The Nature of the Wave Function by Edwin Eugene Klingman

Jonathan:

I typed up my previous comment before seeing this one, so I added it there. I agree with what you're saying here about people pretending not to see the problems associated with a block universe, and chalking things up to illusions. I think this happens because people don't want to change the basic way they think about the theory. The problem with that, I believe, is that the basic way people like to think about the theory---as dynamical---is demonstrably incompatible with what the physical theory has to say about the way they like to think about the theory.

Daryl

Hello Daryl,

in reply to your last two posts, I agree with the latest one, that people don't want to change the way they take SR.

They take SR with spacetime, and yet spacetime may be entirely wrong. It is impossible for anything to move through spacetime, almost by definition. Spacetime distances include imaginary numbers, which people accept in an 'emperor's new clothes' kind of way. But this may have no physical meaning. And, for instance, an event 4 minutes ago on Mars has zero separation in spacetime from right now where you are on Earth. All this may have no physical meaning. And because it leads to block time which requires illusions, spacetime is very questionable.

Spacetime hasn't been tested, and like string theory, it can't be tested. Suppose it's entirely wrong - imagine sweeping it away. We'd be looking for missing pieces of the puzzle in a new landscape. Much of our present conjecture would be irrelevant.

You talk about relating things in space, but the issue is, can we relate things in time? That's what we don't know - we know a lot more about space. We have reason to think we can't relate things in time as we have been doing, because look where it led - it led to block time, which doesn't work with the real world we observe. So time may be different. It may be meaningless to relate points in time at all. We don't know. All out attempts to relate points in time may have failed to work. But within the light cone, light signals give us an alternative method, meaningful, but perhaps just a crude approximation, perhaps also ultimately irrelevant to the way time really is.

Best wishes, Jonathan

Dear Edwin,

You invited me to take part in your discussion. I have to apologize for not reading all contributions. Instead of referring to the weak points in Daryl's view, I just added to my essay a hopefully unmistakable explanation why SR is based on confusion between physical reality and what an observer measures.

"Two events that occur at the same time according to one observer will happen at different times for another observer, ..."

Do they really happen for observers or do they happen at the location where they happen?

Let me tell a story that happened 50 years ago. In a rowing race over 2000 m in about 6 minutes, my crew was defeated by only as little as 0.02 seconds precisely measured with a Swiss Longines system. This was undeniably close to physical reality. Merely at start, we were a bit cheated because the acoustic signal reached us about 0.1 second later than the winning boat.

Best,

Eckard

Dear Eckard,

This perfectly demonstrates the point I've been making about problems that arise due to sloppiness with language. You wrote, "Do they really happen for observers or do they happen at the location where they happen?" Well said. The word "for" in the quotation you gave is meant in the sense of "according to" or "as determined by" or "in the proper coordinate system of", and therefore not in the sense of a gift. Events in space-time are locations or points on the four-dimensional map. What's meant in that quotation is simply that two events at the same value of the time-coordinate of one system will be at different values of the time-coordinate of another system.

Since you've claimed that there are weak parts in my view, I'd very much appreciate those being pointed out so that I might have the opportunity to argue otherwise. I'd consider it a courtesy. I'll even briefly recap my position for that purpose.

The past, present, and future don't all "exist" in the same sense: the past and future "are" purely ideal (ideel in German; i.e., not real anywhere but in *present* brains, computers, etc.) and the three-dimensional enduring present "is" real. Relativity adds another layer, complicating this picture further, because it comes to mean that together with the dual meaning of the copular verb "is" in relation to the dimension of time, there must also be a dual meaning of the word "time" if the theory should be reconciled with a Heraclitean flowing present. Thus, the common-sense impression of "time" that we have when we consider present "existence" in three-dimensional space---which is what we refer to when we say two events occur "simultaneously"---must be separated from the sense of "time" that's described by any space-time coordinate system. This is precisely because any claim that two events occur at the same "time" in the latter sense cannot be universal, since any change of coordinates describes one event as preceding the other; i.e., "synchronicity" is relative.

This latter fact has commonly been taken to imply that relativity is inconsistent with presentism, because "synchronous" and "simultaneous" are thought to be synonymous; but I've shown in my essay the mathematical theory can be consistently reconciled with the above view of time, as long as we make the appropriate split between the meanings of the two words and define a global simultaneity-relation. Therefore, relativity does not require a block universe.

Daryl

Dear Jonathan:

It *is* impossible for anything to move through spacetime by definition. I think the quotation by Geroch that I gave in my essay says that the best. Although the one by Weyl comes a close second. It's just that some people mis-construe that due to an inability to break away from the sense that things really change.

If you're interested, I can prove to you that spacetime distances don't include imaginary numbers in de Sitter space. It's not a hard or long proof, and it's done from first principles. But it requires a positive cosmological constant.

Zero distance between two points that are not identical is indeed a peculiar property of Lorentzian metrics. They're weird. But that doesn't mean we should deny the appropriateness of the Lorentzian metrical structure that's used to describe physical reality. That has been very successful, not even just locally, but also for describing cosmological data. Without the assumption of the RW metric to describe an emergent three-dimensional universe, how might you consistently relate all the cosmological observations?

Best,

Daryl

It's true that spacetime has been very succesful in describing the universe. It has also made it possible to simplify many theories. But that may be exactly why we were reluctant to question it until we had to.

The reason spacetime may be wrong, even though it works for describing many things, is that physics is full of equivalence. As I said in my essay, often more than one conceptual picture is described by similar mathematics. So we may eventually have to let go of spacetime, because conceptual flaws have been giving us a hard time, even though the mathematics seems to work. Spacetime is, after all, an interpretation of SR. And if an interpretation gives you conceptual problems, then you might need a different one.

Best wishes, Jonathan

Hi All:

The discussion of Julian Barbour's conception of time brings up an issue that I think is important. His conception of time is very much like mine, in that he wants to remove the dimension of time from the description of what is real, and describe instead a succession of "nows". However, I believe he goes a step too far in this, by also denying duration and concentrating only on a physical description of what exists in the "now". This brings to mind an ancient fallacy about a footrace between Achilles and a tortoise, which is based on a similar denial of duration---viz., in principle. Since Zeno's purpose was to support the Eleatic thesis (block universe) by an argument that motion can't occur, it's his prior removal of duration from the picture that makes the "paradox" a fallacy.

How did he accomplish this? Zeno described the footrace according to a sequence of configurations: the tortoise is halfway between Achilles and the finish line to begin with, but Achilles will have covered twice the distance as the tortoise at any subsequent "time"; thus, at one point the tortoise is three-quarters of the way to the finish line and Achilles is halfway there; when the tortoise is seven-eighths of the way there, Achilles is only three-quarters; etc. The tortoise is therefore "always" halfway between Achilles and the finish line. Therefore, Zeno concludes that motion does not occur.

But motion can be defined as spatial displacement through an element of duration: as everything endures, bodies can move through space in time, with average displacement over time defined average velocity, etc.; therefore, by denying duration in principle Zeno has denied an essential ingredient of motion, and has therefore demonstrated no real paradox. Furthermore, by co-ordinating the axis of duration with space, it is simple to show that Achilles and the tortoise reach the finish line at the exact same time, and that if each keeps going at the same pace Achilles will indeed overtake, running on ahead always at twice the distance as the tortoise from the finish line.

By using coordinate systems to describe space-time, relativity is just as capable of resolving Zeno's "paradox" as Newtonian mechanics. My question to anyone who would deny prior duration, and therefore the appropriateness of the metrical structure of all of space-time---whether emergent or a block---is this: how do you resolve Zeno's paradox? If the rearrangement of bodies in space essentially *causes* time, and there is no prior duration of space, how can one claim that anything moves at all?

Daryl

Hello all,

in your version of the paradox, they reach the finishing line at the same time. But in Zeno's version, Achilles runs much faster than twice the tortoise's speed, who has an arbitrary head start. When Achilles gets to where the tortoise was when Achilles started, it has moved on a little. When he gets to this further point, it has moved on a little further, and so on. The paradox is resolved because the tortoise knows a shortcut through the bushes.

I don't see how you'd know if the universe was 'synchronised' in the Newtonian way you talk about. It might look the same anyway, with or without that.

Best wishes, Jonathan

PS. If there's a universal 'now', then why can't two observers moving differently get results that match up, when each tries to calculate what time it is 'now' for the other one? I've done the calculation, it comes out of SR, which has been confirmed by experiment, and which I think is absolutely right. I only question spacetime, not SR. It seems to me that to get your universal now, you have to deny SR itself.

Edwin,

I just thought that I should say how that paradox can also be addressed by the framework I am using.

I have written a recent reply to J.C.N.Smith on my thread about why gravity can not be caused by curvature of space time. Even though I am using a framework that allows general relativity to be seen as valid.

I agree there are very many good essay and comments.

Dear Georgina:

Thank you for joining back into the discussion. I do plan to carefully read through your essay (which I've only been able to glance through up to now), and eventually rate it. I hope you do mine as well.

As to your above comment, I agree with it. I think that from what you've said you consider time and energy to be canonically conjugate variables, though, so I'm not sure I see the reason for bringing both into the discussion---unless that relates to your second comment about "why gravity can not be caused by curvature of space time[, even though you are] using a framework that allows general relativity to be seen as valid."

In that regard, I think we are in agreement. On Aug 15 at 18:53, I posted a reply to George Ellis on my topic which contained the following:

"General relativity theory describes space-time as a field that is supposed to be warped in the presence of gravitational mass. In contrast, in order to reconcile relativity with true temporal passage, I've described space-time as the emergent map of events that occur in an enduring three-dimensional universe. As such, the space-time continuum of events is not conceived as a real substantive manifold that warps and moulds due to the presence of gravitational mass; and the need to describe the flow of time associated with a uniformly enduring homogeneous present [in cosmology; this statement's given within the context of George's comment], makes the basic concept of space that truly warps under the influence of gravity seem difficult to reconcile. For instance, in cosmology we take the description of perfect fluidity to be valid on the large scale, but if space-time is a substantive manifold that's truly warped under the influence of mass, so that the local passage of time is really influenced by localised mass, is it really very consistent to say that there should be a cosmic time that passes at the same rate in our Local Group as it does in the Coma cluster? Although the description of space-time that's given by Einstein's equations seems to coincide with the idea of a substantive manifold that truly dynamically warps under the influence of mass (although, in what dimension is the warping of space-time described as dynamically changing? Dropping the assumption of a global simultaneity-relation in space-time that coincides with a uniform flow of cosmic time, while retaining the concept of dynamical change, seems to lead to Zeno's paradox of infinite regression), if an absolute cosmic time is required in order to counter the implication [from the Rietdijk-Putnam argument] that we must only imagine ourselves as existing in a block universe, it seems that some more definite background metrical structure must be required to account for that.

"And that's exactly what the RW metric provides in standard cosmology; therefore, although the local passage of time will be different in different gravitational fields and in different states of motion, the standard model still describes uniform global evolution. The same is true in the SdS cosmology I mentioned in my essay, given the description of r as the cosmic time coordinate. The difference, however, is that in FLRW cosmology the overall curvature of space and the evolution of the scale-factor are supposed to be determined by the large scale average energy content of the universe. Therefore, general relativistic dynamics are incorporated into the theory following the prior assumption of a cosmological background metric. Furthermore, this idea is supposed to be correct according to general relativity theory, so that, in taking the RW metric as background structure and passing it through Einstein's equations, we find that the overall empirical and theoretical consistency of the theory implies that the perfect fluidity of matter should be a good approximation to the large scale average; but it's really debatable whether the large scale distribution of matter really has approximated very well as a perfect fluid since structure formation, and it's anyway this aspect of the theory that really makes the horizon problem such a big problem [notwithstanding inflation].

"Now, the idea that the evolution of our Universe might really need to be described through a well-defined background metric, through which space-time emerges as the map of events that occur in the Universe, seems better suited to a metric-affine theory, whereby the metric and local connection are independent quantities and gravitation is described in terms of torsion rather than curvature. If this were the case, then regardless of what the background metric would be (i.e., regardless of the [possible] triviality [of] its stress-energy tensor), space-time would be described locally through different solutions to the Einstein field equations [that could well contain non-vanishing stress-energy].

"Therefore, if the SdS cosmological background could be used as such to describe the existence of galaxies on its fundamental worldlines, and if the distribution of galaxies would appear isotropic from every such perspective, it would be a legitimate cosmological background for a universe that *should* expand at all times, at a well-defined rate that would turn out to be modelled precisely by the flat LambdaCDM scale-factor, regardless of the actual curvature of space or its global energy content. Therefore, it would agree with empirical observations in our Universe, going a large way towards explaining why the Universe does expand, and would eliminate the flatness problem as well as the need for large amounts of dark matter and dark energy---and the horizon problem would no more be a problem than the requirement to account for that particular background metric. But then, it should be noted that this particular metric has the same form as the one that will describe the final state outside every bound cluster of galaxies in our Universe..."

Neither George, nor anyone else, has offered anything in response to this. Since we agree that there can be both "universal simultaneity as well as the observation of relativity, without contradiction"---and I have demonstrated in my essay how this can work in the case of special relativity, with the mathematical theory emerging as the appropriate description of events that occur in an emergent universe with the required inertial and causal structures---I wonder if you (or anyone else) have any thoughts on this.

Best regards,

Daryl

Jonathan:

I have argued explicitly that I think synchonicity is the wrong way of looking at things. I'm convinced there is a Cosmic Present, in which events that occur at the same "time" may be called "simultaneous", but the physical description from relativity theory demands that this global simultaneity-relation cannot be the same as what's "synchronous" for arbitrary observers; i.e., things that happen at the same "time" in the former sense don't necessarily happen at the same "time" in the latter sense. I've described in my essay exactly how I think it's possible for SR to emerge as the correct physical description of phenomena in all inertial frames in such an emergent universe, using the same postulates that are used to derive the theory in any case, and shown explicitly why in that situation it is wrong to define "synchronicity" and "simultaneity" synonymously. I'd really like it if you'd carefully read though that derivation/thought experiment and comment on it.

Best,

Daryl

Hello all,

without a preferred frame of reference, as in standard SR, observers moving differently estimate each other's 'now' moments in a way that is inconsistent. No universal time emerges. They can even look at each other's watches through telescopes and allow for light travel times, and also for time dilation. They still get results that don't match up. That's why many people see time as more local, and less universal.

This applies in SR with or without the spacetime interpretation, and the local aspect of time might in fact help to explain why the spacetime interpretation is wrong - by making long distance simultaneity meaningless, which would mean that Minkowski's geometry depends on a false assumption. This would remove block time, and all the contractions that go with it.

If you have a preferred frame of reference, such as that of the background radiation, then you can try to make time dilation an effect involving deviations from an underlying universal time rate. But without a preferred frame, it's hard to see how there can be a universal time.

Best wishes, Jonathan

Jonathan:

How is it that you're privy to "Zeno's version"? As with all pre-Socratic philosophers, Zeno's writings didn't survive. His "paradoxes" are known to us through Aristotle's writings. And while your description is probably closer to that than mine, the argument is invalid for the same reason in either case---Zeno denies duration in principle and considers only subsequent states,---and not for the reason you've stated.

Daryl

Ah, hello Daryl,

Sorry, I've just see a post of yours to me I didn't notice before, drawing a distinction between 'synchronicity' and 'simultaneity'. Will look at your essay again. I think our posts crossed in fact.

Best wishes, Jonathan

You can't simply remove the metrical relation between events and still call your idea physics. In this respect, you should carefully read and think about Edwin's post from Aug. 24, 2012 @ 02:32, which I think nails the issue with defining existence as something mystical outside the past light cone, as you seem to want to do.

Regarding your last paragraph, with a preferred reference frame, you *can* describe time dilation as an effect involving deviations from an underlying universal time rate, since the mathematical theory gives a consistent description. In relativity theory, it's impossible for there to be a universal time without a preferred system of reference, and vice versa; the two are equivalent.

Hi Jonathan.

Brilliant. Wonderful. Thanks very much! I'll just make one suggestion for when you read it again: please pay close attention to the reason why "observer" B cannot possibly ever "see" (i.e., exchange information, influence, or otherwise ever be in causal contact with) "observer" C'.

I also missed this post when I typed the one above.

Best,

Daryl