Essay Abstract
The question has been much debated whether there are fundamental properties, fundamental laws, or fundamental truths which apply specifically to consciousness. According to the relevant concept of being fundamental, a fundamental item stands on its own. That is to say, what is fundamental has some features which are not derived from or explained by anything else. By contrast, something derivative is to that extent not fundamental. The debate about the fundamentality or non-fundamentality of consciousness forms the background for this essay, although I do not take sides on the underlying issue. I argue that, if the experience of being conscious were more agreeable than it is, then we would not care very much where the truth falls with respect to the fundamentality of consciousness. However, given the sometimes untoward circumstances of living as conscious beings, we might be inclined to look for a sort of compensation in an alleged theoretical fundamentality of consciousness. When we theorize about consciousness, we are not thinking in an intellectual vacuum. Rather, we theorize from within the lived experience of being conscious. Under different circumstances there might not have been resistance to believing that consciousness is derivative and not fundamental. In the world as it actually is, belief in the non-fundamentality of consciousness does not fit comfortably with the subjective experience of being conscious.
Author Bio
Laurence Hitterdale holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, Maryland. He is now retired, after having worked for both business firms and academic institutions. He resides in California. His philosophical work is focused on ontology, philosophy of cosmology, and philosophy of mind. Some published and unpublished essays are available on the Web, including the 2014 FQXi contest essay, "A Rope over an Abyss," which was awarded a special commendation prize.