Why is the universe comprehensible? by Ian Durham

Dear Ian,

Good essay, interesting view. I agree there "..exist problems that are undecidable for physical reasons" and "The universe has fundamental limits baked into it." but can we not reduce them to 'infinitessimals'? If you interact with a spinning sphere at the equator and I ask; 'Is it + or - rotation?' Can you tell me? But how CLOSE to the equator must we be get 50:50 certainty? Is that not, as I think you suggest, just a matter of experimental precision, so can be reduced!? Now that +/- decidability also INCREASES, by CosTheta Latitude, from 0 to 1 towards the poles.

So now consider your Stern-G Fig.1.; We know all light has ellipticity, as do all orbitals, so if we hypothesise polariser interactions can change ellipticity (major axis orientation) as well as polarity, then we can say the magnets divert the 'state' BOTH WAYS, but only ONE channel corresponds to major axis amplitude so can 'click'.

Now in THAT case, with some simple conditions (shared axis, and vector additions) we can surely reduce 'quantum uncertainty' to the physical limit you suggest!? I've found that a powerfully resolving hypothesis, as I discuss in my own essay, giving Bells inequalities physically, as he always suggested was possible.

We can then ask the truth value question; "is my hair blond?" and get answers of recursively reducing precision of HOW blonde!? So a 'reducing' not 'excluded' middle between Blonde and Brunette.

You struggled with that concept last year, perhaps even ran from it as some do. Now I think it should be more comprehensible from your own viewpoint. Do let me know.

Very best

Peter

Dear Ian,

which color of hair would a pre-colonial Bantu have assigned to Marilyn Monroe? And what about an alien from a planet orbiting Sirius ?

"The universe has fundamental limits baked into it." Isn't it rather so that these 'limits' are constitutive means for there being something at all - FOR US?

Heinz

Hello Ian, Neil Bates here. I am very impressed by the literary quality of your piece, as well as the broad interdisciplinary scope and variety of picking various conceptual metaphors and points to make. Certainly something worthy of publication in a semi-popular science education forum. I must agree that issues of language in science and even basic description of experience can't be brushed aside. Too often, authors take the material of their discussions as simple clear givens. This is so despite decades of wrangling over the philosophical problems of quantum mechanics and even the scientific method. It is important in issues of the peculiar "Renninger null measurement" where we presume a "wavefunction" must have rearranged because a detector that COULD have found a particle showed a negative result. And what about unreliable detectors? Can they have ontological significance?

I haven't seen much similar to your speculations about the effective relativity of calculation. Some would say "so what" because math is conceived as a perfect Platonic thing in itself, yet foundational mathematicians still argue over discovery versus construction, the viability of unmet counterfactuals, etc.

Also: If you or other readers might take at look at my own piece, addressing the issue of the strong correlations of entanglement and how neo-mechanistic models of quantum physics aren't enough - it could use some votes on this last day. Thank you.

Ian,

OK, the hypothesised mechanism seems still beyond your analytical skills. Or did having to decide or - rotation exactly at an equator confuse you? No surprise as you're in the vast majority, just a little disappointing a possible answer before our eyes still seems invisible to most!.

Best

Peter

"As long as the universe remains relatively stable, the first condition implies the second. The fact that the universe remains relatively stable, thus ensuring that the second condition is met in the aggregate, was originally proposed as a "principle" of comprehensibility in [7]. It asserted that the nature of a physical system under investigation will always remain within the bounds of the method of investigation. That is, we expect scientific answers to scientific questions. Of course, one could object to the use of the word 'always' as there is no way to prove this. In fact it is really a statement of tendencies within physical systems akin to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Is it better to say that the entropy of the universe only tends to increase rather than stating that it always increases? I would rather hedge my bets and assume the weaker condition even if it has never been observed to decrease. Likewise with the principle of comprehensibility. In terms of truth-conditional statements, then, we can restate this principle of comprehensibility as follows."

By simply asking a question, we immediately establish a context which limits the scope of the inquiry. The general stability of the universe ensures that answers to our question will, to a high degree of probability, remain within the context of the question. This is the essence of comprehensibility since it allows us to develop systematic measures by which we can further probe a topic. Building an understanding requires refining the context by asking additional questions. But this also necessarily means that our knowledge is shaped by the questions we ask and how we choose to ask them, i.e. by our methodology

"In Newton's day, testing the truth-conditional statement "time is absolute" would have produced a positive truth value given the knowledge and technology of the time. That same statement, if tested now, would elicit a negative truth value. Yet it is wrong to say that there was any change in the underlying physics between then and now. What changed was our knowledge of that physics, i.e. we increased our information. Yet even if we take Braun's view it is clear that limitations still exist and that these limitations intimately depend on context. Our inability to simultaneously measure non-commuting observables in quantum systems to arbitrary accuracy is a limit on our ability to obtain information regardless of whether or not we believe in objective truth. It arises from the context of our measurement. Comprehensibility is still the result of a combination of the mutual agreement between observers and the fact that the universe remains relatively stable. That is to say, the Principle of Comprehensibility need not be formulated in a truth-conditional form. The fact remains that in order to say we comprehend some element of the universe we must necessarily obtain some information about that element. But obtaining that information is a physical process that necessarily has a context which constrains the nature of that information; the very act of acquiring information shapes the information acquired. Physical limitations on the acquisition of knowledge are not controversial. The universe has fundamental limits baked into it. But it is these very limits that allow for the universe to be comprehensible. They are necessary in order for our seemingly finite minds to have any hope of comprehending anything. These physical limitations bear a certain resemblance to G¨odel's incompleteness theorems in that they arise from the internal structure of the system and one must break free from that structure in order to fully understand it. The universe is a vast and interconnected place of which we are but a small part, a mere mote of dust, as it were. Any attempt to comprehend it must necessarily depend on the fact that we are a part of it. Indeed the very act of comprehension is itself a part of it and is thus shaped by it. Like the god Odin from Norse mythology, who is said to have sacrificed an eye in order to attain wisdom, our quest for comprehension limits our very ability to comprehend, and the universe remains always partially veiled."

JP: I will rate your essay just before the time for rating expires. It is a privilege to be able to read what you write and to offer comments.

Hi Ian,

I found the theory of quantum reference frames is very interesting (as you might imagine after having read my essay). I heard in a talk you gave at a FQXI conference, that you are working on quantum reference frame. But sadly, I could not find any paper you published on the topic.

Thanks also for the interest and reply on my essay. I tried to gave an answer to the point you raised about the existence of semantically closed theories, if you are interested.

Luca

Hi Ian,

please have a look at my reply in my blog regarding closeability of SR.

Luca

Hi Ian,

Thank you, any feedback would be helpful. Hope your essay does well in the judging.

Jeff

I always enjoy reading Durham's essays because he is a very smart person and knows his field quite well. Noramlly, Durham writes about consciousness and free choice (see Fxqi 2019 conference in Italy), and now about comprehension, and comprehension, of course, is a part of consciousness and free choice.

The tell for a fundamental question is in its identity. The universe is, simply, the way that it is. Likewise consciousness is simply because we are conscious...and so comprehensibility is because we comprehend. Of course, this is much too simple and so Durham feels the need, like any good philosopher, to argue endlessly about the meaning of nothing...

Instead of free choice and consciousness, Durham states that "...each individual is free to declare whatever they wish to declare." Oh, and a single observer is also "...free to simply deny any result..." Well, the result could be wrong, right? The result could be uncertain or it could be contradicting other work.

Is this all Durham has? Consciousness and comprehensibility are both words that mean free choice. Free choice is the key to both consciousness and comprehension and many other complex terminologies. Without unpredictable free choice, we would not be conscious nor would we ask about comprehension...

Hi Ian,

On a final note and then I let you go. First of all thanks for your interest and your reply in my blog. Time is just the hardest thing to understand. So I think it is better to leave time as external parameter until some ideas have been clarified. This does not hinder the argument.

In a static picture one can apply the ideas of semantically closed theories on quantum reference frames. If we have a quantum reference frame, where for physical reasons, there are only finite degrees of freedom, then only limited information on the objects can be accessed. For instance if only finite SU(2) representation are possible, than such a reference frame is not able to uniquely distinguish an up and down spin in the direction of the reference frame. This is called degradation of a reference frame. It leads to a probabilistic description even for a spin collinear with the reference frame. The probability is due to an epistemic limitation on the exact (classical) distinguishability of all the 'directions' (elements of SU(2)) and the back reaction of the object on the reference frame. So it is assumed that the real symmetry is the full SU(2) but the limited resources leads to a statistical description, like statistical mechanics.

If we demand the theory to be semantically close and the limitation is a physical one, like the finite size of the universe or the system would collapse in a black hole, then the epistemic limitation has to be taken seriously and has ontic consequences. To close the theory, I suppose the group has to be replaced by another one, that does not pretend, that there are infinite resources. I would not know, how to do that. But I can imagine that some additional quantum effect could result from this.

In a way, when Heisenberg went to Einstein, telling him, that only observable elements should enter the theory and Einstein replied, that it is the other way round: the theory tells, what is observable. This is true for naive realistic theory. Semantically closed theories would do Heisenberg's intuition justice, that theoretical terms should be physically realizable.

One could play a kid's game: Kid: what do you mean by spin? Me: a finite (2 dimensional) representation of the 'rotation group'. K: What is that? M: A description, that if you measure any direction, you know how probable you find an up or down result relative to that direction. K: What you mean by 'direction'? M: This is where a gyroscope points. But one needs a infinite sized gyroscope in order to distinguish all directions and having no back reaction. K: But this is absurd. The gyroscope would collapse into a black hole. Are you explaining a concept with something that cannot exist physically.

Thanks for the conversation

Luca