Dear Florin,
thank you for your feedback and your effort to make me understand your point of view. I am thinking about your comments and contemplating the possibility of your arguments being right, absolutely right or partially right. Please let me therefore make a few final remarks.
Concerning our main theme here, the question of what could/couldn't be possible in physics, although it may be provable that the maths underlying our actual universe is consistent and coherent and other maths wouldn't, this is in my opinion not sufficient to conclude an a priori platonic realm of fixed axioms and their consequences and hence the assumption that outside space and time there exists nothing but pure maths as an abstract concept.
You wrote:
"I do not understand the oneness idea, but again I am not a philosopher."
The oneness-idea is simple and i tried to visualize it by my example with the white plain. Even if one defines borders on it, it stays the same regarding its essence and contents.
So let's leave aside my white plain, for it is only an attempt to give a helping construction to illustrate. Some mathematical values may or may not exist forever on this plane or elsewhere, that's not the main point i am concerned with. My question is, if the whole axioms that are generally possible by reasoning (in maths) exist a priori in some platonic realm or not.
You wrote:
"Reasoning and math are not ill defined in the absence of mathematicians"
When understood as absence of everything but abstract math, i would doubt this. Because the main axiom presupposed in the whole discussion is that maths is rather incomplete then inconsistent. There can be many axiomatic systems that are at odds with each other and lead to mutually exclusive perspectives about the validity of the arguments. All that is surely nonetheless based on reasoning and therefore resoning isn't an ill-defined concept in that case. But the conclusions drawn out of these maths could be simply arbitrary and therefore not even ill-defined.
I think we both can exclude not only for the purpose of the arguments, the case that reasoning is a priori deeply inconsistent.
But according to Goedel, every thing that can be considered as absolute, complete and definite, must contain itself as an element (so is our body, which is coded in detail in our brains). And to bind together a mathematicians or someone else's world of ideas (into a class of all the sets of thoughts and conclusions) to a coherent unity, this world must be an element of itself and can only be grasped by irrational insights. Because no rational thought is an element of itself. And therefore no rational thought can bind together one's world of ideas to a unity. The question is if it is rational to consider a completely fixed and differenciated landscape of maths to be preexistent without knowing if this landscape is fully coherent, non-random and well-defined right from the start. I think this question is not yet decided (and maybe cannot decided here and now), but i don't exclude the possibility that it can be decided in the future by a strict proof that convinces every practitioner at the end of the day.