Hello Eckard,

A reply to your comment about oneness was made above.

Jonathan

  • [deleted]

Eckard

"You imagine that the past must cease immediately..."

Take St Paul's Cathedral (again). Now, due to weathering, a molecule of stone detatches from the bell tower. I hope there is no concept other than that the state which involved attachment preceded the state which involved detachment, and that they did not occur at the same time?

But, while quite detailed, this is not a conceptualisation of what we refer to as St Paul's Cathedral at its existential level. That is an incomprehensible configuration of elementary substances each in some particular state with respect to their own innate properties. The fact that we cannot comprehend it is irrelevant. As at any given point in time 'St Paul's Cathedral' must be in one, and one only, definitive physically existent state, otherwise it cannot exist. And that involves no form of change, because change indicates more than one such state. The immediately previous state in the sequence of existence of 'St Paul's Cathedral' must have ceased. Nothing can have more than one physically existent state at a time.

The problem here is our conceptualisation of physical existence. Understandably, we conceptualise it at a much higher level than what actually occurs. For the most part this does not matter in generating understanding, because we only want it at that level. But, we need to recognise, when it is appropriate to do so, that this conceptualisation is ontologically incorrect. Put simply, there is no such entity as St Paul's Cathedral, or indeed all the other 'its' we invoke, when considering how physical existence actually occurs. There is a highly complex sequence (system), which only gives the appearance of St Paul's Cathedral when conceptualised at a high level. That is, certain features at that level constitute it, but they are entirely superficial, in the context of physical existence.

Look at this another way. We do not touch it, so over time St Paul's Cathedral becomes a pile of stone, wood, timber. It no longer 'exists'. But how does that differ, physically, from any of the physically existent states which occurred, and we were content to designate as St Paul's Cathedral? The answer is because what constitutes it no longer has the superficial physical features that we deemed to be St Paul's Cathedral. Physically, logically, this pile of debris is just another configuration in the sequence! In other words, St Paul's Cathedral (and any other such 'it') was only ever a concept.

"In reality, there are traces to be found that memorize...."

Forget memories, etc, etc. The distinction must be drawn between physical existence and knowledge of physical existence. Physical existence occurs independently of the mechanisms whereby we are enabled to be aware of it, albeit within the confine of existence. We are part of physical existence. We cannot 'escape' it. Which addresses your first concern about what constitutes the closed system I refer to. We only have knowledge.

"In principle, your imagined sequence..."

Yes, physical existence must ultimately have a discrete state, as at any given point in time, otherwise it could not exist, let alone change. The trick to identify that, and not confuse it with one that appears to occur when conceptualised from a higher level, or with elementary substance, in itself.

"then tell me please its width and why it cannot be attributed to the past"

Its 'width', ie duration, will be equivalent to the duration taken for the fastest change in reality to occur. Duration being the common denominator unit in the measuring system known as timing. In other words, at such a level of differentiation, no form of change would occur, so what was occurring would be a physically existent state, ie what existed as at that point in time. Obviously, not every form of change occurs at that speed, so one could have exactly the same physically existent state in some sequences occurring for more than one point in time. I just use the word point to emphasise non-divisibility/singularity. But what it constitutes must relate to physical reality, not just a concept, indeed, the same applies to the concept of spatial position and dimension. Any form of change indicates difference, but difference, as such, does not exist, states do. It is just that when compared difference can be identified.

Paul

Paul,

Your finitist point of view is shown in the upper part of my Fig. 3. I prefer to assume time as a continuum as shown in the lower part of my Fig. 3. A continuum is thought to be divisible without limitation. Theory of fields has been based on the assumption of continuity which is often even then advantageous if we know that the continuous model is a simplification of something that is discrete in reality.

The other way round, it also happens that something continuous is favorably approximated by means of discretization, see topic 833.

You assume: "physical existence must ultimately have a discrete state, as at any given point in time, otherwise it could not exist". Hm. Existence could not exist? You are trying to define existence by using it. This is called a logical circle.

Let's ask what properties does common sense associate with the notion reality/existence? I already mentioned opposite notions: imagination and expectation, anything at the level of abstract models.

If something is assumed to be real then it is usually considered immediately relevant in relation to something. This includes possible influences from past processes that we can perceive as well as influences into the future we can possibly exert. Accordingly, we tend to deliberately not exactly specify the temporal position of what we consider reality/existence. Your suggestion to restrict the duration of the present is therefore naive, and it is anyway not feasible. What measure has the very nil? Its measure is zero.

The relation between a particular cause and its effect is called arrow of time In reality it always denotes an irreversible process. It separates a particular past from the belonging future. Should we introduce a period of gradual transition between cause and effect just as to have a notion that would correspond to the present? I hope you will agree: No. I reiterate: The present and the present state are not exact and therefore not suited notions in physics.

Exploded and unexploded, Schoedinger's cat, Buridan's ass, ... There are many examples that ridicule the upper part of my Fig. 3. The lower part of Fig. 3 offers an alternative without singular point.

Eckard

Hello Jonathan,

To me, the assumption of oneness is an important step of abstraction. It has been indispensable for mathematics at least since Euclid.

I would never guess that "little baby knows something we tend to forget". They are blind when they make steps we are not aware of.

I humbly admit being an engineer who decided to abstain from speculations about the beginning of the universe. I see still enough chances even for a nobody like me to contribute improvement in the accessible to logics and experiments very foundations of mathematics and physics.

All the Best,

Eckard

Peter,

Your post is possibly understandable within the context of a discussion on your essay in your thread.

I asked you there to defend yourself.

Eckard

  • [deleted]

Eckard

Time is the unit of a human devised measuring system, known as timing, which measures the relative speed at which change occurs by comparing numbers thereof in different sequences, ie how quickly present became past. Change is concerned with the difference between physically existent states (realities). Difference does not exist, neither can there be any change within any given physically existent state.

There can be no continuity in physical existence, except in the sense of one existent state which never ever changes. Existence cannot occur unless it has a discrete existent state, and elementary substance. Which brings us to para 3 "You are trying to define existence by using it. This is called a logical circle". No, it is called a closed system. And we are part of it. We can only know of it (which includes ourselves) via a mechanism which is existent within it. So, on that basis, we stop, in science, delving into beliefs about how existence might be constituted, and work on what is manifest (or could be properly be proven to be so). That is, what is potentially experienceable by any sentient organism, ie validated direct experience and what proven it could be so if the sensory systems were 'perfect'.

"Let's ask what properties does common sense associate with the notion reality/existence?"

It is not a matter of assuming something to be real. It either existed or it did not, and it either existed in the form assumed, or it did not. Its occurrence is a function of at least one previously existent state which must have had a certain relationship to the current state in terms of sequence occurrence and spatial position, because physical influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance. There are no "influences into the future" because it does not exist and therefore cannot be influenced. When the subsequent present occurs it is just the current present in the sequence. It may be different from what could have otherwise occurred, but so is every present.

"and it is anyway not feasible"

Indeed, I always say that. But that is not the point. One has to accept how reality actually occurs (as known to us) and the implications thereof, and then move forward. Not invoke metaphysical assumptions because it is all too difficult, which do not correspond with reality, and then move forward on the basis of those.

Paul

  • [deleted]

Eckard

Does this help?

The only form of existence (ie our physical reality) knowable to us is that which is detectable, which encompasses both validated direct experience, and that which is proven (on the basis of other direct experience) to have been potentially directly experienceable had the mechanism of the sensory process, which enables detection, been perfect. Whether other forms of existence occur is irrelevant, because they cannot be known.

That form of existence (ie our physical reality) has the following features:

1 It is comprised of elementary substances, of which there may be more than one type. These have a physical presence which is not further divisible.

2 These elementary substances have at least one innate property each which has a propensity to alter, of itself &/or under external influence, in its existent condition.

3 In any given sequence of physical existence, only one physically existent state (ie a reality) can occur at a time.

4 A physically existent state is a definitive physical presence and does not involve any form of change.

5 No phenomenon can have physical influence but not have a form of physical existence.

6 The cause of any given existent state must be associated with other previously existent states (including the previous condition of the same elementary substance) and be only from amongst those states which have a specific relationship with that existent state, in terms of sequence and spatial position. As physical influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance.

We would all like something more 'exotic', but are trapped, existentially. However, when translated into actuality, these apparently simple features could involve something highly complex. Truth is weirder than fiction, so to speak.

Paul

Paul,

The notion physical state is based on assumed oneness which goes back to abstraction. There are not just discrete properties like charge and spin but also in principle incommensurable to a chosen unit ones like position and velocity of a particle. You might find the issue illustrated in simulation results I presented in earlier contests. That's in what I agree with Roger Schlafly: Nature does not have exact elementary states in Hilbert space.

You wrote: "... existence (ie our physical reality) ... is that which is detectable, which encompasses both validated direct experience, and that which is proven (on the basis of other direct experience) to have been potentially directly experienceable had the mechanism of the sensory process, which enables detection, been perfect.

As I wrote in my essay, I see reality/existence an assumption. Your view only includes what already happened. If we assume something to be real then we may prove or disprove the assumption in future.

You added: ... existence has the following features:

"1 It is comprised of elementary substances, of which there may be more than one type. These have a physical presence which is not further divisible."

Are those sheep present that are unborn or just in the state of getting born?

"2 These elementary substances have at least one innate property each which has a propensity to alter, of itself &/or under external influence, in its existent condition.

3 In any given sequence of physical existence, only one physically existent state (ie a reality) can occur at a time."

This and 4 implies to understand the existent state like a snapshot of infinitesimal small exposition time immediately before the border to the future.

"4 A physically existent state is a definitive physical presence and does not involve any form of change."

You are trying to obey logic on cost of the benefits of the deliberately imprecise use of the notion presence. It is quite normal to speak of a present process.

"5 No phenomenon can have physical influence but not have a form of physical existence."

Well, existence/reality is nothing but the integration of influences from the past and the possibility to influence future processes.

"6 The cause of any given existent state must be associated with other previously existent states (including the previous condition of the same elementary substance) and be only from amongst those states which have a specific relationship with that existent state, in terms of sequence and spatial position. As physical influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance."

You states are point-like. You need infinitely much of them. Discrete jumps are valuable abstract models.

Eckard

Eckard

  • [deleted]

Eckard

I would just like to say thanks for responding. This is not personal to you, as you are conveying thoughts commonly held.

I did see your exchange with Jonathan, but am not sure what this concept of 'oneness' actually relates to.

"As I wrote in my essay, I see reality/existence an assumption. Your view only includes what already happened. If we assume something to be real then we may prove or disprove the assumption in future".

Yes, and it is not tenable, given the nature of existence as known. As I said, we can only know of existence in one particular form, ie what is detectable or could be properly proven to be potentially so. Assuming nothing to be real, whilst appearing intellectually valid, is just as incorrect as assuming something which is not actually a feature of reality. It exists and we are part of it. No amount of thinking alters that, or can generate knowledge of it which is objective unless it is subservient to experienceability. Because what the sensory systems receive is the only independent representation of this form of existence which is available to us. In simple language: it can 'only include what already happened'. With the caveat: ...and what we can know, either directly or indirectly, of that. Remember, we are dealing with knowledge of reality, not reality. The issue is abstracting knowledge which correlates with what was received and what caused that.

Now, dependence on sensory detection does not imply that objective knowledge must be limited to validated direct experience: a 'doubting Thomas' type science. Because we know the sensory process does not work perfectly. But the crucial difference is between what, while not directly validatable, is properly inferred from other direct experience, and what is based on no substantiated experienceability (ie is belief). Though in practice, as knowledge becomes complex and its derivation further removed from direct experience, the more likely it is that these will become conflated.

"Are those sheep present that are unborn or just in the state of getting born?"

I do not understand this question. As at any given point time, that which we label 'unborn sheep' has a physically existent state. Our labelling and conceptualisation of it makes no difference whatsoever to the existential sequence involved.

"This and 4 implies to understand the existent state like a snapshot of infinitesimal small exposition time immediately before the border to the future"

Yes, because that is what it is, though I would not speak of future, but next state in the sequence.

"You are trying to obey logic on cost of the benefits of the deliberately imprecise use of the notion presence. It is quite normal to speak of a present process"

No, I am following what must be, given our knowledge of the existence we are trapped in. It may be 'quite normal to speak of a present process', but that is the problem. Because a process (system, sequence) involves more than one, but in existence there is only one at a time within a process. Assuming that the whole (or significant segments) of the process exist at the same time, which they cannot, then leads to all sorts of confusion.

"You states are point-like"

Yes, in that they are singular, definitive, devoid of change. For existence, as we can only know it, to occur and change, it must occur in physically existent states of this nature. My point about 'jumping' follows on from this and relates back to above, where it is believed that the process/sequence is existent at the same time. Which then enables incorrect causal relationships to be inferred, etc.

Paul

Eckard

I responded to your post on my blog with more links (as you felt one was inadequate) and don't have Google. (I refer to your post about my wishful thinking and lack of knowledge).

You suggest my; "reasoning starts with the wrong for waves in the far field assumption that the wave speed re medium depends on the emitter."

The exact reverse is true. You had understood that a few weeks ago but seem now to have forgotten again. I can find no cause for this except that again you didn't follow my advice for gaining better comprehension. I've suggested we all need to dig deeper to find and remove those assumptions which we otherwise revert back to as a 'default mode' the moment we loose concentration.

In fact this is as true for sound, your familiar subject, as it is for light. The signal from the ear to the brain has a 'wavelength', which varies subject to the motion of the body. I suggest a calculation will show this also differs from the wavelength in the 'outside' medium. It would take a completely fresh view of the familiar to see the important consequences of this; The frequency is inversely proportional to lambda, as speed is controlled by the local medium. It is precisely the same for em waves.

I think my full reply on my string should straighten this out. You say you defer to Steve Sycamore's expert view. I also respect Steve's view and believe he'll unequivocally confirm the above. I'll flag this conversation up for Steve to comment.

Best wishes

Peter

Dear Eckard,

Rather than respond to Peter's response I'd rather, first of all, formulate a direct response to your notes. I believe you are well justified in questioning whether EM fluctuations always proceed at c from an emitting body. Since we have no means to directly measure that (without involving a test particle) that velocity must be inferred. From a theoretical standpoint, quantum theory does not furnish the tools to model the emission process as far as I know. One reason for that is that very much of quantum theory is built from relativistic or non-relativistic kinematics by-passing dynamical formulations leaving only before-emission and after-emission states.

It would seem natural that the emission process is quite similar to the absorption process except that the sequence of events and propagation of waves is reversed. In both cases the process involves a photon unless the wave fluctuations are non-photonic, that is, involve only an exchange of displacement current. (I'll assume we want to avoid a description involving virtual photons). Such non-photonic experiments could conceivably be carried out by charging moving capacitors. So the resolution of your concern would probably require the consideration of a number of different experiments plus a consistent and rigorous formulation of emission theory. I'd have to see Professor Omar's analysis before commenting on that.

It may also be the case that a proper EM model that demonstrates the Sagnac effect can illuminate the situation. As I've said a number of times, I believe a rigorous mathematical model for rotating objects must be done using SU(2) algebra. Doing so should relate the absolute qualities of rotation to the relative qualities of linear wave propagation, providing an anchor in time and space for the relative velocities.

So yes, any assumption of emission at c is preliminary and requires more investigation.

Steve

Paul,

You wrote: "Our labelling and conceptualisation of it makes no difference whatsoever to the existential sequence involved." Look at my Fig. 3. It depends on conceptualization alias oneness whether or not there exists the singular point of concern. In real life, there is no natural criterion that marks the exact begin or end of a process.

What about my view that reality is an assumption, I should clarify that this does not mean I assume that something concrete may or may not be real. In this context "assumption of reality" is meant as general trust in what we are calling reality in contrast to imagination. You are quite right in that we can only measure or sense what already left traces and infer on this basis what might be real. My assumption of reality means the comprehensive existence of the world.

When we prepare something for observation in future then the assumed reality refers to something concrete. We do not question the general trust in reality.

There is still one expression you are repeatedly using which I do not understand: "existence occurs". When an event occurs, it happens. Do you equate event and existence?

Eckard

  • [deleted]

Eckard

"You wrote: "Our labelling and conceptualisation..."

Yes, how can what we call something, or how we conceive it to be, have any impact upon whatever the physical existence was? Apart from the fact that one is the actual existence and the other is knowledge of it (whether subjective or objective is irrelevant), existence occurred before it was sensed and knowledge formed. We can only have knowledge of, and indeed that necessarily is limited to one particular form of existence (whether there are others we can never know, so that is irrelevant). And through a process of reverse engineering/elimination of individualism extricate knowledge from information (knowledge) which has a high degree of probability that it corresponds with what was detectable (either directly or indirectly) and what caused that.

However! If flawed labelling/conceptualisation forms the basis of some representational model/device which purports to correspond with reality in its generic form, then there will be problems. While that still does not mean that it is, literally, creating reality, this circumstance usually involves a reality which cannot be directly experienced, a complex model, and one which, in accordance with its own internal rules, is logical. So, in effect the model takes on a 'life of its own' depicting a reality which does not exist.

Re your figs: "The notion time has been derived from elapsed time (see Fig. 1)"

Here you have alighted on the key point. Time and timing is about rate of change. Change is about difference between realities. Difference does not exist. Singular, definitive, existent states do, which when compared reveal difference. So when 't=0', that is what existed, just the present in the sequence, the previous present having ceased to exist, the subsequent present does not exist. Although I would not pretend to understand your figs, this sentence seems key: "The singular point in Fig. 3 is an unphysical artefact. Ideal notions like the point and the continuity of a line do not exactly fit to set-theoretically based mathematics". Whether some concept fits a certain mathematical construction is irrelevant. The question is: does it correspond with the generic nature of reality? And then, so what is a representational model which does?

"It depends on conceptualization alias oneness whether or not there exists the singular point of concern"

No, it depends on the nature of the existence which we are trying to establish objective knowledge of. And we know, once we stop dabbling in the unknowable, two features of this existence: a) it exists independently of the processes which detects it, b) it alters. That is sequence, and such a sequence can only occur 'one step at a time. So, without knowing what that might constitute, both generically and in actuality, we know there must only be one physically existent state at a time in the sequence of existence.

"What about my view that reality is an assumption?"

But it is not, is it? As far as we can know, we are part of 'something' and that has very definite characteristics. Our 'take' on existence might be complete rubbish. It might be completely different, involving all sorts of features which we are unaware of. But we are trapped in it, so scientifically, we must restrict ourselves to what is proven as detectable (either directly or indirectly).

"There is still one expression you are repeatedly using..."

Yes, occurs, exists, event are all interchangeable, otherwise the writing would just be unreadable. My term for what exists/occurs is physically existent state. That being a particular existent condition of the substance which constitutes reality. The underlying point being that something is happening independently of our sensing of it. If all sentient life turned away from the moon for a duration then the physical consequence of that would be that those photons emitted and reaching earth during that time, giving a representation of it for the sight sensory systems, would not be received by sentient organisms. They would be 'received' by water, earth, buildings, etc, but they do not possess a sensory system which can utilise them on receipt.

Paul

Dear Steve,

Thank you for your cautious response. You might find a more clear representation of Jackson's basic idea in topic 1448 by Kingsley-Nixon where Fig. 1 clearly illustrates what I consider obviously fallacious at least in case of acoustic waves.

1448 is also a good guide to what I consider Jackson's maneuvers. For instance, Jackson, who managed so far only to publish in viXra offered to Ernst Fischer:

"I believe our work is very compatible and could be valuably co-joined to be far greater than the sum of the parts (but you'd have to collect the Nobel). I hope you may agree."

I will either find at least one of Omar's papers somewhere in my computer or ask himself for another copy.

Eckard

Paul,

You wrote: "occurs, exists, event are all interchangeable" and you often used the expression "existence occurs". May I object that this is logically impossible?

I already blamed you for a logical circle which you denied with the inappropriate excuse we are living within a closed system.

Let me distinguish between reductionism/determinism as methods and as beliefs. While I see you a firm believer in this respect I consider me someone who is aware of some reasonable restrictions. I just assume reality and causality.

Eckard

Hello Eckard,

I look forward to reading Professor Omar's material. With regard to Peter's ideas, I hope you will reconsider the general vision of what he is working towards. I too find it difficult sometimes to parse out a more simplified glimpse of what he is attempting to portray. On the other hand, Peter is quite familiar with many astronomical observations which can be perplexing to account for in simple theoretical terms if one only considers macroscopic EM physics.

I hope you will reconsider Peter's essay and approach. It seems far better to me to work cooperatively than to dismiss prematurely. From what I can see, Peter is more than willing to discuss any relevant technical issue and address possible criticisms. As he maintains, one must dig a bit deeper into understanding what he really means to show rather than what is immediately apparent to a person who is not already familiar with the ideas.

Steve

Dear Steve,

I recall at least two papers but found so far only one:

Omar, Abbas; Kamel, A.H. (ext.)

Frequency- and time-domain expressions for transfer functions and impulse responses related to the waveguide propagation.

In: IEE proceedings microwaves, antennas & propagation [London] 151(2004), Nr. 1, S. 21 - 25.

You are correct in that Peter Jackson collected a lot of astronomical details. Perhaps he looked for anything that confirmed his re-emission idea, originally including faster than c propagation. His 2012 essay and the essay topic 1448 by R K Nixey (related to Judy N?), who was named as co-author of Peter Jackson's vixra paper "Inertial Frame Error ...", did no longer maintain what Peter Jackson had uttered in the last contest: actually superluminal motion. Jackson adapted to what is common opinion: Faster than c propagation is only apparent.

Meanwhile, Jackson's idea attracted attention of those who are not ready to put SR and MMX in question but prefer to imagine instead space as infinitely many spaces in relative motion.

What about "perplexing astronomic observations" I consider explanations for instance of aberration by Paul Marmet pretty understandable.

Regards,

Eckard

  • [deleted]

Dear Eckard,

You wrote in your essay: "Those who signed for clarification concerning the twin paradox [5] are blamed for not understanding the twin paradox that the twin paradox is not a paradox but merely counterintuitive. While the signers dispute this, they are unable to agree on an alternative. The majority within this minority prefers only to distrust Einstein's relativity [6]".

Please consider whether my essay (attached) provides an alternative.

I would like to let you know, I was a signatory. But I certainly do not belong to the 'majority within the minority' which you correctly comment about. I belonged to a minority within the minority. Perhaps I am in the minority of one, who considered that all the empirical equations that give expression to relativistic phenomena are correct, but Einstein's space-time interpretation is incorrect. (Just the same way McEachern says about equations of QM being correct while the slapped on interpretations being incorrect).

What is required is to discern the physical basis of relativistic phenomena, as arising from state changes of energy.

And this connects up with another statement from your essay: "Conservation of energy does not imply closed systems"..

Yes you are quite right. There is no interaction in the Universe that occurs without exchanges of energy with the field, and this necessarily means that all systems are open.

Conservation of energy needs to be looked at from a broader perspective on the lines advocated by Weyl: : "The total energy as well as total momentum remains unchanged: they merely stream from one part of the field to another, and become transformed from field energy and field momentum into kinetic energy and kinetic momentum of matter and vice-versa" ( Space-Time-Matter, p. 168).

I attach my essay. You would find therein that I have shown the physical basis of 'time dilation'. I have explained how a GPS clock slows down due to orbital motion and how the decay time of a muon gets delayed when in motion and I have matched results to a very high degree of accuracy.

My objection to SRT version of the 'twin paradox' is that it considers 'time dilation' to occur because of some KINEMATIC change in the space-time structure. This interpretation is wrong. Time does not change, but internal processes slow down with respect to time for DYNAMIC reasons.

I have shown in my essay how, when a body is set in motion, it loses the fraction of energy Mc2(1 - 1/gamma) to the field. (A particle or body is also not a closed system). The energy that remains in the body is Mc2/gamma. The internal processes slow down in direct proportion.

The traveling twin's metabolism too will be slowed down in the same manner. WE cannot rule out the probability that the traveling twin's body cells and organs may not degenerate due to slowed down metabolism as much as that of the earth bound twin's. (To this extent we may consider that one has 'aged' less than the other, just like if we consider two fifty year old men, one substance abuser and the other having a healthy life style, the latter would be considered to have 'aged' less healthwise).

But just like the clock on the wall of the spaceship is a CLOCK by virtue of the internal processes within it, the twin's body clock is also a CLOCK by virtue of its metabolic activity. If this clock with the reduced metabolic rate is to be considered the measure for the age, then we can consider the case of two people who are twins, neither of whom have ever left the earth too. One has hypothyroidism and the other not. The question is because the twin with hypothyroidism has a lower metabolic rate does he become younger than the other?

Best regards,

VirajAttachment #1: 17_A_TREATISE_ON_FOUNDATIONAL_PROBLEMS_OF_PHYSICS2.doc

    • [deleted]

    Eckard

    "May I object that this is logically impossible?"

    You can, but on what objective basis, assuming this is not a comment about my use of words just to make it readable? Which links to the next comment:

    "I already blamed you for a logical circle which you denied with the inappropriate excuse we are living within a closed system"

    There is nothing "inappropriate" about this, neither is it a case of "living within". We are part of existence, no different in that sense from Andromeda Galaxy or a stone. The only reason we, and any sentient organism, are aware of existence is because of the development of sensory systems. So we can only have knowledge of what must be assumed to be (but we can never know) a particular form of existence, ie our reality-that which the sensory systems enable us to detect. Which includes what we can properly infer (ie on the basis of other direct detection) we would have been able to detect had the sensory processes been perfect. Objective knowledge must be subservient, either directly or indirectly, to validated direct experience, because that is the only mechanism whereby we are enabled to know. Our reality is knowledge, and is a closed system. It is only within that confine that objectivity is possible, because what exists/occurs, does so independently of sensory detection.

    Now, one of the issues is a tendency to assume that while we are fundamentally reliant on the sensory systems, and hypothesis must relate to it, we still can know existence. Which we cannot. That is, intrinsically logical hypothesis is deemed to enable us not only to overcome the immediate deficiencies in the sensory processes, but also provide knowledge of what is inherently beyond their capability. So, given this flawed presumption, as knowledge becomes more complex and its derivation further removed from direct experience, confusion arises between what, while not directly validated, is properly inferred from other direct experience, and what is based on no substantiated experienceability. The latter is belief, not science, though when it involves, for example, complex mathematical models, and an aspect of our reality that is not directly experienceable, then it can appear scientific (objective).

    In simple terms, the reality we are investigating has a definite physical basis, ie has fundamental characteristics, because it is a function of the sensory systems. It is not an abstract concept. These then must be reflected in a scientific approach, not metaphysical concepts, which includes the apparently intellectually correct stance of assuming nothing, because there is something. What we are actually trying to establish is, within that given form, what occurred. Any type of method must start from the basis of the fundamental nature of our reality.

    Paul

    Hello Eckard,

    Google Scholar finds many papers by A. S. Omar, including the one you mention and another IEEE paper by the same authors published that same year.

    "Network theoretical transient analysis of signal transmission over evanescent modes" IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation Date of Publication: March 2003

    "Steady-state analysis of signal transmission in evanescent channels" IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation Date of Publication: May 2003

    From the abstract, the first paper appears to show the claims you have attributed to Professor Omar. However, it might not be a general conclusion as the paper seems to be applicable only to signals passing through a waveguide.

    The second paper sounds especially interesting as the abstract claims "It is also shown that under steady-state conditions, conventionally defined transmission velocities are not necessarily restricted to be less than or equal to c (speed of light in free space) as long as they are not related to direct measurements."

    Does that result substantiate what many of us are saying about the non-measurability of apparent superluminal wave propagation? I'm not an IEEE member but I think purchasing at least one of the papers would be in order. Thanks for the reference. I'll return after studying the paper(s).

    Steve