Oops, I'm typing too fast... In the last message I meant "add this too," but I guess Freud would say that I am, after all, somewhat in the business of advertising for foreknowledge machines.

Thank you, Torsten! I'm glad you liked it so much. I look forward to your further thoughts. I have now put your article in my spreadsheet, to read and rate. Have a great weekend.

Aaron

Very interesting essay, Aaron. I think your ideas are valuable, although I have my doubts about the feasibility and value of a foreknowledge machine. A few thoughts:

1) I don't think a Cassandra machine is possible either, but I don't think you demonstrate this logically. Your thought experiment seems to me to assume that the machine that executes the program on the basis of the Cassandra machines input cannot go wrong. But I don't think you can assume that any physical machine is perfect.

2) I didn't understand your explanation of why we see/remember the past but not the future. I don't think the speed of light is the issue, since the laws of physics seem to be CPT-invariant (essentially, should run the same forward as backward).

3) I would add, however, that we probably can't have foreknowledge of events--like a wave of radiation from a gamma-ray burst--traveling toward us at light speed.

4) Even if foreknowledge machines are logically possible, they may not be physically possible. The obstacles may not be philosophical, but physical. And even if there is some way to observe the future from the present, we may lose a lot of resolution at any distance through time.

5) I found the idea that foreknowledge machines would end war intriguing. You are right that countries that go to war generally (but not always) do so because they disagree about what the outcome will be. But it seems to me--perhaps I have misunderstood what you are trying to say here--that outcomes that depend on the human use of information about the future are precisely the kind that a foreknowledge machine couldn't foresee.

6) Even if a foreknowledge machine were possible, I would be very surprised if this was something we could develop in 20 or 30 years.

7) I agree that better predictive technology would be valuable. But machines that are occasionally wrong are still extremely useful if their error rates are low. We don't necessarily need theoretically perfect foresight.

In any case, I enjoyed reading your essay. I'm rating it now. Good luck in the contest!

Best,

Robert

    Aaron, I think Tommy's saying we could discover the time of a future catastrophy, or one that's merely apparent. Suppose the machine shows all flights landing safely (as you say), but only till 9:13 p.m. tomorrow. Thereafter it returns no view for any flight in the world, nor any other class of future outcome. Naturally we infer a global catastrophy tomorrow night. That inference might be wrong, but it frightens people and causes them to act in dangerous ways, perhaps with catastrophic consequences. Hence the diagnosis, "Killed by self-fulfilling prophecy". - Mike

    Hi Mike,

    I see what you are saying, and it does serve to make sense of what Tommy was suggesting with his story. However, this kind of behavior is not in the repertoire of a FM. The technology would not operate haphazardly. It would either give viewer foreknowledge (i.e., definite and correct information), or there would be an interference viewing scenario (IVS).

    Now, if one were to ask what would happen if an impenetrable IVS were to confront all FMs that try to see what will happen at and beyond a certain future date, by definition, this would mean that there is no way for any FM to give any instance of definite information about such future events that could possibly also be correct. Meanwhile, FM operators who don't share or act on what they see, by definition, will always get viewer foreknowledge of every future event (apart from their own actions, for obvious reasons).

    So, in order to sustain such an idea, one must devise some kind of unerring constraint which makes the revelation of definite and correct information about future worldwide outcomes impossible. At each juncture, if there is any possibility whatsoever of a match between the sharing of a given instance of viewer foreknowledge and the event it foretells, then such a day will never occur. Since, with worldwide events, there is so much "play" between a given viewing instance and the future 4-D coordinates that operators will attempt to view, any insurmountable constraints of such a nature would be fleeting at best. They may occur in some isolated circumstances, though I don't know of any, but such a state simply could not occur across the board for all future events beyond a certain date--unless everything was dependent upon a huge event that also happened to be perfectly obscured by a worldwide IVS.

    It is difficult in the extreme to devise such a scenario. If you, Tommy, or anyone else can come up with such a scenario for a worldwide outcome, I will be grateful for a new puzzle to work on. If you would like to delve into this and many other topics further, I invite you to consider my inexpensive Kindle offering on Amazon.

    Now, if you both are making the point that this idea would make people ultra-reliant upon their FMs, to the extent that they would really freak out if something went wrong with all the FMs in the world, I agree. However, FMs would have to be as reliable as telescopes, microscopes, and eyes for them to ever be adopted in the first place. I'm sure people would freak out if everyone's eyes suddenly no longer worked someday, but no one would consider such a scenario--ceteris paribus--to be realistic in the slightest. I argue that we are dealing with the same kind of thing here.

    Thank you for your stimulating comments, I really appreciate the help that you and everyone else in this forum has been providing. Have a nice weekend.

    Aaron

    Hi Aaron,

    That's quite an interesting analysis. I think I couldn't help but take your foreknowledge machines as a metaphor for the scientific project. In this way its an interesting analysis. In particular a Cassandra machine illustrates the concept of how as we know more, we can appear less and less able to cheat fate because our predictions are inevitable, and at they same time they grow in number.

    It almost made me think that at least in its use as a metaphor, a foreknowlege machine implies the viewer as an active participant, rather than a separate observer. That is, in viewing the future in enough detail, they are able to trace some of the events back to their own decisions (or decisions of others that they might influence). In this sense it doesn't disempower us as often depicted in scifi/fantasy, but instead links the future to our own actions, giving us the control to shape our own destiny. That's not to imply that our choices are somehow removed or separate from causality, but merely that our choices are a powerful part of causal reality that shapes our fate.

    Perhaps science and foreknowledge machines are different then, in that science can never wholely predict an event that in turn relies on the choice we make, if that choice relies on our observation of the event. In other words, a discrete future prediction is inherently paradoxical, but a probabilistic one that refers to our choices is not only possible but desirable!

    Your essay was certainly different, and certainly thought provoking. Thanks!

    Maybe I'm not thinking clearly (I began by claiming that foreknowledge is impossible, and now I'm claiming it pretty much exists already) but here are my thoughts on: A) observer's built-in time viewers; B) fossils, future fossils and the form of foreknowledge; C) will as close-foreknowledge machine; and D) myth as eternity viewer.

    A. There's a "present viewer" built into the observer that's generally obligatory. Most other viewers (past, present and future) are viewable only through it. It's also error prone. I'm not sure this is helpful, but maybe we could say that the problem Tommy is pointing to (May 9, if actually a problem) is caused by these in-built errors being amplified by the foreknowledge machine.

    The observer also has built-in past viewers and future viewers, these being the only other ones that are accessible directly, i.e. without intermediation of the built-in present viewer. All are likewise error prone.

    B. A fossil is a past viewer, a kind of back-knowledge machine. Switching to foreknowledge then, what might a "future fossil" look like?

    For me, this was a fruitful question.

    C. The human will (or "practical reason" as Kant calls it) seems very close to a foreknowledge machine. Its accuracy is variable, but often high and under one's control. With effort, one can usually increase the accuracy to whatever is needed. When my tea cup is empty, I often activate my will to obtain a "view" of a cup refilled. Soon after, an actual refilled cup materializes. It materializes surely enough that I'd gain nothing by moving to the certainty of a foreknowledge machine. For most purposes (here echoing Robert, May 10, no. 7), the close-foreknowledge machine of the will seems adequate.

    Interestingly, it can have any range in time.

    D. I think of myth as a fusion of back-knowledge and foreknowledge, a kind of Janus-faced time viewer of unlimited range. The thesis of my own essay is that it's possible to construct a myth of near-perfect accuracy in its further reaches (very close to foreknowledge there), and that it's also necessary.

    I've some related thoughts on backward time travel (it too seems to be happening already), which I hope to share after I re-read the essay. But judging by how often I think about it, it's already the most interesting of the essays I've read. - Mike

    Dear Aaron,

    I wrote a comment here, but for some reason it went to nirvana. I'm writing again, but now in short.

    I find your essay interesting. There are 2 intertwined issues, I think: outcomes and decisions, which generate an information overload that place limits on practicability. However, your essay interests me more in the foundational side, and I will be rating it based on that solely. I think that removing time travel from your essay would bring it a better rating, but I will not place weight on the latter on my rating, but more on the idea of foreknowledge machines.

    Best,

    Christine

    Aaron,

    It is difficult to find time to read over 150 essays carefully. I read yours in response to your comment on my essay page about the Community Rating system. While I would like to read your essay through more carefully before final rating, I understand that your essay focuses on the possibility of a foreknowledge machine, essentially a simulator that runs faster than real-time, so that we may accurately predict the future. Further, you make an interesting argument that people would behave better if they knew what the results of their actions might be. While I agree that more accurate information is generally better, people often do not behave rationally, even in the presence of reliable predictions. For example, the evidence of anthropomorphic global warming follows from extensive computer simulations of the global climate system. These simulations are scientifically well established, but the long-term implications are widely either denied, ignored, or put aside for future generations to deal with. In my own essay "Just Too Many People: Towards a Sustainable Future Earth", I argue that the key problem facing humanity (and giving rise to a variety of climate and resource problems) is that the global population is already unsustainably large, and must be reduced going forward. This is not a popular argument (as perhaps reflected in the relatively low Community Rating), but the facts speak for themselves.

    Alan Kadin

      Okay...time travel. As a devout quantumologist, I must conclude that traveling to the future as a way of predicting the future from the present is necessarily futile. QM tells us that there are a very large number of possible futures, but we only ever know one future. Your future viewer would only see one of those futures or would see a superposition of all of the them and therefore also not be very helpful.

      As you can see, there is no problem with causality since a future viewer would not provide any better information than the physics we already have and so the changes that you cause are already in one of the possible futures anyway.

      • [deleted]

      Aaron,

      Yes, I see where I have muddled the Everett machine and the later Foreknowledge machine. How does a Foreknowledge future viewer differ from for example a climate model, which will make predictions with an accuracy dependent upon the completeness of the information supplied and thus also computing power available?

      To be honest I find the explanations difficult to get my head around. I don't understand why undesirable outcomes are not viewed because lots of undesirable things happen. What happens to free will if you have to make the outcome match what you have seen happen? Who then is steering the machine or the human mind? There would be no need to consider why choices were made only that they were made, it seems to me. The advantage of a model is it is only indicative of what might happen under certain circumstances and the circumstances can be altered. Steering to avoid them.

      Hi Robert,

      Thanks for reading my work, I look forward to reading your paper after finals in my technical program have concluded next Friday. Thanks also for giving these wonderful points of critique which provide me with another opportunity to clarify.

      I will go point by point:

      1) I don't think a Cassandra machine is possible either, but I don't think you demonstrate this logically. Your thought experiment seems to me to assume that the machine that executes the program on the basis of the Cassandra machines input cannot go wrong. But I don't think you can assume that any physical machine is perfect.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      To take what is strictly necessary for my argument to extremes, all that is required to let it go through is the recognition that it is logically possible for a computer to follow a simple program accurately, and for a robotic arm to accurately move a small weight from one location to another. Of course, there is no question that these feats are logically possible, since they are everyday occurrences. The possibility of a malfunction in either of these systems, then, is irrelevant to the conclusiveness of the argument I offer against the logical possibility of Cassandra machines.

      2) I didn't understand your explanation of why we see/remember the past but not the future. I don't think the speed of light is the issue, since the laws of physics seem to be CPT-invariant (essentially, should run the same forward as backward).

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      I did not comment on this issue. I said that our eyes see events after they happen, but I made not comment as to why our eyes cannot see the future without some kind of aid like a foreknowledge machine.

      3) I would add, however, that we probably can't have foreknowledge of events--like a wave of radiation from a gamma-ray burst--traveling toward us at light speed.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      If you are referring to viewer foreknowledge, why not?

      4) Even if foreknowledge machines are logically possible, they may not be physically possible. The obstacles may not be philosophical, but physical. And even if there is some way to observe the future from the present, we may lose a lot of resolution at any distance through time.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      True. As far as losing resolution through time, this is an intriguing concept that I have not delved into. Thank you for that.

      (Continued in next post)

      5) I found the idea that foreknowledge machines would end war intriguing. You are right that countries that go to war generally (but not always) do so because they disagree about what the outcome will be. But it seems to me--perhaps I have misunderstood what you are trying to say here--that outcomes that depend on the human use of information about the future are precisely the kind that a foreknowledge machine couldn't foresee.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      The essential point is that all foreknowledge machines which are not in an interference viewing scenario will deliver identical viewer foreknowledge when applied to any given future outcome. This means that all parties who use foreknowledge machines will necessarily work together toward the same outcomes, as these outcomes have been optimized for the parties concerned by the complex quantum process which would make viewer foreknowledge possible. Referring to your last sentence above, one must remember the special case of non-interference which occurs when parties who know about a given future act to bring that very future about.

      6) Even if a foreknowledge machine were possible, I would be very surprised if this was something we could develop in 20 or 30 years.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      Okay, you would be surprised. According to my knowledge of current technology (and even what was reported in journals twenty years ago), if foreknowledge machines are possible, I would be surprised if it takes our best and most open-minded engineers longer than that to figure out how to make them.

      7) I agree that better predictive technology would be valuable. But machines that are occasionally wrong are still extremely useful if their error rates are low. We don't necessarily need theoretically perfect foresight.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      You may know this, but I have to respond in the following way every time someone describes foreknowledge machines as a predictive technology. Foreknowledge machines don't predict anything. One could base predictions on viewer foreknowledge and they would always be right (that is why they would be "predictively useful," to distinguish them from Everett machines which could not help us know anything about which future will come to pass), but foreknowledge machines themselves aren't involved in prediction at all.

      I am now fully convinced that I need to emphasize this distinction much more clearly, since five or six other people have also arrived at the same (understandable) misconception (which I did not sufficiently guard against, as the possibility of confusion here had not occurred to me).

      Now that that is out of the way, I think you may have been expressing that a future-viewing machine which sometimes delivers a view of the future that is wrong would still be useful. However, when would we trust it and when would we assume that it could be wrong? A predictive technology that is sometimes wrong is fine--that's the nature of prediction--but a viewing technology cannot sometimes be wrong, and be useful. That would be like a telescope which sometimes shows Blackbeard and Captain Ahab walking on the deck of a distant ship, when only Blackbeard is on board. See what I mean?

      I look forward your further thoughts. Your comments have been extremely valuable. Thank you once again, and I am keen to read your essay and continue our productive conversation on the work we are both doing to help our fellow humans and the future of our planet.

      Warm regards,

      Aaron

      Hi Alan,

      Thank you for taking the time to read my offering. I will read yours soon as well. I would like to correct the characterization of foreknowledge machines given in the following excerpt: "your essay focuses on the possibility of a foreknowledge machine, essentially a simulator that runs faster than real-time, so that we may accurately predict the future."

      It is important for me to clarify that this is not an accurate description of what a foreknowledge machine would be, since they would not predict anything. Instead, they allow the operator to actually peer into the future to see exactly what will occur (i.e., viewer foreknowledge), or they will encounter an interference viewing scenario. Seeing the future would be "predictively useful," since with such access one could always formulate predictions that would be 100% correct, but doing so would not itself constitute the reception of a prediction.

      This kind of technology may not be physically possible, but it is logically possible. Please skim the article with these clarifications in mind, and pay particular attention to technical note ten. I see clearly now that I must emphasize in future papers or a book on the subject that foreknowledge machines represent the transcendence of prediction. For additional clarification, please read my conversation with Michael Allan at the top of this page. All the best to you here, and in all things.

      Warmly,

      Aaron

      Dear Aaron,

      Very interesting idea, indeed, of a foreknowledge machine.

      The future-viewing machine you propose is very interesting because it seems to incorporate my definition of science. Let me explain:

      Science is about finding causes of results. When we see a result, science can tell us what the root cause(s)of the result are e.g. the air is heating up because we are adding more carbon dioxide. The reverse, the cause seeding the impact, is not always true e.g. if we add carbon dioxide the only result is not warming.

      Your foreknowledge machine seems to correctly predict the result of an action (cause). Am I understanding your thought correctly?

      What is the implication of the fact that different people will have different foreknowledge? If no foreknowledge exists, will the future-viewing machine show any result?

      - Ajay

      It is interesting the Cassandra machines; some time ago I thought a strange tachyon machine (a story for the grandchilds), where a machine that write in the present write in the same machine in the past, so that who write a text? The ink disappear in the present, to appear in the past, and the pen in the present delete the old writing! There is a book in a temporal loop, and no one write the book.

      The computer can be a Turing machine that write in the past, deleting the present tape, so that the computer have the result before of the calculation (always a story).

      I am thinking that each weather forecasting is a Cassandra machine, if the forecasting is perfect, and the prediction time is not high: if there are classical equations, and weak quantum effect, then the Cassandra machine work well.

      Each dynamics have forbidden trajectories, so that it is true that not all the futures are possible (simmetries and invariants), and each real Cassandra machine can say this prohibition.

      A machine that reduce locally the entropy, for example cooling a system, or concentrating a system, is a local Cassandra machine? Is it possible to include information in the system, to send locally message in the past?

      If an essay make you think, then it is a good essay.

        Dear Aaron

        You have put in a lot of thought into this. The concept of a foreknowledge machine is the stuff of science fiction, but you have considered the possibility of their being real - like one day we can download an app that will tell us what we will do in the next 24 hours or week or year. I would imagine that if such a machine were possible its accuracy would diminish with the distance in the future of the setting.

        Unfortunately, from my own point of view, and more specifically from the physics of my Beautiful Universe theory , there is no time dimension. Past present and future are just outcomes of memory, perception and speculation successively. All we have is one universal 'now' state that changes.

        You can counter by saying, yes but what will future 'now' states be? I do not subscribe to many-world theories, so the future such a machine would read would be a Laplacian causal projection. Alas it has been repeatedly argued that any tiny variation in setting the initial conditions (the butterfly flaps its wings, or not) will cause a large change down the causal chain (the storm, or not).

        As for the single photon experiment read Eric Reiter's experiments on his unquantum.org site. He has proven that there is no such thing as a point photon - ie the photon goes through the two slits all the time.

        I wish you all the best, and do not worry nobody is going to tell about WWIII through a foreknowledge machine. Be happy ...now.

        Vladimir

        Thanks for the interesting clarifications, Aaron. I'm glad if my comments were helpful. I have a few more quick responses:

        1) I'm not sure what you mean when you say that it is logically possible for a computer to follow a program accurately. Computers certainly can follow programs accurately. But that's an empirical fact, not an analytic statement. I don't think we can ever guarantee that a computer will necessarily follow its program. It seems to me--I admit I might not have really understood your scenario--that it might be the computer that fails when connected to the Cassandra machine, rather than the other way around.

        2) You wrote that "all known optical systems can only receive information about past scenes" because "it always takes time for light from any scene to reach any lens". I took that to mean that we see the past rather than the future because the speed of light is finite. I'm guess I'm not sure now what you mean here.

        3) I'm not sure how information about the future from another point in spacetime can arrive faster than the speed of light. What am I missing?

        4) My guess is that foreknowledge machines are not physically possible in our region of the universe. Especially if they depend on closed timelike curves to work. As far as I know, there's no evidence that such curves exist--Godel's spacetime is kind of a theoretical special case, right? And if a foreknowledge machine had to create and manipulate such curves to function--is there another way--I assume the amount of energy required would be literally astronomical.

        5) I will have to think about how this works more carefully, since I'm not sure I understand how this would work.

        6) It will be interesting to see who's right. I agree that in some ways technology develops exponentially--if that's what you're suggesting--but I also think that qualitative advances become exponentially harder to achieve in some areas. Projects that require infrastructure or use high energies can be particularly slow. I am afraid at this point we may not even have controlled fusion in 20 years.

        7) You seem to be using distinguishing prediction from foreknowledge in a technical way that wasn't clear to me when I first read your essay. But in any case this is where I think I most strongly disagree with you. A viewing technology that is sometimes wrong can still be tremendously useful. It won't be useful--and may even be harmful--in the specific case where it is wrong. But on balance--if the error rate is low and roughly known--it can be very valuable. Consider diagnostic tests. These routinely produce both false negatives and false positives. But if the error rate is low enough they are still an invaluable tool of medicine. Our actual telescopes inevitably distort images, but nevertheless remain useful to us. I doubt that any machine can run without producing errors. We should certainly seek to minimize observational errors. But we can live with some. In fact, I think we have to.

        Thanks in any case for the interesting discussion!

        Robert

        • [deleted]

        Hi Domenico,

        I'm glad you enjoyed my essay. I found your "strange tachyon machine" idea interesting, as well as the Turing machine which has the result before the calculation. There is a history of this kind of musing.

        I would like to respond about your repeated mention of Cassandra machines. Cassandra machines are not logically possible, they are like round squares. We can talk about them, just as we can talk about round squares, but neither can ever be real. So, the phrase "each real Cassandra machine," is as nonsensical as the phrase "each real round square." Instead, I suggest that you may mean to refer to foreknowledge machines, as they are both useful and logically possible.

        Now, with this change in terminology in mind, perfect weather forecasting would not be a foreknowledge machine, because foreknowledge machines do not forecast or predict anything. They see the future as it will happen, or they give only vague information or fail to operate if they encounter an interference viewing scenario. Also, I would not say that a machine which reduces the local entropy is a foreknowledge machine, since every living organism does exactly this.

        I recommend looking over my article again and reading the conversations with Michael Allan, Tommy Anderberg, and Robert de Neufville above. I would love to hear your further thoughts after this clarification.

        I now have your article in my spreadsheet to read, and I look forward to it. All the best to you here, and in life.

        Aaron

        Hi Daniel,

        Thanks for reading my essay. I am glad you see the potential that foreknowledge machines promise for the amplification of beneficial outcomes. However, this effect would not depend upon the wisdom of people in charge. If you were to read my longer ebook on Amazon, you would get a lot more detail about the nature of the mechanism.

        Now, it is my duty to respond that foreknowledge machines could not be implemented with very powerful computers, as you wrote. Prediction is very limited. Foreknowledge machines represent the transcendence of prediction, forecasting, simulation, et cetera, in favor of viewing the real thing whenever possible. No matter how powerful, no computer could ever become a foreknowledge machine.

        I understand your complaint. We don't know how to build one, or even all the principles upon which one could be based. The point of the paper, however, is purely logical--it specifies the kind of machine that is both logically possible and useful, and then advocates for what beneficial purposes such machines could serve. The technical details of actually building one will have to wait for our best scientists and engineers to crack one day, if such machines, in addition to being logically possible, are also physically possible.

        Aaron