The Present State of Physics, Mathematics, and Science

(By the way Rick, I think the information about sensor accuracy, that you shared with Lorraine, is very interesting.)

I asked myself a couple of additional questions, anwers are welcome:

1. The issue of counterfactuals

If we take it at face value that ultimate reality operates strictly deterministic, then the whole machinery leaves no room for errors. Literally everything plays out just as the laws of physics demand it - without any exceptions. If we imagine that world to be free of any living and thinking entities, everything happens just the way it should, without errors.

But if we now include human thinking and deduction into that reality, the picture suddenly changes, since people make errors, they can take counterfactuals as facts and vice versa. This means that the human mind - deterministically produced by the laws of physics - often produces ontologies that are nowhere to be found in a strictly deterministic world: the human mind can produce all sorts of things for those we can say that they do not exist.

Consequently, if that strictly deterministic world view is true, parts of the deterministic machinery (the brains) are able to produce false statements about the whole machinery (or about parts of it). This seems to be no wonder, since these parts are not the whole and therefore these parts lack some information to produce the correct statements that reflect the whole reality correctly instead of filling the gaps with some imagination. Nonetheless we have to state that a strictly deterministic world obviously is able to produce counterfactual, non-existent things by acts of imagination and thoughts. What is non-existent are not the thoughts themselves, but their thought-to-be-ontological contents.

So, physical laws in a strictly deterministic world obviously can and do produce thoughts that often are in contradiction with these laws themselves. This can be easily seen when evaluating the huge amount of scientific papers on the "market" whose conclusions contradict each other. From a logical point of view, they cannot all state the truth about (ultimate) reality.

So, the strictly deterministic world that has been defined by us as working error-free is nonetheless able to produce errors. It does not produce these errors on the fundamental level (particles, trajectories, interactions etc.), but on a more complex level (brains). The term "errors" surely is a human term, relative to the human desire to know and value truth more than falsity. Nonetheless we can ask whether it is possible to minimize these errors down to zero in the future?

If the reason for these errors is that parts of ultimate reality (brains) cannot represent the whole thing (due to lack of the whole information, the whole truth), then only the whole thing may be error-free - as is expected within the framework of strict determinism. Now, the whole thing is considered to be inanimate and does not know everything about itself (but only what human brains know about it). The more astonishing it would be if parts of that whole thing (brains) nonetheless at some point in time should be able to know everything about that whole thing (theory of everything). Notice that without animate matter (consciousness), the whole ultimate reality wouldn't know anything, not even that it exists! But with brains, so the story goes, ultimate reality will sooner or later know everything about itself (at least everything foundational, what would be a lot!).

Therefore let's look closer at what inanimate matter doesn't know - but human brains know (in the sense that these brains know what they [still] do not know): if there was a big bang, are the initial conditions that led to the present world have been a necessary consequence of some other deterministic processes - or have they merely been a realized possibility amongst other possibilities? How can one ever solve the problem of a "beginning" other than to assume that there was no beginning, but ultimate reality literally did exist forever (maybe in a timeless realm, maybe only in a realm where time was, is and will be "present" forever)?

If we can't trace infinitely back into the past, how substantiated is the assumption of a strict determinism? Moreover, if we assume ultimate reality with a certain set of physical laws to be eternal (without a Big Bang), how would that leap of imagination be different from assuming a Creator for our present world? The fact that the laws of physics were what they were (and not other) and are what they are then is equally mysterious than believing in a Creator.

2. Quantum fluctuations

Are Quantum fluctuations real? And if yes, do they act deterministically or do they counteract the course of events dictated by the known laws of physics?

3. Non-measurable parts of ultimate reality

Are there in-principle non-measurable, non-deterministic influences in ultimate reality that we never can detect in a repeatable fashion? Are there even aspects of ultimate reality that never can fully be imagined by human brains?

4. What place has "intelligence" within the world view of a strict determinism? How can - and should - "intelligence" be defined within this world view?

Rick,

There's no need to take umbrage.

Forget about climate change and the Anthropocene for a minute. The real question is: can people EVER have ANY effect on the world, i.e. can people ever change the world?

The alternative scenario is that people and their actions are mere epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of the laws of nature; the bottom-up laws of nature are the only things that ever have any effect on the world; i.e. the bottom-up laws of nature are the only things that change every number for every variable.

The concept of people having an effect on the world can be reframed as the concept of people assigning at least some new numbers to at least some of their own variables.

I'm saying that physics is very mistaken about the nature of the world. I'm saying that the world is such that people and other living things assign at least some new numbers to at least some of their own variables (whereby other numbers for other variables are changed, due to law of nature relationships).

E.g., people continually assign new numbers to some of their own position variables for their own hands, feet and vocal cords. This is the means by which people have a genuine effect on the world; this is the means by which people literally change the world.

Rick,

Re Rick Lockyer replied on Oct. 3, 2021 @ 19:14 GMT and Rick Lockyer replied on Oct. 3, 2021 @ 22:56 GMT:

Forget about climate change and the Anthropocene for a minute. The real question is: can people EVER have ANY effect on the world, i.e. can people ever change the world?

The alternative scenario is that people and their actions are mere epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of the laws of nature; the bottom-up laws of nature are the only things that ever have any effect on the world; i.e. the bottom-up laws of nature are the only things that change every number for every variable.

The concept of people having an effect on the world can be reframed as the concept of people assigning at least some new numbers to at least some of their own variables.

I'm saying that physics is very mistaken about the nature of the world. I'm saying that the world is such that people and other living things assign at least some new numbers to at least some of their own variables (whereby other numbers for other variables are changed, due to law of nature relationships).

E.g., people continually assign new numbers to some of their own position variables for their own hands, feet and vocal cords. This is the means by which people have a genuine effect on the world; this is the means by which people literally change the world.

Rick,

No honest physicist believes what climate and other scientists say about people having an impact on the planet's climate and ecosystems.

But physics has a different reason for not believing what these scientists say. Physics says that people can have no effect on the climate, and people can have no effect on the planet, because it's the laws of nature (not people) that change every number for every variable.

YOU agree that people have no effect on the climate, or that such a thing hasn't been or can't be proved. But you seem to be ambivalent about whether or not people could ever have any genuine effect on the world.

But, if people have any genuine effect on the world, then this must necessarily be modelled as people changing at least some of the numbers for their own variables.

I agree with the climate scientists and the other scientists, and I disagree with the physicists: I say that people DO have a genuine effect on the world, i.e. people are changing at least some of the numbers for their own variables.

You seem to be ambivalent about whether or not people could ever have any genuine effect on the world. But how would YOU model people having a GENUINE effect on the world?

Re Rick Lockyer's assertions that "free will has no place in a physics discussion" and that "free will has no innate connection to physics or mathematics":

Physics says that the law of nature relationships are the explanation for all physical outcomes. But if "free will" were a SEPARATE AND DISTINCT cause of physical outcomes, then "free will" would necessarily be of interest to physics.

But physics doesn't see "free will" as a separate and distinct cause of physical outcomes: physics' "free will" is merely a rebranding or re-naming of particular aspects of what the laws of nature are already doing. In other words, physics' (and philosophy's) concept of "free will" is just a bit of PR spin.

So, can people and other living things have an effect on the world that is SEPARATE AND DISTINCT to the effect that the law of nature relationships have on the world? I.e. can people have an influence on the climate that is separate and distinct to the effect that the law of nature relationships have on the climate?

According to physics, the answer is: No. According to physics, people and their actions are mere epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of the laws of nature; and these laws of nature are the only things that have any effect on the world, the only things that have any effect on the climate.

(continued)

In other words, physics says "que sera sera", "what will be, will be": physics has a fatalistic view that events are completely outside of the control of people, because there is nothing anyone can do about the laws of nature, and people have NO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ABILITY to effect events.

In other words, despite their PR, 99% of physicists are anthropogenic climate change deniers because of their beliefs about the nature of the world.

Oops. The above "effect" should be "affect"!

(continued)

But, unlike 99% of physicists, I'm not a fatalist. I'm saying that people DO have an ability to affect the world, an ability that is separate and distinct from the laws of nature.

This is why people's ability to have an effect on the world can only be represented via the use of Boolean and algorithmic symbols.

Similarly, the ability to differentiate/discern difference (i.e. consciousness) is a FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND DISTINCT aspect of the world to the law of nature aspect of the world. This fundamentally different and distinct aspect of the world can't be derived from the law of nature relationships: it too can only be represented via the use of Boolean and algorithmic symbols.

The concept of a strictly deterministic working world can be reframed as the concept of a computer simulation.

Ultimate reality as a computer simulation obviously can - and does - some sub-simulations, brought by us via our modern computers. Even human brains could be termed as such "sub-simulators".

However, within the concept of a strictly deterministic world, no such sub-simulation is independent from the simulation ultimate reality does as a whole. Because the existence of such sub-simulations correlate to a 100 % with what ultimate reality simulated at other places and other times (even in the future). That's why some physicists speak of a space-time block universe that is independent of time.

Although that concept of a block-universe has no conscious goal what to simulate, the simulation itself and its results are nonetheless predetermined if we believe in the concept of a strict determinism.

The substrate on which this gigantic simulation is performed is considered by some to be of secondary interest, since all what counts are the fundamental concepts of computation. In a certain sense, that gigantic simulation can be thought of as being simulated on itself - namely on the fundamental concepts of computation. And how could it be other, since a strictly deterministic world cannot have been come into existence by some non-deterministic events. Even if there was a big bang, if we want to hang on to the world view of strict determinism, then that big bang had to be caused by some deterministic causes - and they themselves also - and so on infinitely.

Thus, a strictly deterministic world must be thought of as as an eternal simulation. It has and will simulate everything that is possible to simulate, infinitely often. Of course, such a strictly deterministic world is thought to also being able to simulate consciousness (otherwise consciousness wouldn't be existent, so the argument goes). Consequently that eternal simulation also does simulate you and me infinitely often during its infinite, eternal course of events.

What we call "particles" and their behaviour then are merely computational steps in that giant simulation. Our best physical theories have already figured out to what computational steps these "particles" belong to. Of course, this seems to imply that parts of this gigantic simulation (human brains) are able to figure out what smaller parts of that simulation do - so that this gigantic simulation at least knows a little bit about due to what principles it comes about in the first place.

Although this may be true (if we assume strict determinism to be true), the above mentioned human knowledge about the principles behind that simulation is predetermined by the whole simulation. Here the question arises whether or not it is (logically) possible for a mindless simulation to not only become aware of itself as being a simulation, but moreover to also figure out the principles on which the whole simulation is based on. Many scientist would say that both questions can be answered with "yes":

every simulation at some point becomes partly aware of itself as a simulation. It then figures out a little bit about due to what principles the whole simulation comes about - and the result is that these principles must be considered as fundamental, since they are eternal. To now "solve" the riddle of how some abstract, eternal and timeless principles (like mathematics) are able to produce a time-dependent computation on just the substrate science has found in our world, it is tempting to say that an eternal simulation does not need any substrate to run itself.

Why? Because the world we observe must - according to an eternal simulation - be a repeated version of an infinite series of identical computational histories in the past. And the fundamental principles of simulation (computation) are logically not changeable whereas the substrate could logically be replaced by some other substrate. One now could argue that the latter is not a logical conclusion and the whole universal simulation we speak of here can exclusively only run on a substrate we call "matter". The point here is that we have no chance to answer this question - since we have no chance to answer the question why there does exist such an eternal simulation at all.

That would be the end-point - if there wouldn't be a subtle detail in the whole chain of reasoning: If we even have no chance to answer the two questions about why only a substrate we call "matter" can do such a simulation and why there should at all exist such an eternal simulation, we could reframe these two questions into the one question whether or not an eternal deterministic world is at all a reasonable concept.

It seems that I have reached the end of reasoning here. My intention was to examine the reasonability of a deterministic world view. Without doubt, there is some determinism in this world. And whether or not the world is exclusively deterministic or not, in either case there is an unambiguous answer out there, there is an unambiguous truth out there that already has answered this question - independent of me asking.

I can only say that it seems to me that truth somehow must be a fundamental and universal measure for all of that. And if true - then it is astonishing for me that this benchmark also realized itself in the endeavour of all scientific reasoning. Moreover, that endeavour is characterized by the ever same goal, finding out what is true and what is false. This is goal-oriented behaviour and I conclude from its existence that for answering all the questions that couldn't be answered here in this post, goal-oriented behaviour must somehow come into the equation. In this sense I agree with Lorraine about her arguments concerning human will and goals.

Lorraine, it is pointless for you and me to have a meaningful conversation here, we do not agree on rather fundamental issues like what physics is, how physicists are and what they believe. You have a narrow view and too much tendency to stereotype. While I have strong views (educated opinions) on human influence on global climate, I fully believe there are very smart and dedicated physicists working on climate science with the goal of determining the truth, and sadly some people I can't call physicists that have an agenda to kill the use of fossil fuels, and have no issue with turning their back on honesty, science and the scientific method.

Climate change is not the greatest existential threat to humanity, not even close. My top three are dishonesty, hate, and emotionalism.

Stefan,

From my point of view, I never had any "arguments concerning human will and goals."

I don't have an anthropocentric view of the world: no new physics emerged when birds started to fly; no new physics emerged when human beings appeared.

I think that human beings and other living things are just forms of matter: the difference between living things and primitive matter is a question of degree, but not a question of superiority.

The physics is the same, though in addition to the equations, variables and number symbols of physics, I contend that it is necessary to use Boolean and algorithmic symbols in order to represent the world differentiating (discerning difference in) itself (i.e. consciousness) and the world moving itself (i.e. agency).

There is no program controlling the world; the world is free, but structured by the laws of nature; the Boolean and algorithmic symbols merely represent necessary aspects of the world that can't be represented by equations, variables and number symbols.

And the world is not like a computer:

A computer is a human artefact whereby existing symbols (Boolean, algorithmic, word, sentence, equation, variable, number) are re-represented via ingenious arrangements of electrical circuits, voltages and transistors.

The electrical circuits, voltages and transistors are human-created symbols of other human-created symbols: you can't liken the natural world to a computer, and you can't liken the human brain to a computer. For starters, think of the difference between a real-world number, and how a number is represented in a computer.

Rick,

I presume that there would be a better chance of moderating dishonesty, hate and emotionalism in countries with the rule of law, decent healthcare and education for all, and ways for all people to earn a decent living. What's happening with Facebook and Twitter might lead to people caring enough about the issue to do something about it.

I don't appreciate being repeatedly lectured to about, what you perceive as, my personal failings. Instead, it is up to you to provide an argument which proves me wrong.

But I never was talking about climate change as such. I was talking about whether the nature of the world is such that people and living things COULD influence the climate, as opposed to the physics' view that the laws of nature are responsible for every number outcome for every variable. I'm saying that people DO have an effect on the world (not necessarily a climate effect), and that this can only be represented via the use of Boolean and algorithmic symbols, as well as variables and number symbols.

I have also noted the fact that people and the mathematical symbols they use are so entangled that the mathematical symbols are not standalone entities.

Lorraine,

if I understood you correctly, your lines of reasoning are based on the assumptions Panpsychism makes? No problem with that, I just want to reassure that I didn't miss the point you want to make with your comment.

1. According to physics, every numeric outcome for every variable is determined by the laws of nature. People and their actions are mere epiphenomena, i.e. by-products of the laws of nature, because the laws of nature are the only things that have any effect on the world. So, people can't have a genuine effect on the world.

2. If people WERE to have a genuine effect on the world in response to situations, then you'd need to use Boolean and algorithmic symbols to represent this.

Without going into details of the musculature and nerves, this is essentially about people assigning some new numbers to (e.g.) the position variables for their own vocal cords in response to a situation they are facing (whereby other numbers for other variables would be changed, due to law of nature relationships).

In a way that is analogous to what a computer program does, the situation a person faces can be represented as the result of a high-level Boolean-algorithmic collation and analysis of a set of numbers that apply to a set of variables. In turn, this set of numbers that applies to the set of variables represents the outcome of light and sound waves interacting with the person's eyes and ears.

3. Would physics implode if people assigned new numbers to their own position variables? Well, physics currently copes with the assignment of new numbers to variables that is described as "quantum mechanics". Maybe it's the same type of thing.

(continued)

4. But apart from the above conjecture, do people IN FACT have a genuine effect on the world? I'm saying that they do, but you probably couldn't tell the difference between people having a genuine effect on the world and quantum mechanics.

Hi Stefan,

I think that panpsychism as a philosophical theory is a pretty vague way of looking at the world. Panpsychism as a philosophical theory seemingly has no real details, no real mechanisms, and no real rationale apart from the fact that it would be convenient if high-level consciousness were built out of low-level consciousness.

I would say instead that the world is a system, and the necessary elements of a system include: 1) an aspect that differentiates (discerns difference in) the lawful relationships, categories and numbers; and 2) an aspect that moves/changes the system. These 2 necessary aspects of a system can't be represented by equations: they can only be symbolically represented via the use of Boolean and algorithmic symbols.

The world being a system implies a type of panpsychism. So this would be my religious(?) view of the type of world we live in.

Hi Lorraine,

thanks for your honest answer.

In my opinion there is nothing wrong with "religious" thoughts about the world. Many scientific a priori assumptions are similarly based on deep beliefs about how the world must be.

Take for example the "electron". Apart from its main features (spin, mass etc.) it is believed to be no more reducible. So a certain irreducibility necessarily appears when defining some atomic blocks of reality. Fair enough, the same would hold true for a panpsychism view of that electron. Its panpsychistic property couldn't be reduced to something other.

At some point of analysis, irreducibility necessarily comes into "the equation". Some theoretical physicists try to work around this by introducing mathematical infinities into their theories. For example an electron as a kind of infinite fractal structure, the latter "explaining" the electron's behaviour and interactions. But there are problems about considering such an electron to be existent in space-time, since such a structure had to have ever more smaller sub-structures all the way "down" to the infinitely small. No mechanical cause could ever reach the top of that fractal tower (means our microcosm) from "down there" in finite time, since that cause would have to traverse infinitely many steps from "all the way down" to the top in merely a finite time. Even if assuming that every such step needs "no time at all" would not result in a classical mechanistic explanation, but would re-introduce some "spooky action at a very large distance" (aka instantaneous, infinitely fast influences). By the way, the same problem of infinitely many steps appears if one considers that the present state of the universe has been caused by what happened infinitely far away back in time - by assuming the universe is infinite in the past.

Hi Lorraine,

"but you probably couldn't tell the difference between people having a genuine effect on the world and quantum mechanics."

There could be at least a kind of consistency argument delivered by quantum mechanical experiments in favour of the argument that people have a genuine effect on the world.

If the experiment by Genovese, Marletto and Vedral (to be found on fqxi here: https://fqxi.org/community/articles/display/251 ) and its main statement of having found some irreversible action at the quantum level turns out to show us something fundamental about the quantum level, then this irreversibility would be at least inconsistent with a strict deterministic world view that assumes that all actions can be traced back arbitrarily in time unambiguously only by using the known time-reversible laws (and the initial conditions). And if you can't trace it back, you may also not be able to trace it strictly deterministically forward into the future.

Notice that if the experiment of Genovese, Marletto and Vedral turns out to have indeed found a fact about nature that was not implicit in our hitherto known physical laws, this does not automatically mean that Constructor Theory has it all right - only because it predicts the outcome of that experiment. it only would mean that concerning that prediction, Constructor Theory is not at odds with the experimental result.