Essay Abstract

Various moral conundrums plague population ethics: The Non-Identity Problem, The Procreation Asymmetry, The Repugnant Conclusion, and more. I argue that the aforementioned moral conundrums have a structure neatly accounted for, and solved by, some ideas in computability theory. I introduce a mathematical model based on computability theory and show how previous arguments pertaining to these conundrums fit into the model. This paper proceeds as follows. First, I do a very brief survey of the history of computability theory in moral philosophy. Second, I follow various papers, and show how their arguments fit into, or don't fit into, our model. Third, I discuss the implications of our model to the question why the human race should or should not continue to exist. Finally, I show that our model ineluctably leads us to a Confucian moral principle.

Author Bio

My name is Baek Jongmin Jerome, ë°±ì¢...민. I'm known for teaching "CS198-79: Philosophy of Computation", a course at UC Berkeley, as co-founder of Philosophy of Computation at Berkeley. Follow me at twitter.com/problem_halting

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In section 2.4 Commonsense Objections, you write: "But notice that the aforementioned cases involve in fact the avoidance of harm, not the conferral of benefit. These can be distinguished from benefit."

But "can be" does not imply "should be"; Indeed, making that very distinction, has itself long been regarded as the foremost bad action that "should be" avoided - "First do no harm."

The fundamental problem in attempting to resolve any moral conundrum is, Who (or what) gets to decide? Which persons, or creatures, or gods (or programs) get to decide which actions are good or bad? Good for who? Bad for what?

In section 6.3 The Tao, you write: "Is there a goal that puts an end to the travel?"

Nature has provided a mechanism, in lieu of a goal, for ensuring an "end to the travel"; every program will halt, when the hardware fails, even when the software does not. Nature's "Way", is to simply "Follow the Way" (exist) until that which is, ceases to follow the way (ceases to exist). The moral conundrum is that regardless of what goals entities may create for themselves, or have foisted upon them, they are highly likely to conflict with some other entities' goals; and in particular, the "spiritually noble" man's goal, of self-identifying himself as such, often conflicts with the goals of others, that specifically wish to disallow any such self-identification (other than their own). Who gets to decide if your "following the Way" is being done properly?

Rob McEachern

    Excellent comment, Rob. The answers will be interesting. Especially today.

    Thanks for the comments Rob. Here is my response:

    > But "can be" does not imply "should be"; Indeed, making that very distinction, has itself long been regarded as the foremost bad action that "should be" avoided - "First do no harm."

    Since I have defined "harm" and "benefit" mathematically, when I say "[the avoidance of harm and conferral of benefit] can be distinguished", I mean they can be mathematically distinguished. And distinguishing them is not a "bad action" as defined in the essay: it is computing a computable, not "attempting to compute" an uncomputable.

    > The fundamental problem in attempting to resolve any moral conundrum is, Who (or what) gets to decide? Which persons, or creatures, or gods (or programs) get to decide which actions are good or bad? Good for who? Bad for what?

    The answer is the mathematical model described in the essay, which is derived from one somewhat empirically justified definition that freedom is uncomputability.

    > every program will halt, when the hardware fails, even when the software does not.

    I receive this comment often, and I think it reveals something about how we think of death, rather than being a coherent objection. There is no reason to believe that, upon death, the program halts. It might, it might not. But there is no reason to believe that it does.

    "Since I have defined..." When others choose to define them in a manner that they deem to be less mathematically precise, but more actually relevant to their lives, does that make them wrong, either intellectually, or morally? As the old saying goes, "A friend in need, is a friend indeed."

    "The answer is the mathematical model described..." Models and theorems, derived from idealistic assumptions, more often than not, fail to adequately reflect the less than ideal reality, in which we usually find ourselves embedded. In an ideal world, there would be no moral conundrums.

    "There is no reason to believe that, upon death, the program halts." The machine that was executing the program certainly halted. There is no known, verified instance of an "uninterruptible back-up" machine, picking up the program execution, when the first machine failed. Simply hoping that there is, is no reason to be believe that there is. If there was, why not just keep killing yourself, until you eventually become resurrected in a more preferable situation, as did some of the characters in Philip Jose Farmer's Riverworld novels? (At least until they eventually found themselves resurrected in an entirely different world, in which they were summarily informed that they were abusing the system, before being sent back to where they come from.)

    And you have yet to answer the central question of all moral conundrums - Who gets to decide if your "following the Way" is being done properly?

    Rob McEachern

    > When others choose to define them in a manner that they deem to be less mathematically precise, but more actually relevant to their lives, does that make them wrong, either intellectually, or morally?

    It does not make them wrong, but when we use definitions not used in the paper, the discussion veers off somewhere else. I pointed out how the definitions in the paper address your original worry. If you take issue with the definitions, I am happy to address them.

    > Models and theorems, derived from idealistic assumptions, more often than not, fail to adequately reflect the less than ideal reality, in which we usually find ourselves embedded.

    Note, one way to view this paper is as a translation of a Hegelian / Taoist philosophy in mathematical terms. The models and theorems serve as pivots upon which the translation turns, but they also do not account for the rich background.

    > In an ideal world, there would be no moral conundrums.

    I fundamentally disagree, and this is the thrust of the paper. Contradiction is embedded in reality and in morality. There is no way to reason about moral conundrums without getting mired in contradiction. The paper points out only that all attempts to avoid contradiction in moral philosophy have failed, and points out why they have failed.

    > The machine that was executing the program certainly halted. There is no known, verified instance of an "uninterruptible back-up" machine, picking up the program execution, when the first machine failed. Simply hoping that there is, is no reason to be believe that there is. If there was, why not just keep killing yourself, until you eventually become resurrected in a more preferable situation, as did some of the characters in Philip Jose Farmer's Riverworld novels? (At least until they eventually found themselves resurrected in an entirely different world, in which they were summarily informed that they were abusing the system, before being sent back to where they come from.)

    This is based on a naive understanding of the body as hardware and the brain as software. Once this naive view is overcome, there is simply no reason to believe that the machine halts upon death

    > And you have yet to answer the central question of all moral conundrums - Who gets to decide if your "following the Way" is being done properly?

    The free subject is a law to oneself, and the author of oneself. The free subject decides for oneself whether it is done "properly".

    Jongmin

    "The paper points out only that all attempts to avoid contradiction in moral philosophy have failed, and points out why they have failed." They failed, precisely because differing parties, refuse to accept the same initial premises, from which all else is being derived. That is why I pointed out the problem with your definitions - they are not, and will never be, universally accepted. I do not claim to know any that will be either. The point being, they don't exist. That is the problem - the only problem.

    "The free subject is a law to oneself..." I agree. But the problem remains; one person's "law" and subsequent behavior, may cause another person to become enraged, resulting in the fact that moral conundrums are being caused to appear, rather than disappear. You cannot define your way out of that problem, by simply proclaiming that "If everyone would just adopt my premises, all conundrums and conflicts would disappear", because everyone else can honestly proclaim the exact same thing. It is a peculiarity of "universal consent", that whatever is being consented to (the laws and beliefs etc.) become completely irrelevant, because "universal consent" is a sufficient condition to ensure the lack of any conflict whatsoever. If everyone really and truly believes that going around and stabbing others in the back, is a great thing to do, then no one is going to complain when they themselves get stabbed - Thank you very much! I've always wanted to be stabbed in the back! But what is the likelihood that such a premise would ever be consented to in the first place? That is what needs to be mathematically analyzed - which sets of premises, have the greatest likelihood of being not just willingly adopted, but enthusiastically adopted, by nearly every member of a society. It comes as no great surprise, that those which confer "rights" (avoidance of harm) tend to be highly preferred over those that merely confer some "benefit", because if you have no "right" to actually keep some benefit once you have received it, then it is not worth very much. If the government gives you the benefit of a life-long pension, but then promptly puts you to death, because it does not recognize your right-to-life, then any benefit being provided is going to be of little value to you.

    Many philosophers, going all the way back to ancient times, such as Socrates, have pointed-out that once you accept that the "Noble man" must willing take personal responsibility for judging his own actions, then he should also willing accept whatever fate is inflicted upon him, by his chosen society, if he happens to offend it, including willingly drinking the Hemlock. The moral conflict is thus resolved, by the willing removal of the irritant (halting that program). But as Socrates himself stated, if he ever reemerges in some afterlife, he will still feel free to remain an irritant and a law unto himself.

    Personally, I am highly sympathetic to that point-of-view. But I do not see how it can ever resolve any moral conundrums here on Earth. In Plato's "Crito", Socrates explains to his friend, Crito, why he will not run-away from his pending execution, even though his escape could be easily arranged, and would even be welcomed by many of the very people that voted to convict and then execute him. He imagines "THE LAWS" come and give him a "talking to", in which they point-out that they are solely responsible for making his freely-chosen, philosophic life-style possible. So what kind of "noble man" would he be, if he now became a "fair-weather friend" and only consented to abide by THE LAWS when they favored him, but not when they favor others? A lesson being, be careful what you consent to - that is why the founding fathers of the US insisted upon a bill of rights; first agree to do no harm, then we can try to resolve the remaining issues.

    But we have digressed rather far from fundamental physics. My interest in this, stems from the same source as my interest in the statement in Sabine Hossenfelder's essay, that "This is why, in physics, any mathematical theorem must be taken with a grain of salt. Any proof is only as good as its assumptions..."; The same is true of any logical argument, not just physics or morals. When people do not agree about the "self-evident truth" of the fundamental assumptions/premises underlying their views of reality, they are also not going to agree that any theorems, derived from those assumptions, have any relevance to their view of reality. In other words, the issue of whether or not an incompleteness theorem may prevent one from ever successfully deriving moral (or physical) laws, or "theories of everything", from some set of premises, is rendered moot, when people will not accept the premises themselves, even when you can derive some otherwise "beautiful" laws from them.

    Rob McEachern

      You point out something important: that everyone holds different premises.

      This is true, and it is sort of the point of the paper: use mathematical axioms, instead of "premises", to derive a moral theory.

      There is no significant difference between a mathematical axiom and a premise, in the case at hand. The issue is whether or not the "starting point" of the argument is, or is not, perceived, by all parties, as being both true (self-evidently or otherwise) and relevant, to the issue at hand. Moral issues become conundrums, when one large subset of a society believes an "axiom" is both self-evidently true and relevant, while another large subset of the same society believes it is either self-evidently false, or completely irrelevant (and often both) and neither subset can produce any argument capable of convincing the other, of the validity of their beliefs.

      The mathematical conundrum at work here, is that there are circumstances, in the real world, for which the more likely an idealistic, "mathematical axiom" is to be true, the less relevant the axiom is likely to be, to anything other than a hopelessly idealistic theory of reality. This is true of both physical and moral theories. Your own "Definition 2" is just such an example. Few living beings can be adequately modeled as arbitrary Turing machines, for the simple reason that an untimely or arbitrary response to a life-threatening situation, is not conducive to the "survival of the fittest." In particular, the evolutionary process that produces living beings, often equips them with "time-out" priority interrupt routines, to ensure that they will halt, any endless deliberation and do something, anything (like fight or flight) when they are "out of time" and out of luck. Life is full of situations in which decisions must be made, in a timely manner, often in just a matter of seconds, on the basis of woefully incomplete information. Consequently, the "Halt now! Do something else now!" priority interrupt, is not a free action - it is being compelled. In other words, nature figured out an adequate solution to the halting problem, long ago, and in accordance with your Proposition 2, nature has "decided" that producing living beings that act as an arbitrary Turing machine is, in fact, bad, because it is not conducive to their continued survival. Simply put, it is not possible to enable any good actions, once your failure to avoid a single, sudden, catastrophically bad action, puts an end to your life on this earth.

      Rob McEachern

      Who gets to decide?

      Nature decides by confering survival on the groups that hold morals in conformity to nature's laws. So far in human history, some groups have better answere's than others but all change to draw nature's wrath. So, those groups that are growing are closer than those groups that are dieing.

      The paper makes a number of radical ontological claims, and I'm glad you're picking up on that! If you'd like more intuition about why these ontological claims hold, see my book https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~jjbaek/pocab_book.pdf

      Dear Jerome:

      I haven't read your paper. but from glancing at the comments, it seems to me that its thesis is that the only way to decide a moral conundrum is through computation. Is this in fact what you claim?

      Regards,

      Luis F Patino

      Dear Jongmin Baek,

      Thank you for providing references concerning procreation theories. They are altogether disappointing to me. I hope that Alan Kadin's essay "Just too many people" and Greta Th. will be taken seriously. Mankind has only one planet. How many people and how much luxuria does mankind need? Unfortunately China ended their on-child politics. Why does the unexpected virus hit in particular NY? Was this unpredictable? Is Confucian moral principle a way out? Western religions are also teaching harmony.

      Eckard Blumschein

      18 days later

      Jonagmin -

      A very interesting paper, and some interesting comments. I am quite startled to see Turing machines as the basis for moral decision-making - and it reminds me of the theological teachings of Emmanuel Swedenborg who articulate the basis of moral reality as the marriage of good and truth. There may be theoretical value to the exercise, but I wonder about practicality. Human decisions in the actual world are quite messy - uncertain data, uncertain consequences, uncertain externalities --- none of which fit neatly into a Turing machine.

      There is also the finding from Godel that something may be true but not provable - analogous to an algorithm and a value for which the Turing machine does not halt. That said, I think there are very important insights to be gained in looking at the overall architecture of decidability as you have done.

      Cheers - George Gantz: The Door That Has No Key: https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3494

      Dear Jongmin,

      I greatly appreciated your work and discussion. I am very glad that you are not thinking in abstract patterns.

      "I follow various papers, and show how their arguments fit into, or don't fit into, our model".

      While the discussion lasted, I wrote an article: "Practical guidance on calculating resonant frequencies at four levels of diagnosis and inactivation of COVID-19 coronavirus", due to the high relevance of this topic. The work is based on the practical solution of problems in quantum mechanics, presented in the essay FQXi 2019-2020 "Universal quantum laws of the universe to solve the problems of unsolvability, computability and unpredictability".

      I hope that my modest results of work will provide you with information for thought.

      Warm Regards, `

      Vladimir

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