Why we know a lot of the past but little from the future by Luca Valeri Zimmermann

Chidi Idika

Just above was me. My computer has a mind of its own!

Chidi

Luca Valeri

Hi Chidi,

It is still puzzling me, that we have only memories, stored information, documents about things that happened in the past. And none about the things that will happen. In my essay I tried to explain the physical reason for that.

About moral categories:

Physics asks: what will happen if we know the present state? Morality or religion asks: what shall we do? It s a totally different question, that cannot be answered by physics. It is out of the scope of physics.

In the sentence you cite about the uniqueness of humanity there shines a little hope, we could derive some moral goals given the uniqueness. Although I don't think this can be done rigorously as I am a religious nihilist.

Extended to the uniqueness of all species we could argue that we must try to preserve them as their extermination is irreversible. But does this also count for deadly viruses? I suppose not.

I started to read your essay and will also try to comment on it.

Regards

Luca

Lorraine Ford

Dear Luca,

I agree with you that there must be a "mechanism that creates information in order for the future to be unpredictable". I think this must be a non-mechanistic "mechanism" otherwise it would seemingly be representable as a law-of-nature equation.

As you say, without "a process that creates information", the laws-of-nature that we have uncovered would allow us to perfectly predict all future physical outcomes: "we would know already the future". (But I think we could only have predicted future physical outcomes that weren't too complex, i.e. without too many parameters and interactions).

As you say, "an additional element is needed", "the space between the things", "Something completely out of the scope of physics". But I think that this creative element is not itself representable as a mathematical law-of-nature equation. Only the result, the information created, is representable as a mathematical equation.

Best of luck with your investigations - I think you are on the right track.

Cheers,

Lorraine

Luca Valeri

Dear Lorraine,

Thank you very much for your helpful comment. I also agree that a mechanism that creates information must be 'non-mechanistic'. Although I'm not sure.

In my essay I'm a bit sloppy in the use of the word 'predictable' or 'non-predictable'. Random processes as in quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics are non-predictable in the sense that they are not deterministic. But they are predictable in the sense that we have probabilities (or relative frequencies) that we can predict in repeated measurements. I would still call these processes mechanistic. But they seem to be able to create information. Creation of elements, atoms, planetary systems, primitive self-reproducing cells, complex living organisms, mental processes, free will (?), societies.

Complex systems seems to be non-predictable (not even probabilistic) but mechanistic.

Your notion of representable and non-representable is also helpful. Although non-representable suggests a 'thing' that cannot be represented in laws of physics. How can we even talk about (represent) that? What language should we use?

To go further: there seems to be an intimate relationship between the representable and the non-representable. The later seems to precede the former. But how is the later conceivable from the former?

I will investigate further. Thanks again

Luca

Conrad Johnson

Hi Luca --

Since I think these blogs will soon be closed, I wanted to make one further comment on your statement -- "Physics might not be possible if objects do not have properties, that are independent from observations."

I would say, whether or not objects have properties "in themselves" does not matter for physics, in principle. It's convenient to say that a certain interaction measures the charge of a particle. But the interaction can only do that in a context that makes the charge observable, and that context has to consist of other observables.

So I think the key condition for the possibility of empirical physics must be independent of the non-observables. Whether or not things "have" properties by themselves, the real issue is how what's observed about them gets to be definable in terms of other observables.

Except in the quantum domain, of course, all observations are consistent with the idea that objects do have well-defined properties. This is obviously an important feature of our universe. And it's extremely efficient to be able to ignore context and describe things in terms of their properties. We don't even know yet how to describe things in a completely contextual way, and it would surely be a very cumbersome kind of description. But it must be possible in principle.

So there are two basic questions, in physics -- first, what kind of system can be observable, making all its own information measurable in terms of other measurable information? And second, why should such a system end up looking so much like a classically deterministic world of things-in-themselves moving through flat Euclidean spacetime?

I certainly don't want to eliminate from physics any mention of the "properties" or "states" of objects. These are meaningful and even central ideas, but they must not be taken for granted. We need to understand how they become meaningful. I wonder if this may be another way of stating your project? -- namely, what laws of physics are necessary in order that certain kinds of interactions can constitute measurements of the basic properties of objects? But also -- what kinds of basic properties must there be to support such a system?

Thank you for a conversation I very much appreciate.

Conrad

Don Limuti

Hi Luca,

I will argue the merits of Einstein vs. Bohr (which I would love to do).

However, I will not argue your thesis: "How to steer the future of humanity? Use science in the best way possible but know its limitation in describing what is really out there." Is the most intelligent in the essay contest.

I do like my own essay about education, but it is very much on the practical side, yours bridges the theoretical with the practical. It also take a good deal of courage to do this with the FQXi.org audience.

High Marks,

Don Limuti

Luca Valeri

Thanks for your comment and rates Don.

Would be fun to reopen the debate Einstein vs. Bohr. I started to read your last essay and surelly will comment on that somewhere.

Regards

Luca

[deleted]

Dear Luca,

Let me thank you for your inspiring comment over at my page. Some people see poetry as vain and physics as fact. But it does not seem to me there is a "fact" that is NOT an image in someone's mind.

Conversely, fact is "common" vanity. And "vanity" is a fact you don't share.

Thank you Luca and Bohr (in one breath!) for this cogent observation.

Best,

Chidi

Luca Valeri

Yes. I really think that poetry might reveal a deep through about our being in the world. And this might help to understand quantum physics.

Luca

Chidi Idika

If those who actually read and appreciate an essay don't rate it, who will?

Janko Kokosar

Dear Luca, I gave you good points. I think that you deserve. If you will read my link of Brukner, I think, that you can publish your ideas.

Best regards

James Blodgett

You say "Use science in the best way possible." But what is best? One good criteria, though it does have limits, is the utilitarian "greatest good for the greatest number." This can generate very large numbers if we consider the resources of the galaxy.

Luca Valeri

Dear Conrad,

I want to reply to your insightfull comment from May. 29, 2014 @ 13:37 GMT

"I would say, whether or not objects have properties "in themselves" does not matter for physics, in principle."

This was troubling Einstein a lot and is at the core of the discussion about hidden variables and reality.

"the interaction can only do that in a context that makes the charge observable, and that context has to consist of other observables."

True but the example with the charge might be wrong. The charge (as the masses of the elementary particles) are properties of the particles but seem to be context independent. There is no uncertainty relation with the charge, no complementary observable. This is giving another puzzle.

"We don't even know yet how to describe things in a completely contextual way, and it would surely be a very cumbersome kind of description. But it must be possible in principle."

This reminds me a bit a anecdote with Edward Teller and Bohr. Teller tried to make clear to Bohr, that once we are used to quantum mechanics we could replace the classical notion ("Begriff") by quantum mechanical notions. Bohr who seemed to sleep woke up and said: "I understand. One also could say, that we are not sitting here and drink tee, but we are only dreaming it."

For Bohr it was essential, that the measurement apparatus has to be described classically. On one side it must be describable in our space time view ("Anschauung") and on the other side there must be a causal link from the observed behaviour of the measurement apparatus to the indirect observed object. Here the causal link can be understood in the kantian sense of causality as precondition of experience.

I personally understand the insistence of Bohr to use a classical notion for the properties of the objects as the need how properties get their meaning. Classicality arise or emerges from the behaviour of the microscopic objects and on the other hand the microscopic objects must be described by classical notion. It is neither bottom up or top down. It is a circular reasoning. What must be achieved is semantical consistency.

It is becoming late and my comment a bit long. So I stop here. There would be a lot more to say. But let me resume in your words:

"We need to understand how they (properties) become meaningful."

Yes! To answer this question I think you are more qualified than me.

I will continue my work in trying to reconstruct the known physics from the ure. I'll keep you posted on my progress.

Thanks again

Luca

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