Okay Phil,
Once again, a thought provoking essay! Of course I'm sympathetic to your position but I feel you open yourself up to a bit of critique so I'll take advantage. Where did you open yourself up? I quote:
"Should we base our theoretical foundation on basic material constructs such as particles and space-time or do these things emerge from the realm of pure information? Wheeler argued for the latter. But no amount of philosophizing can tell us if this is how the universe works. There is no point in asking where the information comes from, or where it is stored."
So, with this in mind, I'm going to actually propose to you a fundamental question!
For the last couple of weeks I've been reading FQXi essays, past and present, together with some of the fascinating articles provided. Julian Barbour's essay [JB] is, of course, relevant to this year's subject and although I'm not sympathetic to Mr. Barbour's position it seems to me Mr. Barbour does a rather excellent job of analyzing the nature of information. He divides information into three categories:
"In summary, we must distinguish three kinds of information: Shannon's information, the uncertainty as to which message will be selected from a source; factual information, the content of such a message; and intrinsic semantic information, which distinguishes a random message, or configuration, from one that carries meaning and to some extent explains its very genesis."
After establishing the different kinds of information, Mr. Barbour spends a great deal of time talking about probabilities in the context of quantum information theory; his position is that ITs, quantum configurations or fields, create qubits:
"The key point is this. If we are to speak about ontology, as opposed to efficient coding in communication channels, the most important symbol in (1) is not p for probability but i for the thing, or configuration, that has the probability pi. Probabilities are for outcomes: what you find when you open the box. Thus, even if quantum probabilities are an integral and essential part of the world [PBR] (reference mine), they are meaningless in themselves. They are at best secondary essentials, not primary essentials. They must always be probabilities for something."
Now this is the thing that struck me! When speaking of quantum mechanics, whether regarding the Standard Model or Cosmology, the emphasis is always on probabilities and statistical configurations; but what about the Hilbert Space?
Consider the winning FQXi essay by mathematician George Ellis [GE]:
"Causation: The nature of causation is highly contested territory, and I will take a pragmatic view:
Definition 1: Causal Effect - If making a change in a quantity X results in a reliable demonstrable change in a quantity Y in a given context, then X has a causal effect on Y.
Existence: Given this understanding of causation, it implies a view on ontology (existence) as follows: I assume that physical matter (comprised of electrons, protons, etc.) exists. Then the following criterion for existence makes sense:
Definition 2: Existence - If Y is a physical entity made up of ordinary matter, and X is some kind of entity that has a demonstrable causal effect on Y as per Definition 1, then we must acknowledge that X also exists (even if it is not made up of such matter)."
Now, it's generally agreed that Bell's work proves the mutually exclusive relationship between locality and counterfactual definiteness and, of course, Bell's work has been further elaborated upon since, for example by Mateus Araujo in [MA]. The EPR experiments of Aspect et al. and the Mach-Zehnder experiments of Herzog et al. unequivocally support counterfactual definiteness at the expense of locality. Furthermore, the experiments of Aspect et al. would seem to place quantum entanglement on a firm ontological footing. So then while Hilbert Space is the space of all possible configurations it's much more than a simple Universe of Discourse; the inseparability of Hilbert Space describes quantum entanglement! Therefore, based on experimental evidence and according to the definitions of George Ellis, the Hilbert Space must have an ontological referent!
So I propose to you a "Hogwartian" and certainly fundamental question:
What ontological entity does the Hilbert Space refer to?
References
[MA] Araujo, M., Bell inequalities refined to Boole inequalities in: Quantum Realism, Quantum Surrealism (http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.6283), accessed 26 April, 2013.
[GE] Ellis, G., An excellent exposition revealing the essence of organicism in: Recognising Top-Down Causality (http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Ellis_FQXI_Essay_Ellis_2012.pdf), accessed 26 April, 2013.
[JB] Barbour, J., An informative discourse on information in: Bit from It (http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Barbour_Wheeler.pdf), accessed 26 April, 2013.
[PBR] Pusey, M. F. et al., Are wavefunctions ontological entities? in: A boost for quantum reality (http://www.nature.com/news/a-boost-for-quantum-reality-1.10602), accessed 26 April, 2013.
I shall wait for a few more essays to present themselves before I rate your essay but, rest assured, I'll levy an upper range rating.
With regards,
Wes Hansen