Essay Abstract

I propose "scientific ontology" as a research program to determine what is "fundamental". Since the publication of my article "On a Loophole in Causal Closure", the perceived monism of the world is no longer certain. In the article, interfaces between universes are shown to be consistent with causal closure via an adjustment in the definition of causal closure. The old definition makes the veracity of a claim regarding what the universe "is" as likely as that of any other claim. For instance, the convincing claim of Tegmark in 2008 that the universe is mathematical is as likely as the claim that the universe is physical. However, according to the new definition, dualism is consistent with causal closure. Therefore, we may have both mathematical and physical universes, which are joined by an interface. Scientific ontology aims to theoretically account for that eventuality. In doing so, scientific ontology finds itself constituting an intermediate level of inquiry between the philosophy of physics and physics itself.

Author Bio

Johan Gamper is a clinical psychologist at Stockholm Health Care Services. He recently published "On a Loophole in Causal Closure". In 2017, he founded the Karl P U Institute to provide an independent platform for scientific ontology.

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Hi Johan,

You question whether our physical universe is mathematical and therefore will only need to obey mathematical rules with no meaningful initial physical foundation compared to a domain where everything that exists is physical.

You posed the question very well and suggest that we keep an open mind. I found this statement most interesting...

"Scientific ontology should first account for a consistent theoretical model - on an ontological level - of a universe that is potentially linked with another universe through an interface."

What if there is physical model that accounts for a consistent theoretical model on an ontological level AND also shows that it is physically impossible to link with another universe? That would put an end to Tegmark's universe of math and the Multiverse in one shot! Right?

    Scott,

    I'm saying that the traditional principle of the causal closure of the physical, taken to apply generally as a principle of causal closure of any ontological domain, is neutral as to what "the universe" is. That principle, however, implicates that whatever universe we inhabit, that universe cannot be affected by nor affect any other universe. In effect, therefore, we have what I call a causally monistic universe. So, the universe could be mathematical or physical but not both.

    With the proposed adjustment of the definition of the principle of causal closure, however, the eventuality of two adjoining universes of different ontological types, is consistent with the principle of causal closure. The thing, now, which is the object for scientific ontology as I define it, is to theoretically account for the possibility of an interface between two ontologically different universes (say, a mathematical universe and a physical universe). On that ontological basis, the next step - for physics - is to determine if there is an actual interface preceding the physical universe.

    To answer your question as I see it a physical model cannot account for a consistent theoretical model on an ontological level. A physical model, however, could show that a specific description of an interface is physically impossible. Before that, naturally, scientific ontology must come up with such description. As I am working on one right now I take the opportunity to ask the reader for advice as how to possibly have an endorsement from an arxiv.org user to submit an article to category physics.gen-ph.

    12 days later

    Hi Johan, I found your essay very interesting. One thing that I'm not clear on is why you say "If we accept the principle of causal closure, we cannot be sure that the world is physical; it may be mathematical. In addition, if we choose one alternative, we must let go of the other." Why must one be relinquished? It seems to me that the existent universe can have physical reality by which I mean it is something happening that we can identity as physics and chemistry etc.yet we can also mentally relate to it by considering the relations that are within it that we can identify as mathematics.A bit like a painted pattern consists of pigments but also the geometry of the shapes formed by the pigments.No pigment no mathematical relations forming the pattern, no mathematical relations no pattern either.(Similarly, I also think that information requires an existent host as do EM waves.)

    I do think that the relations that remain when the rest has been stripped away are important but I don't think the abstract entities have 'a life of their own'. Disembodied mass, and velocity for example are meaningless. Mass is mass of something and velocity is velocity of something relative to the observer.

    Though provoking and very readable. Kind regards Georgina

      According to the old definition of causal closure of the physical we had to choose between the one universe and the other if we considered substance dualism. Substance dualism is of the kind that don't allow you to see different things as "aspects" of one thing . Either they are different or not and not in an easy way but ontologically.

      It is like imaginary things and other things. If they are not imaginary they are real. If we consider the new definition of causal closure real things possibly can be of different ontological status. Since this thought rests on a new basic assumption which for me is to say that it rests on a new ontology, my article really is part of a new ontological paradigm.

      The traditional ontology offers only one kind of ontological things. Of that kind we can have aspects and also mentally "relate to it by considering the relations". Following the old definition, though, "the abstract entities"cannot "have 'a life of their own'". And that is exactly what I mean. The traditional ontology does not permit physical things to coexist with, e.g., mathematical things.

      /Johan Gamper

      Ps

      I do agree that "mass is mass of something".

        Thanks for explaining that-interesting. Yet I don't think mathematical 'things 'can exist of themselves . A quantity is a something, a relationship is between existent things or phenomena. Without physical existence there is neither quantity, category or geometry. Though we can think abstractly and use devices that work with abstract entities, sand imagine independent mathematics- yet it requires wetware or hardware to exist.

        Scientific ontology, on the other hand, is not about what we think or find plausible. My view is that we must accommodate the unlikely event of an interface between universes before we can rule it out. This is to say that the thing we want to rule out must, so to speak, be allowed the best evidence and according to the new definition of causal closure an interface is if not possible at least consistent with causal closure.

        I should have said 'velocity' is velocity of something, relative to the observer or other reference object. The main point being it must pertain to something existent. Adding, because it is the way variables are identified - measured by imposing a particular perspective. Which is another point entirely about the way in which measurement imposes a perspective that gives a singular value result -rather than the complete profile of all possible relative measurements. Which ties together with the 'many worlds' of possibility becoming one upon measurement, that is relevant to quantum physics in particular. The many worlds of possibility being many different viewpoints of the same universe,(when considering something within it), not actually many different universes.I digress, but thought you might find the further explanation for my wording interesting.

        Would you perhaps say that this argument ties over to the question of Agency in the physical world?

        Hi, I see agency requiring a foundational passage of time that provides an open future rather than block time, or space-time continuum. So that the pattern of existence does not just exist, see-able/measureable from many viewpoints but is happening. So it isn't existence with a fixed mathematical structure of relations but one that changes. Not just giving the appearance of change. As I see it, existence and change provide that foundational time which is fundamental to the universe we live in.

        Hi Johan, looking into the idea of causal closure, I find it a strange artificial division of ways of thinking about the universe. My own view is that there cannot be independently existing mathematics. It must have some kind of host. Either embodied by the material structure of existence, or generated as abstract 'things' within wetware or software, or generated as external representations that require a material host of some kind.

        Yet when it comes to describing the cause of something; it could be for example the geometry of a configuration of matter that is fundamental to the outcome. Rather than merely the constituents. The function of enzymes is a good example. Their function depending on correct folding so that they fit with the substrate they act upon. Signal molecules and their receptors is another example. However the geometry can not be without the existent constituents of the molecule. So I don't think it is one 'universe type'alone or the other 'universe type' alone.They are aspects of the same. I think this sort of corresponds to what you are saying, but it isn't an interface of two different universe (for the kinds of examples i have given) but different considerations of the same.

        Though there can be other relations between math and the Material universe where the maths is a product of wet ware or software within the Material universe but not itself representing that universe. I don't think the products really deserve to be considered as universes in their own right, as they are not independently existing but fully dependent for their existence on the Material universe in which they were generated.

        Re.'velocity' is velocity of something, relative to the observer or other reference object. It ought to be, that is the intention, but very often the measurement doesn't involve interaction with the something itself, as it is with a camera trap trigger for example, but relies upon vision. In which case the velocity is that of the visual product not source 'something'. Just want to be precise. The measured velocity still requires the material constituents necessary for the measurement happening- It can't be a velocity abstract variable entirely of its own accord. Even the virtual velocity of a virtual object can not be without the software that generates it and hardware that hosts it.

        Johan, your essay is a very good read in my opinion. It raises the question whether or not the claim a certain substance dualism can be fasified by the available repertoire of the physical sciences, together with modal logics.

        The only question I have in mind is that, although it is perfectly reasonable to me that one can change a basic assumption of physics (and therefore changing the spectrum of necessities and possibilities), how you then can achieve that "this ontological layer should identify the necessities and possibilities of physics" if there can be a multitude of parallel, consistent solutions. Doesn't this at the end of the day merely resemble and interpretational variety, just like the quest about quantum mechanics' real ontology? I mean by this that some people claim that the outcomes of quantum mechanical measurements for some cases, albeit not predictable, must be considered necessary in the sense of a strict determinism, whereas others claim that those outcomes are not due to some strict determinism, but should be considered as merely being possible according to some probabilities.

        How does your ontological research program handle the question of objectively evaluating the probabilities for something to be considered merely possible and something to be considered as absolutely necessary - to at all come to the possible (the latter must surely be presupposed) conclusion that a certain interface is impossible?

          Ups, should of course be read as

          "It raises the question of whether or not the claim about a certain substance dualism can be falsified..."

          and

          "at the end of the day merely resemble an interpretational variety..."

          Johan, does any of the two levels supply us with a reliable probability measure to objectively evaluate the probability for something to be considered as merely possible or moreover rather necessary?

          Stefan, I'm currently working in a hypothetical-deductive phase. My latest hypothesis (https://philpapers.org/archive/GAMADH.pdf) relates to the possibility of an interface. Regarding scientific possibilities and necessities I think that a world without an interface would not possibly have a cause of a very first thing whereas a world with at least one interface possibly would have a cause of a first thing.

          6 days later

          Georgina,

          You are right! See, Existence and change is what my essay is about..

          Marcel,

          Johan Gamper,

          I too don't use the word metaphysics (for its bad reputation)... So, I took Fundamental Ontology (Wiki). But I kept the two pillars of natural metaphysics; substance and cause. My essay is about these two concepts.

          So, I believe a good start for your ontological project may be found in my essay.

          Good luck,

          Marcel,

          Dear Dr. Johan Gamper,

          You wrote: "What is "fundamental" for physics can now be determined by referring to the proposed layer of scientific ontology. The efforts to account for the necessities and possibilities for physics - the modal properties of physics - are fundamental."

          My research has concluded that Nature must have devised the only permanent structure of the Universe obtainable for the real Universe existed for millions of years before man and his finite complex informational systems ever appeared on earth. The real physical Universe consists only of one single unified VISIBLE infinite surface occurring eternally in one single infinite dimension that am always illuminated mostly by finite non-surface light.

          Joe Fisher, ORCID ID 0000-0003-3988-8687. Unaffiliated