The Making of the Mind: What is Intrinsic to Matter and What Emerges with Complexity? by Christopher D. Fiorillo

Dear Conrad,

Thank you for your thoughtful and well written comments on my essay. I am glad that you appreciated the style of my essay, if not so much the substance.

It is natural and appropriate for a critique to focus on differences rather than similarities in viewpoints. Nonetheless, after reading your essay, I am surprised by some of your criticisms. Both our essays covered the broad range from particles to human minds, and we both emphasized similarities across these levels, as well as differences. Considering the range of ideas and approaches expressed across all essays, I would say that ours are relatively similar.

From your 'references':

"My views on physics as a functional system are eccentric. So far as I'm aware, the only explorations of this idea are in my previous essays for FQXi"

I am not certain how you define "physics as a functional system," but I am quite certain that my views of physics would fall under your definition.

it is certainly not true to say that biological "behavior is just a thing in motion," or that "emergence means creating more complex geometry from less complex geometry."

My point in that paragraph was that behavior of an animal is not a "mental" phenomenon. I was writing briefly and informally, but I meant that behavior can be well described as a complex and dynamic configuration of particles. Science today does not have a fundamental problem in explaining behavior, but it does have a fundamental problem in explaining "mind" and mental phenomena.

I certainly stand by my statement about geometry and emergence. I don't think anything falls outside of geometry. A configuration of particles is much more than the "sum of its parts" because it has a complex and unique geometry that "emerges" from the interactions of its particles.

"The fact that molecules in living cells operate according to exactly the same laws of physics that all molecules do isn't the whole story. Molecules like proteins aren't just radically more complicated than inorganic molecules, they're specifically built to fulfill very complex functions."

Yes, I agree with all of that.

"No kind of "knowing" is involved here; this is just the kind of thing that can evolve through Darwinian selection, once some kind of physical system manages to master the basic but exceedingly difficult trick of reproduction."

If you think that there is no knowledge (information) in a particle, then you must explain how knowledge emerges from a total absence of knowledge (something from nothing). You must use your knowledge and reason to argue for something more fundamental than knowledge. Knowledge is the most fundamental concept in my view, and that was the main premise of my essay. I believe that if you define your key concepts very precisely (for example, meaning, measurement, accident, reproduction, software) you will find that they all concern knowledge or its absence.

"The problem with the "theory of mind" approach (aka the "theory theory") is that this special kind of imaginative connection between people goes much deeper than any "belief" or "theory" we have. It's already at work in some way from the time we're born."

I do not understand exactly what you mean here. ToM is knowledge (belief) that different observers have different knowledge. I am arguing that scientists and philosophers must use this specific knowledge (theory of mind) to properly understand all mental concepts and their relation to physical concepts. The conventional approach has been autistic.

If you mean ToM more narrowly, as a specific cognitive ability, then certainly most of brain function and cognition has nothing to do with it. But all of brain function concerns information (knowledge, belief).

Thank you again for your comments and essay.

Best wishes,

Christopher

Dear Conrad,

Thank you for your thoughtful response.

I think that much of our apparent disagreement concerns the nature of objectivity and subjectivity. You wrote:

"science has done great job investigating the parts of the world that can be conceptualized objectively - i.e. without regard to individual viewpoints - and that (B) there's much more to be learned, even in physics, by taking viewpoints into account. The thing is, I'm very uncomfortable with the way you express this other side of the world as "mental" and "subjective"."

And in your 2012 essay abstract:

"When we describe things objectively, from no particular viewpoint, we necessarily abstract from these particular physical contexts. So theoretical descriptions of objective reality necessarily overlook the environmental structure that makes information observable. Though objective theory works well in classical physics, I doubt that this contextual structure can be ignored at a fundamental level"

I have not yet read your 2012 essay, but I think that I generally agree with your critique of "objective theory." However, I have very strong views about the meaning of 'objective' and 'subjective.' I wrote about this briefly in my essay, and extensively in a 2012 paper in the journal 'Information' (open access). I follow Jaynes (2003 textbook) in believing that information (knowledge) is always subjective insofar as it is local in space and time, whereas logic (reason) is universal and objective. 'Subjective' should not be taken to imply that evidence is weak or not real. Scientific knowledge is fundamentally subjective, no matter how strong the evidence. It is not possible to have "no particular viewpoint." In science we strive to have more information, and to share it with one another to achieve a common understanding, a "single viewpoint of Science." I think that is what people usually intend when they use "objective," but I disagree with that usage of the term. Reason is objective because it is universal, and therefore applies across all viewpoints.

"Reading your essay more carefully, I can see you're quite sensitive to these differences. Yet you rather aggressively pursue anthropomorphic descriptions. I think that's because it seems to you a strong argument - that if we have conscious experience, so must the things we evolved from, and the things they evolved from. Mentality can't arise ex nihilo, because nothing can. This is the basic "panpsychist" argument, which I strongly disagree with."

I considered not writing anything about the physical basis of consciousness (the section near the end of my essay), because it is not essential to my framework, and because it is necessarily speculative in a way that goes beyond the other issues. I think it is perfectly rational to believe that if I have consciousness, other things most likely have it as well. That is certainly weak evidence and thus a weak argument. However, no one has any strong evidence about which physical things are or are not conscious, since there is no data that scientists can share. I only know with certainty about one instance in the universe, and that is me. I could be unique. My argument about consciousness is rational, but far from compelling.

My more general argument about mental properties and subjectivity does not rest upon such a weak foundation. I am not being anthropomorphic out of a belief that other things are like myself. My framework is based on my understanding of knowledge and reason, and how I believe these concepts relate to the brain and other physical systems. 'Theory of mind' is critical, because I believe that other things also have subjectivity insofar as they have local information, and that information is different from my information. That concept has been essential to progress in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, but generally neglected throughout the rest of science.

Objectivity is also critical, because everything in my framework assumes a rational universe (I did not state that explicitly in the essay. One could argue that it is an enormous assumption, or alternatively, no assumption at all).

"Emergence is not just the increasing complexity of what's already there at the start. When new kinds of relationships arise, entirely new kinds of structure become possible, which then make possible entirely new kinds of relationships."

I fully agree with you, except that the definition of "complexity" is important. An ellipse has properties (relations) that simply do not exist for a circle, like orientation. We could say that an ellipse emerges from the relation of two circles (with different locations), and that orientation is therefore created from the relation of components that had no orientation ("something from nothing," in a limited sense). I would say that an ellipse is more complex than a circle, and that this example captures the essence of how everything emerges from interactions between particles.

"So if we want to talk about "knowing" all the way back to particle physics, they key thing would be to describe the contexts in which what's "known" makes a difference, at each level."

Yes, I fully agree. That is what I have tried to do, and that is why I devoted much of my essay to describing what emerges and how. I think that everything emerges, but it emerges from interactions between particles that are information and consequently have mental properties.

Thank you again for your excellent comments, and essays.

Best wishes,

Christopher

Dear James,

Thank you for your thoughtful comments, as well as your essay. I enjoyed reading it, and I wrote comments on it as well.

We have very similar views with regards to the important philosophical issues, which I discussed only briefly and informally in my essay, but which you explored in greater detail in yours.

"Where we disagree is your identification of "knowledge" as "the foundation" of consciousness. "

It is the foundation of everything in my opinion.

"Instead of knowledge I identify spontaneity as "the foundation", which I think serves us better, because knowledge requires cognitive equipment. "

To view 'knowledge' as a higher mental phenomenon is the standard perspective. In the past I have more often used 'information,' which is synonymous by my definition. I think that these terms should not be reserved for higher mental functions. Something must be at the foundation. I think it is problematic to argue that 'particles' are more fundamental than knowledge, especially since all of our understanding of everything is based on our knowledge.

I agree with you about spontaneity, or at least with my understanding of your views about it (see my comments on your essay). I probably interpret it somewhat differently than you do, and I would not choose the term 'spontaneity.' I interpret you to mean 'uncertainty,' which I would define through probabilities conditional on knowledge. If it is defined in that way, then I think we are in agreement. Knowledge and uncertainty (spontaneity) go hand in hand. They have an inverse relation, but they are inseparable, analogous to reality and imagination, or matter and space.

I also view your 'spontaneity' as concerning the dynamics of a system over time. I did not directly or sufficiently address dynamics in my essay, although it is essential to my framework. To explain my view informally and briefly, I would say that "a thing freely chooses its future, constrained only by its present knowledge of the future." 'Freely' could be replaced by 'spontaneously,' or even 'randomly' (although I detest the latter term). To make this precise would require identification of a probability distribution over future configurations conditional on the present configuration.

"And I think you're over-broad where you say "If a particle has intention, so does everything else"; I say if a quantum has intentionality, so does everything else that is individual, excluding things like rocks and planets."

I am not sure how you define "a quantum," but I interpret it as "a particle in motion." You seem to be quite generous in attributing intentionality, and I do not recognize a clear and definite distinction between your views and mine. However, I am not certain exactly how you define "individual," or why you exclude rocks and planets, even after reading the addendum to your essay that you posted March 28.

I refer in my essay to information that is "local in space and time," and that is what I mean by "a thing." A thing is an individual in that sense, and I imagine that is what you mean by 'an individual.'

A rock (and a planet) has some information that is local and specific to it, and shared by its constituent particles. All the particles share similar location and momentum, relative to other 'things,' and thus those are properties of 'the rock.' I attribute some intentionality to the rock, and also some distinct intentionality to each of its constituent particles. The particles in a rock share some information with one another, but not all their information. Each particle is 'an individual,' with its own location and velocity that is at least somewhat different from any other particle.

"Other universal attributions of human faculties like happiness, perception, prediction, seek mates, invention, internal knowledge, growth strategy, etc, seem unnecessarily anthropomorphic."

I do attribute a primitive form of mental attributes to a particle, since I think mental attributes accompany all information. I would not attribute all the terms you list above to a particle (and I did not use all of those), but it depends on the precise definitions. I have never seen a precise definition of some of those terms (precise with respect to physical systems).

I was partly joking when I embraced the term 'anthropomorphic,' since that term has connotations that I do not endorse. What I meant was that we need to use 'Theory of Mind' to understand a particle from its perspective (given its local information). We need to "imagine being a particle," which corresponds more formally to finding the probability distribution over future (or external) states conditional on the present state (the present state is knowledge). Certainly it would be a major error were I to confuse my perspective with that of a particle or any other thing or person. In fact, that confusion is exactly what happens if people do not utilize theory of mind (as in autism). A child under the age of 5 literally makes that mistake, as do many otherwise brilliant scientists (see my 2012 paper in the journal 'Information' for examples).

One of my objectives is to understand the relation of mind to matter. But another is to better understand matter and physics. Einstein essentially took the perspective of particles and other things in his thought experiments, and that was useful in understanding physics. I think that the only difference in my approach is that I attribute mental properties to physical things. But I do not deviate at all from known physics, or speculate about anything immaterial. My attribution of a 'mind' to a person or other thing has no consequence at all to causality or the dynamics of matter. I do it in part because I think it can help us to better understand and predict the world. Humans (adults) apply this approach to other humans, and over time humans have applied it more and more to understanding animals. Einstein made progress by partially and implicitly attributing 'mind' to physical things, even if he did not call it that. I would like to take it further.

"Less importantly, I'm perplexed by your focus on survival as an obsessive motivation: "Every thought enters my mind because there is evidence that it is relevant to my survival." The issue of survival is normally far from my mind. By your own standard, my intentions unrelated to survival suggests that it isn't primary or exclusive unless it is threatened."

Intentionality requires a goal, and I identify 'survival' as that goal. 'Survival' implies stability and stasis, although obviously it requires change. Like everything in my framework, I defined it in terms of knowledge and probabilities (in the future I need to present these ideas with formal mathematics). I try to minimize the number of terms I use, but I also try to use familiar terms like 'survival.' A more precise statement of my proposal is that "the goal or intention of present knowledge is to maximize future knowledge." I define 'good' as an increase in knowledge. The goal is a better world, not maintaining my present state. I think that intention generalizes across all 'things' (though I am not saying it is the same; I have more intentionality than a particle, and I have more intentions than a particle).

Certainly we do not often think about our survival, and animals surely have no concept of survival (information about survival is distinct from information about the concept of survival). But animals and other things have survived because they have information that contributes to causing their survival. They were 'designed, or 'selected' for survival. The brain is designed to make decisions that promote survival, and to do that, all of its information should concern future survival. 'Information about food' is also 'information about future survival.' When I think about food, I am not usually aware of its relevance to my survival. With respect to my understanding and intentions, it is appropriate to say "I have the goal of eating," and "not the goal of survival." However, one could view the former as the proximal goal and the latter as the distal and ultimate goal. To a biologist or philosopher considering the evolution of the universe, I eat to survive. When I think about science, I don't often think about why it matters or why I am doing it. But ultimately, I believe that I do it, and it matters, because I believe that survival is good and science promotes survival (whether I believe that consciously or unconsciously).

Finally, I enjoyed reading your 2012 paper, "An Advancing Time Hypothesis." The topic is currently at the frontier of my understanding, so I will not comment on it at this time. But I am thinking about how space and time are "shaped" by information.

My email is 'fiorillo at kaist dot ac dot kr'. Feel free to contact me directly (especially after this website stops taking comments).

Best wishes,

Christopher