Constantinos,

"I argue all Basic Law of Physics are mathematical truisms."

You're going to lose that argument. If physical laws were theorems (mathematically true statements), Hilbert's 6th problem would be solved, physics would be axiomatic and there would be no need of experimental validation.

Incidentally, those computer scientists (and there are many prominent ones who think this way), who hold that computer model simulations represent real world phenomena, agree with you. Were reality a product of programming, however, we wouldn't need theorists -- we would simply let the program write theorems and prove them. (The answer is ... 42!)

Albrecht's and Christian's frameworks are just two examples of tightly reasoned and mathematically sound research programs that suggest randomness as a foundational property. And to those who want to counterargue that there is no randomness in computing -- see Chaitin.

"Do you believe, for example, Newton's Second Law F=ma or the Law of Inertia to be 'physical laws' justified only by our experimental observations? I show these are just mathematical identities!"

Physical laws aren't justified, only verified. Physical theories aren't verified, only falsified. It has nothing to do with mathematical identities, any more than C-A-T is a furry creature that eats mice. Language is independent of meaning.

Tom

Tom,

It was not "my claim". It was a quotation from Popper. The word "confirmations" did not mean "confirmations of a theory". It meant "Confirmations of specific predictions made by the theory".

Darwin made many such predictions. String Theory and Multiverse Theory have yet to make any. Of course, they have made many significant advances in mathematics; Witten was awarded the Fields Medal for his work. But science is not math. Science must be held to a different criteria of acceptance. Popper provided the most useful such criteria, to date.

The problem does not lie within your "unfalsified foundational theories".

It lies within "unfalsifiable foundational theories".

Rob McEachern

Tom,

Does not an axiomatic model including an underlying mechanism for SR and probability theory complying with causality, satisfy the requirements of Hilbert's sixth problem?

I agree that Roberts point is of central importance. A falsifiable theory is there awaiting falsification, but has not yet been falsified due to... (I really don't know what else apart from the predicted initial 'unfamiliarity' that it CAN be due to!) Laziness? Crimestop?

Is that not entirely different to an unfalsifiable theory, which description covers string theory and most other current speculations?

Peter

Tom,

Let me clarify what of my thinking you misunderstand. I am not arguing for a Mathematical Universe. I don't believe in any Axiomatic Physics. Hilbert can continue turning in his grave! I have often repeated, "all theory, in my view, is man made and contrived". And any attempt to truly and completely model "what is" the Universe (Nature) is metaphysical in essence and so will ultimately fail. Let me take it one step further and say I don't believe in innate Physical Law that exists independently of our Mind -- yet the Universe obeys. I don't believe the Universe needs (or needs not) to obey any Law. I am saying in order to avoid Physics morphing into Metaphysics OUR Basic Law of Physics should be mathematical identities which we apply to OUR measurements of "what is". What we can only know to be true and certain. Nothing in what I argue takes away experimental evidence or falsification of theories.

You write, "Physical laws aren't justified, only verified. Physical theories aren't verified, only falsified. It has nothing to do with mathematical identities,"

I offered some examples of Physical Law which I show to be Mathematical Identities. Newton's Second Law, F=ma; the Law of Inertia; Planck's Law. All these are in fact mathematical truisms and not 'physical laws' per se. Are you arguing my mathematical derivations in "The Thermodynamics in Planck's Law" are wrong? Have you studied them?

Constantinos

Paul,

You asked "What physically corresponds with these concepts of wave, collapse, observation?" All "concepts" exist physically as a mental state within your brain. they have no other reality. However, if you ask "What attributes of the physical entities existing outside of my brain, interacting with the various attributes of my sensory system and brain, caused my brain to form these concepts?", then you will begin to see my point.

Consider the concept of associating a specific frequency, with a specific sinusoidal wave. Or better still, to provide a more physical, less abstract example, consider how your body produces the concept of the color of light. Since the color of a monochromatic light strongly correlates with the frequency of the light, one might suppose that the body determines the color my measuring the frequency. But it does nothing of the sort! It infers the color from amplitude measurements. The basic technique for accomplishing this, was described in my FQXI essay. The point is that ALL of the concepts that people believe to be attributes of an entity being observed, are actually attributes of counter-intuitive interactions between that entity and the observer.

Rob McEachern

Anonymousse

Einstein

What view of time (standard or otherwise) in SR? All I know about SR is what Einstein defined it as, which was a theoretical circumstance involving no gravitational force, and hence involving only uniform rectilinear and non-rotary motion, fixed shape bodies, and light which moved at a constant speed in straight lines. [If you disagree with this I can post a selection of quotes which prove it]. Which is correct as such, but of no value. This being his theoretical construction to extricate himself from his perceived, but not real, paradox of the two postulates ("only apparently irreconcilable" 1905), as effected in section 7 1916. The irony here being that since he did not use light, just a constant which he named as light, there was nothing to reconcile. The first postulate being that any physical law must pertain in any circumstance, which is true, but a statement of the blindingly obvious. The second postulate is irrelevant, because he failed to differentiate the physically existential sequence from the physically existent reality of light which represents it, and is what we receive. So he can speak of observers, but an entity only becomes an observer if they receive light. Having a disassociated ray of light, or a bolt of lightening, or whatever, is not the equivalent of observational light.

His view of time is misconceived, it copies Poincaré (simultaneity). Here is the argument, which is using 1905 section 1 part 1 as the reference:

1 A and B were each attributed a time (local) of existence, ie t(a) and t(b). Either there was a relationship between these timings, or not. If there was a relationship, then there was no timing issue to resolve. If there was no relationship, then nothing further could have been discerned from this information since they were therefore variables defined on the basis of different references with no known relationship.

2 So there must have been a presumption that the timing devices were synchronised (ie working properly), even though this was not recognised. That is because the reference for timing was not understood, it being a conceptual constant rate of change, ie not timing devices which just 'tell' the time, and are only valid if related to this reference (ie synchronised), within the realms of practicality. This must be so, otherwise the timing system is useless.

3 Hence the timing relationship which supposedly needed to be inferred, ie "local time" to a "common time", was known already, and was a false distinction implying a extra layer of timing for which there was no physical justification. Presumption of the distance AB meant that A and B must have been existent at the same time, ie t(a) equalled t(b). Had the times been different, then A could not have been compared to B, and distance established, because they were not existent at the same time.

4 The comparison of AB to BA was effected in terms of time incurred with consecutive, not concurrent, timings. This was incorrect. Not only is there no duration in a spatial circumstance, but AB cannot be compared to BA on the basis of subsequent timings. Because such timings cannot be presumed to relate to AB, as either A and/or B could have altered over time, and therefore the distance could have altered. The measurement can only represent whatever was deemed to constitute A and B, and therefore AB, at a specific time.

5 The quantification of distance in terms of a conceptual duration incurred, was not an issue, had it been understood. Neither was the use of light to do this, with the condition that its speed be deemed constant, inherently a problem. Any method, involving any direction, would suffice, if properly calculated and represented. The errors were assuming physical existence, and hence any artefact thereof (eg distance), continues to exist in the same physically existent state over time, and a misunderstanding of the reference used in timing.

6 It is argued that the AB example is explainable in terms of observation. So time of existence, and time of observation (ie receipt of light), were asserted by Einstein to be the same if whatever was involved was in the "immediate proximity". This is correct as an approximation, though would need definition. But in reality there is always a difference, which is fundamental to highlighting the flaw in his argument.

7 Introducing the differential between time of existence, and time of observation of existence, is irrelevant. As before, the timing devices must be synchronised, otherwise these timings are meaningless, and if the distance AB is presumed, then A and B must have existed at the same time. Alternatively, if A and B did not exist at the same time, then there could not be a distance AB to observe.

8 Therefore, in the context of observation, assuming a simplification of the real conditions, any difference in these times could only be a function of the time delay for light to travel from B to A, or vice versa, and not a reflection of some other variance. That is, again there is no issue to be resolved. The difference in timing would have been because they were observations of reality (ie receipts of light). However, there was no observational light in Einstein's writings and theory anyway.

9 Physically, there is always a distance and therefore a delay whilst light travels; and there must always be light in order to observe. Indeed, what was the spatial relationship between the observer and the light as at the time of existence and creation of the light, could alter whilst the light is travelling. Neither is physical existence affected by observation, because it occurred before that, and involved no physical interaction with it. That interaction being with the physically existent representation of that reality (eg light), which then just ceases to exist in that physical form, in the same way as it would if the interaction had been with an inanimate entity.

10 By substituting c for v, ie a specific velocity for a generic one, c was asserted to be: 2AB/(t'(a) - t(a)). Which was wrong because that time involved duration incurred from subsequent timings, apart from being deemed an elapsed time in both cases anyway, which it is not. Assuming the quantity is doubled, it should be either twice A to B or B to A, or the sum of A to B and B to A incurred at the same time. So it should be: c = 2AB/2(t(a) - t(b)). Or simply, as considering either direction is superfluous, c = AB/(t(a) - t(b)). Which, although correct, is a statement of the obvious. That is, the velocity is a ratio of total distance travelled to the time taken to do so, ie the definition of velocity.

So, with two fundamental counterbalancing flaws, he derives a concept of relativity in physical existence, which is summarised in the following quote: Einstein para 4 section 9 1916:

"Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultaneity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event. Now before the advent of the theory of relativity it had always tacitly been assumed in physics that the statement of time had an absolute significance, ie that it is independent of the state of motion of the body of reference. But we have just seen that this assumption is incompatible with the most natural definition of simultaneity; if we discard this assumption, then the conflict between the law of the propagation of light in vacuo and the principle of relativity (developed in section 7) disappears".

In short: unless in the "immediate proximity" (1905), every state of existence has its own time. This is nonsense. Physical existence occurs at a time, and then alters over time. The rate at which alteration occurs being what timing calibrates. The real timing difference is in the receipt of light from the same physical existence by differently spatially located observers. Einstein has shifted that timing differential from the end of the physical process, where it belongs, to the start, ie it is deemed to be a characteristic of physical existence.

General

I started looking into this consequent upon finally reading Stephen Hawking. It was an intellectual exercise to see if I could discern what the errors were. As I had no background, and with the Net was able to read all the original key documents, I was unencumbered by 'learning' and found the problem easily solvable. I have no desire, or need, to read a string of people all with their own false ideas. It is boring and depressing. A statement is either correct or not, intrinsically. It does not need to be couched in a lot of extraneous references.

To take the example you mention and what you say at face value. This view is rubbish. Can you please explain, on behalf of the writer/thinker(!) you refer to, how the output of sensory/brain processing can have a physical effect on physical existence. You have a number of problems to overcome: 1) the output of the processing is not physical, physical existence is, so how do these two physically interact, 2) what is processed has already physically existed, it has to have been for it to be received in the first place, so how does a subsequent act affect an already previously existent one, 3) finally(!) the interaction (ie sensing) involves a physically existent representation of physical existence, so how does one process physically affect another, when, apart from pont 1 & 2, the two do not even interact.

In other words, somewhat obviously, what we think/etc is irrelevant to physical existence, it is not defined by this process. Put another way, if all sentient life was wiped out at 16.00GMT, physical existence would continue. Another way of expressing this is that the physical input received (say light-as opposed to noise, vibration, etc) is the same whether received by a brick or an eye. The physics is the same. The only difference is that, consequent upon evolution, a somewhat new development, that physical input receivd can be processed.

Paul

Well I must say I would agree with that, without implying I agree with what Tom has been saying. To say that someone thinks reality is the measurement, is tantamount to calling them an idiot. Tom's point has, and always is, about the correspondence between what can be deemed to be reality, given the proper execution of measurement/experimentation.

Rob

I am not interested in what happens inside brains, that is not physics. Wave, collapse, observation are being referred to, my question is what, physically, are these. My point being, once people try to define that, they will come back to the original point you made, which is that the ideas postulated have not been substantiated. And indeed, more iportantly cannot be, ie the basis of QM is a metaphysical take on existence.

Paul

John,

The problem with the concept of light that your have described, is that "light" remains "light", even when its intensity is reduced to the point that single photons are emitted and/or detected, one at a time. These one-at-a-time particles will still produce an interference pattern, in a double slit experiment.

If you assume this pattern is caused by "wave" behavior, and if you additionally assume that, only direct interactions between particles can produce waves (the classical conception of a wave), then you have a problem.

The problem with that problem is that the second assumption is false. There is another mechanism for producing "wave-like" correlations between the particles, other than direct interactions between particles. You can produce the same result, indirectly, by forcing each particle to interact with a third entity, that ensures all the non-interacting particles will exhibit the required correlation. If that third entity gives each of the particles the same "energy", that is the required correlation. If different particles are given different energies, no interference pattern will appear.

Rob McEachern

All

I must admit, that like many others I have just being responding to points made. So in the spirit of keeping to the topic, I have had a look at what was originally stated.

I will just make one point.

Timing is not about the devices used, these just tell the time. Neither is it about anybody's perception of it, particularly Einstein. The reference against which timing is being effected is a conceptual constant rate of change. There is therefore no choice of timing device available, where that implies one can deploy a different rate of change reference. Obviously, the more refined that reference the better, ie the more detail about what occurred and its alteration one is going to capture, the more highly differentiated the reference. Indeed, the ultimate rate of change reference would be one that alters at the speed that the fastest alteration occurs in physical existence (and please do not say that is c, because light is not physical existence). Now, that is impossible for us to effect, but I am just making the point as to what timing really is.

The "time evolution of the physical world" will obviously "look different" if the reference is more refined. Just in the same way as if one has a complete pantone chart, each colour (which is the function of a physical process) could be identified rather than associating a lot of actually different shades (ie different physically existent states) under (say) 'light green'. But this is implying that what occurred in physical existence is driven by the quality of the rate of change reference utilised, rather than, obviously, it is just a case of refinement of detail, given the reference used for comparison. More detail, may reveal the need to alter theories, this is how knowledge evolves, but this is not the same as suggesting that choosing different times (which is not possible anyway) obtains different results.

Paul

Rob,

I'm not looking at the existence of the particles as foundational, but structural. At the speed of light there can be no structure. It requires a degree of composition, balance and internal dynamics not possible at c. Structure would seem to be an interaction of inertia and energy, where positive and negative charges balance. It may well be the wave patterns are a very initial structural development. It is just that from ourpoint of view we can only judge distinctions inherent in structure and the element of energycan thus only be measured in that context.

So even when you release a single quantum of light it does spread out as just energy and any detection of it in transit does manifest wave patterns. Eric Rieter's experiments on loading theory show how it will then trip the detection point closest to being tripped in the first place.

Tom,

I'm afraid I remain an apostate. Now blocktime, wormholes, multiverses, or even expanding universes for me.

Paul,

Tom has no trouble deeming lots of things to be real, for which the experimental validity is debatable. That doesn't make him an idiot, only deluded. I am sure that in many aspects he is far smarter than me. Sometimes though, even the smartest can fall into age old patterns of believing one's school of thought is infallible. It is a form of intellectual ethnocentrism.

John,

"When you release a single quantum of light...any detection of it in transit does manifest wave patterns." No it does not. ALL "wave patterns" require multiple particles to be detected in order to observe any "wave pattern". If you send a single particle through a double slit, you will observe no interference pattern. You will only observe a single spot on the detector screen. The "wave pattern", that is to say, the interference pattern, is built up by multiple particles striking the screen, to form the pattern. The interference pattern is nothing more than the density distribution of the "impact craters" formed by the multiple particles striking the detection screen.

Rob McEachern

Rob,

The assumption is that it traveled through the slits as a particle/particles. As opposed to a quantum of energy that happened to trip a particular atom in the detector. The detector isn't a complete blank sheet, but is made up of atomic structure and how does light interact with mass, but being absorbed by the atoms. So is light actually composed of particular quanta, or are quanta a function of how mass absorbs energy? This goes to the loading theory mentioned by Constantinos and experimented on by Eric Rieter.

Paul,

We are arguing but not communicating! I argue we cannot know and be 'out of our mind'. While you are arguing we can. I see in your argument an impossibility. And no amount of explaining can bridge this inherent contradiction in your thinking. How can we know "what is" out of our mind? It is typical of metaphysics to argue such knowing is NOT metaphysical. Everything else is irrelevant if this is not relevant. Don't you think?

Constantinos

In the article, it is stated that:

"those states of the clock were correlated with the other evolving parts.

But now, Albrecht ran into an unexpected problem. It was entirely up to him to set up these correlations in his simple computer model. Depending on his choice of correlations, he could hypothesise different clocks and radically change the physical behaviour that the quantum system would then follow."

The first statement would appear to imply that the clock was allowed to "evolve". None of the mathematical equations, that are used to describe the time-evolution of observable events, allow for such a possibility. A clock may appear to evolve to an observer it a different frame of reference, due to time-varying travel-times of the signal from the clock to the observer, but the clock itself is assumed to remain constant and "non-evolved".

The second comment implies that the simple computer model was too simple. Rather than factor in whatever it is that actually determines "these correlations", he simply assumed that he could do it instead. Given the dubiousness of the latter assumption, it is unsurprising that "Albrecht ran into an unexpected problem."

Rob McEachern

    Yours is a strawman argument, Rob.

    Einstein perfectly explained the relation between clocks and correlated events at least as far back as 1921 in his speech to the Prussian Academy of Sciences

    "The phenomenon of the propagation of light in empty space assigns a tract, namely, the appropriate path of light, to each interval of local time, and conversely. Thence it follows that the above assumption for tracts must also hold good for intervals of clock-time in the theory of relativity. Consequently it may be formulated as follows: if two ideal clocks are going at the same rate at any time and at any place (being then in immediate proximity to each other), they will always go at the same rate, no matter where and when they are again compared with each other at one place. If this law were not valid for natural clocks, the proper frequencies for the separate atoms of the same chemical element would not be in such exact agreement as experience demonstrates."

    Tom

    John,

    The assumption is that "it" traveled through the slits. Period. We need not assume that "it" traveled as a particle. The whole point to the experiment is to try to deduce from the outcome, what "it" is, rather than assuming "it" to be anything in particular.

    In other words, create "something", and blast it through the slits. The question is, did the outcome match your expectation for that outcome. Did you expect to see an outcome indicative of a paint-ball splatter, and then observer something indicative of "wave behavior"? Did you expect to see something indicative of a sound wave, and then observe something indicative of a shot-gun blast?

    My point is, that the problem does not simply lie with what "it" is. It lies within the all too human, poorly formed expectation of how "it" is expected to behave. "It" is not behaving badly. The human observers may have merely formed dogmatic, incorrect expectations for how "it" should behavior.

    Rob McEachern

    Tom,

    "if two ideal clocks are going at the same rate..."

    My point is that the wording of the article seems to imply that the above assumption may have been violated. The two clocks of concern are the clock, implicitly assumed within the structure of a mathematical equation, and the clock in the computer model, that is modeling that equation. The designers of the equation assumed the clock does not "evolve". If the designer of the computer model choose to model an evolving clock, then there is no reason to suppose that Einstein's assumption will be valid.

    Rob McEachern