The Perfect First Question. by T H Ray

You are right about both of your points:

(1) Yes, Bell's motivation and inspiration for his theorem came from the non-locality in Bohm's theory, of which he remained a big fan throughout his life.

(2) You are correct to recognize that I am outraged. This is because of the kind of treatment I have received from some parts of the physics community during the past five years, and especially during the past few months. I don't know about you, but Tom has witnessed some of this mistreatment. Needless to say, what you see on the Internet is only a fraction of what goes on in the real world. But nevertheless I will try to "ease up" if I can.

nmann,

Happy to know that it exists rationalists !

Regards

Tom,

Bell's program was "classical" because his primary intellectual weapon was classical logic. That is the logic of our world, the embodied logic of our brains. It's the logic of macroscopic physicality (something JSB proved: the classically logical is also the classically physical). All formulations of QM are classical ... Heisenberg's matrices are classical even if noncommutative etc.

We have two choices: Classical and Classical-NOT. We use the first to identify the second. The second has no meaning except as a contradiction of the first. Smart people ... Putnam, Finkelstein ... have tried to craft a quantum logic but without success. There's a reason. We can recognize and describe (in our own language) superposition but we can't do superposition. Nor can we replicate quantum randomness (cf. John von Neumann on being in a state of sin when you try to do that deterministically ... you need to tap an actual quantum source).

Nick Herbert's right: we don't know whether underlying "reality" is classically deterministic or in some manner non-causal. If Bell's classical logic is a correct tool then reality's at least nonlocal. (Leggett tests suggest it's also counterfactually indefinite.) If Bell's logic is wrong then it means classical logic itself is inapplicable beyond the macroscopic world although in ways we may never recognize, much less understand.

Hi nmann,

Bell's logic is wrong but it doesn't mean that classical logic can't apply microscopically. Have a look at De Raedt et al's work. Bell just simply didn't consider all the elements of reality in his logic. That is real easy to see in Joy Christian's work.

Fred

Hi Tom,

In the spirit of questioning hidden assumptions, there is an assumption in these considerations that the background metric doesn't change on you. As I commented to Edwin, a change in the signature of the background metric can turn local into apparently non-local in classical physics (see attachment for a toy model that demonstrates this). This effect has the potential to explain the odd Quantum Theory feature of non-local identity without non-local causation, which incidently probably won't conflict with Joy Christian's work [currently waiting for his book to arrive].

This feature explicitly arises in my demonstration that quantum field theory can be derived *from* classical physics, on the condition that QT is due to a representational change to continuous variables. This chagne is necessary because the classical physics theory over discrete physically-real variables is proven to be subject to Godel's incompleteness. Thus QT is the result of a *necessary* change in functional description of the dynamics which leads to local causation of observables.

MichaelAttachment #1: Local_to_nonlocal.pdf

Hi again Tom,

"I don't really mean to be that subtle. I hope to do better."

For the sake of clarity, my earlier comments were not intended as a criticism of your essay or your subtlety, but rather as an admission of my own obtuseness. Subtlety in this case may well be synonymous with brilliance. Having noted that the overwhelming majority of comments others have posted on your blog reveal no hint of befuddlement, I've concluded that my lack of fuller comprehension is probably due in large part to the inadequacy of background knowledge I bring to the topic.

If you're willing to help me along a bit, I'd welcome a relatively concise statement of the "bottom line" message you want readers of your essay to come away with. Call it "T. H. Ray's Essay for Dummies" if you like. I know we're constrained by length limits as to what we're able to cram into our essays, but these blogs can offer a welcome opportunity to expand on the essays. If you're so inclined, I'd welcome a bit of schooling. Recognizing how busy everybody tends to be these days, however, I also won't be offended if you're not so inclined. We've got to pick and choose how to spend our all-too-limited time. Thanks.

jcns

Hi Michael,

Nice illustration!

Let me make a minor clarification, however. You do mention this distinction above, but for other readers let me point out that what you demonstrate in your illustration is a *signalling* non-locality due to a possible signature change in the space-time metric. In Bell's language this type of non-locality has to do with a linkage between the experimental parameters a and b of Alice and Bob. Quantum theory, on the other hand, harbours a peculiar *no-signalling* non-locality, which in Bell's language has to do with a linkage between the measurement results A and B observed by Alice and Bob.

In my view the latter non-locality is only an apparent non-locality, because not only the quantum mechanical description of Reality is incomplete, but Bell's supposedly compete analysis of it is also quite incomplete, with the incompleteness in it creeping in from the very first equation of his famous paper. Thus the kind of possible explanation for the no-signalling non-locality you are suggesting is a bit heavy handed from my perspective. Within my framework such a non-locality is no more mysterious than the non-locality observed in Dr. Bertlmann's socks.

Best,

Joy

On second thought, there is something interesting about your illustration.

The signature change you induce from g = (-,,,) to g = (,,,) in the space-time metric is quite similar to the change in the orientation of the 3-sphere from (,,) to (-,-,-) I take as a choice between two initial conditions in my model. So there seems to be a closer link between what you are saying and the fundamental hypothesis of my model.

--Joy

... my post seemed to get cut off.

The non-locality in my analysis specifically applies to virtual-radiation m^2

Joy and Michael,

Thanks for the great dialogue. I'm at kind of a disadvantage right now, because I've been traveling on business since Sunday, and it's hard for me to get my thoughts together quick enough to keep up.

I've been holding on to the attached for a couple of weeks, undecided if it would enlighten or confuse. I've decided to post it anyway, relevant to the current topic of locality/nonlocality.

Best,

TomAttachment #1: Local_Wave_Function_vs.docx

Tom,

Thank you very much for taking the time and trouble to provide this explanation of your take away message for me. Yes, it does help. I won't go so far as to say that I've now fully succeeded in wrapping my head around it, but your message certainly is clearer to me now than before. I'll be the first to admit that abstract thinking about topics such as this is not my forte. Taking this as a launching point, if I may, I'd like to discuss this general topic in broader terms not specifically related to your current essay.

For openers, I fully and truly understand and appreciate the fact that abstract thought and mathematical modeling are tools which are crucial in our quest to understand the universe in which we find ourselves. Without them, there is no hope. I become concerned, however, when the findings and pronouncements of science fly blatantly in the face of what is commonly perceived as "objective reality," whatever that may be. (In case you're wondering at this point, yes, I have read Georgina Parry's essay here and enjoyed it greatly. I noted that you were the first reader to comment on it.) And to be clear, I am not accusing you of guilt in this regard, Tom. I'm talking only in general.

I'd be the first to acknowledge that our *interpretations* of our empirical observations are extremely fallible, as in the case of our thinking for millennia that the sun revolves around the Earth. That appeared to be such an *indisputable* fact! It was obvious! But we eventually corrected that misinterpretation; and how did we do it? We made other empirical observations and we thought long and hard about them, and then we accomplished a paradigm shift from thinking in terms of a geocentric universe to thinking in terms of a heliocentric universe.

I see a similar situation in modern physics regarding our thinking about the nature of time. Mainstream physics tells us that perceived distinctions between past, present, and future are illusory, and that there is no objective flow of time. Our empirical observations, on the other hand, have told us for millennia that perceived distinctions between past, present, and future, are real and that there is a real, objective flow of time. Is this yet another case of believing that the sun revolves around the Earth? Possibly, but I seriously doubt it. Once the nature of the illusion of the sun revolving around the Earth had been clearly explained, then a "new objective reality" became obvious, and the paradigm shift was accomplished. But I've not seen any similar general, widespread "acceptance" of proclamations that distinctions between past, present, and future are illusory. Even Einstein found it hard to swallow, but swallow it he did. (And how could he not!?)

I believe that what's called for to resolve this apparent disconnect is a paradigm shift in our thinking about the fundamental nature of time. I touched on that in my current essay, and I've spelled it out in greater detail in a longer essay, Toward a Helpful Paradigm for the Nature of Time, should you ever have the time and inclination to explore it. I fear that at the present time we're at serious risk of losing sight of the distinction between the map (i.e., the mathematical models of reality) and the terrain (i.e., the underlying objective reality which the models are intended to describe).

I realize that all of this is only tangentially germane to the topic of your essay, Tom, and I apologize for "hijacking" your space, even if only temporarily. I certainly do agree with your enthusiasm about this FQXi competition. The overall quality of the essays is far above average, to my thinking, and the discussions have generally been constructive and civil, even cordial, as should be the case!

By way of repaying you for the use of your space, I'll leave you a couple of nice quotes.

"What guarantees the objectivity of the world in which we live is that this world is common to us with other thinking beings. Through the communications that we have with other men, we receive from them ready-made reasonings; we know that these reasonings do not come from us and at the same time we recognize in them the work of reasonable beings like ourselves. And as these reasonings appear to fit the world of our sensations, we think we may infer that these reasonable beings have seen the same thing as we; thus it is we know we have not been dreaming." (Henri Poincare, 'The Value of Science.')

"The way to converge with each other is to converge upon the truth." (David Deutsch, 'The Beginning of Infinity.)

Cheers,

jcns

Hi jcns,

I'm a committed rationalist. Objective knowledge has a very specific and unfuzzy meaning. So while I can appreciate arguments that, like Georgina's creative brand of dualism, invent imaginative categories and help lighten the darker corners of human psychology -- the only thing that gets me up in the morning is the possibility of matching a closed logical judgment to an object, whether that object is mathematically abstract or physical. Poincare was the same. Notice that he does not once use the term "reality," when he speaks of how to demarcate a dream or an illusion from what we can objectively know in common language. The demarcation -- i.e., demonstrated correspondence between the common language ("reasoning") and common sensations (observations) -- is all the reality that science can accommodate. Nothing else is required or desired.

For better or worse, however counterintuitive objective knowledge -- (and demonstrably, most all of what we do objectively know is counterintuitive) -- appears to those who do not share this philosophy of strict rationalist correspondence between language and meaning, it does not represent a weakness or a failure of science. On the contrary, it's what rationalist science is for.

As regards the "stubbornly persistent illusion" of time (Einstein's words), I won't comment on your own research until I've given it a fair read. I promise I will do that. (Personally, though, I have no fear that the map will ever be confused with the territory -- in making a rational judgment -- because I am fully persuaded of the value of Tarski's correspondence theory of truth and Popper's falsifiability criterion.)

So until we can meet again on common ground, after I have read your essay -- thanks for being here!

Tom

Hi Tom,

Thank you for agreeing to read my essay Toward a Helpful Paradigm for the Nature of Time.

Now, in keeping with the premise that no good deed ever goes unpunished, and at the risk of immediately setting myself up be justifiably accused of moving the goal line during the game, I'd like to request that before we reengage on this topic you do me the further great favor of reading two of my other essays on the topic: Time: Illusion and Reality, and On the Impossibility of Time Travel. The latter was my entry in the 2009 FQXi competition.

Each of these essays comes at the same topic from a somewhat different angle. Although less polished stylistically, 'Time: Illusion and Reality,' is perhaps the clearest statement of my foundational thinking on the topic. 'On the Impossibility of Time Travel' in essence applies my thinking on the nature of time to a long-standing chestnut of speculation and source of various paradoxes.

I don't doubt that you're extremely busy, Tom; aren't we all? But I do believe that this topic is worthy of some time if we can make progress toward converging on the truth. I'm in no hurry, so please take your time and get back to me at your convenience. Please give me a "poke" over on my blog whenever you'd like to reengage on this. We can either meet back here or resume our discussion at my blog, whichever you'd prefer.

Btw, I've just read George Ellis's latest paper on time, and of course find it interesting and also to be in agreement in many, but not all, respects with my own thinking on the topic.

For whatever it's worth, I, like you, am also fully persuaded of the value of Tarski's correspondence theory of truth and Popper's falsifiability criterion. This mutual persuasion strikes me as a good, solid starting point for a constructive dialogue.

jcns

Hi jcns,

I enjoyed reading your papers. I think, as I suspect does George Ellis, that the part -- which is by far the major part -- which is fully relativistic, is the part in which I would fully agree. So I will only take issue with a couple of points that question the completeness of relativity:

You quoted Feynmann: "... nature is telling us that time and space are equivalent; time becomes space; they should be measured in the same units." [Feynman's italics.] I would submit that Feynman's 'trick' was no trick at all, but rather an accurate portrayal of reality."

Doesn't that depend on what one means by "reality?" Feynmann is not trying to trick us -- he is describing a two-dimension (complex) space that is the source of an n-dimension Hilbert space. This is the space of quantum probability predictions. Hawking got imaginary time by imposing this flat complex plane on the surface of a sphere (Riemann sphere); "what happens," he asked, "when one goes north of the North Pole?" Well, of course, there is no such thing -- that singularity, the pole, is the limit of real spacetime, yet one can speak in quantum-mechanical terms, of imaginary time in that context. "Reality" is therefore inherently nonlocal in that picture, which conflicts with Einstein's relativity in which spacetime is physically real and all physics is local.

Elsewhere you write, "It is absolutely crucial to recognize here, and to point out explicitly, however, that the changes which we observe in the configuration of the universe are not caused by, and are not in any way a consequence of, the flow of time. Rather, the changes we observe (as well as those we don't observe) are the flow of time. If the configuration of the universe did not change, there would be no flow of time."

Actually, there can be a flow of time in an unchanging universe, too. A geometric flow does not necessarily change the global geometry; it only changes the local relations between points. I get what you mean -- however, in this statement you are implicitly assigning causality to the observer. A quantum mechanic will agree with you; a relativist won't.

You say, "The universe may be the ultimate example of 'what you see is what you get.'"

Maybe. It wouldn't be a relativistic universe, though. In a relativistic universe, unlike a quantum mechanical universe (if quantum mechanics were mathematically complete), there is no assignment of nonlocality to events not observed; metaphysical realism is local realism.

Few, I think, appreciate the mathematical completeness of relativity (every element of the mathematical theory corresponds to every element of the physical reality) -- so I think it's fortuitous that a whole institute (The Minkowski Institute) is now forming, and dedicated to understanding spacetime. Its esteemed founders include Ellis and Vesselin Petkov, as well as another of my favorites, David Finkelstein.

Just some things to think about.

All best,

Tom

Tom,

Thank you very much for taking the time and trouble to read my various essays and for commenting on them. Greatly appreciated, especially in light of how busy I'm sure you must be. Glad you enjoyed the reads.

As I'm sure is clear from my participation in these blogs, I'm not a professional physicist or mathematician, but I've been thinking (and reading) about the nature of time for something like 50 years. (Regarding which, let me be the very first to add my recognition that credit accrues not on the basis of *duration* of thought given to a topic, but only on the basis of *quality* of thought.)

As alluded to in the essay I've written for the current FQXi competition, I believe my view of time (essentially a presentist view) offers a worthwhile *complement* to the operational definition of time. This view, to my way of thinking, represents a much-needed paradigm shift in our thinking about the nature of time, not unlike the paradigm shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican cosmology. Nothing about the universe is changed, aside from the way we think about and interpret our empirical observations, but that can be huge.

My view is not compatible with block time or with the notion that the flow of time is illusory, both of which are mainstream views of modern physics. Moreover, my view makes the so-called "arrow of time" essentially inevitable. In addition, it absolutely rules out the possibility of time travel (of the Buck Rogers variety at any rate), a claim which certainly is, at least in theory, falsifiable. (Fwiw, I don't consider the "twins paradox" to qualify as Buck Rogers style time travel.)

These are some things to think about, too.

You wrote, "Actually, there can be a flow of time in an unchanging universe, too." In an unchanging universe, how would such a flow of time be observed, measured, or recorded? And if it can't be observed, measured or recorded, what is it?

Again, I deeply appreciate the attention you've given to my ideas, Tom. Thank you! This clearly is a crucially important topic, given the vital role of time in physics. I'm personally in full agreement with Lee Smolin's comment in 'The Trouble With Physics: 'More and more, I have the feeling that quantum theory and general relativity are both deeply wrong about the nature of time. It is not enough to combine them. There is a deeper problem, perhaps going back to the beginning of physics.' (p. 256)

Fwiw, I've heard from a reliable source that Smolin plans to publish at least one new book on the nature of time later this year. If so, I'll be lined up to get an early copy. And I'm certainly encouraged that so many smart people are looking anew at, and questioning, some of our fundamental assumptions about a wide variety of topics.

Cheers!

jcns

nmann,

The question is not about liking or not liking Bell's theorem, or liking or not liking entanglement, or liking or not liking non-locality. The question is about whether these ideas, or unicorns or UFOs, have any relevance for the real physical world, or for the future theory of physics. We had a perfectly cogent concept known as phlogiston---a truly beautiful concept. Unfortunately it turned out that it had absolutely no relevance for the real physical world. Similarly, Bell's theorem, entanglement, or non-locality has no relevance for the real physical world. As Tom says in different words, in the real physical world what matters are the correlations among a set of measurement events---or among the clicks of a set of detectors.

Now Bell claimed that for local functions of the form

A(a, L) = +1 or -1 with 50/50 chance for any a in R^3

and

B(b, L) = +1 or -1 with 50/50 chance for any b in R^3,

together with

AB(a, b, L) = A(a, L) x B(b, L) = -1 when b = a,

it is mathematically impossible to construct a model that can reproduce the correlation

E(a, b) = -a.b.

It turns out that Bell was wrong (but not trivially so). It *is* possible to mathematically reproduce the correlation E(a, b) = -a.b if we take the physically and mathematically correct co-domain for the functions AB(a, b, L), A(a, L), and B(b, L); namely a unit parallelized 3-sphere. The proof can be found in the attached paper.

It is scandalous to continue to believe in Bell's theorem despite this explicit one-page proof showing exactly what Bell thought was mathematically impossible. Further details and implications of the proof can be found in my book.Attachment #1: 19_disproof.pdf