(continued from previous post)
After initially struggling with the idea, I've been thinking a bit about
how your [George's] top-down causation idea might look from the
perspective of nonmanifold models of fundamental spacetime structure that
emphasize the role of causality. It seems that top-down causation might
provide an interesting new perspective on such models. For definiteness
and simplicity, I use Rafael Sorkin's causal sets approach as an example.
Causal sets, as currently conceived, are by definition purely bottom-up at
the classical level. Causality is modeled as an irreflexive, acyclic,
interval-finite binary relation on a set, whose elements are explicitly
identified as "events." Since causal structure alone is not sufficient to
recover a metric, each element is assigned one fundamental volume unit.
Sorkin abbreviates this with the phrase, "order plus number equals
geometry." This is a special case of what I call the causal metric
hypothesis.
In the context of classical spacetime, top-down causation might be
summarized by the statement, "causal relationships among subsets of
spacetime are not completely reducible to causal relations among their
constituent events." In this context, the abstract causal structure
exists at the level of the power set of classical spacetime, i.e., the set
whose elements are subsets of spacetime. Discrete models very similar to
causal sets could be employed, with the exception that the elements would
correspond not to events, but to families of events. Two-way
relationships would also come into play.
Initially this idea bothered me because of locality issues, but such a
model need not violate conventional classical locality, provided that
appropriate constraints involving high-level and low-level relations are
satisfied.
This idea is interesting to me for the following reasons.
1. The arguments for top-down causation presented by you [George] and
others are rather convincing, and one would like to incorporate such
considerations into approaches to "fundamental theories," particularly
those emphasizing causality.
2. One of the principal difficulties for "pure causal theories" is their
parsimony; it is not clear that they contain enough structure to recover
established physics. Top-down causation employed as I described (i.e.
power-set relations) provides "extra structure" without "extra hypotheses"
in the sense that one is still working with the same (or similar) abstract
mathematical objects. It is the interpretation of the "elements" and
"relations" that becomes more general. In particular, the causal metric
hypothesis still applies, although not in the form "order plus number
equals geometry."
3. There is considerable precedent, at least in mathematics, for this type
of generalization. For example, Grothendieck's approach to algebraic
geometry involves "higher-dimensional points" corresponding to
subvarieties of algebraic varieties, and the explicit consideration of
these points gives the scheme structure, which has considerable
advantages. In particular, the scheme structure is consistent with the
variety structure but brings to light "hidden information." This may be
viewed as an analogy to the manner in which higher-level causal structure
is consistent with lower-level structure (e.g. does not violate locality),
but includes important information that might be essential in recovering
established physics.
4. As far as I know, this approach has not yet been explicitly developed.