Dear Christopher D. Fiorillo
Than you for your thoughtful comments.
>> It seems that you are only making an assertion when you state that goals are lacking in non-biological systems. You explicitly presented that as an assertion at the start, and I did not recognize a subsequent argument to support it.
Several others have raised similar issues; I am surprised by this. Perhaps you are thinking of something like energy minimisation. I do not classify that as a goal, as it is not the result of an intention or a purposeful mechanism: it is just the way purposeless laws work, and there is no option about it. Animals can and do change their goals according to circumstances.
>>> How do you define what it means to have a "goal" or "intention?" We can intuitively recognize intentionality in biology, but to draw strong conclusions about its relation to physical systems requires a precise definition that would allow us to judge whether or not a physical system does or does not have intentionality.
At a higher level, it is a potential outcome that is the result of choice: it could have been different. At a lower level, it is a potential outcome that is a result of interacting systems actively working to attain that outcome (which activity costs energy).
>> We can describe the state of an ion channel or other protein with logical statements (equations 5 and 6). However, any physical system, following any rule, can be described by logical statements.
Yes, but physical laws are not arbitrary - they are immutably given us by Nature, for example an inverse square law of repulsion of like electric charges. The key point in (5) is where I emphasize that the logical and mathematical functions can be anything. They are not fixed by physical laws.
>> Relative to a 'free' particle than can quite readily accelerate in any direction, an ion channel or other protein tends to transition between only a small number of "discrete" states (although more than two, to be realistic).
sure
>> That is a very important difference between higher and lower structures, but it is not a dichotomy. In the most detailed and realistic model that we could make of a protein (a quantum model), it would be possible for its component particles to accelerate in any direction at any time, however unlikely that might be. Because of the forces binding particles within a protein, a configuration that we label as a 'protein' is "more nearly binary" compared to a configuration in which the same number of particles are "free" of one another (separated enough so that interactions are weak).
It has a specific structural character that is preserved over time, even if conformation changes
>> But even a single particle could be described with a sufficient number of logical statements (for quantum or classical or any other rules).
See above: they are not arbitrary, they are fixed by fundamental physics.
>>> If you mean to identify logical statements with intentionality, then would it not follow that any physical system has intentionality?
No. Physical systems are constrained by the initial data to do just one thing. Biological systems alter the way they react according to environmental conditions.
>> "The key point is that the functions T(X), F1(Y) and F2(Z) are not determined by the underlying physical laws; they can be shaped by evolutionary or developmental processes in highly complex ways (as for example in the citric acid cycle), or planned by human thought to produce any desired outcome"
Precisely so
>> The above statement seems to say that inanimate matter follows the laws of physics but animate matter does not.
Not at all. Living matter is structured so as to channel the underlying physical laws, which are always true. in order to attain specific goals.
>> I argue that a person is a configuration of particles following the laws of physics.
Indeed
>> But that does not imply "merely a configuration of particles." A person is a very special and unique configuration of particles, with special and unique properties (physical and mental).
Yes again.
>> Though not of fundamental importance to your argument, or my criticisms above, I think I should point out that equation 6 is not correct (except as a very rough approximation that is never made in biophysics, as in the case that "greater" means at least 0.1 V greater). Neither a single ion channel, nor a population, has a "voltage threshold." As membrane voltage changes in a graded manner (on the scale of millivolts), the probability of channel opening will change in a graded manner, and thus the number of open channels will change in a graded manner. In order for a voltage-sensitive channel to transition from closed to open with near certainty requires a change of at least ~50 mV, and that is very large on the physiological scale (see Hille, "Ion Channels of Excitable Membranes").
Ok I agree. It is an approximate description. We can use a more accurate description as you point out. The point then is that that response function you describe is not determined by the underlying physics per se. It is determined by the structure of the ion channel, which provides the physical laws a context in which to function so as to achieve that outcome.
>>> Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that you are a physicist who appears to be arguing for a fundamental dichotomy between animate and inanimate matter,
Not the matter per se, which is identical at the particle level, but they way it is organised, which is very different at the molecular level
>>> I want to emphasize that I am not a materialist; in my essay I label my framework as "anthropomorphic reductionism" (which I intend to be both humorous and accurate). I believe that intentionality is a property of matter, although it certainly does emerge with complexity in a quantitative sense.
Ok then we agree on that
Thanks for the kind comments
Best wishes
George