Dear Lawrence,
Here's what I replied to your comment on my page:
Thanks for the visit. I am very sad that you got Covid-19, I hope it is the easiest form and you'll be well as soon as possible. Don't worry about my essay until you get well, but please get well, because I would love to hear some feedback from you, if possible about the longer version, even if it will be long after the contest ends.
> Your paper works with the connection between Gödel theorem or self-reference and consciousness. I have thought that consciousness is a sort of epiphenomenology that is an illusion having an illusion of itself. I have not read it in its entirty, and I do see you connect with what look like fractals.
I didn't appeal to self-reference or fractals, although I'd agree with you that they play a role. But it has strong relation with no-go theorems. As for consciousness, I am interested in the hypothesis that there is something irreducible about it (this irreducible I called "sentience"), and I try to see if this makes testable predictions. My claim is that it does. Indeed, for many who think consciousness is irreducible, the epiphenomenal position seems a good refuge, since it makes the hypothesis unfalsifiable. But I think we should be brave and don't avoid the fact that it does make predictions. So we can test it. We risk, those who deny it risk to see the predictions confirmed, but they can still continue to deny it, since the test of a prediction is not necessarily a proof of what led to the prediction. A rejection of the prediction is a rejection of what led to the prediction, so it is more risky for those who endorse the position that consciousness is not fully reducible. If we want to bring the hard problem into science, we have to take this risk.
I wish you to get back in shape soon!
Cristi