Responding to the second last:
> I hope you don't mind, but I don't agree with Platonism for the following 3 reasons: 1) Platonism seems to imply that the power to bestow rules exists outside the universe, with the Platonic realm being like a puppeteer, and the universe being like a poor puppet.
- Well in a sense that may be the case. It is unclear if the possibility spaces of physics and biology precede the existence of the universe, or come into being with it. Some people believe the former: that the laws of physics brought the universe into being. In any case they certainly dictate what is and what is not possible, once the universe is in existence; and they are timeless eternal relationships, hence of a Platonic nature.
> 2) Platonism seems to hypothesise (i) that all rules must abstractly exist, rather than (ii) hypothesising that what exists is the raw material to make rules (where the raw material is an inherent ability to create rules/categories; rules being equivalent to categories because a category is like an equation re-arranged so that the category is on one side of the equal sign).
- (i) is true of Mathematical Platonism, which I subscribe to. (ii) may be true of physical and biological platonism (for the latter, see Wagner's book I refer to).
> 3) Platonism is seemingly uneconomical about numbers as well: it seems to hypothesise that all numbers must abstractly exist, rather than hypothesising that what exists is the raw material to make numbers. Surely numbers, even numbers like pi, must ultimately derive from the fact that with some rules/relationships, you can cancel the numerator and denominator categories, and end up with a number: a thing without a category. I'm contending that numbers are essentially due to relationships, rather than being like little rocks. (I also contend that the set theory view of numbers is too unlike the equation-like structure of law-of-nature rules, for numbers-as-sets to exist at the level of fundamental-level reality.)
- I am open to discussion about numbers; you may be right. What I have in mind is facts such as the square root of 2 is irrational. That is a timeless unchanging mathematical fact, hence has a Platonic nature.
> In any case, I think the hypothesis that what exists is the raw materials with which to make new rules/categories and numbers, is no more fantastical than the hypothesis that what exists is an (uneconomical!) Platonic realm of every possible rule and number.
- yes but where do the rules of logic come from? They are a set of unchanging possibilities that we discover and explore with our minds. They have a Platonic nature.
> I hope you don't mind if I say that Platonic realms seem to be all about deterministic mechanisms and a universe that has no control over the functions bestowed upon it by the realm;
- yes
> complex systems are all about deterministic mechanisms and the illusion that new function could evolve purely from the mechanism;
- well I don't think its an illusion, because that view rests on the assumption there is only bottom up causation, which I dispute;
> but actual reality is both mechanism and continually creative of the truly new:
- yes here we agree.
> Also on the radio this morning: Bees are smarter than we give them credit for - "They may have tiny brains, but it turns out that bumblebees can not only learn to use tools by observing others, they can improvise and make the task even easier", http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-24/smart-bees-learn-how-t
o-use-tools-by-watching-others/8297576 .
Ah bees are very intelligent. They can understand abstract symbols. That is an emergent power that physics enables but does not dictate.
regards
george