Dear Harrison,
I read your comments several times and, frankly, do not see on what grounds the experimental verification of length contraction should be downgraded from a "proof" to "consistent".
Let us look again at the two figures in the attached file - they represent two ontologically sharply different entities (of different dimensions): Fig. 1 depicts the suggested by our senses three-dimensional meter stick (and a three-dimensional world), whereas Fig. 2 represents a four-dimensional entity - the stick's worldtube - (and a four-dimensional world). These figures are definitely not merely different equally good descriptions of the physical reality, because reality is either 3D or 4D. If someone rejects the accepted view and holds that the dimensionality of the world is not a fundamental feature of the world (on equal footing with its very existence), then that should be explicitly stated and arguments, based on the experimental evidence, should be provided.
Now the question is whether experiment can determine the dimensionality of the meter stick (and therefore of the world). This is precisely what the experimental verification of length contraction did. And I would like to stress it again: I think that is the strongest form of experimental verification - if the meter stick's worldtube were not a real 4D object (depicted in Fig. 2), length contraction would be impossible.
In your comment you talk more about describing physical reality, whereas Minkowski asked the fundamental question: What is the dimensionality of the physical reality? How to describe it is a separate question.
Of course, I will read your essay - it is already in my FQXi 2020 folder.
Best wishes,
Vesselin