An end to steer by, and a means by Michael Allan

Thanks very much, Mark. In summary: A) Any beauty must come from the technology, not my writing; B) I agree the tooling needs a methodical description; C) I mean extinction of the network is barred, not the local nodes; D) I clarify "essence of humanity" and ask you to re-evaluate; E) I agree about the value of life, but think it implied in the supreme value of reason; F) I ask you to explain your concern about the principle of freedom; and G) I clarify my use of Habermas's principle D, and ask if you still see a problem.

A. I'm very pleased you see beauty in it; I wanted to share that, above all. I think it comes from the technology (theory, design) because I've no talent as a writer. It's actually that recognition that led me to working on recombinant text, and eventually the rest.

B. I agree the core inventions of the guideway internals (recombinant text, transitive voting, vote pipes) would benefit from adding a simple, methodical description. Above all, I felt I needed a description in terms of the theoretical requirement of maximizing freedom. Then space constraints took over and prevented me adding any other clarifying viewpoints. I think it's like Robert says, I just "cover too much ground", too much that's novel. It needs more structure in the delivery, as you suggest, and therefore a bigger delivery van.

C. I agree there's no assurance against haphazard, local violence. So a collision of colonists at a target star might, as you suggest, escalate beyond reason and destroy a stellar civilization (an event that we already fear today). But the larger network of civilizations would continue to exist, slowly expanding among the stars. This is the only assurance. (I should clarify this in the text.)

D. Humanity is the only rational being we know, objectively speaking. Maybe we'll never know another. Still, I write about the future of rational being as a whole, not humanity in particular (see p. 2 where I cite Kant). By "essence of humanity" (p. 1), I really mean "essence of rational being". With this clarification, do you still see a danger in speaking of essence?

E. You don't so much attack the supreme value of reason (P2) as defend the value of life, which leaves me room to agree. I think life is implied by reason. Reason cannot reproduce and maintain itself outside a social space, which in turn depends on a population of reproducing individuals (life). This is the necessary physical form of rational being. Further, I think rational being as such is bound to respect and honour its own cause within life at large, "To see a world in a grain of sand", as Blake says, "And a heaven in a wild flower". I feel we should be patient with ourselves therefore, and give reason the necessary time to work. *

F. Here I don't understand you, Mark. How does a principle of maximizing personal freedom (compatible with equal freedoms for all, p. 2) contribute to slavery, or any other unfreedom? I admit that a principle doesn't guarantee its practice, but neither does it undermine it.

G. Habermas's discourse principle (D, p. 3), when applied to laws, actually is a principle of democracy within a theory of democracy. So when you say it's "contradictory to the principle of democracy", I take it you mean contradicted by the practice of democracy. In other words, you are pointing to the existence of actual laws that are "invalid" when judged according to D. But this should come as no surprise. Few (least of all legislators) would suppose that all laws are de facto right laws. Some are struck down as illegal, some plain wrong by any standard, and most others flawed in ways that would be unacceptable if only we had the resources to fix them (which rarely we do). What D is telling us, at least in practical terms, is the direction each such law would have to take (again according to the theory) in order to move toward validity. Do you still see a problem here?

Mike

* Which reminds me of William Canning's beautifully structured, unnarrated film: Temples of Time (1973). Play at 480HQ for the best sound. Watch closely during the wild-flower sequence.

Thanks for these questions Armin, and the chance to explain. I answer in two posts. Here's a summary of the first: 1) I explain the literal necessity of endlessly retelling the myth; 2) I explain how "Life could radiate... but death could not"; 3) I further justify the premise of a supreme value on reason; and 4) I suggest that answers 2 and 3 may help you follow the theoretical deductions.

1. Yes, I mean this literally - "The essential, material practice of rational being is the perpetual telling and retelling of its own, immortal myth" (ab.) - not figuratively. For an interstellar network of civilizations to maintain a slow expansion into the galaxy and beyond, it must constantly remind itself of the reason for this expansion. This requires an endless telling and retelling of its own myth (where we come from and where we are going). Suppose this retelling stops. Then the reason for expansion is lost, and with it the assurance of expansion and hence of survival. You see, barring a fluke of the universe, rational being cannot be maintained in a continuous line without a modicum of interstellar expansion (p. 9); distance and the limit of light speed combine into an effective extinction barrier only when we maintain a sufficient dispersal across that barrier. So the retelling of myth is necessary to rational being.

I'm not sure I understood "stand in". Please repost if you still have a question about that.

2. "Life could radiate across that barrier (just), but death could not." (p. 1) You counter that death too might radiate and "undo" life, but death is a relatively poor self-radiator, self-propagator. Picture an interstellar network of civilizations expanding from the Sun throughout the Orion Spur and beyond. I claim that no mode of extinction could feasibly expand in pursuit and destroy all those civilizations - like a perfect interstellar plague, or a galactic earthquake. While that sort of hazard is conceivable, it's not plausible (see my reply to Tommy, May 1, A).

3. "(P2) Let reason be the supreme value." I justified this premise in the text (p. 2) by its utility in expanding the moral argument to its proper scope. Here I agree with Kant that an ethics co-extensive with humanity would make no sense.

A further justification might hinge on our desire to exist. Nature (P1) allows rational being the choice of existing forever in a continuous line, a choice open to no other form of life. We alone can choose between rational being and non-being. If we choose rational being (and why wouldn't we?), then it makes sense to interpret this choice as a supreme valuation on reason, because reason is the basic difference between rational being and non-being.

I think this premise is strong, though the strength isn't immediately obvious. An artist could show how reason is alive in the mutual gaze of mother and child, and this alone might carry the day (as it carried much of Christianity). A narrow objectivity would see these two as dumb machines, but there's another view, the necessity of which is felt by everyone. Kant's insight helps here. He explains how freedom is subjectively necessary to reason despite its objective impossibility in nature (4:446-63). "Reason must view herself as the authoress of her principles, independently of alien influences, and must consequently, as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, by herself be viewed as free... From this stem all judgements about actions such that they ought to have been done even if they were not done." (4:448, 55)

So I think reason offers a strong, defensible value-premise in moral theory.

4. Given my answers above (2, 3), it might now be easier to follow the deduction of M0 from the two premises, and thence M1 and M2. The arguments are there, just (as Robert implies, and I admit) much condensed. - Again, thanks for the chance to explain.

(continued in next post)

Continuing from previous post: 5) I outline the essay structure; 6) I explain details of recombinant text; 7) I reiterate the purpose of pipes; and 8) I agree the rationale for overguidance should be more graphic, and offer a kind of picture.

5. For each principle in theory (M2, M1, M0), I devote a separate section of the essay to the corresponding practice; 3 sections in all. That's the gross structure of the essay, which I should've emphasized better. Does knowing this help?

If not, please be specific about where you're stuck. See also my answer to 7 below.

6a. One creates a recombinant text (a population of drafts of size N) just by writing something down as the first draft. As I mention to Robert (May 3, C), the pattern of a recombinant text is pretty much synonymous with that of literary freedom. So you write down your idea of the plan, or whatever, in your own draft (N=1); then I write down my idea (N=2); and so the population grows from scratch.

6b. You have authors X and Y modifying the same draft, as in a wiki. But a wiki is not a recombinant text. In a recombinant text, each author would normally modify his own draft and therefore the conflicts you mention would not occur.

7. Actually, it would be quite normal for a person to identify somewhat with a piped position (say a downstream draft) and advocate or campaign for it. She might even be elected the pipe minder of that draft, a kind of administrator. But because the draft is piped, she can simultaneously draft her own personal version of the text upstream, which might differ on key points. So the pipe is basically a device to prevent a candidate (one who receives votes, as anyone might) from being trapped downstream by her own voters in "a position that is not properly her own" (p. 4). It isn't a device to prevent identification or advocacy.

So here maybe is an instance of what you were looking for in 5 above - a "chain of reasoning from the table [here the principle of personal freedom M2] to the concrete implementation [here the device of the pipe that frees]" - evidence that the theoretical principles M1 and M2 are implemented in practice as an actual steering mechanism.

8. You suggest something more graphic and concrete is needed to explain the rationale of overguidance (pp. 7-8). I agree. It's actually a simple concept at heart, and I should've emphasized this. So picture an analogy for the plain guidance of laws, plans and other norms in modern society (i.e. an incomplete steering mechanism) as a long and arduous journey that we undertake, on the order of the D-Day invasions, or the Apollo missions, but without any idea of the destination. Feel the senselessness of that, the difficulty of justifying the tremendous effort and maintaining the necessary morale. Enter the idea of overguidance, "Let's agree where we're going and why."

It seems obvious, but I think modern society was born blind in this particular eye. When we threw out the logic of Christianity during the Enlightenment (in Kant's day), we threw out the baby with the bath water. There's much in it that we still can't dispense with.

Mike

You're welcome Ross, thanks in return. - Well, I'd simply defend the premise of a supreme valuation on reason. The full realization of that value requires an interstellar network of civilizations, something that can only be strengthened, never weakened, by the addition of other civilizations, human or non-human. This I argue in the essay and in the comments.

To the extent your hypothetical AI-creatures are more rational than we, I feel we've less cause to fear them than ourselves, even if we're all crammed into the same local niche. Genocide is never a rational response to competition, only a sign of mental weakness or collective insanity.

I'll re-read your essay shortly and see if I can't think of a question or two for that gentle interviewer to ask. - Mike

Hello again, Hai. Here's a text version of my essay. I hope it's easier to translate.

Thanks very much for your generosity. I've added you to my review list. I'll be to comment on your essay shortly. - Mike

John, I don't claim humanity's 'an end in itself'. Maybe you've confused me with someone else? - Mike

James, while I agree Earth's origin is a mythic theme, I don't understand why you confront me with faith and religion. 'Myth' I describe (p. 1) and define (p. 7) as a normative story of "where we come from and where we are going", one that's backed by rational discourses in the public sphere. Are you confusing my essay with someone else's? - Mike

No problem, John. You correctly identify the end as "M0". But M0 isn't defined as "humanity", nor could anything "come after" it. - Mike

Thanks Aaron, Please go ahead and count on my vote. Toward the end of the month I'll be voting for all the essays on my review list, which includes yours. I've kept the timing deliberately vague in order to avoid issues of vote disclosure. - Mike

If you don't mind John, I added you to my review list. I'll read your essay shortly.

You say my "endless continuity of rational being" is a process and therefore not a stable destination. But the qualifier "endless" makes it stable in theory. Are you claiming that an endless continuum cannot be realized as a practical matter? Please explain. - Mike

Thanks Ajay for the thoughtful review. Here I explain the feasibility of consensus.^* The kind of consensus we're after is defined by the validity criterion (D, p. 3) as a text (myth, law or plan) to which all affected persons can in reason agree. Put like that, you'll see it's easy to obtain a starter consensus. The example I give for a mythic text is (p. 8), "We want to create a better future for ourselves and our children."

Nobody could reasonably disagree with that; or, if they do, we just erase the part they disagree with. The only problem now is to take that trivial starter consensus and evolve it into something less trivial and more actionable while still holding onto the consensus. My essay describes some of this from the vantage of the individual guide (G, p. 8), but here I offer a more general and graphic description. Picture that starter text ("better future") sitting on the forest floor as the root draft. Above it picture a horizontal series of more substansive drafts ("better future by flying into space", "better future by letting folks play with science", etc) as the lower branches of the tree. Above each branch, picture sub-branches of yet more substansive drafts. And so on, out to the leaves. The tree now encodes a complex set of alternative paths along which the trivial consensus of the root might evolve toward a more substansive text.^** Guiding its actual evolution is the public sphere above the leaves (figures F6, F9) whose rational discourses constantly mull the overriding question, "By what path could the text evolve without ever losing consensus?"

It then evolves by path selection, step by step, till there emerges in the lower branches the fruit of the process, which is either a) the sought for substansive consensus, or b) a clear dissensus together with a mutual understanding of why consensus has failed. There's also the possibility c) of a given forest dying. The mythic forest would always be the last to go, it alone having the potential for immortality; and the essay ties its fate to that of all rational being in the cosmos.

Mike

* I take the feasibility of consensus as your "implementation" question. Please correct me if you meant something else.

** Here I simplify the tree's internal structure and gloss over the mechanics of its evolutionary stepping. For more information, see: 1) figure PS; 2) my April 27 post to Doug's essay; and 3) Doug's April 30 post to my essay, and my reply there.

(on path selection, see also my reply to Ajay's May 9 post)