Dear Edwin,
thank you for reading and commenting. I agree that my conclusion that "mindless mathematical laws can give rise to aims and intentions" heavily depends on how I interpreted FQXi's question. Many contributions fall into two categories corresponding to two different interpretations of the question "How can mindless mathematical laws give rise to aims and intention?"
Some essays interpret the "mindless mathematical laws" as elements of our theories about the world. Then the question gets the following meaning: (i) We use the notions of goals, aims or intention in some of our theories about the world. (ii) We do not use these notions in what we call our "fundamental" theories. (iii) How can that be? Can (i) even be consistent with (ii)? If yes, what happens somewhere on the way from (ii) to (i). My essay falls in this category.
Other essays interpret the "mindless mathematical laws" in an ontological way. Then the question presupposes that mathematics itself is the foundation of the world, not only as an element of a theory but as an element of the world itself. The task would then be to explain how the material world together with goals, aims or intentions arises from mathematics. Some essays embrace this idea and develop some kind of Platonism. Others reject it. Yours is of the latter kind.
Your conclusion "math is a formal byproduct, having nothing to do with giving rise to awareness, volition, or purpose" and my conclusion cited above sound mutually exclusive. But given that we answer different questions, I think that our conclusions do not even contradict each other.
Cheers, Stefan