Thank you, Colin, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a worthwhile place to learn about how philosophers of physics think -- not always sensibly, because philosophers, but it's almost always at least not obvious why an idea is nonsense. The SEP often doesn't obscure ideas by using technical words quite as badly as does the philosophy literature proper.
Indeed, the whole concept of a smallest scale is tendentious. One has the Javelin argument that the universe is infinite in extent and the turtles-all-the-way-down argument, which one can turn to anything that rests or relies on anotherthing. So, I suppose, one could have a microscopes-all-the-way-down argument, or one could just talk of fractals, which in broad summary is apparently Steve Dufourny's approach, though there is an infinite diversity of possible fractal structure). Such arguments are not definitive: the Wikipedia page is very keen to deflate the javelin argument by mentioning that the universe might be a closed space, like a sphere, but the javelin argument also fails if the javelin we use keeps breaking (because temperature or whatever) so we have to keep replacing each javelin with successive different kinds of javelin, if we can, or if we cease being able to detect the javelin from where we are, so that perhaps the javelin does or does not exist (and, mutatis mutandis, microscopes for javelins); so perhaps the world is fractal, but perhaps it is not. I think the question, however, is how much of life rests on whether it's all the way out or inwards or not? For me the answer is that it is not at all, even though knowledge and skills still seem precious things.
Ian Hacking's idea that spraying electrons makes them really real (or something like that) has had a profound effect on how people think about electrons, but we do not know whether there will be such a thing in some future theory. There will be an account, more-or-less, of how what an electron used to be thought to be is related to the structure of the future theory (just as quantization is an account, more-or-less, of how classical is related to quantum), but electrons may eventually be thought to be no more helpful as an idea than was phlogiston, even though we will very likely continue to use quantum mechanics as a practical mathematics just as we still use Newtonian mechanics. That's the pessimistic metainduction applied to the specific case of the electron, so it could be wrong, and anyway it's OK to use at least the idea of an electron field until we have something else to use (again, this is not a counsel of despair, it's a counsel against hubris). Against thinking in terms of electrons too much, try my YouTube video, Quantum Mechanics: Event Thinking, because, after all, too much Particle Thinking is a bugbear of mine.