Caro Tommaso,
I read and re-read your brilliant essay, finding in it a lor of precious suggestions, concerning e. g. the discrete vs continuous or the teterminismus vs indeterminismus relationship and concerning, in particular, the problem of computability, in which I am very interested from the time when I developed the ideas that I partially sketched in my contest essay.
Although I find the "Priss-Goedel-Priss theorem" (that you place significantly in 2031) not easy to be accepted, I am inclined to believe (maybe agreeing with you) that all existing facts or empirical objects of the universe (no matter if they exist in the past, the present or the future), are in principle representable by computable functions.
But, on the other hand, I am not sure that consciousness is a fact or an empirical object. (As well as I am non sure that all merely possible state of affairs can be described by computable functions, if only because their set is probably uncountable, while the set of all computable functions is certainly denumerable.)
I wonder if these will be still issues in 2075..
Tanti cordiali saluti
Giovanni