Essay Abstract
How is it possible for a physical system to have goals? In the way we commonly use the notion, goals have qualities that are different from attractor states that characterize the dynamics of a system's progression. Goals are part of the characterization of at least minimally intentional systems. Thus, our question cannot be extricated from: What is the minimal descriptive frame that allows us to describe a system as representing, choosing, committing to and pursuing goals? And when we can answer that: what processes and dynamics are necessary and sufficient for the genesis of such a system?
Author Bio
Joscha Bach is a cognitive scientist and AI researcher, specializing in cognitive architectures, Artificial General Intelligence, and models of motivation and decision making. He obtained his PhD from the Institute of Cognitive Science in Osnabrück, worked at Humboldt University of Berlin and the MIT Media Lab, and is currently affiliated with Harvard's Program of Evolutionary Dynamics in Cambridge, MA.