Rob,
We're not that far apart.
I agree that intelligent life *programs* run on every substrate. Because of this demonstrable fact, though, one has to make the reasonable assumption that the potential for consciousness inheres in every particle, because programs are not conscious.
I'll look up your book and read it if I can.
You wrote, "In my FQXI essay, I agree that all such interpretations (MWI et al) are equally valid. But I also stressed the point, that none of them *explain* anything. They are not part of *THE THEORY*, they were created external to the theory, per se, and slapped onto it, after the fact, like a post-it note."
This is certainly not true of the many worlds hypothesis, as it is based on a non-collapsing wave function. That *is* the theory. The mechanics of the theory support a continuous wave function by probability theory which admits the equally likely hypothesis.
It isn't surprising to me that you and Edwin are in accord philosophically -- because Edwin and I are also close, in our support of continuous function physics, i.e., field theory. Where we part company is in the number of dimensions required to sustain continuous functions -- I find that there are not enough degrees of freedom in 4-dimensional spacetime. This accords with string theory, the multiverse and of course, Joy Christian's framewrok.
You write:
"Regarding:
'In standard quantum theory supported by Bell's theorem...'
I think we both agree that Bell's *purported* theorem is not valid, although we have quite different reasons for our mutual conclusion. Invalid theorems support nothing."
It isn't the mathematics of Bell's theorem that I have a problem with. One gets into a semantic trap to speak of invalid theorems, since a theorem is true by definition. There are plenty of theorems (the Pythagoras theorem, e.g.) that are proven in contexts that have nothing to do with physics.
"Regarding:
'equaly likely' hypothesis at the center of probability theory ...'
"To me, probability theory is a branch of mathematics. Physical observations and theories can explain nothing about mathematics. Mathematics however, can be used to describe low-information-content phenomenon, like physics; In that sense (and no other) it can explain something."
I don't know any mathematician who will admit to mathematics having any information content *at all* -- any more than the English alphabet of itself conveys useful information. To the extent that mathematical structures describe physical information, they are no different from the sentence "See Spot run" that describes kinetic energy.
"Now if you want to consider the proposition that 'The new and critical thing that Albrecht introduces' explains why the mathematics of probability theory has been found to be a useful tool for developing physical theories, that might be of some interest."
He doesn't explain it -- he only says that his models suggest that ambiguous time leads to multiple cosmological initial conditions. I am the one who says that probability theory supports that hypothesis in the context of the many worlds hypothesis.
"But The Equally Likelihood hypothesis, has more to do with physicists, than physics. It is primarily concerned not with 'what is?', but with what do we 'intelligent life forms' known about what is."
I don't have a problem with that. Objective knowledge is itself concerned with what we know, not with "what is."
"In other words, it has less to do with what happened at the dawn of creation (or anything else outside ourselves), than with what is presently going on within our minds."
Is there a difference? Choose a point where creation began -- in the 4-dimensional Riemannian geometry of continuous spacetime, you will find that that point lies everywhere. Outside your mind, and within it.
Tom
