Essay Abstract

Physical reality is found, not made. Since it is not a product of definition to begin with, it cannot be exhaustively formalized. Nature is not virtual, nor merely 'mathematical', 'information', 'geometry', 'simulation' or 'computation'. Rather, it must be considered 'immanently real'. Moreover, there can be no final theory of everything. The computational metaphor is appealing for various psychological and historical reasons, including the certainty offered by deductive systems.

Author Bio

Dan Bruiger is an independent researcher and amateur astronomer, with undergraduate studies at UCLA and UC Berkeley. He is the author of Second Nature: the man-made world of idealism, technology, and power, Trafford/Left Field Press 2006. He is currently working on a new book, The Made and Found. He resides in the small community of Hornby Island, British Columbia and dances Argentine tango.

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You may have allies among computational complexity theorists. Here for example is Scott Aaronson ("NP-complete Problems and Physical Reality"):

"... For broadly speaking, that which we can compress we can understand, and that which we can understand we can predict. Indeed, in a recent book [12], Eric Baum argues that much of what we call 'insight' or 'intelligence' simply means finding succinct representations for our sense data. On his view, the human mind is largely a bundle of hacks and heuristics for this succinct-representation problem, cobbled together over a billion years of evolution. So if we could solve the general case -- if knowing something was tantamount to knowing the shortest efficient description of it -- then we would be almost like gods. The NP Hardness Assumption is the belief that such power will be forever beyond our reach."

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"While the difference between these entropy concepts is considered a matter of convention [9], their historical distinction suggests that thermodynamic entropy is an objective physical property, while Shannon entropy (information) pertains to communication between agents. Perhaps it is through their mathematical equivalence that the two entropies have alike been objectified, which might in part account for the current belief that 'information' is a plausible ontological basis for reality.10"

You need to consider the possibility that information (like energy, the subject-matter of thermodynamics) is an objective physical property too. I agree that the isomorphism between the two "entropies" at times seems all too convenient, but then on the other hand perhaps it isn't. Communication is always a transfer of information between physical entities. And it's an event. It can have consequences that are physically measurable. You yell "Watch out -- the bus is moving!" and I jump back to the curb. That's a measurable consequence, even if you can't see the information itself. But then you can't see energy either.

You'd probably dislike (or you do dislike) Jan Kåhre's contention that the Second Law can be regarded as a special case of his Law of Diminishing Information. But I find it kind of thought-provoking.

    Thanks. I'll have a look at the two sources you mentioned.

    One difference between 'energy' and 'information' in the example you give (communication that 'the bus is moving') is that the latter involves agents to whom the information is meaningful and their action as part of the cycle. Perhaps one could make a case that all processes somehow involve at least the potential of this aspect of "control"--for lack of another term--even processes we think of as simply "physical". Good question. It still leaves a distinction between external agents, such as humans, and the physical processes involved in communication: the observer and the observed.

    Dan

    nikman,

    I believe that information is not a physical entity. It is descriptive in nature, and depends upon frames of reference. If you shouted the same thing in a location where English is not spoken, it may have no effect at all, whereas the bus will have the same effect regardless of local dialect.

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

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    Information cannot be conceived of apart from its physical embodiment and physical transmission, any more than energy can. (A photon may be pure mass-less energy but it's still 100% physical.) And, like energy, information may change form. As with energy, its productivity is contextual. In the case of energy you can't make an air-conditioner work directly from thermal energy by holding it over a fire, or from kinetic energy by swinging it around by its cord or dropping it off a roof. But plug it into an electrical outlet and you're in business. However, this doesn't mean there's no such thing as energy per se. Likewise the fact that you could yell at me in Chinese without my understanding your information doesn't mean information coded in Chinese isn't an objective property for those who do understand Chinese. (The inevitable loss of meaning through person-to-person transmission, and within-person transmission, even among Chinese, is often considered a form of entropy.)

    In other words, information, like energy, always comes coded. And if we can't read (translate) the code then for us it's not information. For example, it's generally assumed that there must be such a thing as quantum information, because how else do you explain (say) entanglement? But human beings don't read quantum code. You measure a qubit -- which some people believe might be literally a microcosm -- and all you get is a classical bit; as Hans C. von Baeyer says: "It's such a waste." We may very well exist surrounded by all sorts of communication and information we can't even detect and never will be able to detect, much less read, so it's not really information. For us, that is.

    nikman,

    You begin with "Information cannot be conceived of apart from its physical embodiment and physical transmission, any more than energy can."

    And that is the essence of the problem. Information cannot be separated from 'conception' or conscious awareness, while energy goes its merry way regardless. It is exactly the intimate link between physical reality and conscious awareness that distinguishes information from physical energy.

    You allude to this when you speak of "productivity" as an attribute of energy and information. This is a conceptual term and energy does not depend upon it. 'Productivity is artefactual and interpretative.

    The interpretation of information leads to meaning, and hence connects information to knowledge, wit, wisdom, ethics and other conceptual realities-- a realm that is closed off to energy.

    In short, information is 'imposed' on a system by humans for human purposes. It is not a physical aspect of nature, no matter how many modern physicists try to make it so.

    Finally, you ask: "For example, it's generally assumed that there must be such a thing as quantum information, because how else do you explain (say) entanglement?"

    You may not yet be aware that Joy Christian has an fqxi article here that claims John Bell made an error in deriving his inequality. If that is true (and I believe it is) then *all* of the 'entanglement' phenomena (based upon so-called 'violation' of Bell's incorrect inequality) are non-sense. And this non-sense includes non-locality and non-reality.

    As the author of a theory of local realism, I welcome this. Obviously those heavily engaged in the "entanglement industry" and those psychologically committed to the 'spooky' and 'weird' aspects of quantum mechanics, no matter how unintelligible it makes our universe, will fight tooth and nail to preserve the nonsense of entanglement.

    You might want to check out Christian's post.

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Dan,

    You have written a truly excellent essay.

    But you seem to have left one item hanging. You distinguish between artifact and reality (Found and Made) and you include the word 'thought' in your title, but you do not state whether 'thought' is an artifact, produced by "things coming together" in the proper order.

    My own preference is to define 'consciousness' as awareness plus volition (free will) and then to define 'intelligence' as consciousness plus logical hardware. The 'hardware' can be arranged, or self-arrange [via re-connecting connected networks] to 'model' or 'map' whatever is the object of attention. And this map or model, of which we are consciously aware, is the 'thought' of which you speak. 'Thought' then is essentially physical in 'construction', whereas conscious awareness is more a field property, one that interacts with the physical world.

    So my real question, after preparing the ground, is: Do you believe that conscious awareness and volition 'emerge' as a natural artifact from simply having the Lego blocks come together in the right order, or do you believe that awareness and volition are an inherent part of the fabric of reality?

    Your response?

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

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      Terrance McKenna coined the term extropy, and it roughly means the production of orderliness. One can go on to produce a morality based on local extropy production even though the second law (of entropy) is not violated. The efficiency of extropy production (extropy/entropy approaching a maximum) could be associated with a higher morality whereas the opposite the opposite. Life and perhaps computers could be efficient producers whereas nukular bombs would perhaps be maximally efficient destructors. In such a world, information efficiency would be a benchmark like gas mileage.

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      Dear Sir,

      We generally agree with the above post. We had a detailed discussion on this subject with Mr. Israel Omar Perez, which can be seen below his essay. You may kindly see it there.

      Regards,

      basudeba.

      Hi, Edwin

      Thank you for your kind words of appreciation.

      To answer the question you come to, I don't believe that consciousness or awareness inheres in matter in some spiritual or pantheistic sense. I view it as "emergent"--as you say, as a "natural artifact, a result of the self-creation of natural reality.

      In regard to your first question, "is thought an artifact?", that is tricky business. I see human beings (and perhaps conscious creatures generally) as having a foot in two worlds--a potentially awkward situation! The actual awkwardness of it is reflected in the fact that there is no (and probably never can be) universal agreement concerning mind-body issues, or a choice between materialism and idealism. To the degree we are natural creatures, our consciousness is a product of nature. To the degree we seek to create our own identity apart from nature, we are alien to it, and our thought occupies a distinct domain from anything natural or physical. It is this aspect ("the made") that I wish to contrast to the reality of nature ("the found"). I hold it as a general tenet that human beings are the creature that seeks to create (or re-create) not only itself, but the found natural world as well. Hence, civilization, including the scientific reconstruction of nature.

      Thanks again,

      Dan

      Dan,

      Thanks for your response.

      I'm not pushing either spiritualism or pantheism.

      Having pondered the issue for decades, I simply do not believe that 'awareness' emerges from material, no matter how the material is arranged. Same for 'free will'. Having argued these points on countless threads, I will not clog up your thread with the same arguments.

      If you'd like to see an alternative approach, I invite you to read my first essay in the 'Ultimate Limits' contest. To see the same idea but with all mention of consciousness suppressed, see my current essay here.

      If these cause you to rethink the issue of consciousness, I would be happy to exchange 'thoughts' with you.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

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      Edwin,

      I'm aware of Christian's post and of his past papers and the responses to them. There's a long trail of Bell refutations -- including his prior ones -- going back at least a quarter century, subsequently debunked. He (I've long known his gender) may be on to something, or maybe not. Time will tell. He has unusual credibility because of his association with Shimony. Anyway, the information argument doesn't hinge on entanglement (see below).

      Dan,

      Yours is one of the very few essays in this competition that I've felt an affinity for. You confront in an intelligent, serious and knowledgeable manner subtle and fundamental issues of the philosophy of science (even if I don't necessarily agree in all instances with your conclusions). Let me throw this at you. It's by a grand old man of theoretical biology, Howard Pattee. It's obviously a re-statement of the matter-mind problem, but done from a slightly different angle, as the matter-SYMBOL problem:

      "The problem also poses an apparent paradox: All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws."

      Pattee has also stated the issue from a technical DNA-RNA perspective as: "How do molecules become messages in cells?" Because clearly they do. All the coding that resulted in you and me was somehow conveyed by a relatively limited number of physical molecules. I don't believe Edwin will dispute this.

      Anyway, how can the process be explained without positing information (and some informational variant of transduction) as central from the get-go?

      Dear nikman,

      Thanks for your accolades, and for the reference to Pattee, of whom I didn't know. I thought I might respond (also to Edwin) with some thoughts on information.

      On the one hand, information refers to real structure; on the other, to some extent structure is in the eye of the beholder. This complicates any analysis that is not in the third-person terms preferred by science. Epistemically, however, there is always both subject and object. Experience in general is necessarily a product of both--an interaction of of the epistemic subject with its environment. Yet, even to go this little far embroils us in circularity or regression. For, this division of subject and object--and the boundary between them--is also itself determined conjointly by the epistemic subject and its environment or object of thought. In science, the putative boundary between observer and observed is supposed to be a clear separation. No doubt the conceptual problems of quantum physics (entanglement, measurement problem, etc.) are related to this "entanglement" of subject and object. So must be the problem of the ontological status of 'information'.

      It is usually admitted that information as defined by Shannon must be distinguished from meaning or content. This seems to give it an objective reality since it is freed from particular meanings and particular agents. It describes the general case, as mathematics describes the most general features of the world (properties such as integrity, additivity, identity, etc.). This does not mean there is no input from 'mind', which can slice up structure in the world in diverse ways. Information should reflect this flexibility and the agent's participation. It cannot be objective in an absolute sense, and I do not believe it should be objectified as a causal agent when we are the causal agents involved.

      I do not mean to ignore other agents. From what I could tell by a cursory look, Pattee's work seems to concern the general case in regard to the use of information by non-human agents, as does the work of Maturana and Varela (Autopoiesis and Cognition, c.1973?). Information for such agents may not be the same as for human agents. One can only pretend to an objective handle on the information content of something, or the structure, for that matter.

      Information should reflect reality, of course; but it also reflects the agent involved. 'Meaning' thus remains implicit, and need not be made explicit, just as Shannon kept message transmission capacity separate from the content of messages. But it would be a mistake to objectify information as ontologically real just because it reflects real structure, without considering also how it reflects the intentions of the agent.

      Of course, similar arguments could be applied to all concepts of physics. They too are human-centric (e.g. force) or involve agent participation in spite of addressing 'objective reality'. (I believe even the concept of reality is agent-related, in that it refers to the evolutionary need to take the external world seriously.) This is something a mature science must comes to grips with.

      Information is a necessary concept to explain cognition, but not sufficient. It should not be objectified as 'physical' in a way that divorces it from the meanings and uses of agents. It cannot, therefore--on its own--constitute a causal domain or serve as an ultimate ontological basis for 'reality'. On the other hand, it does bridge the gap between mind and matter/ energy in that it overlaps both domains. Since meanings must be carried on physical signals, information is both mental and physical, and one can assert (as Herbert Feigl did in mid 20th century) that 'the mental is the physical'.

      The question remains, how does mind "emerge" from matter? Well, I backtrack to to say that matter itself emerges through processes of self-organization (autopoiesis). With the emergence of life, there are then agents to whom various events and structures in the physical world have significance. Brains evolve as specialized organs to handle not only self-organization but specifically the organism's relations with the external world. In this way 'mind' (considered behaviorally, from a third-person perspective) emerges through an evolutionary contest. Meaning refers to the urgency of survival, because physical events bear significance for the fate of the organism and therefore are meaningful to it.

      Yet, (as Chalmers and many others have insisted) there still persists a gap between first-person experience and third-person description, leaving us wondering how 'consciousness' fits into a physicalist description of nature. I have some ideas about that, which I will summarize here (more can be found on my website http://bruiger.leftfieldpress.com/).

      To put the question bluntly, how can a physical system have 'experience' or a 'point of view'? Or: how can these be explained in physical terms? One must relate 1st-person and 3rd-person perspectives.

      We might realize right from the outset that that the 3rd-person is a fiction, at least for self-conscious organisms. All experience is necessarily 1st-person. 3rd-person description arises from the convention of ignoring the 1st-person perspective, and all that it implies epistemically. We want a transparent window on the world, unclouded by personal considerations--including the mechanics of nervous systems. This served well in physics before the discoveries of relativity and quantum mechanics. Now the presence and circumstances of the observer must be taken into consideration, if only because of the finite values of c and h.

      This ideal transparent window corresponds to the perspective of a naive epistemic agent. Once self-consciousness enters, the situation is characterized rather by Gödel's theorems applied to knowledge generally.

      But I have not yet addressed the gap between 1st and 3rd person perspectives--Chalmers' "hard problem". In a sense, it must be admitted that there never can be a definitive solution to the mind-body problem, because of the very nature of consciousness as self-transcendent. The problem is too far upstream from any ground we can stand on. For the same reason, there will never be universal agreement among philosophers , who are always free to prefer either materialism or idealism. In another sense, however, I think the problem can at least be understood more clearly. I tentatively suggest the following.

      The self-luminous character of conscious experience arises through intentional assignation, in much the way that the meanings of language arise. A symbol is assigned by convention to represent something. While signal transmission has to do with causal processes, meaning has to do with intentional rather than causal connections. Consciousness is a language, so to speak, that the brain speaks to itself through such connections. Just as the inchoate sounds of speech acquire meaning to the infant (or to the adult learning a foreign language), so the "babble" of the senses acquires meaning through immersion in the world. The specific quality or "feel" of sensation, or of any other form of cognition, derives from its significance to the organism (which may be studied and understood in behavioral terms). A simple example is pain. The meaning of pain as an experience is contained in the behavioral response of aversion to the harmful stimulus. The experience of fear is aversion to a stimulus suspected to be harmful. Pleasure impels us toward a beneficial stimulus, etc. The meaning of the experience is contained in the action or judgment, the recognition of real consequence. This is how the 'symbol' acquires meaning. So much is clear for primitive responses. The picture becomes more complicated when considering the distance senses and the mind's dedication to an objective modeling of the world. One may nevertheless speculate that the very perceived objectivity of the world refers to the need of the organism to navigate space, avoiding obstacles and predators, and seeking nourishment and reproductive partners, etc. 'Reality' refers to consequence for the organism.

      To further explain the comparative (behavioral) neutrality of perceptual qualities like color, shape, etc., requires introducing another fundamental aspect of mind, besides the organism's ability to respond immediately to stimuli. And that is the ability to not respond to them. A 'picture', from which one is overall detached, is built up essentially from these primitive responses. It thereby retains the "luminous" or self-evident quality that derives from intentional assignations, but does not necessarily compel us to action. This is something like the relationship between concrete terms, which evoke clear images as their referents, and the general flow of "sense" that occurs in speaking or listening, or the sense evoked by more abstract terms.

      At any rate, that's my "just so" story about the mind-body problem, the best I can do here. I doubt it would satisfy Chalmers. My main point is to characterize information as a function of subject as well as object.

      Thanks again,

      Dan

      Dan,

      In general I agree with most of your above statements about information. Perhaps the statement I most agree with is: "But it would be a mistake to objectify information as ontologically real just because it reflects real structure, without considering also how it reflects the intentions of the agent."

      When you jump to 'mind' we part ways. First, I am continually frustrated in these fqxi excursions into consciousness because people use terms link 'mind', 'intelligence', 'consciousness', 'free will' etc without defining their terms and often it's clear that two participants are working from different definitions.

      Nevertheless, I do not agree that awareness and free will (which together define consciousness) 'emerge' from structure. No one has ever succeeded in explaining how this might happen, and no one ever will.

      I do not think that "Consciousness is a language, so to speak, that the brain speaks to itself through such connections."

      You say: "Meaning refers to the urgency of survival, because physical events bear significance for the fate of the organism and therefore are meaningful to it."

      If one has only matter, atoms and molecules, and no awareness in the universe, then 'survival' is meaningless. Even if, against all odds, a 'proto-cell' accidentally came together it would have no 'urge' to survive, let alone to split and 'reproduce'. As beautiful as the process is, it really makes no sense in a dead world of matter. It truly is a 'just so' story.

      Chalmers recognizes that consciousness is essentially 'real' but cannot figure out how it interacts with the physical world. I began by assuming that it is real, that it has more the character of a 'field' than an 'object' and asked how my consciousness controls physical reality (raise my arm, jump). That has turned out to be very rewarding approach for me.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

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      If you think of reality as interaction between agents you understand that the subject/object distinction can never be entirely certain. So, scientifically, you worry about where the "epistemic cut" occurs ... you want to minimize the extent to which you're measuring yourself measuring and maximize the degree of "objective" measurement. Niels Bohr for one worried about that a great deal. That's part of what he meant by the statement "Science is the study of what we can know about reality." Pattee has worried along these lines also. As have his allies (Maturana, Varela, Emmeche, Hoffmeyer) and students (Luis Rocha, Peter Cariani et al.).

      Modern information theorists (Kåhre, for example, despite his mathematical emphasis) appreciate Shannon's technocratic shortcomings and deal forthrightly with meaning and subjectivity. One conceit we need to give up, however, is the idea that although an individual's consciousness is in an important sense separated from that of other individuals (and from the world) it's wholly autonomous. It's not. Try living in an isolation tank for an extended period and you realize the truth of that. (But only after you're out of the tank. While still inside you tend to realize less and less of anything.)

      Consciousness surely emerges from matter but my belief is that it's a more complex form of what's crudely called information processing. The inorganic-organic cut is critical, something very different is clearly going on, but the process after that is graduated. All life has a greater or lesser degree of consciousness in the sense of autonomous response to the environment, but often when we talk about consciousness what we really mean is self-awareness. That's critical for the notion of subjectivity, and as far as primates are concerned it seems to be much more a characteristic of apes. Monkeys aren't particularly self-aware judging from mirror tests. Apes demonstrably recognize themselves in mirrors, indeed often we can't seem to get enough of it. Also self-awareness is linked to altruism. Monkeys aren't particularly altruistic compared to apes. Not sure where dolphins fit in. Or cats. We had one cat who seemed quite self-aware and may have possessed a rich interior life and who was definitely a feline politician in the neighborhood. Other cats seemed to seek him out and not only to fight. He and I were very tight but he got really pissed off at me once because he apparently felt I wasn't being gentle enough with a kitten we'd just taken in. So I altered my behavior. Don't think he recognized himself in the mirror though.

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      Hi, Edwin

      We seem to agree that there will not likely be a purely materialistic explanation of consciousness. I sympathize with your frustration around undefined terms. On the other hand, philosophical writing can be frustrating by being over-technical. My own thinking (and writing) tends to be more impressionistic than rigorous. I simply present ideas hoping someone will latch onto something they find useful.

      Intentionality seems to be for me what free will is for you. I take it to be primary in some sense, however, which bridges the 'mental' and the 'physical'. That is, it can be part of a 3rd-person description and, for me, is the key to the presence of subjective experience also. Matter that intends is mind.

      Hi, nikman

      Yes, I agree consciousness cannot be autonomous. Right from the beginning it is a product of environment and organism conjointly, and environment consists largely of other creatures.

      As far as the consciousness of other creatures, this is problematic because we are coming from a default position of definite self-consciousness, projected upon other creatures. So, it is hard to tell what belongs to us and what to them. On the other hand, as you point out, consciousness can be assessed behaviorally to some extent. Thanks for the animal stories. I've had pets and nowadays I often wonder at what goes on in the awareness of deer that wander around my place.

      Best wishes,

      Dan

      Best wishes,

      Dan

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      Dan,

      I agree about intentionality. Also about the virtual not being at all the same as the real. (An iconic paper, for me, covering all of this is Putnam's "Brains in a Vat". Also of course there's John Searle.)

      A problem is that since intentionality is unmeasurable and can only be inferred you're always going to have functionalists like Dan Dennett and the Churchlands who insist on its objective irrelevance. Maybe they're your real enemies.

      Dan and nikman,

      I repeat that no one has ever or will ever derive awareness from matter.

      I've no argument with using 'intentionality' as 'free will' and I like your definition 'matter that intends is mind'. That may be the best definition I've seen.

      Of course isolation tanks, LSD, Salvia, many things affect awareness. Awareness is there whether or not it's being driven by external stimuli.

      'Information' is best understood by its action, it 'in-forms'. The 'forms' inside us, the ideas, thoughts, models that our neural net has mapped from sense input (with the help of DNA-based structuring) are internal, and information either forms or reforms these models. But this could go on forever without awareness arising from such. Awareness is primordial.

      Once this is understood, one ceases to worry about 'where it came from" or "how it arose" and can focus on 'how it interacts', which is a much more fruitful undertaking.

      And once one has a model of this, then questions concerning the consciousness of cats go away. All matter in motion is aware locally of other matter in motion. This is the sense behind Schrodinger's asking 'Do Electrons Think?' [which in my terminology would be 'Are Electrons Aware']. In this view it is easy to see how a biological cell that somehow evolved would then have an 'urge' to survive, how insects, cats, dolphins and man are all conscious and aware, with an easily understandable hierarchy of 'thoughts' and mental accomplishments based on evolutionarily derived 'thinking machinery'.

      Without the essential primordial awareness, awareness and volition will never appear at one local spot.

      With such awareness, we need only ask how it couples to the physical world, then things fall into place.

      And information, in this scheme, also falls into place.

      And the consciousness of other creatures, ceases to be problematic.

      But none of these things will make sense if one believes that material becomes 'aware' when it is arranged in 'proper order'.

      Time for a commercial: My best treatment of this is Gene Man's World.

      I can't reproduce 600 pages of supporting arguments here, so I should probably stop trying.

      Thanks for the exchanges, and good luck in the contest.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Thanks, Edwin, for the keen discussions.

      Best wishes in all,

      Dan