First, my thanks for the kind and generous over-all judgment. I much appreciate your comments.

The subject of time is, it seems to me, fundamental to any understanding of how things are. I would distinguish two basic strategies for dealing with time. One is to accept all the apparent properties of time as fully real and objective in nature. The other is to consign some of time's properties to mere appearance. Passage or flow (i.e., the river of time) and asymmetry between past and future are two features that many thinkers have tried to explain away. As I understand the situation, time as experienced and normally understood is hard to reconcile with reality as presented in contemporary physics. On the other hand, features of time demoted from objective reality have to have their apparent reality explained somehow, and that is not easy to do.

In particular, if the flow of time is not objectively real, the obvious explanation for the "illusion" of flow is to say that subjective consciousness projects a sense of passage onto the world. This proposed explanation is evidently inconsistent with the position that consciousness itself is not a fully real aspect of existence. Sweeping something under a rug is not a useful technique when the rug has already been sold as surplus.

Finally, on information, I think the concept of information which is the basis for these essays is the minimal structural notion of distinguishable states. This is not information in an ordinary sense. Information in the very abstract sense of Shannon does not say what we are talking about. The compensating advantage of this concept of information is its comprehensive applicability. We can use it to measure the "bits" necessary to describe anything. The essay topic, as I interpret it, is about the relationship between such an abstract structural order and the more concrete existence that we think we find in nature.

Laurence,

You say, "The subject of time is, it seems to me, fundamental to any understanding of how things are." I fully agree. I would also point you to a current essay, Time is the denominator of existence, and bits come to be in it by Daryl Janzen. In this and his previous essay, he develops a 'presentist' view that is nevertheless consistent with General Relativity (his specialty).

I also agree with you that: "I think the concept of information which is the basis for these essays is the minimal structural notion of distinguishable states. This is not information in an ordinary sense. Information in the very abstract sense of Shannon does not say what we are talking about."

Thanks again for your excellent essay, and good luck in the contest.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

I enjoy your appreciation that the problem of consciousness doesn't seem to reduce to bit, and your proposal that it doesn't reduce to "it" either. There's been some speculation that the "Something More" is perhaps quantum at some level in nature (in my paper I neglect much dealings with consciousness, but I talk about a similar issue of the problems of describing some aspects of reality). Your ideas are reminiscent of the ideas of Chalmers who I admire- I'm glad we have some philosophers in here as well as the usual physics/engineering crowd :)

Have skimmed so far since I'm trying to take in a number of interesting essays, but wanted to let you know I appreciate what you're working on here. I'm not going to beg you to read or rate my essay but I would enjoy any discussion from a philosopher's perspective if you find my approach interesting or enjoyable :)

Good luck !

Cheers,

Jennifer

    Thank you for your comments. I will try to read your essay, and will comment on it there.

    With respect to quantum approaches to consciousness, as for example, the ideas of Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, I would question whether such an hypothesis, if true, would of itself solve the problems of (1) what consciousness is and (2) how it is connected to the rest of things. It is not easy to see how quantum states could actually be conscious, particularly when other seemingly similar quantum states are not. The problems are not solved, but are merely transferred from neurons and neuronal assemblages to smaller and stranger constituents of nature.

    The second paragraph of this comment poses the mind/body problem. What is the relationship between "in the brain" and "in the mind"? I don't think we really have a definitive answer to this question yet. The third paragraph asks whether I believe information is sufficient to create matter from nothing. No, I do not. Information, in the abstract sense understood for these essays, is a type of abstract mathematical structure. Which mathematical structures apply to physical existence is a fact external to the mathematical structures themselves. It is a further fact, the fact of contingent existence. One way to see this is to notice that some mathematical structures are physically relevant, but others, which as pure mathematics are just as good, have no physical relevance at all. The only way to evade this conclusion, it seems to me, is to embrace modal realism. That doctrine has problems of its own.

    Responses to three items in this comment:

    (1) Whether consciousness is any kind of computation would seem to be an important question. So far it doesn't look as though the kind or location of the computation ("a kind of quantum computation, or a kind of neuronal computation") would make a difference.

    (2) I agree that some thinkers believe that non-conscious, strictly physical processes, reduce the quantum wave function. As I understand it, this view is often called an "objective reduction" interpretation. Hence, on objective reduction interpretations, conscious observer-participants are not needed for this important transition. I suppose it is a matter of semantics whether or not one chooses to call these reducing entities "observer-participants."

    (3) In his original article Wheeler did not talk about "law without law." You say that concept of his is "even worse." It does seem to me that the concept will not work as a foundation for the existence we see. I do not see how pure indeterminacy and indefiniteness can lead, either in time or in logic, to specific details. "Law without law" sounds too much like Hegel's attempt to derive everything from pure and empty being as such.

    This posting raises a number of issues, and it would not be possible to respond to all of them. However, to items can be discussed. First, I am not sure what proposal is being made about the relationship of the cognizing mind to the external world. "The universe is a projection of our processes of cognition" sounds like some sort of subjective idealism. However, this is immediately modified to something that sounds like representational realism. The latter view seems more plausible to me. Second, I agree that reality as we encounter it appears to contain diverse elements. We think these elements fit together in ways that we do not understand. There seems to be a proposal here to postulate a large "master field" which will hold all other things together. This raises such questions as the evidence for this field, the nature of its intrinsic properties, and an explanation for the capacity of the field to act upon the lesser entities immersed within it.

    Hi Laurence,

    I enjoyed your essay and thought that you brought up some valid points. Overall, though, I would have to classify myself as a "computationalist" and so will play devil's advocate to your position here. You wrote:

    1. "Clearly the cosmos could not contain the information describing such a small though intricate subpart of itself. Still less could the cosmos compute that description."

    Why would a virtual world have to contain the resources to compute itself? It seems possible (in theory) to stipulate any finite capacity for the computational substrate. For example, that substrate can take as "long" as it needs to compute each "timestep" of the virtual world, even perhaps starting and stopping while it does so. Within the virtual world it would appear that the clock ticked once regardless.

    2. What data types are used? What mode of representation for each type?

    I give one possible answer in my essay Software Cosmos. I also treat what I think Wheeler means by "participatory universe".

    3. "Another thing to say about computationalism is that, if it be true, computations do not merely supplement what we now take to be the workings of nature. Instead, the computations would operate instead of natural laws. Natural laws would not directly determine that electric lights work, that tables and chairs stay solid, and that food nourishes."

    I do not see why the computational model could not be understood as just the implementation of natural laws. We take macroscopic objects to be composed ultimately of sub-atomic particles that follow physical laws. If the compuational model of the lowest level particles causes them to behave as physics describes, why is this a worse explanation than some abstract mathematical description of the same thing? In the latter case we have an explanatory gap: how is it that an abstract mathematical equation is realized in the behavior of a part of nature?

    4. "If everything is really "it from bit", then we shall have to find some other and more specific way to differentiate between the "bits" of mind and the "bits" of everything else."

    I agree with you on that. The conclusion in my essay is "It from Bit and Bit from Us" and I offer an analogy for the conscious observer within a virtual world.

    Hugh

      Dear Laurence,

      I have down loaded your essay and soon post my comments on it. Meanwhile, please, go through my essay and post your comments.

      Regards and good luck in the contest,

      Sreenath BN.

      http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1827

      Dear Professor Hitterdale,

      Congratulations on an intelligent and well written essay. I've added a few new words to my vocabulary! I really like that you've included consciousness, after all it is us human beings taking part in the contest!

      I think that you are dead right that we need to ask "How come existence?".

      Wishing you well in the contest. If time permits - please take a look at my essay.

      Best wishes,

      Antony

      Since points 2 and 4 could be better addressed with reference to the "Software Cosmos" essay, I do not reply to them here.

      On point 1: I agree with the comment insofar as it applies to a virtual world. When we consider computational universes, we need to draw distinctions and go into details. In my essay, I left out almost all of that. Specifically, we need to distinguish (1) a universe which uses computation as part of its normal mode of operation and (2) a universe which is a virtual product of some domain external to it. Seth Lloyd seems to regard our universe as a case of type (1). Nick Bostrom has discussed the possibility of type (2). For type (2), we would also want to distinguish between (2-a) a universe which is fully realized down to the unobserved details and (2-b) a universe which is sketched in just enough to convince creatures such as us who inhabit it. I think both Bostrom and David Chalmers have talked about these two varieties. Only for type (1) computationalism does the universe have to contain enough computational capacity for compute itself. For type (2) universes all the computation is done externally, and so the universe need not contain any computational capacity--or any actual powers of any sort. It might be argued that a virtual universe has few properties (or at least it does not have the properties it seems to have). It might be said that a virtual universe lacks even the kind of existence it seems to have. However, if we assume that a given universe (for example, our own) is a virtual construction, we might be able to estimate the computational capacity which would be required for it externally.

      On point 3: Once again, I can to some extent agree with the comment, but I think there still is an important issue here. Yes, the computational model can be understood as a way in which natural laws are implemented. I would emphasize that, before we can assess it as better or worse than some other model, we have to ask, What is the other model? How else might natural laws be implemented? This is something which Paul Davies talks about in his essay, "Universe from bit". It would seem that, on a computational view, the implementation of laws is more complicated than on a non-computational approach. On either view, there would still be an "explanatory gap". The "lowest level particles" just behave one way rather than another. On both the computational and non-computational views, natural laws and antecedent conditions jointly determine what happens next in a particular situation. But how does the world get from laws and antecedent conditions to what happens next? On the computational view, there is in nature some type of process of figuring out what to do. The process is at least somewhat analogous to what a human observer might do to figure out what will happen. (If our world is a virtual reality, then the figuring out is done outside the world so as to simulate the operation of laws which do not really apply.) On the non-computational view, the next step in the world process happens automatically. I think these two pictures are distinguishable, and I think we can at least explore the implications of each of them.

      Dear Professor,

      Your essay is written on properly/professionally level and honest polemical style. However I am afraid that I am understand it not well and fully. (Maybe because of my not so perfect English, and I am not philosopher) I need to read it more and to spend more time. However, I think that I find one important confirmation to my own conclusion. You says about important factor for the science: about dependence of its significance from initially accepted criterions of its construction. I.e. the science will too much depend from the brain constructing it. It is my point also. However, I come to confidence that there are other trivial factors also that we do not care usually. But those may have huge significance too. I have rated your work as a valuable for me (with nine point) And I hope get your opinion/impression on my work Essay, that will be valuable for me.

      Best Regards,

      George

      You wrote:

      > I think these two pictures [i.e. virtual/non virtual] are distinguishable, and I think we can at least explore the implications of each of them.

      How might we distinguish them? One possible model system (or analogy) that occurs to me comes from the computer industry: There are several situations in which we simulate the operation of a CPU: that is, we create a virtual operational model of a computer and run the model rather than the actual hardware.

      (1) During its development, before it is created as a hardware device, it is simulated in order to refine the design. (2) shortly after its heyday as a commercial product it is simulated so that new and cheaper hardware can provide seamless support for software originally designed for it, and (3) well after its commercial lifespan, it is simulated by nostalgic hobbyists.

      The simulated versions differ from the actual product. In case (1) the simulation is slow and will have glitches, some form of error monitoring, and frequent restarts. In case (2) the simulation runs at basically the same speed as the original but there will be a kind of "emulation layer" that takes one form of operational information and transforms it into something basically equivalent before executing it. In the case (3) the simulation is fast and the input/output environment will seem oddly arbitrary (because it is dummied up by the hobbyist who does not have the time to also simulate the whole environment it used to run in, and wants to tinker with it anyway).

      For this model system, the question is if any of these types of effects could be detected by software agents running on the CPU or its simulated counterpart. Case (1) might exhibit discontinuities in the clock that agents in different runs could find, if information from one run was used to initialize the next (as it often is in practice) Case (2) would show seemingly needless inefficiencies as information gets transformed before something happens with it. Case (3) would exhibit effects of powerful external forces with seemingly supernatural powers.

      Turning from this toy model system to our world, one might make the case that (2) applies to DNA in biological systems and that (3) is confirmed by Biblical scholars. Solid evidence that our world is virtual? Hardly, but food for thought, anyway. :)

      Hugh

      Dear Laurence,

      You have a briiliant essay taking us through an excursion to 'bit from it' or 'it from bit' territory. However, can you really get a satisfactory answer to this question without knowing what the fundamental 'it' is? If we take Leibniz by his words (especially the first 8 paragraphs of his Monadology) and I quote, "...So monads are the true atoms of Nature--the elements out of which everything is made".

      Then again, that age old question, ...how come existence? You may find Paragraph 6 of that monadology and a few ideas in my essay of interest. My essay also has a dose of philosophy so your comments are particularly welcome.

      Best regards,

      Akinbo

      Professor Hitterdale,

      I thought that your essay was quite absorbing. Please do excuse me for I am a decrepit old useless realist. You wrote: " In order for there to be a genuine question here, we need to understand what a non-computational universe would look like. Unless we can describe an alternative to computation, then we do not know what we are trying to discuss."

      Please behold the non-computational real Universe sir.

      The real Universe only deals in absolutes. All information is abstract and all and every abstract part of information is excruciatingly difficult to understand. Information is always selective, subjective and sequential. Reality is not and cannot ever be selective subjective and sequential.

      One (1) real unique Universe can only be eternally occurring in one real here and now while perpetually traveling at one real "speed" of light through one real infinite dimension once. One is the absolute of everything. (1) is the absolute of number. Real is the absolute of being. Universe is the absolute of energy. Eternal is the absolute of duration. Occurring is the absolute of action. Here and now are absolutes of location and time. Perpetual is the absolute of ever. Traveling is the absolute of conveyance method. Light is the absolute of speed. Infinite dimension is the absolute of distance and once is the absolute of history.

      Good luck in the contest,

      Joe

      Dear Dr. Hitterdale

      Richard Feynman in his Nobel Acceptance Speech

      (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1965/feynman-lecture.html)

      said: "It always seems odd to me that the fundamental laws of physics, when discovered, can appear in so many different forms that are not apparently identical at first, but with a little mathematical fiddling you can show the relationship. And example of this is the Schrodinger equation and the Heisenberg formulation of quantum mechanics. I don't know why that is - it remains a mystery, but it was something I learned from experience. There is always another way to say the same thing that doesn't look at all like the way you said it before. I don't know what the reason for this is. I think it is somehow a representation of the simplicity of nature."

      I too believe in the simplicity of nature, and I am glad that Richard Feynman, a Nobel-winning famous physicist, also believe in the same thing I do, but I had come to my belief long before I knew about that particular statement.

      The belief that "Nature is simple" is however being expressed differently in my essay "Analogical Engine" linked to http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1865 .

      Specifically though, I said "Planck constant is the Mother of All Dualities" and I put it schematically as: wave-particle ~ quantum-classical ~ gene-protein ~ analogy- reasoning ~ linear-nonlinear ~ connected-notconnected ~ computable-notcomputable ~ mind-body ~ Bit-It ~ variation-selection ~ freedom-determinism ... and so on.

      Taken two at a time, it can be read as "what quantum is to classical" is similar to (~) "what wave is to particle." You can choose any two from among the multitudes that can be found in our discourses.

      I could have put Schrodinger wave ontology-Heisenberg particle ontology duality in the list had it comes to my mind!

      Since "Nature is Analogical", we are free to probe nature in so many different ways. And each of us surely must have touched some corners of it.

      Good luck and good cheers!

      Than Tin

      Dear Lawrence,

      Very enjoyable essay, and a rare (this year) and refreshing philosophical viewpoint. Nicely organized, highly logical and a pleasure to read.

      I could take issue on some points but it would greatly help communication if you could read my essay first. I make some radical points, mostly consistent with your views.

      My high points from yours; "Nature does not in general operate computationally." and; "we usually talk about bits, but have we really determined that nature computes in the binary system?" (I give that concept a tight definition).

      "The problem is to determine what coding scheme or schemes nature itself uses." I define one with empirical support, and on the basis that; "the experience and the underlying computation cannot be the same thing." ...which I find not as fully analysed as we assume. An EPR paradox solution without FTL emerges.

      Well written and thank you, a suitable 'heap' of points being applied. I very much look forward to your views on mine (It's foundations in last years essay were well supported philosophically).

      Best wishes

      Peter

      Laurence,

      It is refreshing to read an essay that deals with Wheeler's aspects of "It from Bit," like consciousness. The attribute and behavioral ambiguities of consciousness, the subatomic world, and the macro world are not dealt with in many analyses of the "Anthropic Principle."

      No one seems to analyze the nature of consciousness either -- "What we have learned, I think, is that consciousness is not a phenomenon of "bits" as you do and I do.

      I would like to see your thoughts on my essay: "It's Good to be the King."

      Jim

      Dear Hitterdale,

      I am sorry in the delay in replying you. I did not check the replies. You also did not intimate,

      It was not mind body problem, Brain is Hard ware, Mind is software.

      It was my proposition, it was not an inference to your essay. What I mean is that we should be more close experimental results for our propositions.

      I think we form a picture of anything in our mind, and keep them in our memories. We communicate about that picture to others, which we call information. When we die we loose all these pictures and memories.

      Now in this context, can we create material from information...?

      You can discuss with me later after this contest closes also.

      Best

      =snp

      snp.gupta@gmail.com