Marcus
"Paul: you're playing semantics"
Not so. What I said was: "If there is, within the existence knowable to us, more than one universe, then all that means is that our physical existence comprises more than one of what we label universes". The point being that there is not more than one existence.
"What *is* relevant is the substantive question of whether there is anything beyond the *observable* universe"
This is incorrect. Again it is a function of your failure to differentiate that which is potentially knowable to us, and therefore constitutes existence for us, and the possibility of an alternative to that, which we cannot know. In terms of sight, existence is manifest by a physical process (aka light), which we know is an existent representation of some other existent phenomenon. Both are within what we can potentially know, which does not have to be limited to direct observation, but can be hypothesis, ie virtual observation. The point being that what we cannot know is any alternative possibility, which may or may not exist. So, if it is properly proven (ie the assertion does not rest on a flawed presumption about the nature of existence) that there are more than one of what we label as universes, so be it. This is not proof of alternative existence, because we can only prove one form of existence.
"Also, Paul you just *can't* make an argument (as you do) against QM or relativit on the basis of speculation about "existence", "difference", "sequence", etc."
On the contrary, you can, and indeed, must. Because what should have been established first, for a science investigating existence, is, generically, how we are aware of it, and how that must occur. Otherwise either flawed presumptions are invoked, or none are supposedly invoked, which is the same as deeming existence to be an abstract concept. Which is not only a presumption anyway, but is wrong. Existence as knowable to us, has a form, which determines what constitutes valid presumptions and due process. How that generic form is manifest is an entirely different matter.
Based on input received, we can identify that the form of physical existence we can know has two fundamental characteristics:
-what occurs, does so, independently of the processes which detect it
-it involves difference, ie comparison of inputs reveals difference, and therefore that there is change/alteration.
This means that the physical existence we can know is existential sequence. The entirety of whatever comprises it can only exist within that sequence in one definitive discrete physically existent state at a time, as the predecessor must cease to exist so that the successor can exist. Therefore, physical existence is a spatial phenomenon, which alters over time.
Now, what has happened is that we what knew was never pursued to its proper logical conclusion. We know there is alteration, but this was rationalised in the normal human view with the concept of 'it changes'. 'It' being a conceptualisation of the existent state at a higher level than that which exists. That is, 'its' are identified by certain superficial physical characteristics. And we deem the 'it' to persist in existence so long as those remain. Indeed, we even contradict this, because if such a characteristic alters, we then assert that 'it' has changed. The point being that this is not how physical existence occurs. The 'it' occurs as a sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states, there is no 'it' per se, just the appearance of persistence from a higher conceptual level.
So, what is now labelled as the 'classical' view was usurped by a new view which fundamentally rests on the presumption of some form of indefiniteness in existence, in order, it is thought, to explain the 'bottom line', ie the opposite to the classical. But this is incorrect, existence as knowable to us cannot involve indefiniteness, for something to exist it must be definite. And was not necessary anyway, had the 'classical' view been properly analysed, because this encompasses the 'bottom line' but does so without having to dispense with definitiveness. And in order to resolve this inherent flaw, these theories then have to invoke increasingly bizarre rationalisations to 'keep on track'. Which is a clear sign tht there is something fundamentally wrong. We have all sorts of perverse views of time, the notion that observation affects the physical circumstance, etc, etc.
Paul
