Dear Daniel,
I have been thinking a bit more about the last few sections of your paper. I am in the process of trying to learn several new things at once (and also write a dissertation about something completely unrelated!) so you'll have to forgive my delayed response.
First, I appreciate your explanation in the previous post; I think I have a better idea now of how you are using certain terminology. In particular, I realize now that a large part of what you are presenting is your own ideas, so it's not surprising I haven't heard of this view before. Now let me itemize a few remarks.
1. Regarding the concepts "time, space, object, motion," it seems that you want to define each in terms of the others. Now it seems clear that any logical or mathematical system (at least any system satisfying a suitable finiteness assumption) will have either undefined concepts at its lowest level (in terms of which the remaining concepts are defined), or will have redundancy at its lowest level (where the fundamental concepts define each other). It seems that these two possibilities are interchangeable: if you have redundancy, you can eliminate concepts one by one until the redundancy disappears and the remaining concepts are undefined. Conversely, you can define new concepts in terms of the fundamental (undefined) concepts and take these to be "equally fundamental." I suppose this is analogous to finding a basis of a vector space from a spanning set, or augmenting a basis to a larger spanning set that is no longer linearly independent. There are plenty of situations in which a larger redundant set of concepts is useful, so parsimony is not the only consideration here.
2. It seems that "semantic completeness" as you define it requires redundancy, because if every concept can be defined in terms of others, then some of these concepts can be eliminated (at least, if there are a finite number of fundamental concepts).
3. We must be very careful about the use of the word "object," because it has more than one meaning. It has a precise, axiomatic, but very flexible meaning in the context of category theory; as you point out, categorical objects could be Hilbert spaces, or logical propositions, or whatever. It seems to have a vaguer but more specific meaning in the sense of "physical object." When you mention defining time in terms of objects, space, and motion, the objects you are talking about in this case must mean "physical objects," such as "particles" or "fields," and to define "time," they must somehow be indentifiable as "the same object" after undergoing the "change" that defines time. In other words, I don't think a pair of different structures by itself can define time in a Machian sense; rather, it is necessary to be able to identify the "second" structure as being the "result" of "changing" the "first" structure. I use quotation marks to indicate that I am not attempting to be precise at this point! What I am trying to get at is that the concepts of "change" or "motion" require that the "initial and final states" be identified as different states or configurations of the "same object" rather than two totally unrelated structures.
4. I am glad you pointed out the work of Derek Wise. I have not read these notes yet, and they seem very relevant to what we have been discussing.
5. There is much more to discuss, but no time at the present to do so. I see you have an email address on your paper, and I also have one on mine... that way we can keep in touch after the essay contest is over.
Take care,
Ben