Essay Abstract

The goal of physics has always been to find the fundamental constituents of nature and their interactions. Once those are known the rest is nothing more than an application of this theory. This search for a fundamental theory is very much like Hilbert's goal to find the formal axiomatic system that describes all of mathematics. I argue that just like Hilbert's dream this one is equally doomed. It is the emergent phenomena that are to fundamental physics what true and unprovable statements are to mathematics. I show that there any number of such statements in physics and I provide an easy example. I further argue that emergence should not be seen as a weakness of physics. Rather, it is a way to obtain new insights into old problems.

Author Bio

I have obtained my PhD from the Pennsylvania State University while working on classical and quantum aspects of gravity. I continued my work in quantum gravity at the Perimeter Institute, Imperial College, MIT, & La Sapienza. I am now working as s consultant in finance.

Download Essay PDF File

Dear Olaf,

I appreciated your essay very much, thank you for sharing.

> In this essay we argue that emergent phenomena are to the laws of physics what true but unprovable statements are to formal axiomatic systems

A neat and powerful concept, well expressed even for not-physicist people like me. I agree with your idea - in my essay, being my formation philosophical, I touched similar arguments about sensations and consciousness (that's in your fig.2), and I tried to sketch a philosophical frame for emergence.

All the best, I wish you luck!

Francesco D'Isa

    Dear Olaf,

    I was curious about your essay, because it touches topics that are similar to the ones I first thought of, when I learned about this contest - my essay has not been posted yet, I hope it appears in the near future. I enjoyed the read, you write in a clear and fluent style.

    I have a question. If I get you right, the main cause why a fundamental physical theory formulated in terms of position and momenta cannot assess the truth value of the statement "solid A touches solid B" is basically a problem of language. Is that right? The statement "solid A touches solid B" is not a statement about position and momenta, so the theory cannot determine whether it is true or false.

    Gödel's theorem, however, is not a problem of language. Gödel's theorem states that any complex formal system contains statements with undecidable truth value, but those statements are formulated in exactly the language of the formal system. They are well-formed strings, they are meaningful within the language spoken by the formal system, and still, they can neither be proved true nor false.

    In your example, were we to take the trouble to re-formulate the statement "solid A touches solid B" using the language of a physical theory based on positions and momenta (for example: "there is at least one atom in solid A whose distance to at least one atom of solid B is less than such-and-such a length"), then the theory would be able to decide whether the statement is true or false.

    This, of course, does not prove you wrong. I do agree with the fact that emergence gives rise to phenomena that make sense at a higher level. But I wonder whether one can really draw a parallel with the incompleteness theorem. Am I interpreting things correctly?

    Thanks for the read, it was a pleasure!

    Inés.

      Cool. I am in the midst of reading Exact Thinking in Demented Times: The Vienna Circle. Gödel and Hilbert are mentioned often.

      Question: how deep could any undecidable-like character of physics go? In particular, it is hard to imagine (maybe not impossible) that a fundamental particle might exist without there being any way to prove that it does. Quarks are not observable in any ordinary sense, but they are inferrable, which is proof enough. If there is any kind of interaction with ordinary matter, then existence could be inferred. Anyway, just thinking.

        Greetings:

        I think you have shown that truth in physics is insufficient to evaluate a physics model's usefulness to humanity. A different scheme is necessary to determine the physics models to pursue.

        "Touches" is a definition problem. Does the Earth "touch" the moon (they do appear to influence each other).

          Hi Olaf,

          I exaggerate to no degree when I say that yours is a truly brilliant essay. I love the way in which you spoke of Gödel's theorem, and the brilliant manner in which emergence emerged (har, har, har). I completely agree with your point of view; not all things are quantifiable.

          However, much like Gödel's theorem, this result majorly leaves one's sense of aesthetics rather unsatisfied. And so, although I myself abandoned formal analysis, I did go forth and attempt to tackle the issue in another manner which I feel is not susceptible to the feared theorem-it might be of interest you.

          Regards,

          Aditya

            Dear DR Olaf Dreyer,

            Reliable evidence exists that proves that the surface of the earth was formed millions of years before man and his utterly complex finite informational systems ever appeared on that surface. It logically follows that Nature must have permanently devised the only single physical construct of earth allowable.

            Joe Fisher, Realist

              Dear Francesco,

              thank you for reading my essay. I will read yours in a bit. See you in your comments.

              Cheers

              Olaf

              Dear Olaf,

              I've elsewhere remarked on how these essay contests seem to bring certain common strands of thought to the fore---so I'm happy to see another essay using a Gödelian analogy to argue against the possibility of having an overarching framework accounting for all of the world (or at least, all of physics). I think (and argue in my own essay, if you'll excuse the advertisement) that scientists will have to learn the lesson that mathematicians have learned almost 90 years ago---that it does not mean an end to our efforts if they can't be unified in a single axiomatic system.

              However, I'm not sure I really understand your example of a physical 'Gödel-sentence'. It seems to me that if you were to input the description of your system into a sufficiently powerful computer, it could run a simulation by means of which it would indeed conclude that the tow solids touch---thus, the truth of the proposition is decidable from the axioms after all.

              Or did you have something else in mind?

                Dear Ines,

                thanks for reading and commenting! It took me some time to reply because I wanted to read your essay first (more on that in your thread). I see that you have been thinking along similar lines! I am not sure I understand your language remark so let me try make a couple more remarks about why I thing the analogy between incompleteness and emergence is apt:

                If you have formal axiomatic system FAS_n and a true and unprovable statement you can add it to FAS_n and obtain a new FAS_(n+1). This new system will have its own true but unprovable statements which in turn can be added to the system to obtain FAS_(n+2) and so forth. You thus obtain a tower of theories (see image). This is much like the tower you obtain from emergence. Statements about the solids in my example are added to the statements about atoms to form a new theory. Note that this addition is not arbitrary. It is important that the solid is made of atoms and thus that the new set of statements remains consistent.

                You propose the sentence „there is at least one atom in solid A ..." which is a reformulation of my shorter statement. Note, though, that you need to know about solids to make this statement. What is a solid? All you have is a (long) list of positions and momenta. Finding the solids is the hardest part. It only looks easy because we note the positions and momenta using coordinates that come from the solids themselves.

                Thanks again for reading!

                Cheers

                Olaf

                Dear Geoffrey,

                thank you for reading and commenting!

                I think you are right. If there were a particle that is fundamental but we can not know about it then we do not really care about it. It would exist in a world that is disjunct from ours. Only if the particle had some effect would we care about it but then we would also be able to investigate those effects.

                Cheers

                Olaf

                Dear John,

                thank you for the interest in my essay!

                You are right to point out that touches is a bit vague. I just needed any statement involving the two solids. Any statement would do. Any ideas?

                Cheers

                O.

                Dear Aditya,

                thank you so much for the praise!

                I will now go and read your contribution and see what emerges (sorry, couldn't resist).

                Thanks again!

                Cheers

                Olaf

                Dear Joe,

                thank you for reading and commenting.

                I am not entirely sure I understand your comment.

                Cheers

                Olaf

                Hi Jochen,

                thanks for your comment! You are making an important point that I tried (and obviously failed) to address properly in the essay. Let me try again.

                If you have the list of positions and momenta you will be able to find the solids (how would you actually do it? Not knowing the distances in the solid I would write a Fourier transform of the data and look for the peaks. These give you the distances. Then you just need to sort ...). The important point here is that you already know what you are looking for! It is especially easy because the way you write down the positions and momenta will be in a basis that is constructed from the solids themselves. You measure space by taking the solids and putting one next to the other. This is the reason why the program you want to write is so simple.

                Now imagine I don't give you the particles in such nice coordinates. I could use a function that is arbitrarily complex to represent the positions and momenta so that you would not be able to discover the order (even if you knew what you where looking for). This is in fact the situation that you face in solid state physics all the time. You can write down the Hamiltonian and you know the phenomena that you want to describe but you have no way of getting from one to the other. It is the rigidity of the solids that is invariant under such transformations. The solids will push back when pushed and doesn't care about the way you represent the atoms.

                Thanks again for reading.

                Cheers

                Olaf

                Dar Olaf,

                I bare bruises for suggesting that physics has some Turing machine/Godel type of incompleteness. I suppose the idea seems to be percolating out into the world.

                I think the quantum classical dichotomy is a case of this. The measurement of a quantum system couples that system with a reservoir of states. The quantum system then becomes entangled with this reservoir of states as superpositions and entanglements in that system are reduced. This all sounds unsurprising, as this is just decoherence. However, in the case of an emergent classical state, say the needle of an instrument or a general classical configuration, we lack the quantum mechanical tools necessary to understand this. Quantum mechanics is basis independent and we are demanding that it somehow produce a prediction for a fixed classical basis. I see this as a possible instance of Godel incompleteness with self-referential qubits.

                Cheers LC

                  Hi, Olaf, thanks for your reply! Yes, we took the topic of the contest along the same lines, that's good, it means there must be something there! I think I fully agree with all what you say, my comment about the language thing is just a matter of what to stress.

                  > Note, though, that you need to know about solids to make this statement. What is a solid? All you have is a (long) list of positions and momenta. Finding the solids is the hardest part.

                  Precisely! In your example the obstacle is the definition of a solid in terms of microscopic variables. Being a definition, I referred to the problem as a matter of language. The theory is written in the language of position and momenta, but the statement is stated in the macroscopic language of large objects. There is an incompatibility between the two languages, and that is why the microscopic theory cannot assess the truth value of the macroscopic statement. Gödel's theorem, however, is not a matter of language. The unprovability of some statements is present even for statements that are written in exactly the same language as the one of the theory. In a way, Gödel identified an even more serious problem, because his unprovability is still there in the absence of translation problems.

                  But never mind this, it does not challenge your main emergence conclusion. Because in addition to Gödel's unprovability, we also have to deal with the scale/language/emergence un-assessability you discuss.

                  Best!

                  inés.

                  Dear Olaf,

                  Nice Essay, connected with the fundamental question of physics: "Does the fundamental theory of nature exist?" You argue, making an intriguing parallelism with Gödelian incompleteness, that the answer should be "no". Despite I agree with your statement that "To exclusively look for the fundamental theory of nature is as narrow a search as the search for the formal axiomatic system that underlies mathematics", I must add that this does not automatically imply that such a fundamental theory of nature does not exist. Einstein's position on this issue was of substantial uncertainty. We all recall his quest for a unified field theory in the latest years of his life. On the other hand, he aslo claimed that it should not exist a fundamental theory of nature but only subsequent theories which explain nature with always increasing approximation levels. I am substantially incerte in the same way.

                  Finally, I completely agree with your point that emergence is not a weakness of physics (despite I have various dubts on energent gravity), but it could be a useful tool instead.

                  In any case, I find your Essay to be entertaining and intriguing. Thus, it deserves my high score.

                  As I know that you are an expert on black hole quasi-normal modes (despite I am astonished that you are now working as consultant in finance), maybe you could be interested in my Essay, where I discuss about them (and also on the unified field theory) ... with Albert Einstein!

                  Good luck in the Contest.

                  Cheers, Ch.

                    Dear Olaf,

                    once more an essay with Gödel's results involved. And I like it. But I also have some suspicions.

                    If I take your analogy serious, I conclude that you have proven consciousness to be an emergent phenomenon. Since consciousness is needed to at all be aware of something like 'emergence' and consciousness in your framework is an emergent property of reality, it follows that consciousness has proven to itself to be an emergent property.

                    But now 'emergence' is 'provable' and not anymore a true, but unprovable statement.

                    So, once more, what is 'provable' seems to depend heavily on what one puts into the equation in the first place as an axiom. Since your axiom is 'emergence', your output will be 'emergence'.

                    I really don't know how such logical figures should or can say anything true and reliable about *physical* reality and the underlying origins (if there are some) of for example consciousness.

                    For me, it seems to only say that we don't know how consciousness comes about from dumb matter, because we cannot prove this to be factually the case. But this does not mean that consciousness must be 'emergent', in the sense that a clump of matter awakes to some awareness.

                    I think what you did is simply state that the concept of emergence cannot be proven to be evidently valid for 'things' like consciousness, quantum behaviour, gravity and cosmology.

                    Isn't there a big danger that we label things we cannot formalize in the traditional Newtonian manner as 'emergent' - and by the very premise that consciousness should itself be 'emergent' it then seems that the very concept of 'emergence' naturally emerges not only in the fact that consciousness exists, but then also 'necessarily' in the fact that this consciousness can facilitate at all the idea of 'emergence'?

                    The big question for me is whether or not the concept of emergence is merely an - unprovable - idea, or rather a physical necessity.

                    Another question for me is what or who adds new 'axioms' that can built the upwards ladder of emergence? Surely, all we can observe in physical reality should be consistent with other facts. Therefore the hierarchy of axiomatic systems should be more or less well-ordered. But is there an *end* to this hierarchy - and if yes, why and where does it stop and if no, what does the latter then mean at all for physics?