Tom,

I'm afraid you missed my main point: the formative/temporal information must be explicitly present in the representation and not put into it in some artificial manner. Of course, even with numbers, instead of '11' one can write '2@9' but this simple trick does not addresses the typical physical situation when a single event is followed by (i.e. directly connected to) several immediately consequent events each of various structure. By the way, graphs (with nodes and edges), as well as strings, are not such temporal representations.

You really need some new, temporal, form of representation. The point is simple but strong mental habits prevent most from seeing it: math. does not really deal with non-numeric representations.

Okay, Lev, even if I am willing to suspend judgment on everything I know about numbers, points, lines, planes -- I would still not understand why a "... new, temporal, form of representation" would be less "artificial" an imposition than converting points, lines and plane to "chairs, tables and beer mugs" as Hilbert put it.

Why would not a topological quantum field theory satisfy your requirements? After all, if time is identical to information, exchange of quantum information over topological manifolds would reveal, but not determine, the object representation.

Tom

Tom,

When I speak of "representation", I'm talking about the form of data representation in science.

Any field theory or, for that matter, *any* current physical theory still relies on numeric measurements, while I'm suggesting non-numeric "measurements".

    Lev,

    Isn't an ordered structure what "measurement" implies? Then, isn't temporal order fundamental? And doesn't numerical order follow from temporal order?

    I think about Brouwer, who called mathematics "a languageless activity of the mind." That same Brouwer allowed that doing mathematics entails "a move of time ... a twoity."

    The twoity you seem to suggest is the independence of semantics and syntax, and I agree with that -- a congruence of semantics and syntax would seem to imply meaning -- yet how does such meaning differ from that we find in the congruence, e.g., of identical geometric angles?

    Do understand that I am not asking these questions to be contrary -- there is so much in your concept that I find agreeable. I am just looking for a handhold that would obviate numerical representation of physical phenomena, and I haven't found it yet.

    Tom

    Tom,

    I'm quite comfortable with any question. ;-)

    I came to ETS formalism very gradually, trying to model inductive (biological) processes, which I and many other consider central to unlocking the nature of biological information processing: How is an object represented in order to be able to 'recognize' later another object that belongs to the same class of objects. This led to the search for the concept of structural representation: conventional numeric representations are not rich enough for the purposes of induction.

    I guess the 'easiest' way to approach ETS is the direct way: think now of the generalized measurement process in which numbers are replaced by their structural generalization, structs. A numeric/spatial measurement is based on the repetitive application of the same "stick", while the result of ETS measurement is a struct also obtained during the interaction with the corresponding object/process (all objects are, in fact, processes) . Of course, the conventional measurement is a very special case of ETS measurement.

    Thanks, Lev.

    This gets me the closest yet, to understanding your research program. As a student of complex systems, I grasp the terms of a recognition algorithm, and I have always been impressed, as you know, with the power of structs to generalize relations to this extreme degree.

    Scale has got to play a role here, though. Consider an infinitely self similar set. One does not measure with the "same stick" across different scales; scale, in fact, determines the stick one chooses -- a jagged coastline may be of infinite or finite length. And surely the Mandelbrot set is also a process as well as an object, which evolves according to a simple algorithm into an exceedingly complex form.

    Anyway, may I make a suggestion to narrow this discussion a bit, and also accommodate your emphasis on biological processes? An important unsolved problem in both biology and computation is that of protein folding -- could we possible focus on an ETS strategy toward that singular case?

    Tom

    Dear Lev and Tom,

    This looks like an interesting topic, if I understood it, but several points leave me confused.

    When Lev says "representation", this typically implies some sort of graphical picture or map. Yet he states that "...graphs (with nodes and edges)... are not such temporal representations. So are you foregoing all graphical (i.e., visual) representations?

    Lev states, "we have no (temporal) information on how number '11'...was formed. What does this mean? Using logical circuitry I can create a counter to generate *ALL* integers (with appropriate carry extensions) and also build adders and subtractors. They are generated in numerical order that can be interpreted as temporal order. What exactly is the problem?

    Tom says, "...isn't temporal order fundamental? And doesn't numeric order follow from temporal order?"

    Eons ago, in physics lab, we attached a weight to a paper tape, running between two electrodes and the spark 'marks' recorded 'measurements' of acceleration on the paper. if I now add simple counter circuitry to encode the marks (as binary integers) then I have integer marks, existing as spatial order, that we can interpret as temporal order. Where is the problem?

    Lev then states, "...I'm suggesting non-numeric "measurements"." What does this mean?

    Thanks for any explanation,

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Hello Edwin,

      1. "When Lev says "representation", this typically implies some sort of graphical picture or map."

      Please note that yours is not a formal meaning of the term 'representation': the formal meaning has to do with the formalism chosen to represent data.

      2. "Lev then states, '...I'm suggesting non-numeric "measurements".' What does this mean?"

      This is the case when you represent your data not by numbers but by some (preferably properly formalized) entities other than numbers. Note that "graphical pictures or maps" are not properly formalized entities that can be reliably manipulated for the purposes of "data processing" (in the same sense as we 'manipulate' numbers). So far, in science, this has not happened yet, but there are important reasons for moving in that direction.

      Tom,

      In ETS, "scales" (i.e.'stages') are handled very naturally, via the concept of 'transformation', which allows to shrink most large structs at he next stage.

      Also, although I would be more comfortable to talk biology, I believe it's not about comfort. ;-)

      I would like to make at least some small headway in physics: physics began essentially with dynamics but ETS is about structural representation. So I would like to understand at least some connections between an object viewed/represented as a process and its motion in space. I have some very preliminary ideas.

      1. "Are you saying that your 'structs' cannot be represented graphically?"

      Edwin, let's not confuse their *pictorial depictions* with their formal definition (see our main paper, p.29).

      2. "And would you attempt to explain about "(temporal) information on how '11'..was formed."?"

      I'm simply following the the temporal spirit of Peano definition of natural numbers (and, of course, more generally, the concept of struct).

      For example, '11' could have been obtained as '7' "followed" by '4', which is different from '2' "followed" by '9'. But when you look at '11', you can't see which temporal sequence of events produced that struct (in primitive cultures, one new what was going on simply because you had to make knots on the rope, or notches on a stick, or find the right number of stones) . And this is a general problem with all conventional mathematical representations (since they are not temporal).

      A temporal representation (such as struct) is not only more accurate but is also much richer, simply because it allows for the existence of qualitatively different events, which of course we have admitted in physics (e.g. qualitatively different particles).

      Lev,

      I read a newspaper story here in Detroit, concerning a giant T-shirt that public school teachers had made to adorn the "Spirit of Detroit" sculpture downtown.

      Accompanying the story was a picture of the shirt all spread out, with a caption that began "Up to 300 yards of material were used ..."

      "Up to"? I imagine that the caption writer was working from an earlier press release that estimated the amount of material needed. But here is the actual shirt, all constructed. If all the information we have is in the picture and caption, the shirt may have anywhere from a fraction of a yard to 300. If it has 300 plus a fraction, however small, the narrative that was true, before the shirt was made, is false after the shirt is made. If it is important to know (obviously, in this trivial example, it isn't, but the principle still applies) we measure the material to the best of our technical ability. Perhaps there are weather conditions that cause it to shrink or expand, so we may decide on either an average or a median measure under varying conditions. After all said and done, we declare the account of the event true or false, but not both. Wait, though - this account was written _after_ the shirt was constructed, and one would think that it has a definite value, a "real" outcome. Yet, even though the outcome has already been determined (the shirt is made) and its representation (photo & caption) exist simultaneously, our knowledge of the state of the shirt is in limbo until after the event and its representation are reconciled by measurement. There is only one right answer.

      My point: As you make clear with the independence of semantics & syntax, the gulf between representation and truth is not bridgeable. A representation is neither true nor false; ergo, there is no numerical representation that can tell us the truth, so long as the truth is probabilistic.

      Trouble is, we know that measured truth _is_ probabilistic. One of the contributors to quantum theory (I forget whom) characterized quantum mechanics as "something somewhere is doing we don't know what." The measured is never certain enough, only good enough. We don't need to know true from false. Except ...

      For cosmological models.

      I think Brendan made a good call in naming this thread. It makes a difference, when considering the origin, whether we start with something or nothing. If "something," our problem is rather like botany or zoology -- naming particles and properties, identifying and studying the characteristics that demarcate one particle from another. If "nothing," our problem is one of structure itself--and that is structure without matter, because when we measure changes in the state of a system, it is always from mass points, never space points. We know how spacetime changes matter dynamics; we do not know (in fact, general relativity forbids it in principle) that matter changes spacetime.

      To a theorist, and particularly a mathematical analyst, matter is a contaminant in an otherwise perfectly symmetrical world. We want all our space to behave smoothly, on an infinitely flat plane, where we manipulate points and lines at will -- we are descendants of Euclid. If mass doesn't want to cooperate, we coopt mass for energy and spread it symmetrically over the plane. If we encounter enough curvature caused by physical effects, to be troublesome, no problem -- we add dimensions. The n-dimension distribution (generalized Poincare Conjecture) is massless, with average energy content zero.

      My own strategy toward this problem (my "time barrier" preprint linked earlier) is to give the vacuum an n-dimensional sphere kissing order in which time (information) is dissipative over n Euclidean dimensions. The math works out (by a purely algebraic method) to where the ordinary matter content of the universe (4.59%) becomes a probability 0.0459 that our universe has any matter content at all. (As a consequence, my model anchors probability theory to a length 1 continuous field in n-dimension space, with asymptotic approach to 1).

      As with the giant T-shirt, the result we get after observation (WMAP data) is consistent with the range of observation; i.e., 4 dimensions. The 4-dimension horizon, I have found, is identical to a 10-dimension limit of an n-dimension field.

      So--a numerical analysis _does_ get us "somewhere." My interest in your research, Lev, is that the numbers don't tell us what "something" is doing. The dynamics of structure must always add a " 1" dimension to account for our knowledge of change in the system. The classical dynamic system is 3 1. The added dimension is of course, time.

      We agree between us that time is identical to information. However, do we mean the same thing by "information?" I mean, quantum information bytes, physical information, i.e., the same as described by Jacobson-Verlinde. I think, by your definition of structs if I understand it, that we do mean the same thing in different terms--"pairs of primitives" correspond, do they not, to quantum information? It is understood, though, that the state of your structs is positive definite and not in superposition, and quantum state measure is replaced by struct dynamics. Which leads back to the main question:

      Something or Nothing?

      (1) If something, structs are the product of broken symmetry, evolution is top down, and cosmology is botany.

      (2) If nothing, structs are a primitive, self organized, dynamic relation between time and space, and evolution is bottom up.

      My program is compatible with structs IFF (2). In that context, 0 1 spacetime relates the n-dimension set to the measure function -- with your representation of the natural numbers in fig 12, pg 30, the connected dots representing evolutionary events and therefore dynamic results. I can see that these events can both structure and decompose structs (according to the initial states of the structs) just as in biological evolution. Your definitions that follow imply novel structures from primitive representations, with a non-perturbative mapping.

      How am I doing so far?

      Tom

      Lev,

      I will look at your paper to try and understand your point of view of graphic depiction.

      But on the following:

      You say: "I'm simply following the the temporal spirit of Peano definition of natural numbers (and, of course, more generally, the concept of struct).

      For example, '11' could have been obtained as '7' "followed" by '4', which is different from '2' "followed" by '9'. But when you look at '11', you can't see which temporal sequence of events produced that struct (in primitive cultures, one new what was going on simply because you had to make knots on the rope, or notches on a stick, or find the right number of stones) . And this is a general problem with all conventional mathematical representations (since they are not temporal)."

      The basics of quantum electro-dynamics is the counter, the sum of creation and annihilation operators over a particle space. The basic logico-arithmetic circuit is the counter. It is basic because it gives rise to the integers *in order*. It is the physical implementation of Peano's axiom. Probably an infinite number of other logic circuits can be defined to produce any number of logical combinations of binary bits, but the primary ones that are useful are comparators, adders, and subtractors. The use of these to accomplish 2 plus 9 or 4 plus 7 are of no consequence and have nothing to do with the nature of time. I think the point about "(temporal) information on how '11'..was formed" is non-sensical and based on a misunderstanding of the nature of number in a physical universe that supports logic.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

        Edwin,

        You seem to find Lev's concept nonsensical on the assumption that time is identical to number. I think you'll have a hard time supporting that assumption, for if it were true, the equations of classical physics would not be time reversible. We know that they are.

        My own research does find a well ordering of the time sequence as a sequence of integers from a field (the complex numbers, z) that is non-ordered. But I think I get what Lev is saying about the noncommutativity of number combinations; these orderings are time-dependent, just as in the dynamics of QED that you cite. Thus, "temporal order."

        Tom

        Tom,

        You have incorrectly stated my position. I do not believe that time is identical to number. I am still trying (along with many others) to get a handle on time, including your assertion that "time is identical to information."

        I generally agree with Marcel LeBel that the most basic property of the physical universe is logic, in the sense that physical contradictions do not exist. He further states that "maths are based on logic. They are the metric extension of simple rules of logic." Based on physical reality and logic, I can construct logical circuits (AND, OR, NOT...) and from these construct arithmetic circuits. One of the simplest is the counter, which, as I noted, is the basis of QED and physically instantiates Peano's axioms. Unlike Kronecker, I do not count on God to supply the natural numbers (as long as a logical physical reality is available.) The numbers derive from physical logic. Before the logic existed, I do not believe numbers existed.

        The addition operations that Lev references are further derivative and are simply the most useful of a possibly infinite set of logico-mathematical circuits that can be implemented. Since the natural 'temporal' characteristic of 11 is to be generated after 10 and before 12, I do not see that it makes any sense to ascribe a problem to the fact that 11 can be generated by many different logico-mathematical operations.

        I am trying to understand why, when one has a physically real "natural" source of well-ordered integers that can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with time sequence, one would go to a non-ordered field looking for the same property. I'm sure this is related to your view that "...time is an n-dimensional infinitely orientable metric on a self-avoiding random walk", which I am trying to relate to "time is identical to information."

        That's the fun of these fqxi conversations. They stimulate thought.

        Edwin Eugene Klingman

          "The use of these to accomplish 2 plus 9 or 4 plus 7 are of no consequence and have nothing to do with the nature of time. I think the point about "(temporal) information on how '11'..was formed" is non-sensical and based on a misunderstanding of the nature of number in a physical universe that supports logic."

          Edwin,

          I'm afraid you are not reading my posts carefully and missed the main point: numbers do not allow us to record adequately what's going on in nature, since temporal processes have formative/temporal structure that cannot be captured numerically. In general, it looks that with the development of quantum physics we are led to face the reality that the temporal structure of (physical) events is the only structure of interest.

          Edwin,

          That time is identical to information is a result, not an assumption.

          Mathematical logic is a branch of mathematics, not the other way around.

          Boolean logic doesn't capture the time dependent relations of quantum states, the "something somewhere" -- it only informs us of the "doing what" in a classical computation.

          I can't understand why you think I have mischaracterized your position as a claim that time is identical to number, when you say " ... one has a physically real "natural" source of well-ordered integers that can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with time sequence ..." If you don't mean that the time sequence and number sequence are identical, I can't figure out what you do mean.

          Neither Lev nor I assume temporal order, however. We get to the identity of time with information by different routes -- Lev (if I understand correctly) from a hypothesis that the time-dependent structure of events is fundamental, and I from a hypothesis that the 2-dimensional structure of the complex plane is fundamental.

          Tom

          Tom,

          You are very well informed and bright, but you believe things that I do not believe.

          First, one-to-one correspondence is not 'identical' to me. Identical means essentially, "the same as" and time and numbers are not the same as each other, to me. Nor are time and information.

          The fact that Feynman was correct when he said "no one understands quantum mechanics" has not changed with his death. That no one of the five or more current interpretations of QM can explain it 'logically' does convince me that QM violates logic.

          As for "Mathematical logic is a branch of mathematics, not the other way around.", it seems to me that perhaps the most significant dividing line among physicists is the one that divides those who believe that mathematics is a useful tool to map the territory of physical reality from those who believe that mathematics is the essence of the universe and can somehow create the real physical territory from the map. The latter is perhaps best represented by Tegmark's "Mathematical Universe". It is basically a Platonic view or reality.

          Your statement "Mathematical logic is a branch of mathematics, not the other way around." is true as stated, but does not contradict my position (LeBel's position) that physical logic underlies math. This is based on the fact that physics does not support contradictions and that I can build physical devices that produce all of logic and all mathematics based on natural numbers. (I don't take real seriously any math that cannot be linked to numbers.) Once math arises, it is natural that the mathematician attempts to go back and 'capture' logic in the framework of math. But since I can demonstrate to you that math derives from physical reality, and you cannot demonstrate to me how you can derive physical reality from mathematics, I believe my view is correct. I don't expect this to change your view, because in the wake of Tegmark's paper I have come to believe that this is more a religious question than one of logic. Many on these blogs simply believe that math is primary and physical reality is secondary. This is perhaps attributable to the lack of significant new physics discoveries over the last half century, and the corresponding focus on more and more abstract math, but I suspect it really has more to do with psychological quirks. I no longer hold out much hope that the two sides will ever see the same universe.

          I view math as a game, and have no objection to the wildest assumptions being employed as the basis of the game. I view physics as more constrained, and if temporal order and numbers can be linked in a useful manner, as I have described above, I see no need as a physicist to look for 2D alternatives.

          Edwin Eugene Klingman

            I guess everything comes back again and again to the confusion created in the last century (particularly with the advent of computing) whose source is the blurring of the distinction between *coding* of 'reality' and its *representation*.

            There are many different means of coding information, and digital is one of them. But coding does not have to address the nature of information being coded, i.e. the meaning/semantics of this information. The reason confusion appeared in the first place has to do with the situation that so far mathematics has not dealt with the *meaningful* encoding, i.e. with representation. (Actually, I had to face this problem in the 80's.)

            I suggested in my paper Representational Formalism in Which Syntax and Semantics Are Congruent: Towards the Resolution of Searle's Chinese Room Challenge that the best way to approach this confusion is to rely on the formalism in which syntax and semantics are basically the same. What it means is that if you use such formalism in physics (or any other science) your 'encoding' is meaningful, i.e. it is a 'faithful' copy of 'reality'. (By the way, I believe that there is, basically, only one such formalism.)

            It goes without saying that, first of all, one has to face the central issue: What is an adequate view of 'reality'? The answers to such question will be investigated in this century, but the ETS formalism was developed to address precisely this question. I postulated that 'the reality' is an interconnected net of structured events. Again, natural numbers can be obtained/realized ("physically", to use Edwin's language) in this manner.

            Mathematics, for obvious historical reasons, has adopted the numeric view of reality, but as I have discussed in several papers the reduction of *all events in nature* to a single event of the simplest structure (corresponding to the successor operation in the Peano axioms) although allow us to encode reality but in a very 'primitive' manner. For example, an event in QED has a more complex structure.

              Lev,

              I've looked at (and around) page 29 as you suggested. At first glance it appears not entirely unrelated to my "Automatic Theory of Physics" based on automata theory as the most promising means to understand both "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences" and as the model of how physics theories are generated from observations. I'm sure there are significant differences in our approaches, but I do not at the moment have time to study your 98 dense pages.

              You reference "the lack of any fundamental mathematical models whose roots are not directly related to numeric models," and appear to lament that, "during mankind's scientific history, we have dealt only with numeric models and, during the last century, with their derivatives."

              If I understand you so far, your goal is to replace the role of numbers in scientific theory with a non-numerical approach. I do not see the need, nor the likelihood of success, for such an undertaking, but I wish you well in your endeavor.

              In reply to your remarks above, I am not sure that it makes sense to state that a representation exists in which "syntax and semantics are the same". Meaning seems to be inherently related to contextual framing, and I'm unclear as to how one can combine the object and its context in one representation.

              Do we see reality, or is our view unreal? Matthew Crawford, in "Shop Class as Soulcraft" has elegantly pointed out that it's possible to view exactly the same scene with two different interpretations; this doesn't refer to well-known optical illusions, but to the meaning of what we see. For example, while cleaning parts, "Previously... I had held one of those valves in my hand and examined it naively, but had not noticed the mushrooming. Now I saw it. Countless times since that day, a more experienced mechanic has pointed out to me something that was right in front of my face, but which I lacked the knowledge to see. ...the raw sensual data reaching my eye before and after are the same, but without the pertinent framework of meaning, the features in question are invisible."

              This bears repeating: "the raw sensual data reaching my eye before and after are the same, but without the pertinent framework of meaning, the features in question are invisible."

              In other words, the truth is the same for everybody, but it is not seen by everybody.

              The meaning does not come from the visual data or information, which is the same before and after. It comes from the framework of meaning... the knowledge of the system, of which the piece being viewed is a part. The same truth or visual data is seen each time, but the meaning of what is seen changes, depending upon the framework in which it is understood. Meaning seems to derive from the real physical world. In his example, the meaning of the 'mushrooming' seen on the valve depended upon the design, construction, and operation of the physical motorcycle. Awareness of the visual data without the understanding of the system of which it is a part imparted no meaning.

              In physics this may apply to something like 'fine tuning'. In one framework, this is understood in one sense. In another framework, one postulates a mega-verse.

              That you believe that there is only one such formalism is sufficient explanation for me. It has also become clear to me over the last year or so on fqxi that almost all of us have developed our ideas and understanding over many years, and no one is really convincing anyone else to change their ideas. But we do seem to serve a worthwhile purpose in getting each other to clarify our ideas.

              Thanks for your comments.

              Edwin Eugene Klingman