Demolishing prejudices to get to the foundations by Flavio Del Santo and Chiara Cardelli

A brilliant paper, thank you! You have demonstrated a rigorous process for challenging philosophical prejudices (what I refer to as articles of faith in "Faith is Fundamental") with empirical and theoretic falsification. You have specifically debunked the prejudice of non-directionality or, as I put it, the faith in randomness. Interestingly, although you have not discussed it, this specifically calls into question the key premises of the multiverse theory. I agree, and believe that a variety of scientific findings in the past century in physics, life sciences and complexity have increasingly demonstrated a directionality or purposefulness in the cosmic evolutionary process.

I would suggest however, that there are also logical constraints to the empirical enterprise. There are features of our universe that are self-referential, specifically invoking the logical limits of Godellian incompleteness. Under this constraint, there are categories of propositions that are not falsifiable. Certain things need to be accepted on faith - but we should be clear about our faith and humble about the possibility that we are wrong.

Many thanks - George Gantz

Flavio Del Santo and Chiara Cardelli,

Let me ask you about a very specific physics example to see if I am correctly understanding (part) of the intent of your essay:

Mathematically, regular space (xyz) and momentum space (pxpypz) are extraordinarily symmetric in terms of them being Fourier transforms of each other, and in terms of their importance in physics as alternative ways to formulate and interpret quantum mechanical wave functions. Momentum space shows up powerfully in phenomena as commonplace as mirrors and metals, for which conduction electrons form Fermi seas and are "more" in momentum space than in regular space.

Despite this symmetry, few physicists truly momentum space as being "real" in the same way as regular space. That is in no small part because we live in regular space, not momentum space.

For this very reason I think, theory level exploration of momentum space has been less intensive in comparison to regular space. There is no momentum space theory equivalent of general relativity, for example, and even the notion of time gets a bit odd due to energy being the proper conjugate of time for in momentum space.

A machine intelligence (more my area of expertise) in theoretical exploration mode would not view the situation in the same way, because it would have no inbuilt bias from living in regular space. It would instead take both spaces as equally real views of the universe, an assertion with which most quantum physicists would at least tacitly agree.

However, for a machine intelligence not interested in time, reputation, or other human biases, it would quickly notice an inexplicable imbalance of past research of issues in the two symmetric space, and then prioritize a major theoretical exploration of momentum space. In that exploration it would initially rely on dualism and complementarianism opportunities to build new ideas on the momentum space. It would use a game theory mode to fit the resulting tentative pieces of theory together into a larger self-consistent structure on the momentum space side. It would almost certainly uncover some interesting surprises during that reconciliation process, including new experimental predictions.

My apologies for such a detailed lead in, but I wanted to be as specific as possible in building up my example of what I think you are saying.

So, my question now is simply this:

Would this analogical expansion of spatial aspects of quantum theory into momentum space, by a machine intelligence with minimal human biases and time limits, be an example of the transition you show in Figure 1 in which the blue oval of doable theory exploration expands until it approaches the oval of red limits imposed by non-human, more fundamental constraints?

Sincerely,

Terry Bollinger

(essay https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3099)

Flavio, thanks. Your response clearly answers my main question: I clearly do not have even a clue what you are really talking about! Yours is still one of the most cogent essays I've read here, though. Good luck --Cheers, Terry Bollinger

Flavio,

After re-reading your (for me) puzzling response, I should emphasize that the intent was that even for a tool as widely used as the momentum wave function, unconscious biases can inhibit the range of hypotheses generated. I used math symmetries as one of many possible sources of hypotheses, and I used the physics of spaces only as an example.

Cheers, Terry Bollinger

Flavio,

I'm not sure our views are all that different? What I call foundation messages in my essay (topic 3099), by which I mean the invariant realities imposed by the universe independently of anything we as human think or say, do not seem to be much different from your foundation constraints. The main difference in our approaches is that I suggest using an information-theory approach to uncovering and discarding human biases. That has the advantage of transforming them into "noise" with quantifiable metrics. Human self-examination in contrast is always a tricky business, and I say that as someone who knows the state of human cognition research pretty well (it was part of my day job).

The best example in your essay of falsifying a philosophical stand is John Bell's inequality. But ironically, in Speakable and Unspeakable Bell asserts that he was able to derive his inequality only through the clarity of thought provided by his own version of the pilot wave model, which was both local and deterministic. Implementation of your strategy thus would seem at least partially dependent on having a vibrant complex ecology of diverse but individually biased researchers with enough enthusiasm (and luck) to create such tests.

Finally, your paper (ref 30) on one-particle, two-way correlation is pretty fascinating. I gather it requires a conventional c-limited channel to validate the correlation.

Cheers, Terry

Dear Flavio Del Santo

Just letting you know that I am making a start on reading of your essay, and hope that you might also take a glance over mine please? I look forward to the sharing of thoughtful opinion. Congratulations on your essay rating as it stands, and best of luck for the contest conclusion.

My essay is titled

"Darwinian Universal Fundamental Origin". It stands as a novel test for whether a natural organisational principle can serve a rationale, for emergence of complex systems of physics and cosmology. I will be interested to have my effort judged on both the basis of prospect and of novelty.

Thank you & kind regards

Steven Andresen

Flavio and Chiara,

Certainly we must make clear that searching for the fundamental involves "Demolishing prejudices to get to the foundations." Even the dominate theories like the Big Bang and the Standard Theory must be taken as theories and not override what the process of discovery focuses on as your reductionism and methodology sections point out. As my essay develops I point out the same cautions but not as emphatically as you do. Many times the expectations of looking for habitable exoplanets are constrained by the solar system we know. The Jupiter probe -- I pointed out -- revealed surprises to scientists. Your biophysics sections touched on bio studies that might not have seen the discovery of quantum coherence in warm, wet, turbulent systems such as plants in photosynthesis. Hope you get a chance to check mine out. Your essay rates highly in clearly showing the unencumbered road to fundamentalism.

Jim Hoover

Dear Flavio,

Thank you for reading my essay and commenting. Your invited me to read your essay and compare and contrast. It's difficult for me to summarize in a few words. My last essay, The Nature of Mind, offers nine pages that address the issue of intuition, which you appear down on. You seem to lump determinism and absolute simultaneity, local realism and conservation laws into the same category of 'prejudice'. My current essay argues for absolute simultaneity, and I elsewhere argue for local realism, while I have a more nuanced view of determinism, and I have argued against conservation as a consequence of symmetry, as all symmetries I am aware of are approximate.

I recently watched a YouTube discussion between Jordan Peterson and Camille Paglia, a goodly portion of which dealt with Derrida, Foucault, and other deconstructionists and radical relativists. For a number of reasons I feel this nonsense is beginning to infect physics, probably because physics is chaotic in the extreme, based (in my opinion) on fundamental false assumptions and prejudices that have endured for about a century, both in relativity and QM.

Once one discards intuition, one is left with 'word hash', combining words/equations in 'narratives' [see Gibbs essay] and having no idea how to discriminate reality from story. My current essay focuses on one non-intuitive narrative, while previous essays address other such instances. As you spend quite a bit of time on Bell I will address Bell.

You refer to Bell's theorem as "momentous no-go theorem" and spend a couple of pages on his logic. If you look at his first paper, his first equation determines the outcome: A = +/-1, B = +/-1, where A and B are measurements on Stern-Gerlach. This is based on the (prejudiced) assumption of quantum qubits. You clearly state that QM provides only probabilistic predictions. Many-body experiments on spin yield qubit outcomes, as should be expected. Stern-Gerlach does not yield qubit outcomes but smeared results that match 3D spin dynamics in an inhomogeneous field. However Pauli's mathematical projection of qubit mechanics: O|+> = +|+>, O|-> = -|-> is Bell's prejudiced assumption of reality. In other words Bell claims to look for a classical (local variable) description of Stern-Gerlach, but then constrains the problem to quantum results based on the mathematical projection of Pauli, not on the empirical results of Stern-Gerlach.

Feynman later put the final nail in this coffin by assuming that his favorite two-slit photon experiment could be carried over directly to a two-slit spin analog (the SG experiment). Of course the same equations apply, because he's making the same mathematical projection, but the actual physics of the photon in two-slits is vastly different from the physics of atoms in a homogeneous magnetic field, and Feynman's extended SG model has never been tested.

Since Feynman and Bell's math and logic have been accepted as gospel, local realism has been excluded from physics. A no-go theorem based on atoms in a magnetic field, constrained to never-tested single-qubit spin results, is then "proved" by photon-based experiments which actually do produce two-state results: on/off detections.

I repeat - the entire industry is based on the erroneous assumption that the results of the Stern-Gerlach atomic experiments are +1 and -1 deflections, "tested" by photonic experiments that use +1 and 0 detections. The atomic data produced by Stern-Gerlach clearly conflicts with Bell's initial assumption, but instead of trying sophisticated tests of Stern-Gerlach using modern technology the whole entanglement industry is based on 1922 experiments that clearly do not yield +1 and -1 results. The confusion of 1920s quantum mechanics is locked in. Here is your fundamental 'prejudice'.

My suggestion is if one wishes to 'deconstruct' physics, look for the basic assumptions that violate intuition and that lead to nonsense. Of course that is dangerous for those toiling in the establishment, so generalizations are preferred.

This is how I would contrast your approach with my approach.

Good luck in the contest and in your careers.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Dear Flavio (and Chiara),

Thanks for inviting me to read your very interesting and provocative Essay. I find it contains very wise advices. Here are some comments:

1) I think that insurmountable limitations are due not only to "philosophical prejudices" as you correctly stress, but also to the issue that, today, science is sadly dominated by politics.

2) I am essentially a physicist of gravitation. Personally, I have various doubts on emergent gravity. This is NOT in contrast with your point of view expressed here, but with the issue that gravity is considered to not be fundamental in the emergent gravity framework. I think that it should be, instead, the fundamental field of the Universe, which goes even beyond quantum theory.

3) I appreciate your discussion on Popper. This great philosopher has been exploited too often.

4) Your agreement with Bohm that "scientists generally apply the scientific method, more or less intuitively" is also my agreement.

5) Congrats for your nice explanation of Bell's inequality. In general, it is not a simple task and there are various people who still make a lot of confusion on this issue.

In general, I have found your Essay remarkable and very entertaining. It deserves my highest score. Congrats and good luck in the Contest.

Cheers, Ch.

Hi Flavio and Chiara,

I sympathise with your aim to criticize reductionism and realism as scientific doctrines. And I agree with your assessment that local realism has been falsified. However I have some comments on you essay.

Accepting, that local realism has been falsified and that locality is a condition for theories to be falsifiable, we have to reject realism. But it is not at all clear, how to replace it. Some sort of realism has to be maintained. The world outside us is independent of our observation otherwise we would fall in a sort of solipsism, which would make any scientific enquiry impossible. So how to reject realism without rejecting it totally?

Rejecting realism does not mean, we have to reject reductionism. Reductionism was accepted by Popper as a good (and I must say) successful working hypothesis. I find it difficult to unthink reductionism. Mostly the rejection of reductionism is has the goal to justify emergence of some sort. I find it difficult to imagine emergence, although there are a lot of phenomena like free will or consciousness, and some biological processes as you state in your essay, that have not been successfully reduced to elementary processes. The lack of a reductionist explanation for these phenomena is not a falsification of the 'working hypothesis'. I personally do not belief that complex system can explain emergence, since complex systems themselves are described by simpler elementary systems. In a way they accept reductionism.

Most physicist are falsificationists. The problem here is that there is no observation, that is independent of any theory. This was the problem with the positivists, that accepted only observational statements as basic concepts from which a theory has to be developed. But the problems remains, if we want to falsify a theory. Usually the observation needs an auxiliary theory, that has been well accepted, to describe the observation. But if it comes to a fundamental theory of physics, we expect the fundamental theory to provide itself the theory of observation. This is circular or at least problematic.

I raise some of these problems in my essay: The quantum sheep - In defence of a positivist view on physics.

Best regards

Luca