Essay Abstract

Concrete progress has been made on Wheeler's project of understanding the concomitant emergence of the material world and the world of information and experience, as a quantum process, by investigating information principles that can be used to characterize quantum theory from among other possible theories.

Author Bio

Howard Barnum got his Ph.D. in physics at University of New Mexico with Carlton Caves. He was a postdoc with Herb Bernstein at Hampshire, and Richard Jozsa at Bristol. He was Director's Postdoctoral Fellow and then Technical Staff Member at Los Alamos National Laboratory. He has been visiting research at Perimeter Institute, Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Stellenbosch, and is Adjunct Professor of Physics and Astronomy at University of New Mexico.

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Howard,

As of 7-6-13, 2:35 am EST, the rating function for your essay is not available. Sorry I can't help you out right now by rating your essay. NOTE: I have logged in using a PC and a MAC and different browsers but it appears to be a site function issue.

Manuel

    Hi Howard,

    I can confirm that the rating function is not available on your essay for me either.

    Your essay has given me a much clearer understanding of your view on the path to progress beyond the basic operational theories formalism. One comment that intrigued me was:

    ``Still, I would argue that in many situations quantum theory does give us "the

    facts" about how agents with particular information should "bet"''

    Since I believe that future progress in physics is going to rely on adopting a consistent and coherent interpretation of probability across the board, I was wondering what you meant by this? Do you have a particular theory of objective chance in mind? Since you described laws in terms of counterfactuals, I am guessing that you don't subscribe to a Humean theory of chance a la Lewis, i.e. you think that chance depends on more than just the contingent facts that occur in our universe, but if not that then what?

      Hi Matthew---

      Thanks for reading the essay. I am afraid I did it in a bit of a rush so it is not as well-organized, and in some cases, not as well-though out, as would be ideal. So I'm glad you got a clearer understanding of some of my views from it!

      Regarding probabilities, I dither over whether or not to call myself "objective Bayesian" about some of the probabilities arising in quantum theory. My view is that some such probabilities, while still being in essence personalist Bayesian in that they are in essence advice on how to make decisions, are the "objectively correct" probabilities. By which I mean, they tell you the right way to bet in certain situations. I'm not sure they have to "depend on" anything beyond contingent facts ... but on some reading they might "constitute" a law that is itself not a contingent fact, but a fact nonetheless, e.g. "the fact that if you set up half-silvered mirror and aim a photon at it from 45 degrees, you should bet as if the probability is 0.5 that it gets through...." I haven't read Lewis, as far as I can recall (it's possible I did as an undergraduate), and perhaps I should. So I may not have worked out how to deal with various issues that people who think about "objective chance" have raised.

      Howard

      Section 2.2 of another impressionistic essay by me has more ont

      Perhaps it would be useful if you could compare the objective nature of quantum states with that of a thermal state in classical statistical mechanics. Do you believe that these are objective in the same sense?

      If you would assent to this, then I believe we are essentially in agreement although I would tend to avoid using objectivist language. I have never really understood the subjectivist credo that priors must be completely arbitrary in any case. After all, it is to some degree conventional what we regard as an axiom of probability theory and what we regard as a constraint on a prior. For example, the fact that you must assign probability 1 to something you believe to be certain is a constraint on prior probabilities that is accepted by subjective Bayesians. Note that, it is important here that it is belief that something is certain that forces you to assign probability 1 and not, as some authors say, if an event "is certain". If something is certain but you do not believe it to be certain then the argument has no normative force, and equally if something is not certain but you believe it to be certain then the argument does have normative force. The argument is not about logical necessity but about the shape of our beliefs. From this it is clear that subjective Bayesians do sometimes accept very stringent constraints on their prior assignments, and ones that cannot be thought of as a logical necessity. It is unclear to my why this should only happen with regard to events that are assigned probability 0 and 1. The key idea is that it is not some objective fact about the world that causes you to assign certain probabilities, but only a fact about your state of belief. There are certain statements of the form "I believe that such and such is a true fact about the world" that can highly constrain your prior assignments. This is still all perfectly subjective, since no other agent is compelled to adopt the same belief about that fact.

      It seems to me that one ought to be able to derive the thermal distribution and some quantum state assignments from the idea that one believes that certain physical facts about the world are true, and in the case of stat mech some beliefs about the coarse grained nature of our measurements. If true, this would make such assignments no less subjective, since belief in those physical facts is not a logical necessity even if we all have access to the same empirical data.

      An example of this that I give in my essay is the idea that if you believe that a classical particle has a certain position and momentum at time t and you believe that the system is accurately described by Newtonian mechanics with a certain Hamiltonian then you must believe that it is described by the appropriate solution of Hamilton's equations at all other times because your beliefs entail that you believe the events entailed by these solutions are certain. Similarly, if you start with a probability distribution over phase space instead of a single point then you must use Liouville's equation to figure out your probabilities at other times on pain of a sure loss. This is arguably a constraint on priors (why should probabilities at different times be tied together at all a priori?), but it should be acceptable to the subjectivist because it is a coherence argument. I believe this is part of the way to a subjectivist derivation of the second law and thermal equilibrium. One would only have to add some beliefs about the coarse grained nature of our access to the system, which however would be a bit more tricky to formulate correctly.

      Now, with quantum Bayesianism, things are a bit trickier because we cannot ground probabilities in beliefs about how the underlying state of reality behaves as we can in the classical case. However, if you think, as I do, that there is some yet to be found ontology that underlies quantum theory then the situation should be analogous. We can ground constraints on prior probabilities in terms of beliefs about what reality is made of and what laws it obeys.

      Howard,

      I have sent an email requesting that FQXi extend to those of you who had their essay posted on July 5, 2013, be allowed additional days to compensate for the days of not being able to rate these essays.

      My experience in conducting the online Tempt Destiny (TD) experiment from 2000 to 2012 gave me an understanding of the complexities involved in administrating an online competition which assures me that the competition will be back up and running soon. Ironically, the inability of not being able to rate the essays correlates with the TD experimental findings, as presented in my essay, which show how the acts of selection are fundamental to our physical existence.

      Anyway, I hope that all entrants will be allocated the same opportunity to have their essay rated when they are posted, and if not possible due to technical difficulties, will have their opportunity adjusted accordingly. Best wishes to you with your entry.

      Manuel

      PS I will be reviewing and rating your entry after this function has been turned back on.

      Hi Matthew---

      I guess the quick answer is that I would probably say that ascriptions of probabilities in certain classical statistical mechanical situations are objectively correct in roughly the same sense that certain quantum probabilities are. The difference, however, might be that in quantum theory, there might not be underlying "elements of reality" (other than measurement results and such) that these represent uncertainty about. I just don't know. But I think that this might not be necessary for them to be "objectively correct". This might be a pretty weak sense of "objective".

      A possibly relevant point is that inasmuch as one might be able to calculate probabilistically using e.g. the canonical ensemble without thinking what's microscopically underlying it... one might view the resulting betting advice as objectively correct even if one is pretty unsure that there actually is an underlying reality described by the canonical ensemble...e.g. even if one thinks it is actually an incorrect but useful description of something that is really quantum at bottom...

      I guess I think that "constraints on priors" coming from "beliefs about underlying reality" and "constraints on priors" that reflect empirically / conceptually well grounded beliefs about the symmetries of measurement outcomes... aren't that different.

      Another point that I'm very glad you reminded me of was in your discussion of Lewis and dependence on contingent facts vs. laws involving counterfactuals. I'm somewhat drawn to the idea that any statement, even one of apparently contingent facts, has dispositional or counterfactual aspects to it. In other words, that all our concepts do... this is not very well thought out, though.

      Cheers,

      Howard

      Dear Howard,

      I have liked your very clearly written panorama of Wheeler's legacy. As a distinguished member of the quantum information community, you may have some interest at reading my current interpretation of contextuality, using algebraic/geometrical tools introduced by Grothendieck.

      Good luck for the contest,

      Michel

      Dear Dr Barnum,

      I enjoyed your essay and particularly liked your assertion that the It from Bit question may be insufficient to fully capture experience and existence. Also I think you examined the whole subject thoroughly and ask further questions of importance. Perhaps my Fibonacci sequence - entropy - black hole - arrow of time - dimensionality essay (diverse I know), may suggest a possible area for further examination with regard to your work?

      Great work - best wishes,

      Antony

      Dear Howard,

      It's surprising to me, given physics' well-known aversion to serious discussion of consciousness, how many current essayists recognize the necessity of including consciousness in any serious discussion of the nature of information. You begin by noting the two uses of information: that involving 'meaning', requiring consciousness, and that involving signaling with the potential for conveying meaning.

      I believe that signaling is the transfer of energy, which, if it crosses a threshold and changes (informs) a local structure, becomes stored or registered information. The local structure, or hierarchical structure, may provide the context or code-book for interpretation. The energetic threshold crossing is a key to the preconditions you mentioned for storage, processing, or communication of information.

      You then note that the 'functionalist' account of consciousness arising from unthinking matter may have virtue, but you're more inclined to the view that material constituents have some mental aspect. This, I believe, is what Wheeler meant by Participatory Universe. I present a theory compatible with this in my current essay, which I hope you will read and comment upon. Although Dennett believes (with emphasis on belief) that consciousness emerges from a classical universe, you note simulations of mental processes do not exhibit awareness or understanding: "perhaps it would appear to us from inside as understanding... But it is not clear this is so."

      If one separates "awareness" (of the color 'red') from "thinking" (that 2+2 = 4) it is clear that computers can think, via logic circuitry, but do not seem to be aware. We however can think via logical neural networks, but we are also aware. No one has ever successfully explained how awareness can arise from structured Lego blocks. Only Dennettian hand-waving arguments exist.

      As you note, "evolution is crucial to the emergence of complex structures having mental aspects" (i.e., 'thinking') but there is no evidence that 'awareness' emerged. I do agree with you that "the content of consciousness can be emergent."

      I enjoyed the remainder of your essay focused on operationalism and quantum mechanics but can offer little of note in a comment. As you expressed more reservation about blind acceptance of the idea of emergent awareness, I hope you find my essay worthy of consideration.

      My best regards,

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

        Hi Howard,

        I enjoyed reading your essay. and believe that you have correctly pointed out several issues that are crucial to a more complete understanding of the universe. I think that Mr. Wheeler's vision was, in fact, "the seed of a more developed and confirmed theory that in some ways might look radically different," and that it's possible his vision wasn't "radical enough."

        I believe that one of the key points you've made is that, "embodiment, and interaction with an environment, are probably crucial for things to have a mental aspect . . ." It would seem that one of the qualities that distinguishes a living thing from an inanimate object is the observation that living things are capable of creating decisions unique to themselves, as a system; i.e., decisions that are internally generated and are separate and distinct from their environment. This would square with your observation that the rules of standard quantum theory are probabilistic and best understood as "advice to a decision maker." I'm of the opinion that, although biology lacks a simple, clear-cut definition of "life" or "living thing," that what most clearly distinguishes a living thing from an inanimate object is that a living thing possesses an 'internal decision-maker' of some sort, whose purpose is to keep the living thing alive by creating decisions in response to stimuli from its environment. Your assertion that, ". . . in many situations quantum theory does give us the 'facts' about how agents with particular information should 'bet,'" makes a great deal of sense, particularly in light of the possibility that living things create their own decisions in an effort to survive their environment. I'm curious about your thoughts.

        At any rate, I enjoyed your essay and think you pointed out several areas that are in fact, crucial to a better understanding of our universe.

        Sincerely,

        Ralph

        Dear Howard,

        Thank you for presenting your nice essay. I saw the abstract and will post my comments soon. So you can produce matter from your thinking or from information description of that matter. . . . ?

        I am requesting you to go through my essay also. And I take this opportunity to say, to come to reality and base your arguments on experimental results.

        I failed mainly because I worked against the main stream. The main stream community people want magic from science instead of realty especially in the subject of cosmology. We all know well that cosmology is a subject where speculations rule.

        Hope to get your comments even directly to my mail ID also. . . .

        Best

        =snp

        snp.gupta@gmail.com

        http://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.com/

        Pdf download:

        http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/essay-download/1607/__details/Gupta_Vak_FQXi_TABLE_REF_Fi.pdf

        Part of abstract:

        - -Material objects are more fundamental- - is being proposed in this paper; It is well known that there is no mental experiment, which produced material. . . Similarly creation of matter from empty space as required in Steady State theory or in Bigbang is another such problem in the Cosmological counterpart. . . . In this paper we will see about CMB, how it is generated from stars and Galaxies around us. And here we show that NO Microwave background radiation was detected till now after excluding radiation from Stars and Galaxies. . . .

        Some complements from FQXi community. . . . .

        A

        Anton Lorenz Vrba wrote on May. 4, 2013 @ 13:43 GMT

        ....... I do love your last two sentences - that is why I am coming back.

        Author Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta replied on May. 6, 2013 @ 09:24 GMT

        . . . . We should use our minds to down to earth realistic thinking. There is no point in wasting our brains in total imagination which are never realities. It is something like showing, mixing of cartoon characters with normal people in movies or people entering into Game-space in virtual reality games or Firing antimatter into a black hole!!!. It is sheer a madness of such concepts going on in many fields like science, mathematics, computer IT etc. . . .

        B.

        Francis V wrote on May. 11, 2013 @ 02:05 GMT

        Well-presented argument about the absence of any explosion for a relic frequency to occur and the detail on collection of temperature data......

        C

        Robert Bennett wrote on May. 14, 2013 @ 18:26 GMT

        "Material objects are more fundamental"..... in other words "IT from Bit" is true.

        Author Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta replied on May. 14, 2013 @ 22:53 GMT

        1. It is well known that there is no mental experiment, which produced material.

        2. John Wheeler did not produce material from information.

        3. Information describes material properties. But a mere description of material properties does not produce material.

        4. There are Gods, Wizards, and Magicians, allegedly produced material from nowhere. But will that be a scientific experiment?

        D

        Hoang cao Hai wrote on Jun. 16, 2013 @ 16:22 GMT

        It from bit - where are bit come from?

        Author Satyavarapu Naga Parameswara Gupta replied on Jun. 17, 2013 @ 06:10 GMT

        ....And your question is like asking, -- which is first? Egg or Hen?-- in other words Matter is first or Information is first? Is that so? In reality there is no way that Matter comes from information.

        Matter is another form of Energy. Matter cannot be created from nothing. Any type of vacuum cannot produce matter. Matter is another form of energy. Energy is having many forms: Mechanical, Electrical, Heat, Magnetic and so on..

        E

        Antony Ryan wrote on Jun. 23, 2013 @ 22:08 GMT

        .....Either way your abstract argument based empirical evidence is strong given that "a mere description of material properties does not produce material". While of course materials do give information.

        I think you deserve a place in the final based on this alone. Concise - simple - but undeniable.

        ===============

        Please try Dynamic Universe Model with some numerical values, give initial values of velocities, take gravitation into consideration( because you can not experiment in ISOLATION). complete your numerical experiment.

        later try changing values of masses and initial values of velocities....

        Calculate with different setups and compare your results, if you have done a physical experiment.

        I sincerely feel it is better to do experiment physically, or numerically instead of breaking your head on just logic. This way you will solve your problem faster.....

        Best

        =snp

        Dear professor Howard Barnum:

        I am an old physician that does not know nothing of mathematics and almost nothing of physics. Why I am writing you?, because I think I can help in some ways in "space-time" with the experimental meaning of "time" I send you a summary so you can decide in reading or not my essay "The deep nature of reality"

        I am convince you would be interested in reading it. ( most people don't understand it, and is not just because of my bad English) "Hawking, A brief history of time" where he said , "Which is the nature of time?" yes he don't know what time is, and also continue saying............Some day this answer could seem to us "obvious", as much than that the earth rotate around the sun....." In fact the answer is "obvious", but how he could say that, if he didn't know what's time? In fact he is predicting that is going to be an answer, and that this one will be "obvious", I think that with this adjective, he is implying simple and easy to understand. Maybe he felt it and couldn't explain it with words. We have anthropologic proves that man measure "time" since more than 30.000 years ago, much, much later came science, mathematics and physics that learn to measure "time" from primitive men, adopted the idea and the systems of measurement, but also acquired the incognita of the experimental "time" meaning. Out of common use physics is the science that needs and use more the measurement of what everybody calls "time" and the discipline came to believe it as their own. I always said that to understand the "time" experimental meaning there is not need to know mathematics or physics, as the "time" creators and users didn't. Instead of my opinion I would give Einstein's "Ideas and Opinions" pg. 354 "Space, time, and event, are free creations of human intelligence, tools of thought" he use to call them pre-scientific concepts from which mankind forgot its meanings, he never wrote a whole page about "time" he also use to evade the use of the word, in general relativity when he refer how gravitational force and speed affect "time", he does not use the word "time" instead he would say, speed and gravitational force slows clock movement or "motion", instead of saying that slows "time". FQXi member Andreas Albrecht said that. When asked the question, "What is time?", Einstein gave a pragmatic response: "Time," he said, "is what clocks measure and nothing more." He knew that "time" was a man creation, but he didn't know what man is measuring with the clock.

        I insist, that for "measuring motion" we should always and only use a unique: "constant" or "uniform" "motion" to measure "no constant motions" "which integrates and form part of every change and transformation in every physical thing. Why? because is the only kind of "motion" whose characteristics allow it, to be divided in equal parts as Egyptians and Sumerians did it, giving born to "motion fractions", which I call "motion units" as hours, minutes and seconds. "Motion" which is the real thing, was always hide behind time, and covert by its shadow, it was hide in front everybody eyes, during at least two millenniums at hand of almost everybody. Which is the difference in physics between using the so-called time or using "motion"?, time just has been used to measure the "duration" of different phenomena, why only for that? Because it was impossible for physicists to relate a mysterious time with the rest of the physical elements of known characteristics, without knowing what time is and which its physical characteristics were. On the other hand "motion" is not something mysterious, it is a quality or physical property of all things, and can be related with all of them, this is a huge difference especially for theoretical physics I believe. I as a physician with this find I was able to do quite a few things. I imagine a physicist with this can make marvelous things.

        With my best whishes

        Héctor

        Dear Dr. Howard,

        I have down loaded your essay and soon post my comments on it. Meanwhile, please, go through my essay and post your comments.

        Regards and good luck in the contest,

        Sreenath BN.

        http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1827

        Dear Howard,

        It is good to see your work in this contest. I was struck by how strongly it was philosophically oriented, (to me, it had even a stream-of-consciousness feel) but of course, when one finds oneself in a realm in which objective yes or no questions can rarely be answered definitely (except of course, when they are elicited from a measurement apparatus), then perhaps this is not so surprising.

        I must admit that the distinction between meaning and and the potential for meaning in reference to information makes me slightly uncomfortable because to me it has a subtle anthropocentric overtones.

        My impression is that when you discuss your views on probability, you are searching for a way to distill out "the best of both worlds", i.e. the subjectivist and the the objectivist accounts in one coherent and tightly integrated package. I wonder whether and to what extent this is possible.

        Your statement "The very idea of a physical law usually involves counterfactuality" reminded me of an amusing discussion I had with a theoretical physicist while I was in Vaxjo this year. He claimed that counterfactual statements do not exist, that one could not even utter a counterfactual statement (I presume he meant that if one actually states a counterfactual sentence, then in some sense which is not at all clear to me it is no longer counterfactual, but at that moment I was just too dumbfounded to respond).

        I understand your perspective somewhat better now and wish you all the best,

        Armin

          Dear Howard,

          I just managed to browse your essay but will be re-reading in more detail later because it is not off point, falling within the scope of this contest. Meanwhile, being a professional physicist, see below:

          As the contest in Wheeler's honor draws to a close, leaving for the moment considerations of rating and prize money, and knowing we cannot all agree on whether 'it' comes from 'bit' or otherwise or even what 'it' and 'bit' mean, and as we may not be able to read all essays, though we should try, I pose the following 4 simple questions and will rate you accordingly before July 31 when I will be revisiting your blog.

          "If you wake up one morning and dip your hand in your pocket and 'detect' a million dollars, then on your way back from work, you dip your hand again and find that there is nothing there...

          1) Have you 'elicited' an information in the latter case?

          2) If you did not 'participate' by putting your 'detector' hand in your pocket, can you 'elicit' information?

          3) If the information is provided by the presence of the crisp notes ('its') you found in your pocket, can the absence of the notes, being an 'immaterial source' convey information?

          Finally, leaving for the moment what the terms mean and whether or not they can be discretely expressed in the way spin information is discretely expressed, e.g. by electrons

          4) Can the existence/non-existence of an 'it' be a binary choice, representable by 0 and 1?"

          Answers can be in binary form for brevity, i.e. YES = 1, NO = 0, e.g. 0-1-0-1.

          Best regards,

          Akinbo

            Armin, thanks for your careful reading and comments on my essay.

            I do have a couple of things that might be worth saying in reply...

            You wrote that "I must admit that the distinction between meaning and and the potential for meaning in reference to information makes me slightly uncomfortable because to me it has a subtle anthropocentric overtones."

            I see what you mean here, but I'd argue it isn't anthropocentric (i.e. human-centric), but rather centered on the potential for beings/systems that are able to find meaning in the world, and perhaps convey it to others, or record it to remind themselves of it at a later time. Still it is interesting to consider whether or not there is a reasonable notion of what Murray Gell-Mann calls an IGUS (Information Gathering and Using System) that does not involve meaning...

            I am coming down on the side of "no" as the answer, at least in this essay.

            About "the best of both worlds" regarding subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of probability, I guess that may be so. I sort of don't like the term "subjectivist" for the decision-theoretic view of probability, but since the decision-maker is a "subject" it makes some sense. I'd prefer "decision-theoretic", though. My basic point is that I think that probability, inasmuch as it is used to state the "laws" of a theory, or facts about the world, is best interpreted decision-theoretically, as a partial guide to how to act, but that it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that there is a "best"... "objectively best", if you like.... way to act in certain situations. And that is how I see quantum probabilities in many situations.

            Thanks again, and

            Cheers,

            Howard

            Offhand I'd answer 1 -- yes, 3 --- yes , 4 --- yes .

            It wasn't quite clear to mean what question 2 means, so I wasn't able to answer.

            Perhaps you could rephrase it.

            Hope this helps you understand how I interpret the word "information."

            However, please don't rate my entry based solely on these answers--- the ratings are meant to be based primarily on a reading of the essay. The blog discussion could reasonably come into play by helping to clarify the meaning of the essay, but I believe that's essentially the only bearing it should have on the rating.

            Best wishes,

            Howard

            Thanks for your careful reading of my essay and your comments. Interesting point about Wheeler and functionalism... I tend toward this view of Wheeler also, but in some of his writings he seems drawn toward functionalism of a computational sort... it may be that he was entertaining the idea that the emergence of It and Bit together make consciousness, functionally explained, possible. On the other hand there are the stories of him in a lecture theater throwing some papers on which some equations were written, and shouting something along the lines of "Fly, fly! You see, they don't fly!". Not sure if these were equations for fluid dynamics in air and initial conditions of an airfoil... anyway, that suggests an (theatrically exaggerated, of course) that things mathematically described aren't enough to fully capture reality...

            I don't agree that a computer that is calculating that 2+2=4 is thinking, though. It is we who interpret the patterns of ink on its roll of teletype paper or magnetization in its memory or electrons in its transistors as representing a proposition such as "2 + 2 = 4". I think it's fairly likely that to be able to think "2 + 2 = 4" an entity needs the potential for awareness, though given this there might be circumstances under which one might want to say that someone was thinking it but not aware of thinking it...

            Thought-provoking comments, thanks.

            I'll check out your essay.

            Cheers,

            Howard