic and math based on physical structure, so I've gone beyond merely mentioning the possibility. You might try to familiarize yourself with my arguments before commenting as above.

And having decided for myself that Bell is incorrect, I do not feel the need to faithfully follow those who are still in his spell. As Feynman noted in his Nobel acceptance lecture, "Since they had not solved the problem, I did not have to pay too much attention to what they did." [probably not his exact words, but the lecture's online.]

Anyway, thanks for making me aware that others are now thinking this way.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Dear Edward,

I like the logical presentation of your essay. You say that "Relativity is an expression of the observational equivalence of spacetime descriptions of physical processes. This observational equivalence is due to the essentially probabilistic nature of quantum theory."

But finally, in your opinion, which of our basic physical assumptions are wrong in Relativity or in Quantum Theory?

G S Sandhu

+

Just for the information of other readers, Edwin's model is NOT based on my framework. Whatever it is based on, it has nothing to do with my framework.

" ,,, You really ought to familiarize yourself more with the thinking and writing of people who believe in BT instead of accepting on faith what its detractors say ...:

nmann, people who "believe in" BT or any other theorem or theory are not doing science in defending their beliefs. They are doing science only by demonstrated correspondence between the theory and the physical result. When the fundamental assumptions of the theory (probability measurement schemata based on infinite domain and range) only guarantee a result (nonlocality) consistent with the assumption -- one had better question the science, because the logic of double-negation has no chance of meeting the scientific standard of objective knowledge.

That's all we detractors are saying.

An observer-created reality is not rational -- this irrational tenet can only stand uniquely alone among the results of objective science when there is no alternative. If one replaces the assumptions of probability with a specifically constructed domain of defined limit, the nonlocality of quantum correlations is an illusion, and the locally real alternative is in evidence. It's sound math, it's sound physics, it's good science -- and Joy Christian has done it.

Edward Gillis, even though I disagree with your assumptions, I appreciate your competence in seeing them through to their logical conclusion -- and wish you the best in the contest.

Tom

ahahah stop your car Benhur.

And buy a bibble Tom.ahahah it will be good for your redemption.

Spherically yours

and buy also some books of maths, and make several copies and give them to your friends ! Because there it becomes ironical. I just say that for your credibility :)

Hi, E.E.K.,

Well, questioning logic became unavoidable post-Gödel.

You, of course, following (I accept this on faith) d'Espagnat, specifically noted inductive logic. Which is notoriously slippery, only partially codified and thus certainly more open to challenge than deductive logic. But to whatever extent Bell's thinking, as adapted by d'Espagnat and Harrison (see below) was inductive, the result's Venn-provable. Take the formulation (presented here without the official inequality or plus signs, sorry):

Number of (A, not B) plus Number of (B, not C) is greater than or equal to Number of (A, not C) --

and then construct a tripartite Venn diagram with circles or ovals A, B and C. (Instead of "Number" think "Amount of Space"). For simplicity try it first with the shapes separated with no overlap:

(1 [because no A is within B]) plus (1 [because no B is within C]) is greater than (1 [because no A is within C]) ... 2 is greater than 1. Good so far.

Now, continuing with the maximally simple, do it with complete overlap:

(0 [because all A is within b]) plus (0 [because all B is within C]) is equal to (0 [because all A is within C]). ... 0 plus 0 = 0. Still good.

Next play with the degree of overlapping however you want. Try overlapping two to whatever extent you wish while putting one aside. The inequality still holds. (We need to assume both that d'Espagnat's derivation from Bell is valid and that Harrison's tweaking of d'Espagnat is also.)

As I've noted elsewhere, the formulation works with all sets of separable physical objects as long as you can define three parameters. If you had dogs running around in a fenced parking lot full of automobiles you could define such a set because dogs and cars have weight, length (or height) and color, and are animate or inanimate, black or not, have fur or not, are or aren't predominately metal etc. Or take a paragraph of text. Make the individual words your set members and three specific letters your parameters. Still works. In English, Russian, any alphabetical language. Then take your existing data table and switch the parameters around ... make A into C, C into B and B into A. Still works. Pretty profound, actually.

Now, it's the macroscopic world we're doing this in, and the logic is classical. BT is (BT and Leggett are) formulated as classical logic because that's the logic we know. It's entirely conceivable that BT is experimentally violated because classical logic doesn't cut it when you're experimenting with microscopic entities. Theorists tend to give that possibility less weight because BT (and its spinoffs such as Bell Entanglement) are based the same logic and general formalism that makes nuclear bombs explode and semiconductors semiconduct but still it could be.

Naturally we'd probably need a whole new logic and mathematics to deal with the microworld in that case.

Hi nmann,

I don't wish to use Ed's thread for this.

You mention the logic that "makes nuclear bombs explode". I have at least twice on these threads quoted Norman Cook, who has submitted an essay on nuclear dynamics. He points out that the main theories of nuclear structure are incompatible, and have been for over 50 years. I'm not sure what this proves about logic.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Hi Ed,

I will tell you both what is wrong with the Bell-CHSH argument and why it does not apply to the analysis of the entangled states considered by Bell.

As stated, there is nothing wrong with your or Bell's argument. The inequality you and Bell-CHSH derived is a completely straightforward and mathematically valid inequality.

But here is a problem: Bell-CHSH inequality is not respected by Nature. It is routinely violated in the actual experiments. So, clearly, at least one physical assumption that has gone into the derivation of the inequality must be wrong, or at least unjustified. The question is: Which assumption?

Bell of course thought that it was the assumption of local causality that was unjustified. But I think that he was unduly influenced by his fondness of Bohm's theory to think that.

Suppose we did not know anything about quantum theory or Bohm's theory. We could of course still derive Bell-CHSH inequality, as Bool did before Bell. Without the knowledge of quantum theory do you think we would blame the violations on non-locality? Not unless we are completely mad.

So what is going on behind the violations? Well, to begin with not all alternatives, ab, ab', a'b, and a'b', can be simultaneously realized in any actual experiment. Only one pair can be realized at a time. So there is clearly an assumption of counterfactual definiteness of the joint outcomes ab, ab', a'b, and a'b' that has gone into the derivation of the inequality. But this can be eliminated by considering a single pair, say ab, for the sake of argument, because even a single pair produces stronger-than-classical correlation. So, counterfactual definiteness cannot be the real culprit behind the violations.

What other assumption, then, has gone into the derivation that could be wrong. Well, I claim that it is the assumption of wrong topology of the co-domain of the measurement functions Bell considered. Bell assumed measurement functions of the form

A(a, L) = +1 or -1

in the very first equation of his famous paper. But one cannot write a function like this without specifying its co-domain. Usually one assumes the co-domain to be just {-1, +1}. But I have proved that that makes the above prescription of Bell incomplete. With {-1, +1} it cannot satisfy the completeness criterion of EPR. The only way to satisfy the completeness criterion is by taking the co-domain to be a parallelized 3-sphere.

Here is where things get a bit technical. To understand why what I am saying is true, I invite you to read the attached paper of mine (which is the first chapter of my book). Please read at least up to page 4 to understand my argument. Further details can be found in several other chapters of my book.

I hope this helps,

JoyAttachment #1: 11_Origins.pdf