Essay Abstract

In my recently published article, "A New Theory of Free Will" , I argued that several serious philosophical and empirical hypotheses - hypotheses which have all received and continue to receive serious discussion by philosophers and physicists, and which may all turn out to be true - jointly entail that we are living in the functional equivalent of a peer-to-peer (P2P) networked computer simulation. Not only that, I argued that this P2P Hypothesis explains the very existence of almost all of the most puzzling features of our world: 1. Quantum indeterminacy and measurement problems. 2. Quantum entanglement. 3. The apparent irreducibility of conscious experience to physical objects, properties or functions. 4. The intuition that our personal identity, as conscious subjects of experience, is irreducible to any form of physical or psychological continuity. 5. The apparent "unreality of time" in the objective physical world, along with our subjective experience of the passage of time. 6. Our experience of ourselves as having free will despite our experiencing the physical world as causally closed under the laws of physics. §1 of this essay briefly summarizes (a) the philosophical and empirical hypotheses that jointly entail the P2P Hypothesis, (b) how the P2P Hypothesis explains all six features of our mentioned above, and (c) the P2P Hypothesis's four distinct empirical predictions. §2 then shows something new: that even if the P2P Hypothesis is true, our world differs from the kind of P2P simulations we have constructed in one profound, fundamental way: a way that implies that reality cannot be reduced to mere quantitative information of the sort dealt with in the hard-sciences. Reality has fundamentally qualitative elements that cannot be understood as "information" in any traditional sense.

Author Bio

The author is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa. He received his PhD from the University of Arizona in 2008. His doctoral dissertation, "A Nonideal Theory of Justice", developed a comprehensive theory of how to respond to injustices. He is currently writing a book entitled, "Re-laying Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Simple, Intuitive Case for the Categorical Imperative, the Unity of its Formulas, and Beyond." In addition to social-political philosophy and ethics, the author also does work in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, including work on free will.

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Marcus, thank you an illuminating essay. The idea that our worlds acts like a P2P simulation is very thought provoking. Of course there are error correcting codes connected to symmetry groups, especially in string theory, but it is not yet clear whether they play any kind of error correcting role. I am one of a few who have speculated that it might be the case but more work is required.

It is not clear to me how the holographic principle comes into your argument. Why is the holographic principle necessary for a P2P simulation to work?

Phil

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Hi Phil: thanks for your comment. I'm a long-time follower of your blog, and really appreciate the work you've done wit vixra.

Anyway, here's how the holographic principle is relevant. Consider an online simulation such as the popular video game "Halo." What generates the 3-dimensional environment one experiences on one's television when one plays halo? Answer: a disc of 2-dimensional information that is read by an outside apparatus (the laser-mechanism and processor in the game console). The three dimensional interactive environment, then, just *is* a hologram of sorts generated from a disc of 2-dimensional information. But this is what the holographic principle states is true of *our* world. Our reality can be thought of as a hologram generated by a vast body of information located on the cosmological horizon.

    OK I get it. I think it is very useful to think in terms of computer analogies in this way. You may also have been playing Halo too much :-)

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    Marcus

    Just a couple of questions for now:

    1 How does the mind/consciousness/whatever have any affect on the physical circumstance when in order to know of it, sentient organisms receive a physical input, ie it has already occurred. And, just for good measure, what is received is not what occurred, but a physically existent representation of it (in the case of sight this is light).

    2 The reception of physical input, and therefore its subsequent processing, is at the individual level. So how does everybody agree that they are aware of the same entity.

    Paul

      Professor Marcus,

      Respectfully sir, reality is not difficult. Believe me, if I can master reality, anybody can. "The (abstract) physical world might indeed be an eternally existing (abstract) array of (abstract) 2-dimensional [(abstract) (physical)] information comprising a vast (abstract) array of possible (abstract) pasts, presents, and futures." However, as I have pointed out in my sensible essay BITTERS, the real Universe is occurring somewhat differently than that particular piece of misinformed abstraction might indicate.

      One real Universe can only do one real thing once. Each real particle is unique. Each real person is unique. Generalized abstract wispy conjecture about free-will is not unique.

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        Thanks! Yes, little did I know that all the time I thought I was wasting playing Halo instead of finishing my doctoral dissertation was actually time spent doing philosophical research... :)

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        Paul: I'm not exactly sure what your questions are.

        Your first question seems to be: how can a non-physical mind affect physical conditions when *before* the physical conditions occur? Is that what you meant to say? If so, are you referring to experiments which suggest that people's bodies execute actions *before* the person reports having made the conscious choice? (I'm assuming these are the experiments you mean). For my part, I think these experiments are profoundly methodologically problematic (and I'm not the only one). The experiments presuppose that a person's *self-report* of when they make a choice are accurate. But, philosophically, there are plenty of reasons to believe that people do not have this kind of privileged access to their own mental states. The conscious experience as of having made a decision may be the *after*-effect of a decision made pre-consciously, and so, in effect, experienced consciously only after the fact. Of course, this might seem to make the causal efficaciousness of the mental untestable, since how (if this is right) might we possibly measure the preconscious intention if (a) it's non-physical, and (b) cannot be measured using any physical apparatus. To which I say: my theory makes several distinct physical predictions such that, even if these particular questions (about when a choice is made) cannot be answered definitively, we may be able to come by strong overall empirical evidence that the model is correct. For my part, I also believe it is part of the conceit of modern science to suppose that all questions *can* be given an operationalized, measurable answer.

        2. As to your second question, it is a very good one. We can of course never know for *certain* whether solipsism (the view that there is only one mind; our own) is true. The only person's consciousness you've ever experienced is your own. However, we can reason abductively: that is, by inference to the best explanation (something that we do in ordinary life as well as in science). Because I experience my consciousness as connected with this body, and I see other bodies that behave much as mine does, inference to the best explanation dictates concluding that other bodies are accompanied by conscious subjects just like me but distinct from me. Again, this conclusion -- that each body has a conscious mind -- cannot be *proven*. But then again, *nothing* (besides theorems of logic and mathematics) can be proven: not even the existence of the external world. For the sake of knowledge as we commonly understand it in ordinary life and the sciences, inference to the best explanation is warranted.

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        Joe: respectfully, the question of whether a theory is correct is not to be answered by asserting that one has "mastered reality" or written a "sensible" essay. It is to be answered by evidence and argument. My paper provides evidence and argument. Your comment does not. Moreover, the assertions you do make in your comment are false.

        First, there is in fact some real evidence that -- contrary to your unsupported assertion that there is one real universe -- there may be more than one universe. Second, there is also real evidence, from quantum mechanics, that individual particles are *not* unique. Every electron, for instance, is intrinsically the same. Third, my paper is not "wispy conjecture": it argues that several respectable hypotheses from philosophy and quantum physics jointly entail the theory I defend. That is not conjecture; it is a genuine philosophical/scientific argument.

        Marcus

        My first question is as written. There is a process, call it thinking, whatever, which converts a physical input received, eg light, noise, into a perception of what was received. Since this has already occurred, and has done so independently of this subsequent processing, which is not a physical process, how then do we affect the physical circumstance in any way whatsoever.

        "For my part, I also believe it is part of the conceit of modern science to suppose that all questions *can* be given an operationalized, measurable answer". And further down "But then again, *nothing* (besides theorems of logic and mathematics) can be proven: not even the existence of the external world.

        Physical existence is all we can potentially know. And knowing is the function of a physical process. Whether there is a alternative is irrelevant, because we cannot know it. Science is, or should be, concerned with what we can know, and not belief about other possibilities.

        "We can of course never know for *certain* whether solipsism..."

        We cannot know, the 'for certain' is superfluous. This is an example of a possible alternative, ie that physical existence is some sort of collective illusion amongst sentient organisms. However, in accord with the last paragraph, and seemingly contrary to something you wrote in your essay, which is why I asked the question, you then answer it in terms of the above paragraph. That is, dealing only with the knowable, the evidence is....Incidentally, my know includes hypothesis, which is effectively virtual sensing, ie it is what could have been seen/heard/etc, had the circumstances allowed. In effect this question was another form of the first question, and pointing out that reality is independent of the mechanisms whereby sentient organisms are enabled to be aware of it. So their awareness has no affect on it.

        Paul

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        Marcus

        If there is, within the existence knowable to us, more than one universe, then all that means is that our physical existence comprises more than one of what we label universes. However, the word universe is usually mean to mean 'all there is'. The point being that there is, for us, only one 'is'.

        On the subject of uniqueness. We know there is existence and difference. Which means our physical existence is sequence. That is, a discrete definitive physically existent state of whatever comprises it, at a time. Aka a reality, as Joe says. Existence necessitates definitiveness, etc. QM, as with relativity, is incorrect, because it presumes physical existence involves some form of lack of definitiveness. What has happened here is that what is now derided as the 'classical' was never properly understood. The logic of what we know was not taken to its conclusion. We know there is alteration, therefore...But we missed the point by thinking in terms of 'it changes'. Whereas, in reality there is difference.

        To make any proper scientific argument, the start point is a generic understanding as to how we are aware of existence and how that must occur. This then provides science with a set of rules which must be adhered to. If one wants to attend woodworking classes, then it is best to know the nature of wood, because going with a toothpick and a lawnmower, on the basis that these are tools, will not result in progress.

        Paul

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        Professor Marcus,

        Reality is not my theory. There is nothing intrinsic about reality. My reality does not need any "real evidence" to support it. Could you please define scientifically what would constitute "real evidence?" of there being more than one real Universe? How can this "real evidence" be distinguished from scientifically assessed unreal evidence? Does any "real evidence" exist of free-will? Who has free will and how does one acquire it? How scientifically intrinsic is free will?

        Paul: you're playing semantics. There are two uses of the word "Universe." One use -- the use typically used in physics -- is the *observable* universe. We call this "the Universe" because it is all we can *see*. On this disambiguation of the term, there may of course be other universes: ones we cannot observe. On the other hand, there is also the use that you describe: using "Universe" to refer to all there is. But of course on this disambiguation it is *trivially* true that there's only one universe.

        Semantic questions are neither here nor there. They are just wordplay. What *is* relevant is the substantive question of whether there is anything beyond the *observable* universe, and this is what the multiverse theory answers in the affirmative.

        Also, Paul you just *can't* make an argument (as you do) against QM or relativit on the basis of speculation about "existence", "difference", "sequence", etc. Here's why: this sort of speculation has a horrific history. The ancient Greeks up to Ptolemy *assumed* that the planetary orbits MUST be circular on the basis of claims about the nature of circles. Of course they were wrong: you can't derive facts about the world from *mere* speculation about concepts -- about circles, "difference", "sequence", and so on.

        That is simply not science. It is pseudo-science, and no more respectable for that reason than astrology. What makes science *science* -- the thing that has given us computers, and rocketships, and GPS -- is its METHOD: and the method says, "You don't get to decide what's true; OBSERVATION decides what's true." And you know what we've observed? To date: that QM and Relativity both conform to observation. So, you can't say that they're false. (Well, you can *say* it, but you'd be without any evidential grounds). The WORLD will tell us whether they're true or false, and for now, the world tells us that they're true.

        Paul: you are making philosophical claims here about knowledge that, with all due respect, most philosophers today reject. You say that when I say we "cannot know for certain", the "for certain" part is superfluous. No, it's not. It all depends on what knowledge is. *Descartes* argued several hundred years ago that we have true knowledge only when we believe things that we cannot possibly doubt. This is known as Infallibilism. Now, of course, in one sense infallibilism seems true. We cannot TRULY know something (for certain!) if it's possible that we could be wrong.

        But here's the problem with infallibilism. It is such a high standard that it implies that we can't know *anything* (except for maybe truths about mathematics and geometry). In real life and in science, we do equate knowledge with infallibility. We equate it with inductive support giving our observations of the world. This is known as Fallibilism. When I am speaking about knowledge, I mean it in this sense, because it is the only sense that scientists are interested in. No one -- not even the strongest physicalist -- would say we can know FOR SURE that we are not living in a Cartersian dream. But they're also not interested in infallible knowledge. What we're interested in is what we can know *fallibly* given our admittedly fallible(!) observation of the world. That's all science does, and saying that it shouldn't be doing that is just dogmatic.

        Marcus

        I am not making "philosophical claims". I am expressing how we are aware of existence and how that must occur, generically, based on the evidence. I am not interested in philosophy. In very simple terms: there is existence and difference thereto. This can only be achieved by a sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states. We are enabled to know of this existence with the receipt of physical input generated as that sequence progresses.

        "You say that when I say we "cannot know for certain", the "for certain" part is superfluous. No, it's not. It all depends on what knowledge is"

        Which is what I have been saying. The key point in this context being the differentiation between what we can potentially know, and the logical possibility of an alternative (this being expressed as: if A, there is always a possibility of not-A). There are not different forms of knowledge, it is just knowledge being judged for validity against either of those references. The second one being irrelevant because it encompasses what we cannot know. So it is spurious and meaningless to make such assessments, and confuses what is achievable.

        Existence is only knowable to us by virtue of a particular physical process, ie the receipt of certain types of physical input (valid hypothesis being in effect virtual sensing). So, there may be an alternative, but we cannot know it, and musing on such possibilities is not for science. It is irrelevant, we must lust accept that there may be an alternative. But the corollary of this is that what we can potentially know, since this is independent of the mechanisms which enable knowing, is definitive. Whether we can ever know what is potentially available for us to know is a practical point. And different from the point that there may always be an alternative which we cannot, by definition, know.

        That is, we are trapped in an existentially closed system. Existence for us is everything we could potentially know, ie confirmed knowledge is the equivalent of physical existence. We only have knowledge of it, and from within a closed system. There is no 'direct access' to existence, and confirmation of the validity of any knowledge is by default, ie after nothing new transpires, because as we are within a closed system there is no extrinsic reference against which to judge validity. Going back to A, not-A, the circumstance is as follows:

        Given A (where A is 'is'), there is always the logical possibility of not-A, however, this cannot be defined from within A, as a reference from within not-A is required for that. So all that can be defined is A, from within A, and that that is not not-A. But not what not-A is. The corollary of this is that 'is' (A) must be definitive in itself (ie a closed system), and therefore possible to define, albeit only from within. That is so because there is an absolute reference, which is 'of ', or 'not of', A, ie the only absolute reference there can be is the factor which determines inclusivity. [In the context of our existence the absolute reference can be characterised as detectability (either actual or properly hypothesised), because we can only be aware of existence via that means].

        The key differentiation, which you are not making, is between what we can potentially know, and the possibility of an alternative to that. Science is only concerned with the former, and judgements as to validity can only be based on the way in which we are enabled to know that.

        Paul

        Marcus

        "Paul: you're playing semantics"

        Not so. What I said was: "If there is, within the existence knowable to us, more than one universe, then all that means is that our physical existence comprises more than one of what we label universes". The point being that there is not more than one existence.

        "What *is* relevant is the substantive question of whether there is anything beyond the *observable* universe"

        This is incorrect. Again it is a function of your failure to differentiate that which is potentially knowable to us, and therefore constitutes existence for us, and the possibility of an alternative to that, which we cannot know. In terms of sight, existence is manifest by a physical process (aka light), which we know is an existent representation of some other existent phenomenon. Both are within what we can potentially know, which does not have to be limited to direct observation, but can be hypothesis, ie virtual observation. The point being that what we cannot know is any alternative possibility, which may or may not exist. So, if it is properly proven (ie the assertion does not rest on a flawed presumption about the nature of existence) that there are more than one of what we label as universes, so be it. This is not proof of alternative existence, because we can only prove one form of existence.

        "Also, Paul you just *can't* make an argument (as you do) against QM or relativit on the basis of speculation about "existence", "difference", "sequence", etc."

        On the contrary, you can, and indeed, must. Because what should have been established first, for a science investigating existence, is, generically, how we are aware of it, and how that must occur. Otherwise either flawed presumptions are invoked, or none are supposedly invoked, which is the same as deeming existence to be an abstract concept. Which is not only a presumption anyway, but is wrong. Existence as knowable to us, has a form, which determines what constitutes valid presumptions and due process. How that generic form is manifest is an entirely different matter.

        Based on input received, we can identify that the form of physical existence we can know has two fundamental characteristics:

        -what occurs, does so, independently of the processes which detect it

        -it involves difference, ie comparison of inputs reveals difference, and therefore that there is change/alteration.

        This means that the physical existence we can know is existential sequence. The entirety of whatever comprises it can only exist within that sequence in one definitive discrete physically existent state at a time, as the predecessor must cease to exist so that the successor can exist. Therefore, physical existence is a spatial phenomenon, which alters over time.

        Now, what has happened is that we what knew was never pursued to its proper logical conclusion. We know there is alteration, but this was rationalised in the normal human view with the concept of 'it changes'. 'It' being a conceptualisation of the existent state at a higher level than that which exists. That is, 'its' are identified by certain superficial physical characteristics. And we deem the 'it' to persist in existence so long as those remain. Indeed, we even contradict this, because if such a characteristic alters, we then assert that 'it' has changed. The point being that this is not how physical existence occurs. The 'it' occurs as a sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states, there is no 'it' per se, just the appearance of persistence from a higher conceptual level.

        So, what is now labelled as the 'classical' view was usurped by a new view which fundamentally rests on the presumption of some form of indefiniteness in existence, in order, it is thought, to explain the 'bottom line', ie the opposite to the classical. But this is incorrect, existence as knowable to us cannot involve indefiniteness, for something to exist it must be definite. And was not necessary anyway, had the 'classical' view been properly analysed, because this encompasses the 'bottom line' but does so without having to dispense with definitiveness. And in order to resolve this inherent flaw, these theories then have to invoke increasingly bizarre rationalisations to 'keep on track'. Which is a clear sign tht there is something fundamentally wrong. We have all sorts of perverse views of time, the notion that observation affects the physical circumstance, etc, etc.

        Paul

        Dear Sir,

        Your highly interesting and thought provoking essay leaves many questions unanswered possibly due to space constraint. "Eternalism: the hypothesis that past, present, and future objects and properties all exist timelessly" is one such example.

        Both space and time arise out of the concept "sequence", which implies intervals. When such intervals are ordered; then the interval between objects is called space and that between events is called time. We chose arbitrary segments of these sequential arrangements and name them as the respective units. Thus, the designations: past, present and future, like the origin in a graph, are chosen arbitrarily, as a digitized representation of analog space and time. These are like taking out water from the ocean at different places in different pots. Thus, when we say about "objects and properties", we should differentiate the digitized objects (confined fields) in different combinations (macro and micro particles) showing different properties from the fundamental objects or fields. For example, quarks in different combinations give rise to everything. Their non-linear arrangements give the particles certain dominant characteristics. The interactions of these constantly changing (because of interaction with other particles and fields) characteristics are known as the various forces of Nature (properties). Hence neither objects nor properties exist timelessly. This also explains the fallacies in the "Subjectivity About the Flow of Time". The other hypothesis are similarly flawed.

        Your example of the video game is not appropriate. But there is difference between Reality and its simulation. Formulating a Theory of the observed (or potentially observable) events means building up a network of input-output connections between them. In a causal theory, these connections are causal links. In computer-programming language, the events are the subroutines and the causal links are the registers where information is written and read. In physical terms, the links are the systems and the events are the transformations. The computer does not function naturally, but we design and write the algorithm for the computer to function. Hence it will be a creature of our ideas and limitations - GIGO.

        The quantum measurement problem is inherently faulty. The mathematical entities called wave-functions represent quantum states. A wave-function can be thought of as a list of all the possible configurations of a superposed quantum system, along with a set of numbers that give the probability of being detected for each configuration. The wave function treats each element of the superposition as equally real, if not necessarily equally probable from the point of view of the observer. It is presumed that we will detect one of these probabilities, seemingly selected at random, if we measure the system. The Schrödinger equation delineates how a quantum system's wave function will change through time, an evolution predicted to be smooth and deterministic (i.e., without any randomness). But what happens when humans observe a quantum system, such as an electron; with a scientific instrument (which itself may be regarded as a quantum-mechanical system) seems to contradict that mathematics.

        At the moment of measurement, the wave function describing the superposition of a series of alternatives appears to collapse into one member of the superposition set, thereby interrupting the smooth evolution of the wave function and introducing discontinuity. After measurement, a single outcome emerges always, banishing all other possibilities from the quantum world and conforming to the classically described reality. Which alternative probability is returned at the moment of measurement appears to be arbitrary - its selection does not evolve logically from the information-packed wave function of the electron before measurement. Nor does the mathematics of collapse emerge from the seamless flow of the Schrödinger equation. In fact, collapse has to be added as a postulate - as an additional process that seems to violate the equation.

        Superposition has been unnecessarily glamorized. The result of measurement is always related to a time t, and is frozen for use at later times t1, t2, etc, when the object has evolved further. All other unknown states are combined together and are called superposition of states.

        Uncertainty arises due to our inability to control the total environment affecting measurement. If we send a pulse to an object to revert back to us giving information about the object, we are not counting the dynamics of the field through which the pulse passes. These give the outcome an element of uncertainty and not some weird quantum effect. For this reason, quantum phenomena do not have definite values until they are observed. This does not imply that the act of observation creates those values. Observation only reports the value.

        We wish you would have focused on the format of the equation for your analysis. The left hand side of the equation represents free-will, as we are free to change the parameters as we want. The right hand side represents determinism. Because, once we change the parameters, the result will be predetermined subject to the uncertainty described above.

        Finally, you are right that human consciousness is fundamentally qualitative in nature. It cannot be reduced to a mere structure.

        Regards,

        basudeba

        7 days later

        Your mention of error correction codes is interesting. I read an article by Gates a few months ago on the role of error correction codes with adinkras. I think that error correction coes, say with the Mathieu group, apply for quantum systtem in spacetimes with event horizons. The interesting system is the M_{24} contained in the J3(O) O = octonions.

        I am not committed to any particular idea about consciousness, or the mind-body problem. There could in juxaosition to quantum mechanics be the existence of a consciousness domain, which certain physical systems with enough complexity can "chart" their way across. In that sense we might have consciousness as something not entirely based on physical processes, but which is in a sense activated through physical systems that are highly complex or evolved.

        LC

        Marcus,

        Fascinating idea and well argued. A refreshing change from the main themes, how nice to have counterpoise.

        The real question I have is, if the error correction codes are worth their salt, why do they not correct the obvious errors in our hopeless (lack of) understanding of the universe?

        I think I take an almost diametrically opposite case, where not even maths really applies to reality, and the life is some amorphous 'real' evolving thing. Just as radical! but it does seem to address the EPR paradox! I'll be interested in your views.

        I think yours is very worthwhile addition to the contest. It was about time we had the computer gaming generation putting in a showing! (me I stuck to computer golf!).

        Best of luck

        Peter

        11 days later

        Dear Marcus

        Glad to know you also to like the philosophy.

        'll Be happier if you said : how P2P explains to " it and bit"?

        http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1802