Essay Abstract
Those wanting to realign science with our democratic and ethical ideals often challenge the view that physics has some unique status among the sciences, rejecting the claim that it is fundamental. The thought is that the privileging of certain theories as fundamental grants them a status that then allows them a free pass to funding, even in the absence of inductive support. I argue that properly construed, the claim that physics, or some part of physics, occupies a fundamental status is both theoretically reasonable and ethically defensible. However, a plausible understanding of the fundamentality of physics must move beyond interpretations of fundamentality as a kind of explanatory completeness. No present physical theory explains everything, nor is there a good argument to support the claim that any future physical theory will. Nonetheless, there is a significant kind of explanatory power we can claim even for our current physical theories, and this yields the sense in which they are fundamental. This notion I propose of fundamentality as explanatory maximality underwrites two compelling arguments for the continued support and development of research projects in physics, demonstrating that the claim that physics constitutes a fundamental science should be an important element of a vision for twenty-first century science.
Author Bio
Alyssa Ney is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. She earned her MA and PhD in Philosophy from Brown University, and her BS in Physics and Philosophy from Tulane University. She is the author of Metaphysics: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014) and co-editor with David Z Albert of The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics (Oxford, 2013). Her research focuses on the interpretation of quantum theories and the unity of science. She is past-president of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science and Associate Editor at The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.