Dear Alexey and Lev,
Perhaps you will excuse me for being tardy in replying to your comment here. It is not easy to read several different essays and then engage in multiple discussions, in the midst of other projects and tasks as well. However, your remarks about metaphysics and ethics are very important. I have thought about what you say, and I would like to respond.
Let me begin by agreeing with you that "the beauty of the world" is an extremely important aspect of things. At the end of the Book of Job two components of this beauty are emphasized. The workings of nature, many of them at least, are immediately delightful upon perception, apart from intellectual examination of them. Furthermore, also according to the Book of Job, when we do think about natural objects and processes, they disclose to us additional aspects of intricacy and grandeur.
Leibniz agrees with the general approach of the Book of Job, but his position is importantly different. When Leibniz says that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds, his standard of goodness, like that of the Book of Job, involves a kind of beauty. For Leibniz, however, the beauty of the world is primarily a quasi-mathematical elegance. The world, Leibniz asserts, is at once very simple in its basic principles and quite rich in its detailed phenomena. This conjoint simplicity and richness is not as evident as the workings of nature mentioned in the Book of Job. Leibniz is talking about something which requires persistent investigation to detect.
Leibniz and the Book of Job do not contradict one another. They simply emphasize different aspects of the world's beauty. We can agree that the world is beautiful in various ways. Some of the beauty can be immediately apparent to conscious human observers. Other aspects of the beauty require effort to uncover. We can accept that nature is beautiful in several ways, and we can appreciate the different layers of beauty.
Nietzsche takes this line of thought in a different direction, but not in a direction necessarily antithetical to what we have just considered. Although Nietzsche may not talk much about beauty, he is interested in values above all else, and for him the primary values, and indeed the only ones he affirms, are those of aesthetic excellence. Nietzsche differs from the Book of Job and from Leibniz in that Nietzsche approaches aesthetic excellence from the standpoint of a creative artist rather than from the standpoint of a person who contemplates and appreciates excellence which already exists. In Nietzsche's view, the important thing is to create works of aesthetic excellence. Also according to Nietzsche, the most difficult task is to form oneself into a splendid work. If one can come close enough to succeeding at that, the result will be consequential and praiseworthy.
Once again, there is no contradiction here. We can agree that the production of excellent works complements the appreciation of various forms of beauty in nature.
At this point a serious error can enter the discussion with another theme from Nietzsche's philosophy. Not content with extolling creative excellence, Nietzsche spends much time and effort denigrating normative philosophies which differ from his. He attacks Kantian ethics and all forms of utilitarianism. More generally, Nietzsche seems to have nothing but contempt for what we might think of as humane values, such as justice, fairness, kindness, compassion, the relief of suffering, and the like. It is not too difficult to look beneath his words to his underlying motivation. Nietzsche sees that, if values such as these are the correct ones, then the world stands condemned, because the world does not operate according to principles of this sort. In the historical context of nineteenth-century philosophy, the opposition between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is evident. In Schopenhauer's view, suffering is the chief fact to which we should attend and compassion is the core of ethics. Schopenhauer does condemn the world as a place of suffering. Nietzsche takes the opposite view. As theodicy is part of Leibniz's enterprise, so cosmodicy is essential to Nietzsche's philosophy.
(A search in Google shows that the word "cosmodicy" has been in use for some time, and that the topic has been discussed both in general and particularly with reference to Nietzsche's thinking.)
It is both helpful and interesting to look at what other people have thought and said, but of course the important question is what assessment we ought to make, all things considered. Suppose, then, we ask, "From the standpoint of conscious human individuals, is the world in which they find themselves a good place or is it not?" I do not think we can give an unqualified answer to this question. The beauty of the world in its various forms is genuine, and to the extent that people engage with it and (as Nietzsche advocates) add to it, the world is a good place. But Schopenhauer, and many others with him, are also correct. Suffering, like beauty, comes in various forms. The pain of existence is as real and as significant as the sublimity of existence. If there is some way to overcome this opposition, if there is some resolution in a higher synthesis, it is not now apparent how that could be done.
In your comments on the Web page for my essay, you mention the "paradoxical worldview," and you discuss the issue of how we should think about paradoxes in worldviews and perhaps in the world itself. I intend to add to that discussion on the Web page for my essay. I am not sure whether the idea of paradox is relevant to the present discussion of evaluations. Perhaps you would not count this kind of opposition between evaluations as a paradox. Maybe it is a kind of paradox. By whatever name the opposition might be called, it does seem to be the way things are, or at least the way they appear to be.
Obviously, more could be said about these matters, but additional thoughts will have to wait for another time.
Laurence Hitterdale
