Here is an example: I drive on the highway with my nice car that has the automatic speed control turned on. My friend sitting next to me sees something unclear ahead and tells me: "There is something ahead, take away the automatic speed control, do not let the car decide by itself, in this situation." Is he making a mistake? No, of course, he is using "deciding" with the car a s subject, in a sense which is fully coherent, in this context. Once we understand exactly what we mean, we realize that there is no contradiction between this use of the words and the fact that everything is fully programmed in the car driving system.

Same for "free will" used with ourselves as subjects.

carlo

Your essay was nice and short. It provided an eloquent, overarching argument for why information is very important in physics. And how, exactly, it is built into the foundations of the physical world. However, I think you sort of neglected the question posed in the essay prompt. It is clear, in my opinion, that "bits" and "its" are both in the foundation. They are are both very fundamental concepts. The question was/is what is more fundamental. I suggested in my essay that force(s) are even more fundamental than both, i.e., its and bits from forces.

Please check out my essay: All Your Base Are Belong To Math.

- Kyle Miller

Dear Carlo,

Thank you so much for your interesting essay. I doubt your last section on relativity based on the Shannon-sense information. As also mentioned in my essay, http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1836 , Shannon originally consider the amount of information can be taken as the optimal compression rate of bit sequences. In relativity sense, this connection is not trivial. From this viewpoint, it seems to be conceptually mismatched. What do you think?

Best wishes,

Yutaka

Dear Professor Rovelli,

I agree with you, "The universe is not just simply the position of all its Democritean atoms." I agree further that, if this be true, then the

additional facts (i.e., the facts which go beyond the simple Democritean-atomic facts) have to be objectively "out there." The additional facts

should not be just subjectively projected onto the cosmos. Finally, I agree that the crucial issue then becomes how to identify the appropriate

macrostates. What coarse-graining does nature use? What is the "real" way to group microstates into macrostates? Your illustration about color

and electric charge clarifies the problem.

However, your proposed solution seems incorrect. You argue that interaction with an external physical system brings about the requisite

organization. But surely, the correct answer is that "physical constraints" provide the order. These I take to be laws and categories of

nature. The laws of nature hold true, prior to any interaction between two systems and even in the absence of all interactions.

One way to see what I am saying is to think about the metaphor of messages formed from letters of the alphabet. You ask, "If they [Democritean

atoms] are like letters of an alphabet, to whom do they tell stories?" This is an important question, but the relevant question is a different

one. We should ask instead, Why are some combinations of letters stories, while other combinations are gibberish? In stories, there are at

least three levels of structure. These are the constraints of vocabulary, the constraints of grammatical rules, and then the need to tell a coherent story and make sense. In the world, nature furnishes analogues of at least the first two of these. Perhaps the operations of nature

are so restricted that the world also objectively contains at least part of the analogue of the third.

If we locate the principles for coarse-graining in objectively-given laws rather than in interaction with something external, then we can think

that it makes sense to speak of the information content of the entire universe. One reason to believe that this does make sense is that we

should then be able to compare the actual universe to merely possible universes.

So then, are the Democritean atoms like "an immense alphabet so rich to be capable of reading itself and thinking itself"? The answer depends on

where we think the richness is located. If we think the richness is in the atoms, the answer is "No". If we think the richness is in both the

atoms and the rules which constrain how the atoms behave and combine, then the answer appears to be "Yes". The complex structures of the world

are not merely concatenations of atoms, nor do these structures "emerge" from concatenations per se. Rather, the complex order of the world

results from very specific properties, relations, and rules which were in the world from the beginning.

Laurence Hitterdale

Carlo,

The only conclusion I can come to from what you are saying is that future physical outcomes are already fixed and set in stone. This is the picture of the nature of reality painted by determinism i.e. by the view that living things are, in essence, mechanisms like the automatic speed control in a car.

(Of course although we can estimate probable/possible future outcomes, we usually can't know what future physical outcomes are going to be because of complexity. But complexity is a separate issue)

I think we must agree to disagree about the nature of reality!

Cheers,

Lorraine

Professor Rovelli ,

I am sure You do not Know who I am, as many other

participant.

Let me say , to be in this contest is an historical goal.

Can I ask to read my essay for some opinion?

Into my best hope, the basic idea of the script is a "classic law"

for quantum physics. Well, I need suggestions about the idea.

http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1903

My Best Regards. Giacomo Alessiani.

Late-in-the-Day Thoughts about the Essays I've Read

I am sending to you the following thoughts because I found your essay particularly well stated, insightful, and helpful, even though in certain respects we may significantly diverge in our viewpoints. Thank you! Lumping and sorting is a dangerous adventure; let me apologize in advance if I have significantly misread or misrepresented your essay in what follows.

Of the nearly two hundred essays submitted to the competition, there seems to be a preponderance of sentiment for the 'Bit-from-It" standpoint, though many excellent essays argue against this stance or advocate for a wider perspective on the whole issue. Joseph Brenner provided an excellent analysis of the various positions that might be taken with the topic, which he subsumes under the categories of 'It-from-Bit', 'Bit-from-It', and 'It-and-Bit'.

Brenner himself supports the 'Bit-from-It' position of Julian Barbour as stated in his 2011 essay that gave impetus to the present competition. Others such as James Beichler, Sundance Bilson-Thompson, Agung Budiyono, and Olaf Dreyer have presented well-stated arguments that generally align with a 'Bit-from-It' position.

Various renderings of the contrary position, 'It-from-Bit', have received well-reasoned support from Stephen Anastasi, Paul Borrill, Luigi Foschini, Akinbo Ojo, and Jochen Szangolies. An allied category that was not included in Brenner's analysis is 'It-from-Qubit', and valuable explorations of this general position were undertaken by Giacomo D'Ariano, Philip Gibbs, Michel Planat and Armin Shirazi.

The category of 'It-and-Bit' displays a great diversity of approaches which can be seen in the works of Mikalai Birukou, Kevin Knuth, Willard Mittelman, Georgina Parry, and Cristinel Stoica,.

It seems useful to discriminate among the various approaches to 'It-and-Bit' a subcategory that perhaps could be identified as 'meaning circuits', in a sense loosely associated with the phrase by J.A. Wheeler. Essays that reveal aspects of 'meaning circuits' are those of Howard Barnum, Hugh Matlock, Georgina Parry, Armin Shirazi, and in especially that of Alexei Grinbaum.

Proceeding from a phenomenological stance as developed by Husserl, Grinbaum asserts that the choice to be made of either 'It from Bit' or 'Bit from It' can be supplemented by considering 'It from Bit' and 'Bit from It'. To do this, he presents an 'epistemic loop' by which physics and information are cyclically connected, essentially the same 'loop' as that which Wheeler represented with his 'meaning circuit'. Depending on where one 'cuts' the loop, antecedent and precedent conditions are obtained which support an 'It from Bit' interpretation, or a 'Bit from It' interpretation, or, though not mentioned by Grinbaum, even an 'It from Qubit' interpretation. I'll also point out that depending on where the cut is made, it can be seen as a 'Cartesian cut' between res extensa and res cogitans or as a 'Heisenberg cut' between the quantum system and the observer. The implications of this perspective are enormous for the present It/Bit debate! To quote Grinbaum: "The key to understanding the opposition between IT and BIT is in choosing a vantage point from which OR looks as good as AND. Then this opposition becomes unnecessary: the loop view simply dissolves it." Grinbaum then goes on to point out that this epistemologically circular structure "...is not a logical disaster, rather it is a well-documented property of all foundational studies."

However, Grinbaum maintains that it is mandatory to cut the loop; he claims that it is "...a logical necessity: it is logically impossible to describe the loop as a whole within one theory." I will argue that in fact it is vital to preserve the loop as a whole and to revise our expectations of what we wish to accomplish by making the cut. In fact, the ongoing It/Bit debate has been sustained for decades by our inability to recognize the consequences that result from making such a cut. As a result, we have been unable to take up the task of studying the properties inherent in the circularity of the loop. Helpful in this regard would be an examination of the role of relations between various elements and aspects of the loop. To a certain extent the importance of the role of relations has already been well stated in the essays of Kevin Knuth, Carlo Rovelli, Cristinel Stoica, and Jochen Szangolies although without application to aspects that clearly arise from 'circularity'. Gary Miller's discussion of the role of patterns, drawn from various historical precedents in mathematics, philosophy, and psychology, provides the clearest hints of all competition submissions on how the holistic analysis of this essential circular structure might be able to proceed.

In my paper, I outlined Susan Carey's assertion that a 'conceptual leap' is often required in the construction of a new scientific theory. Perhaps moving from a 'linearized' perspective of the structure of a scientific theory to one that is 'circularized' is just one further example of this kind of conceptual change.

Carlo,

"The world is not just a blind wind of atoms, or generally covariant quantum fields. It is also the infinite game of mirrors reflecting one another

formed by the correlations among the structures formed by the elementary objects."

In "It's Great to be the King," I claim that this mirror is a telescope taking humankind back in time,access that enables us to visualize an anthropomorphic interpretation of reality.

I never thought of information being a unifying force and the assembling of atoms like an alphabet into a macro system. I like the idea of selected structures defining finality but not reality.

You have a more nuanced concept of It and Bit.

Jim

Your comment that the Universe is the net information that all systems have about one another seems to be the Machian Principle regarding the global affecting the local. A network of dynamic space-time would create this, everything would be connected to everything else (and the interactions create information). In my essay I have assumed such a model to create matter from dynamic space. However I was interested in your comment that a dynamical space-time is necessarily discrete. As a last minute questons can I ask why this is so?

I enjoyed your essay. Thank you

Carolyn Devereux

  • [deleted]

Hello Carlo

Apologies for not making contact sooner. I had to read your essay several times.

You wrote the first principle that the information contained in any finite region of the phase space of any system is finite. This aligns exactly with the Harmony Set of my essay because the nature of that 1-space model implies a limited amount of information, and one cannot have a model from this system that brings more information that in the founding structure, as a matter of equivalence (that is, under the GPE).

You introduce the second principle that it is always possible to acquire new information about a system. Unexpectedly, I think this aligns with the Harmony Set, because every iteration of the set introduces new structure, although the proportional amount that is being introduced becomes tiny when the set has a great number of previous iterations (states).

You said: If the system S can be in two states, say a and b and the system O can be in two states, say A and B and there is a physical constraint that forbids the states (a;B) and (b;A), thus allowing only the two states (a;A) and (b;B), then we say that O has (one bit of) information about S.

I don't think this carries very well. To say that O has information about S seems to have an bother in the epistemology. To use your analogy, just because one is not standing and smiling does not mean one was knocked down by a tree, or indeed anything. Even when picking out O and S, while the system might deduce the case, O may know nothing of S. Indeed, I'm not sure that it can know or have access to this with any proper connection really, but the bothers I am seeing are abstract and foundational. You have read my essay, so you will have seen a little of how I view ontology, epistemology, and the majority of what are otherwise well thought out arguments. So these don't mean my arguments would be those of most of the community.

Best wishes

Carlo,

This Essay is not at level of your previous works. It's a little lecture to students on the topic "The reality, information and Democritus". Yesterday I rated it according to my judgement. In any case, good luck in the Contest.

Sincerely,

Ch.

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