Dear Ian,
Bell's work takes centre-stage in my research, so your essay (already much annotated) is excellent for me. To keep it simple for now, here's how I parse your Abstract:
"From its earliest days nearly a century ago, quantum mechanics has proven itself to be a tremendously accurate yet intellectually unsatisfying theory to many." This issue is the focus of my research. Please see Fröhner, hyperlinked at Reference [12] in my essay; or via direct link to the PDF (which may be slow) Missing link between probability theory and quantum mechanics: the Riesz-Fejér theorem.
"Not the least of its problems is that it is a theory about the results of measurements." Yes, I prefer to speak of tests (which are secondary to the initial beables).
"As John Bell once said in introducing the concept of 'beables', it should be possible to say what is rather than merely what is observed." Yes, to say also: what is inferable and not observable; what is interactively sensitive and what is not.
"In this essay I consider the question of whether a universe can be a beable and what that implies about the fundamental nature of that universe." Spacetime is a beable in my theorising.
"I conclude that a universe that is a beable within the framework of some theory, cannot be fundamental." I conclude that spacetime is fundamental; it provides the framework for my theory.
Since your comments on my theory will be welcome at any time, here is some background from my essay thread:
Background to Wholistic Mechanics (WM)
Whereas QM emerged from the UV-catastrophe ca1905, WM emerges from the locality-catastrophe typified by John Bell's dilemma ca1965: ie, seriously ambivalent about AAD, Bell adamantly rejected locality. He later surmised that maybe he and his followers were being rather silly -- correctly; as we show -- for WM is the local theory that resolves Bell's dilemma [there is no AAD] and proves the Bellian silliness.
So WM begins by bringing just one change to modern physics: rejecting naive-realism, true realism insists that some beables change interactively, after Bohr's disturbance-dictum. Thus recognising the minimum-action associated with Planck's constant, WM then recognises the maximum speed associated with light: for true locality insists that no influence propagates superluminally, after Einstein.
The union of these two classical principles -- the foundation of WM -- is true local realism (TLR). Under TLR, EPR's naive criterion for "an element of physical reality" is corrected, then the Laws of Malus and Bayes are validated in the quantum world. Then, via the R-F theorem ca1915, Born's Law is seen to derive from elementary Fourier theory. This in turn allows us to understand the physical significance of Dirac's notation; etc. Thus, beginning with these elementary natural principles, WM's universe-of-discourse focuses on beables in spacetime: with mathematics taken to be our best logic.
NB: Formulated in 1989 in response to a challenging article by David Mermin (1988), many leading Bellian physicists and philosophers have committed to review the foundations of WM and its early results. Since no such review has ever been delivered, I am not yet aware of any defect in the theory. Further, WM provides many ways to refute Bell's theorem (BT): one such is provided on p.8 of my essay.
PS: To those who dismiss my essay due to an alleged typo in the heading, I follow C. S. Peirce (absent his severity): "It is entirely contrary to good English usage to spell premiss, 'premise,' and this spelling ... simply betrays ignorance of the history of logic." [End of background story]
Ian, warmly appreciating your essay; assuring you that critical comments on my own ideas are welcome at any time;
and with best regards,
Gordon Watson More realistic fundamentals: quantum theory from one premiss.