Sorry for my mistake:
I forgot that the larger or smaller sign is not tolerated here. So possibly an important idea of me got lost.
Let me try, recall and continue: ... n results from m+1. While Cantor's naive set theory has been based on a firm set or "block" of "all" natural numbers, I cannot confirm any necessity to assume a largest natural number. The natural numbers cannot be completely set but they are to be considered endless. One can biject the numbers 1,2,3,... to the numbers 2,3,4,...
Incidentally, Cantor ignored this impossibility to freeze the natural numbers in his proofs, in particular in DA2.
Laymen understand, as already did Spinoza, that the pseudo-quality "infinity" can neither be enlarged nor exhausted. Nonetheless, it is often reasonable to use "infinity" like a block.
What about countability, I argue, any set of natural numbers is countable but "the" set of "all" natural numbers is something qualitatively quite different and uncountable.
The block universe is imagined to extend in space from - infinity to + infinity in three orthogonal directions. Isn't this a considerable enlargement when compared to the just positive natural numbers? If one considers space with respect to a point belonging to a particular object, then one can use the always positive distance to all other points of space.
Such individualized space might be considered like a block that is open-ended.
I could agree that there are two likewise unilaterally infinite "blocks" of time: Past time and future time.
Would such consideration contradict
a) Einstein 1905
b) Minkowski 1908
c) neither E nor M?
Regards,
Eckard