Dear Luca,
Thankfully I was drawn to your essay by the comments that you made to others. However, I found your deep essay to be heavy-going with the sheep; possibly because I believe that quantum-analogies do not help. Thus, as a true local realist, I prefer to deal with the quantum settings themselves. Hence my essay: More realistic fundamentals: quantum theory from one premiss
[nb: contrary to the view of some, "premiss" is a valid spelling in logic.]
Thus I'm hoping that my essay might have some appeal for you, given your comment to Ian Durham: "What a nice idea to use Bell's theory of beables to discuss, what is fundamental. Bell's view of beables - I believe - is how most of us think about how the universe looks like."
For on this we agree: "The EPR reality criteria has to be given up."
Also, I believe Bell used "beable" to represent whatever exists in "the universe of discourse". Thus, for me: "superimposed quantum states exist in quantum theory" -- being epistemic and not ontological. All my beables are therefore existents (ontological) in spacetime; spacetime being my universe of discourse.
Alas, going beyond some shared beliefs, I suspect we share this defect: "Now after reading also some other essays I find that I expect the reader (that does not know me) to trust me too much and to follow me in my thoughts. That is too much to expect." In my case, I expected my readers to follow some elementary math and draw some interesting conclusions without prompting. [nb: to partially remedy my defect, and to help you, I will add a brief BACKGROUND note to my thread. I'll let you know when it's up.]
However, modifying one of your comments to fit my case: I tried hard to find the underlying reality, that explains these quantum phenomena WITHOUT introducing any ad hoc mechanism that does the job.
Also, you say: "I always liked Bohr." I say: I always liked Einstein.
However, as you say: "Bell and Einstein are the ones that are nearer to our thinking on what is real [imho, because Bohr is often hard to fathom]. So when I try to defend Bohr, I always have in mind Bell and Einstein, to explain how Bohr could have been right."
But note here (re the disposition of the whole apparatus; and without any nonlocality), I think that Bohr was right. Since interactions perturb sensitive objects, what we learn will be contextual because the context (eg, the paired-test-settings in EPRB = the disposition of the apparatus) will determine what we learn: HENCE (and critically) what we can reliably infer. BUT, relatedly, in my essay I show that Bohr was also right with his all-too-often-neglected "disturbance dictum".
Such a small comment by Bohr: BUT, as I show, THUS does Bohr eliminate many naive interpretations that talk of nonlocality or instantaneous collapse of the wavefunction!
And I agree with this: "As a realist I imagine the world consisting of fundamental things with properties, that are independent of whether they are observed or not." But I amend this next: "Of course some properties need to be inferable [not necessarily observable] in order to build the basis of a scientific theory."
Also: It looks to me that some of the math that you brought to your sheep would not be out of place with my essay.
With my thanks again, and best regards: Gordon
PS: Luca, if/when you reply to my post, please copy it to my essay-thread so that I'm alerted to it. I will do likewise.
Many thanks; Gordon Watson More realistic fundamentals: quantum theory from one premiss.