Dear Erik,

please, don't apologize for being critical---if the idea is to have any chance at all, it must be able to withstand some pressure. So every issue you point out is helping me, and I'm grateful for having the opportunity of discussing my idea.

Regarding the problem you see, do you think that narrow content is just in principle not capable of solving the problem of reference, or do you think that if one believes in narrow content at all, then there's really no additional problem left to solve---i.e. that one then is committed to a kind of eliminativist stance?

To me, the problem to solve is how any sort of mental state refers at all---i.e. how it comes to have any kind of content. For instance, I disagree with the idea that a thermostat refers, simply by virtue of being in a particular state, to the temperature (or to its being 'too low' or 'too high'). There's no salient difference between that thermostat and any other system with two possible states---it will always depend on the environment which state the system is in, and thus, the representational content could at most be 'I am in the state I am when the environment dictates that I evolve into this state'---which is basically empty, and doesn't really say more than that the system is in one of two possible states.

Reference, semantic content, etc., needs more than that. For instance, consider the example of one versus two lights being lit in the steeple of the Old North Church. If that's all you see, it has no representational content; but if you further know that 'one if by land, two if by sea', then one lantern being lit has content, and it represents the English attacking by land.

The trouble is, of course, that the intentionality thus bestowed to the lantern is derived from that of you, who knows that 'one if by land, two if by sea'. Since you already possess intentionality, trying to explain the intentionality of your own mental states---i.e. how they come to refer to anything---in the same terms as we have just explained the intentional, referential nature of the one lantern burning in the Old North Church will run into the homunculus problem.

This is independent of whether mental content is narrow or wide---the important thing is that it represents something; whether that something is, say, the apple out there in the world, or the conditions caused within the brain by the presence of that apple, or even the phenomenal experience of that apple is immaterial.

And it's there that my model comes in (if things work as I think they do): by collapsing the symbol and the entity using it as a symbol---the representation and the homunculus using it; you and the lantern at the Old North Church---into a single entity, I think it's possible to get rid of the regress. So, a von Neumann replicator evolved in conditions caused by the presence of an apple uses itself as a symbol for these conditions, reads the information it has stored and causes the body to perform actions appropriate to the presence of said apple. One might call this an 'autotelic symbol', because it derives its referent not from something external to it, but rather, from its own form (and because I just learned the word 'autotelic').

Thank you for the compliment! I suppose you're essentially asking about how there come to be different categories of objects that can be represented. I.e., what makes a different apple an instance of the category 'apple'? What makes a peach not an instance of the same category?

In a sense, this harks back to the problem of universals, with all the attendant baggage that would take too long to even review, much less address, here.

But I think that, from a more modern perspective, one can draw an interesting analogy to a hash function. A hash function, used, e.g., in cryptography, is a function that takes a set of inputs to the same output, thus 'grouping' inputs into distinguishable sets.

Thus, we get a partitioning of a certain domain into different classes---like, e.g., the domain 'fruit' is partitioned into 'apples', 'peaches', and so on. So, one possible response here would be that two different replicators represent different instances of the same sort of object if they are mapped to the same hash code. This doesn't have to be explicit; for instance, when the replicator guides behavior, it might be that only certain of its properties are relevant for a given action---this ensures that the reaction to 'apple A' will be the same as to 'apple B', but different from 'peach X'.

Alternatively, one can think about this more loosely in terms of Wittgensteinian 'family resemblances': if there is a resemblance between objects, there will be a resemblance in the replicators, and consequently, a resemblance in actions taken upon encountering these objects (such as saying, 'that's an apple').

However, I think that this is an issue whose detailed treatment will have to wait until the model is more fully developed, and one can start applying it to real-world situations.

I found the essay a but hard to read and a bit waffly.

It seems to me you are over complicating the problem.

We can easily see how a robot can build another copy of itself & then install the software that it is using itself into the new robot - job done!; no problems about infinite regress etc.

In nature, creatures that are unable to reproduce will die out, so given enough time and different types of creatures being formed due to essentially random changes, those that have formed the ability to copy themselves will continue to exists - those that don't won't.

Declan T

    Thanks for your comment, and the compliment! I've already had a preliminary look at your essay, but I'll hold off on commenting until I've had time to digest it somewhat (there's quite a lot there to be digested).

    I'm thus not quite sure we mean the same thing by an 'open world'. It's true that I use the evolvability of my replicators in order to cope with the limitless possibilities that an agent in the world is presented with---that's why something like an expert system simply won't do: it's essentially a long, nested chain of 'if... then... else' conditionals, which the real world will always exhaust after some time (and given the limitations of feasibility of such constructions, usually after a rather short time).

    It may be that something like this intrinsically non-delimitable nature is what you have in mind with the concept of openness, which you then more concretely paint as the existence of long-range entanglement between arbitrary partitions of a system, defining a topological order. But I'll have to have another look at your essay.

    Thank you for your comment. I'm sorry to hear you found my essay hard to read; I tried to be as clear as I can. One must, however, be careful in treating this subject: it is easy to follow an intuition, and be led down a blind alley. Hence, I simultaneously tried to be as scrupulous in my formulations as possible---perhaps excessively so.

    Take, for instance, your example of the self-reproducing robot: at first sight, it seems to be a nice, and simple, solution to the problem. Likewise, a machine that just scans itself, and then produces a copy, seems perfectly adequate.

    But both actually don't solve the problem, as can be seen with a little more thought. For the self-scanning machine, this is described in my essay; for your robot, the key question is about how it copies its own software. The first thing is that the robot itself is controlled by that software; hence, all its actions are actions guided by the software. So, too, is the copying: consequently, the software must actually copy itself into the newly created robot body.

    But this is of course just the problem of reproduction again: how does the software copy itself? So all your robot achieves is to reduce the problem of robot-reproduction to software-reproduction. Consequently, it's an example of just the kind of circularity my essay tries to break up.

    So I don't think I'm overcomplicating the problem; it's just not that easy a problem (although as von Neumann has shown us, it is also readily solvable, provided one is a little careful).

    This definition of open world is with respect to entanglement swapping in the framework of ER = EPR. With cosmology there is no global means to define a time direction. A time direction is really a local structure as there does not exist a timelike Killing vector. Energy is the quantity in a Noether framework that is conserved by time translation symmetry. So if you have cosmologies with entangled states across ER black hole bridges (non-traversable wormholes) the only means one can define an open world is with entanglement exchanges. For instance the right timelike patch in a Penrose diagram may share EPR pairs with the left patch. In general this can be with many patches or the so called multiverse. There can then be a sort of swapping of entanglement.

    I then use this to discuss the MH spacetimes and the prospect this sets up the universe to permit open systems capable of intelligent choices. Your paper takes off from there to construct a possible way this can happen.

    Cheers LC

    Hi Jochen,

    You began by observing that "a stone rolls downhill because of the force of gravity, not because it wants to reach the bottom." In fact, life is almost defined by its ability to work its will against gravity. One might ask how this happens.

    But your paper, on the homunculus fallacy is excellent. The main problem of representations 'using' themselves [thus somehow invoking 'intentionality'] is two-fold. First, there is usually an infinite regress hiding somewhere, and second, as you note in your essay, in the absence of one replicator, "it is not clear how the dominant replicator is selected in order to guide behavior." This is clearly a major problem.

    Along the way quite strong assumptions are introduced:

    "Suppose the system is simply capable of scanning itself, producing a description that then enables it to construct an exact copy." [Maybe, for strings of bits, but how scan ones 3D self?] Svozil addresses this. Even so, past the DNA level, it's difficult to envision "mapping all possible responses of an automaton to binary strings...".

    Then one assumes producing "images of the world that are capable of looking at themselves - representations that are their own users." You "create mental representations (CA patterns) that are their own homunculi, using themselves as symbols." This strikes me as easier said than done!

    I love automata. My PhD dissertation, The Automatic Theory of Physics dealt with how a robot could derive a theory of physics, [see my Endnotes] but, significantly, the goal was supplied from outside, leaving only the problem of recognizing patterns and organizing Hilbert-like feature-vectors. I made no attempt to have the robot formulate the dominant goal on its own.

    You then ask that we "imagine the symbol to be grabbing for the apple." Despite that you presume "employing a replicating structure that interprets itself as something different from itself" [??] I have trouble imagining the symbol doing so. You've lost me. This is how you achieve "the symbol becomes itself a kind of homunculus."

    The core of the problem, as I see it, is the concept of "the internal observer, the homunculus." In other words, an internal system must both model itself and understand itself. Your treatment of this problem is masterful.

    May I suggest a different approach. In my essay I note that there experiential grounds for speculating that there is a universal consciousness field, a physically real field, that interacts with matter. This can be developed in detail [I have done so] but for purposes of discussion, why don't you willingly suspend your disbelief and ask how this solves your problem.

    It allows a homunculus to model or "represent" itself (as pattern recognizer and neural nets can do] while not demanding that the device understand itself, or even be aware of itself. All infinite regress problems disappear, as does the need to explain how consciousness 'emerges' from the thing itself.

    I hope you will read my essay and comment in this light.

    Thanks for an enjoyable, creative, well thought out essay.

    Best regards,

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Hi Edwin,

      thank you for your kind words, and for giving my essay a thorough reading! I'll have to have a look at yours, so that I can comment on some of the issues you raise.

      Regarding the selection problem, I think this is something my model can only hope to address in some further developed stage. Right now, my main concern is to show, in a kind of 'proof-of-principle'-way, that a pattern, or a state of mind, having meaning to itself isn't in conflict with a natural, physical world governed by 'mindless mathematical laws', as the contest heading stipulates (although I myself tend to think of laws rather as descriptions than as active governing agencies).

      Furthermore, the 'self-scanning' system is introduced as an example of what will not work: I (following Svozil) demonstrate that this assumption leads to absurdity. So, your intuition is right: there is no system (well, no 'sufficiently complex' system) that could simply scan itself in order to produce its own description. It would've made my life a whole lot easier if there were!

      Rather, the impossibility of this particular solution is what forces me to introduce the von Neumann structure, of a system with a clearly delineated syntactic and semantic aspect---copying and interpreting its own, coded description. So there's a system that simply has its own description available to itself; and if now this description is shaped, as I propose, by an evolutionary process such that the fitness function depends on the 'outside world', then this description contains likewise information about the outside world.

      Consequently, we have a symbol that has access to information that it itself represents, and that information is about the outside world (by mediation of sensory data setting up certain conditions within the internal CA-universe). In this sense, it is a representation that is its own user.

      Now, intentionality is contagious: your own purposeful behavior translates into purposeful behavior of, say, the car you drive. The car makes a left turn because you want to take a left turn. In the same way, if a replicator becomes dominant, it gets to control an organisms behavior---where I fully acknowledge that how it comes to be dominant, and how exactly this behavior-controlling works, don't as yet have a satisfying answer in my model.

      But suppose this works (and I don't believe that there are any other than technical problems in realizing this). Then, we have a symbol that to itself contains information using that information in order to guide movement---say, grabbing for an apple. That is, the goal-directedness of the action is due to the information the evolutionary process has imbued the replicator with---because it has a certain form, so to speak, it produces a certain action.

      Does this help?

      I'm going to have a look at your essay (but it might take me some time to comment).

      Cheers,

      Jochen

      6 days later

      Thanks for the clarifications Jochen. It's clearer to me what your account is addressing now.

      I think maybe the best way to phrase it is there's two separate problems: the homunculus problem and the problem of reference. The problem of error that you talk about in the paper is a subproblem of the problem of reference. I don't think your account actually addresses it (beyond you advocating for a narrow-content view). However, I do see how you're trying to address the homunculus problem of mental content in an interesting way. It might be clearer to separate those out in the future, so that way you can drill down on this notion of "autotelic symbols."

      Thanks for the interesting read!

      Erik

      Hmm, I don't really think these two problems can be usefully separated. Rather, the homunculus problem is a problem that arises in trying to solve the problem of reference---namely, trying to solve it by means of an internal representation immediately implies the question of who uses that representation as a representation.

      Consequently, such a naive representational account doesn't work; but if the homunculus problem didn't arise, then the account could do its job, and solve the problem of reference. Likewise, if the homunculus regress could actually be completed---i.e. if we could traverse the entire infinite tower of homunculi---the account would work, giving an answer to how reference works.

      But we typically don't believe such 'supertasks' can be performed; and that's where my construction comes in, replacing the homunculus with my self-reading symbols. If they now do the same work, which I argue they do, then this solves the problem of reference just as well as traversing an infinite tower of homunculi would have.

      Dear Jochen Szangolies

      Nice reply and analysis... have a look at my essay also please....

      Best wishes for your essay

      =snp.gupta

      As I said, you're right that have a relation, but they can also be separated. Accounting for errors in reference is different than the homunculus problem. In fact, I'm not even sure the homunculus argument needs to be framed in terms of reference - although as you point out, it can be.

      All the best,

      Erik

      6 days later

      The essay is well written and calls attention to von Neumann's self-replication construction that could have a relevant role in some forms of intentional behavior.

        Jochen.

        I must say I consider your essay one of the best here. I didn't find it difficult to read and it was spot on topis with some important points. The homunculus fallacy and regression are too little considered in the contest.

        I agree and also discuss the 'three-partite' relationship area, but suggest it seems to leave out the key element, whoever it was who turned a blank sheet of paper into a blueprint, and how. Perhaps you 'roll that in' to the drawing', but I think other important points emerge. Perhaps discuss when you've read mine?

        I also agree your points on mutation but ask; How?. Again I identify a mechanism in my essay which has the advantage of a classic analogue of QMs predictions to shed light on the smallest scale mechanisms.

        Very nicely written. I don't understand why your score is so low, perhaps it's n been trolled with 1's like mine? (three 1's without comment early on!)

        I look forward to discussing further.

        I certainly think yours should be a finalist and my score should help.

        Peter

          7 days later

          Jochen and Lee,

          Most enlightening thread. Particular the concept of a fixed point (you are here). The concept of a GPS for completing a goal is also valid.

          The mathematics is valid but behind this there needs to be a concept (notion) of self with a desire. Hmmm?

          Don Limuti

          Jochen -

          Thank you for working through an interesting problem in a very clear and thoughtful way. The argument is coherent and well-structured from beginning to end, despite its complexities.

          Since I take quite a different approach in my essay on the emergence of meaning, I'm afraid my comments here may not be very helpful in clarifying your theme - I've tried to make up for that by giving your essay the high rating it deserves.

          You understand meaning in terms of reference or representation, which is well-accepted -mainly because it has a kind of clarity that's otherwise hard to achieve. But of course there are many other ways for things to be meaningful - to "make a difference that makes a difference," in Bateson's phrase - without representing other things. You're right that to understand reference we need to include an "agent" as well as a sign and its interpretation... and the rest of your argument follows convincingly, on this basis. More generally, though, what makes things meaningful is the context of possibilities in which they may have some effect, that changes what can happen in other contexts. Such contexts are always complex, hard to represent symbolically. But I've tried to show they can be understood in terms of the functionality of three distinct kinds of recursive systems.

          Your argument about replicators makes a great deal of sense in a computational context. But the original replicators on Earth apparently faced a very different kind of challenge - they could by no means take for granted the existence of well-defined structures more complex than small organic molecules, and there were no blueprints or constructors available. So I suspect there may be basic limitations to computational models of biological systems, including the brain, where information-processing has to operate through interactions that are largely random, at the molecular level. Even in physics, I argue that the mathematical patterning serves a more basic function - that of selecting meaningful, i.e. measurable information out of a background of random events.

          Nonetheless, I find your point very interesting that computational self-replication is only possible through a two-stage process. As you know, von Neumann was also instrumental in developing the two-stage representation of quantum dynamics, which plays a role in my essay. I wonder if there's any connection between these aspects of his work?

          Thanks again for your excellent contribution.

          Conrad

            Dear ðÖð¥Ð...ðÁð¢ Szangolies!

            I invite you to familiarize yourself with New Cartesian Physic

            I appreciate your essay. You spent a lot of effort to write it.

            If you believed in the principle of identity of space and matter of Descartes, then your essay would be even better.

            I wish to see your criticism on the New Cartesian Physic, the founder of which I call myself.

            The concept of moving space-matter helped me:

            - The uncertainty principle Heisenberg to make the principle of definiteness of points of space-matter;

            - Open the law of the constancy of the flow of forces through a closed surface is the sphere of space-matter;

            - Open the law of universal attraction of Lorentz;

            - Give the formula for the pressure of the Universe;

            - To give a definition of gravitational mass as the flow vector of the centrifugal acceleration across the surface of the corpuscles, etc.

            New Cartesian Physic has great potential in understanding the world. To show this potential in his essay I gave The way of The materialist explanation of the paranormal and the supernatural . Visit my essay and you will find something in it about New Cartesian Physic. Note my statement that our brain creates an image of the outside world no inside, and in external space. Hope you rate my essay as high as I am yours. I am waiting your post.

            Sincerely,

            Dizhechko Boris

              Dear Peter,

              thanks very much for your kind words! (Sorry, by the way, in being so late in replying---I was on holiday the past week...)

              I think you correctly identify one of the main points where my proposal still needs work: as it stands, it's indeed not clear how, exactly, the selection process is implemented in the brain (if indeed it is). Mutation as such isn't that difficult: we merely need to stipulate that copying isn't perfect, which seems only realistic. But what decides which version is more fit with respect to the conditions the environment (ultimately) sets up?

              I'll certainly have a look at your essay; maybe you can help me out there!

              Regarding the score---yes, I've noticed a few unfortunate one-point votes without comment. It's a bit of a shame that people feel the need to resort to such practices, but with the voting system as it is, there's probably not a lot to be done right now.

              Cheers,

              Jochen

              Hi JS,

              I want you to ask you to please have a look at my essay, where ...............reproduction of Galaxies in the Universe is described. Dynamic Universe Model is another mathematical model for Universe. Its mathematics show that the movement of masses will be having a purpose or goal, Different Galaxies will be born and die (quench) etc...just have a look at the essay... "Distances, Locations, Ages and Reproduction of Galaxies in our Dynamic Universe" where UGF (Universal Gravitational force) acting on each and every mass, will create a direction and purpose of movement.....

              I think intension is inherited from Universe itself to all Biological systems

              For your information Dynamic Universe model is totally based on experimental results. Here in Dynamic Universe Model Space is Space and time is time in cosmology level or in any level. In the classical general relativity, space and time are convertible in to each other.

              Many papers and books on Dynamic Universe Model were published by the author on unsolved problems of present day Physics, for example 'Absolute Rest frame of reference is not necessary' (1994) , 'Multiple bending of light ray can create many images for one Galaxy: in our dynamic universe', About "SITA" simulations, 'Missing mass in Galaxy is NOT required', "New mathematics tensors without Differential and Integral equations", "Information, Reality and Relics of Cosmic Microwave Background", "Dynamic Universe Model explains the Discrepancies of Very-Long-Baseline Interferometry Observations.", in 2015 'Explaining Formation of Astronomical Jets Using Dynamic Universe Model, 'Explaining Pioneer anomaly', 'Explaining Near luminal velocities in Astronomical jets', 'Observation of super luminal neutrinos', 'Process of quenching in Galaxies due to formation of hole at the center of Galaxy, as its central densemass dries up', "Dynamic Universe Model Predicts the Trajectory of New Horizons Satellite Going to Pluto" etc., are some more papers from the Dynamic Universe model. Four Books also were published. Book1 shows Dynamic Universe Model is singularity free and body to collision free, Book 2, and Book 3 are explanation of equations of Dynamic Universe model. Book 4 deals about prediction and finding of Blue shifted Galaxies in the universe.

              With axioms like... No Isotropy; No Homogeneity; No Space-time continuum; Non-uniform density of matter(Universe is lumpy); No singularities; No collisions between bodies; No Blackholes; No warm holes; No Bigbang; No repulsion between distant Galaxies; Non-empty Universe; No imaginary or negative time axis; No imaginary X, Y, Z axes; No differential and Integral Equations mathematically; No General Relativity and Model does not reduce to General Relativity on any condition; No Creation of matter like Bigbang or steady-state models; No many mini Bigbangs; No Missing Mass; No Dark matter; No Dark energy; No Bigbang generated CMB detected; No Multi-verses etc.

              Many predictions of Dynamic Universe Model came true, like Blue shifted Galaxies and no dark matter. Dynamic Universe Model gave many results otherwise difficult to explain

              Have a look at my essay on Dynamic Universe Model and its blog also where all my books and papers are available for free downloading...

              http://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.in/

              Best wishes to your essay.

              For your blessings please................

              =snp. gupta