Good point, Rob.
I also do not accept that the world is probabilistic. Which forces me to the default position that the wave function does not collapse. Which implies that the wave function is not a quantum probabilistic wave function. Which logically entails a fundamentally unitary reality -- but that militates against what we know, empirically, of quantum mechanics. Probability measures are real.
You write, "What I find intriguing about Albrecht's hypothesis, and others of similar ilk, is that they all seem to be blissfully unaware of Karl Popper's criteria for distinguishing science from pseudo-science."
Also a good point -- although I believe Albrecht's program *can* be made Popper-falsifiable. From Jacob Aron's New Scientist article: " ... in a multiverse with just two universes, you might add a 50-50 chance of being in either one, just as we instinctively assign the same odds to a coin toss.
"Albrecht says that is wrong. Unlike a coin toss, these probabilities do not have a quantum origin. To explain the multiverse scenario, a new theory of probability is required. 'It is not an extension of our everyday experience of probability,' he says. 'It is really a brand new thing.'"
That makes sense to me. In our conventional experience of probability, we have perfect information, or we arbitrarily assign an information boundary, such as that found in an example from the article:
" ... placing a bet on the value of the millionth digit of pi. It is easy to calculate this exactly - it is 5, as it happens - but if neither party knows that in advance, it becomes a probability problem, and conventional probability says there is a 1 in 10 chance of winning the bet."
But we *know* the number is calculable. We have perfect information, or know how to get it. And:
"As Albrecht and Phillips say, quantum effects come into play here too, through the choice of which digit to bet on, either as neural fluctuations, as with the coin flip, or as other uncertainty from a random number generator."
If there is true randomness in the world (and Chaitin's research among other things convinces me that there is), the idea of *perfect* randomness is entirely equivalent to perfect information. That is, most numbers are not calculable -- so it remains to be seen if perfect information in an infinite multiverse implies perfect randomness in our universe. And that leads directly to Albrecht's hypothesis of how the free choice of clock results in different cosmological initial conditions.
Tom