My attachment of 2 April -- which demonstrates reversibility of the counting function by the natural properties of recursion and parity -- got me thinking about the Monty Hall problem and why reversibility of the time metric is equivalent to experimenter free will in a Bell-Aspect type experiment. Switching choices implies physical time reversibility, and here's why:
Mathematicians will always agree -- that given n contestants choosing 1 of 3 doors, two of which hide a goat, and the third a new car -- one can predict that over many iterations, or even if many contestants simultaneously choose from sets of doors, that by the law of large numbers 1/3 of the contestants will win cars. This how Richard Gill describes the independent "counts" of four 2 X 2 tables of results in a Bell-Aspect type experiment, with 4 instead of 3 "doors.".
The singular case in which the host (Monty) opens one door of the two that a contestant has not chosen -- and reveals a goat, then asks the contestant if she would like to switch choices -- raises the question of whether the contestant has a winning advantage by switching the choice, or staying with the first.
Naively, one thinks that -- because Monty has shown one of two doors that the car is *not* behind, that the odds of choosing the winning door have been increased some 16% (from 1/3 to 1/2) by choosing to switch. In fact, though, the odds are still 1 in 3 whether the contestant switches the choice or not. The question is whether one has a better choice of winning the car by switching choice, or not.
Even though the contestant knows in advance that Monty will never open the door with a car behind it, this information adds nothing to her knowledge of what door the car is behind. In other words, a potential choice (the door identified but not yet opened), does not change the energy state of the system. It does, however, add to the information of the energy state -- one now has a 66.6% chance of winning the car if one switches choices of door -- and this is equivalent to the Hess-Philipp result ( 3) for their Bell-Aspect type inequality that I cited in the attachment; i.e., there is a 3 to 1 advantage (my paper explains) for the result not observed, over the P(1/2) probability for the result that is observed. That difference of initial condition vs. measurement outcome is a hidden variable.
To see why, compare this scenario to the Schrodinger Cat experiment. The decay rate of the substance that emits a particle and triggers the hammer that breaks the vial that releases the poison that kills the cat -- is precisely known. The energy potential of the hammer is identical to the pre-choice of door in the MH problem -- If Monty lifts the lid on the box and declares "the cat is alive," or "the cat is dead," it has no effect on the decay rate of the material or the energy potential of the hammer.
Monty, however, *cannot choose* to say "the cat is dead," because we *know* that the conditions under which the cat dies are fully determined, even though hidden in a black box. There is absolutely no point in Monty communicating to us that the cat is dead, because:
If the cat were dead, the experiment is ended -- just as if Monty opened the door with the car behind it while the contestant still has a choice pending. It doesn't happen, because Monty knows which door the car is behind. He isn't an observer making a binary choice; he's the guiding principle *behind* the measurement choice. This is the same principle by which Joy Christian successfully argues for the choice that Nature makes independently of conscious observers, and which guarantees real binary measurement in a locally real and objective way.
Ultimately, the free will hypothesis prevails, because -- and I made this point repeatedly in the great "debate" over Christian's result -- *unless* Nature has a choice, human observers have no free will. The energy cost to remove the middle value is equal to the observer's choice to change the state of the system.
So in support of Tegmark's hypothesis and Christian's measurement framework (which was published by the International Journal of Theoretical Physics recently as "Macroscopic Observability of Sign Changes under 2(pi) Rotations"-- nature is not fundamentally random, even though conscious observers switch their choices.
As my attachment shows, observer choices that change the measurement outcome deterministically, also change the initial condition randomly -- consonant with my claim that free will exists IFF nature is not fundamentally random. The question of whether the initial condition is positive or negative obviates the independence of tables that Richard Gill describes. The measurement is observer entangled -- and that entanglement is equivalent to classical orientation entanglement (spinor property).
More to come.