The Logic of Physical Reality by Paul Reed

Daniel

"I guess most physicists now don´t investigate this very much"

No. Indeed, if you were to trawl back through posts over the last year, you will find at best I am told: 'interesting but this is philosophy'.

Which it is not. We, and all sentient organisms, receive physically existent phenomena (eg light, noise, etc). They are the result of a physical interaction with other physically existent phenomena (what is usually referred to as the reality). In other words, the received phenomena are, in the context of the sensory systems, representations of the reality we are trying to discern. The entire process is physical and identifiable. Therefore, before one embarks on physics, it would be best to understand how, generically, physical reality occurs.

Paul

PS: will look at your essay

Hector

Your economics model example sounds like one of those instances where the 'right' result is obtainable, albeit for the 'wrong' reason, a coincidental outcome.

Anyway, it is not so much that 'models are in agreement with empirical data' (models include assumptions and representational devices-particularly mathematical constructs in the case of physics), which is a statement of the obvious, but what can constitute empirical data/objective knowledge. That being a conceptualisation which corresponds with reality as independently manifest. So to answer that question one must examine how reality manifests and is detected. Which reveals certain 'rules' that any analysis purporting to be scientific and concerned with the nature of physical existence, must obey. The simple fact is that reality exists independently of the sensing of it, which is the only valid mechanism whereby it is knowable. It is not an abstract concept. And science must operate within that existential confine.

In a sense I am more interested in where you (or indeed anybody else) do not agree.

Paul

The fundamental problem with Physics is the misconceptualisation of time, and more generally, a failure to construct explanations based on concepts which correspond with how reality occurs and is detected. Originally, a potential variable in reality was postulated as being length dimension (which may or may not occur), but this variance then became attributed to time (which is incorrect). The essential problems with ideas about time (from Poincaré) are as follows, using extracts from: Einstein: On the electrodynamics of moving bodies (1905), Section 1 Part 1 Definition of Simultaneity

Para 3: "If, for instance, I say,"That train arrives here at 7 o'clock," I mean something like this: "The pointing of the small hand of my watch to 7 and the arrival of the train are simultaneous events.""

Comment: Incorrect. The two events did not occur simultaneously on this basis. The train was at its specified spatial position before the hand on the watch reached its specified spatial position. Because, for a physically existent state to be observed, the photons which reacted with it (and thereby, in the context of the sensory system known as sight, conveyed a representation of it) must reach the observer. And the consequent delays involved are different, since the relative spatial positions of train and watch, vis a vis observer, are different. Indeed, the relationship of those spatial positions, ie original vis a vis on receipt of light, could alter at different rates during the delays, if the entities involved are moving at different speeds (dimension alteration could be an additional factor in this situation). Furthermore, there can be no presumption that light travelled at the same speed in both circumstances, since that can be afffected by environmental circumstances. Finally, at the practical level, the two observations would be effected consecutively, ie upon receipt of information about the train, the observer would then look at the watch.

Para 4: "but it is no longer satisfactory when we have to connect in time series of events occurring at different places, or-what comes to the same thing-to evaluate the times of events occurring at places remote from the watch." And Para 6 third part: "But it is not possible without further assumption to compare, in respect of time, an event at A with an event at B."

Comment: Incorrect. Physically existent states do not each have their 'own' time. They exist as at a point in time. Timing being an extrinsic measuring system which, with the use a common denominator, enables the establishment of the relative relationship between occurrences (and enables comparison of rates of change).

Para 6 fourth part: "We have not defined a common "time" for A and B, for the latter cannot be defined at all unless we establish by definition that the "time" required by light to travel from A to B equals the "time" it requires to travel from B to A."And Para 7: "In accordance with definition the two clocks synchronize if: t(b) - t(a) = t'(a) - t(b)

Comment: Incorrect. No more than one physically existent state can be in the same spatial position at a time. The concept of 'immediate proximity' is false. As at any given point in time, everything is in a relative spatial position. It is just that some entities are nearer each other than others, but there is always a distance between any two. As at any given point in time, AB is a specific distance. So whether it is measured as A to B, or B to A, is irrelvant, as too is the method used to calibrate and express that. That is, it is not necessary to use light to determine the time taken to travel that distance. And it is incorrect to assess this in terms of a relationship between the duration incurred one way, and then the duration to subsequently travel back. This introduces a factor which is non-existent, ie reifies time as a dimension, and because of the coincidental use of light speed (as opposed to any other possibility) implies a property thereof which is incorrect.

Hoang

By definition, the 'T.O.E', in the sense of one common basis to all diverse and more detailed explanations, will be that which reflects how reality occurs.

I will have a look at your essay.

Paul

Sergey

In the sense of what constitutes these physical phenomena, within the confine of our existence, I have no idea. On the basis of how reality, as manifest, must occur, and how it is detectable, I can however stipulate the following generic rules, to which any objective explanation of physical reality must conform. Otherwise it is belief, not science.

1 There is a physical reality which occurs independently of the mechanism whereby it is detected (so while knowledge is trapped in an existential loop, within that, objectivity is attainable). Also, this reality involves change.

2 Physical reality is therefore sequence, which means that only one state can occur at a time. Because for the successor to exist, the predecessor must cease. That is, reality is a sequence of physically existent states, the latter being that physical presence which involves no form of change. Or put the other way around, what occurs as at any given point in time (which has a specific definition).

3 No form of sensing (ie the mechanism which detects physical presence) can have any effect on a physically existent state, because it occurred before it was sensed. Furthermore, what is sensed is not what is usually referred to as reality (although it is a reality in itself). It is the consequence of an interaction with other physically existent phenomena.

4 In terms of interaction, physically existent states cannot 'jump' physical circumstances. So the cause of any given physically existent state must be from amongst those which were the immediate predecessors in the sequence and were spatially adjacent thereto. This applies universally, as there cannot be a circumstance where some phenomenon is deemed to have physical influence, but has no physical existence.

This is all very easy to say. In practice, I doubt if we could isolate a physically existent state (ie reality) even in the simplest of circumstances. However, that failure is not an excuse for flawed analysis which is contrary to what must occur, with occurrences being defined as realities when in fact there is a sequence of realities therein, cause being attributed to occurrences that are neither in sequence nor spatially adjacent, concepts being reified as existent, and a presumption that sensing has an effect, etc

Paul

PS: I will look at your essay, but I react to the word infinite immediately. We only know of physical presence. By definition, this is infinite. Whether it is or not, we cannot know. We cannot assert infinity.

Sergey

I have a much simpler view. The rating of an essay should be on the basis of its accordance with facts and the extent to which it, correctly, reveals new information. I am not sure that the views of other contestants, for a number of somewhat obvious reasons, can correlate with this. The whole process should be left to an panel of independent and knowledgeable individuals.

For my part for example, having gone on holiday, which is what most people do at this time of year, I neither now have the time, nor the enthusiasm, to delve through what had since become hundreds of essays. No form of meaningful exchange can take place with that many possibilities.

Paul

I am concerned about anybody who does make the effort to read my submission, 'wasting their time'when a better version is available. So here are the first 22 paras rewritten.

The Logic of Physical Reality

Introduction

1 By establishing how, generically, physical existence is detected and must occur, a set of principles which underpins physics can be derived. Despite being the basis for any objective explanation of reality, these have not been defined formally, and when the subject is addressed, it tends to be characterised as philosophy, not physics. But reality, as in its independently detectable form, physically occurs, it is not an abstract concept, and its detection involves a discernable physical process.

2 Without such pre-conditions, which are determined by the fundamental nature of reality, theories can reflect their own beliefs, which can result in flaws, the apparent ability to substantiate an alternative existence, or the assertion that no preconceptions were deployed. The latter, while seeming intellectually valid, is unachievable since we are part of reality. Therefore, the issue for science is that any assumptions or representational devices utilised, must correspond with existent phenomena as independently manifest, and not reflect metaphysical conceptualisations thereof.

The logical absolute and physical reality

3 Any form of existence invokes the logical possibility of the alternative, (ie if A, there is always the logical possibility of not-A). But as this is inherently undetectable because we cannot transcend our own existence, and only has the status of a logical possibility anyway, it is irrelevant to any objective explanation of our physical reality. That analysis must involve only what is directly (or circumstantially) knowable (ie not belief or assertion), and is dependent solely on the sensory systems, since these mechanisms render information about reality available to us. Objective knowledge being conceptualisation abstracted from that which corresponds with that reality.

4 Since they exist, these sensory processes are closed systems. But they enable objectivity within that inescapable confine of physical existence, as that occurs independently of them. The senses receive physically existent phenomena (albeit the results of interactions between other existent phenomena, which is what is usually being referred to as reality), which are processed, thereby creating knowledge of reality, not reality. The sensory processes can have no influence on existence.

5 All this reflects the function of these processes, which evolved to enable awareness of reality, utilising certain physically existent phenomena. And is demonstrated by the fact that, irrespective of understanding, any given organism does not affect action which indicates that it was unaware of any given form of physical existence; unless its sensory systems are incapable of detecting it as their evolution did not involve it, or there is a flaw with that particular individual capability. Also, evidence shows that once certain aspects of the sensory process are discounted (eg individual sensory capabilities, specific prevailing physical conditions, and attributed meanings), all sentient organisms receive similar physical input from the same existent circumstance.

6 Dependence on sensory detection does not imply that objective knowledge must be limited to validated direct experience. Because there are known physical problems with those processes, ie instances where sensory detection either cannot be effected, or at least not completely accurately and/or comprehensively. In those circumstances, what occurred must be hypothesised, but still be based on, and assessment of consequent outcomes referenced to, validated direct experience, ie indirect experiential validation must be substantiated by direct experience. The crucial difference being what, while not directly validatable, is properly inferred from direct experience, and what is based on no substantiated experienceability (ie is belief/ assertion). In practice, as knowledge becomes complex and its derivation further removed from direct experience, the more likely it is that these will become conflated.

7 So, reality, for us, comprises those physically existent phenomena which are potentially sensorially detectable by any organism, and the existent phenomena which caused them. The caveat of potentiality referring to physical, not metaphysical, issues with the mechanics of the sensory processes.

8 Put the other way around, if we were endowed with all possible types of sensory system, and the processes functioned so that every detail was available, received, and processed, without alteration, then what was received by any given individual would be known objectively. Differences due to the varying physical circumstances of each recipient could then be reconciled, and what must have occurred originally inferred, based on knowledge as to how the phenomena involved behave physically.

The nature of physical existence

9 The scope of this analysis ceases immediately before a physical phenomenon is received by a sensory organ. That is, it is not concerned with the biological, physiological, psychological, etc, aspects of the sensory processes, nor sociological issues around meaning. Though to comprehend fully the entire sensory process, and hence facilitate the proper identification of reality, these need to be understood.

10 Apart from general complexity, the core analytical problems revolve around the following: that what is received by the sensory systems is only the result of an interaction between other phenomena, that this is then processed, and that that is effected by individuals. Thus objective knowledge has to be extricated from information which could have undergone several alterations, and that requires validated reverse-engineering, and cross-referencing to counteract individualism.

11 The generic analysis of our physical reality starts with two knowns: 1) existence is independent of sensory detection, 2) difference occurs. This means that physical existence must be sequence, and therefore only one physically existent state (ie a reality) can exist at a time, because for the successor to occur, its predecessor must cease. Furthermore, such states must occur in a definitive form, and cannot entail any form of change because that would involve more than one state.

12 It is comparison of these states which reveals difference. So change is concerned with how realities differ, not an attribute of any given reality. It is not existent, and neither is the difference. Only physically existent states are existent. Logically, it comprises: 1) substance (ie what changed), 2) order (ie the sequence of differences), 3) frequency (ie the rate at which change occurred). The latter being established by comparing numbers of changes occurring over the same duration. This could involve realities in any sequence (including different aspects of the same sequence), and have either occurred concurrently, or otherwise. This is timing.

13 Identification of any given physically existent state (a reality) involves establishing what existed at a point in time. The ultimate unit in the timing measuring system being that which equates with the duration elapsed whilst the fastest alteration in reality occurs. An analogy would be the identification of the still frames which comprise a film. Though in practice there must be significant doubt whether any reality could be deconstructed to this existential level.

14 Apart from sheer complexity, another factor which tends to obscure the actual nature of reality, and hence its understanding, is the way it is often conceptualised, which is ontologically incorrect. This may be an understandable reaction to practicalities, but that does not justify the reification of misconceptions. Generally, certain superficial physical traits are deemed to constitute any given 'it'. That is then considered to remain in existence, albeit with changes to 'it', until at least some of those defining characteristics are no longer manifest. However, this depicts physical reality at a higher level than what exists, though it could be a correct conception at that level. So there just appears to be less change than there is, resulting in the illusion of a level of persistence to existence which does not physically occur.

15 Furthermore, there can be a tendency to accept certain types of phenomena as being substantive, ie having some form of physical presence, while denying that for others. But there must always be physicality, there cannot be a circumstance where a phenomenon is deemed to have some form of physical presence, but not have some form of physical existence. Which means that the fact that there can only be one physically existent state at a time, in any given sequence, applies universally, ie any physical occurrence must be an existent state in a sequence of such states.

16 The above relates to the confusion between what constitutes the elementary substance of physical reality, and what constitutes a physically existent state, ie what is reality as at any given point in time. Often these are assumed to be the same, but they are not. Given that there is an independent physical existence, which alters, then it must comprise elementary substances, albeit probably different types. However, these are not reality, because physical existence involves alteration, and by definition, elementary substances as such do not change. What does change is their innate properties. Therefore, a physically existent state is a function of the condition of the properties of the elementary parts which comprise reality, at any given point in time.

17 There is no physically existent state commonly referred to as the future. It does not exist. Any concept which involves the notion of change to it, or that it can have some physical influence, is incorrect, because there is nothing in existence to affect, nor anything to invoke an effect. The notion of changing the future is properly expressed as the situation where a physically existent state occurred which is different to what which would otherwise have done so, had the causal factors been different. But this is meaningless physically, as by definition, any given state is a function of certain previously existent states.

18 Neither does the physically existent state commonly known as the past exist. It did have physical existence, unlike the future, but must have ceased to do so in order that the subsequent (ie current) reality occurs. There is only ever one physically existent state occurring at a time, in respect of any given sequence. In colloquial terms, only a present exists.

19 None of this should be confused with the sensory process whereby reality is detected. In that context, representations of any given reality, from the perspective of the sensory systems, exist as physically existent phenomena in themselves (eg light, noise, vibration, etc). One of their features being that their physical state, again from the perspective of the sensory systems at least, remains unchanged (or nearly so). In this circumstance, apart from other potential differences between these phenomena and the reality they represent, there is a timing delay. The point in time at which existence occurred being earlier than that at which sensory reception occurred, but that does not affect the former.

20 So notions such as oscillation, reaction, feedback, etc, are ontologically incorrect, unless they are expressed properly in terms of a sequence of occurrences. At most there is just a repetition of a previously physically existent state as the sequence progresses, but this is still different because it occurred separately. Although even that is likely to be superficial, ie due to the level of conceptualisation (but possibly correct at that level). Physically, it is probably impossible that a configuration of any given physically existent state, in its entirety, will re-occur.

21 Furthermore, the cause of any given physically existent state must be from amongst other previous such states which, when existent, were adjacent both spatially, and sequentially, to that which subsequently occurred. Because influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance. Any given physically existent state cannot potentially be the cause of its successor, if it is spatially remote from where that successor occurred, or if it is not the immediate predecessor in the sequence of occurrence.

22 It is probably always going to be impossible for humans to identify the precise physical constitution of any discrete physically existent state, especially if it involves any degree of complexity. Similarly, with respect to differentiating the precise physical interrelationship of cause in any given circumstance which involves some degree of complexity. However, this is a 'failure' in human capability, and the issue should not be attributed to innate characteristics in reality.

Roger

Thanks, hopefully you read my post above, as although it does not convey anything different, it is expressed better.

Below I will comment only on what is written here, and then go elsewhere.

1 In respect of your general first paragraph:

Yes, the whole point of my paper is to deconstruct, generically, physical existence on the basis of two fundamental questions: a) how is it detected, b) how can what is detected (or potentially could be if the detection systems were perfect) occur. That delineates the boundary as to what we can and cannot know (directly or indirectly), and hence what we are examining, and how information about it is created.

No, one needs to differentiate: reality from a representation thereof (aka light, noise-though they are a reality in themselves), the existential state of reality from a conceptualised state, what constitutes the substance of reality from a physically existent state thereof, reality from information about reality, information from objective information, and whether a representational device (word, maths, graphics) corresponds with experienced reality or is based on assertion (albeit the construct can be internally rational).

2 In respect of your copied comments on Olaf Dreyer's essay (which I have not read but will do-afraid I went on holiday in August, as many do, and came back to be overwhelmed by the number of additional essays submitted):

""Why is there something rather than nothing?" While I do not know the context of this, this question, as such, is irrelevant to an objective explanation of the physical reality we can know of. The simple fact is that there is something, it is only detectable by the sensory systems, but it occurs independently of them. So, within the closed system of existence, we can establish, objectively, what exists, and why, etc. Any attempt to transcend existence (which is not the same as compensating for issues in the sensory systems) is belief and assertion, not science.

"Because our universe has more than one existent state in it". Careful, it depends what constitutes a sequence. If the sequence is the entirety of reality, then at any given point in time it is in one physically existent state, ie a form of physical existence which involves no change (because if there is change there must be more than one state). But within that entirety there are countless sequences, normally we refer to them as 'things'. It is like the still in a film. I do not like the concept universe, really we can only refer to physical existence. And the point about Big Bang, is that knowledge eventually reaches that boundary where experience is not possible (even if it is hypothesis as, obviously, direct experience cannot be effected). We then cannot know. We can postulate that Big Bang, or whatever, repeats, but that is not a solution. The point being that there can be no objective solution.

"allowing these existent states to change and transfer this change to adjacent states". It is not really a case of 'allowing', neither is it the existent state, but the 'substance', which is in a physically existent state and has innate properties. Neither, leaving aside the concept of transfer, are the states adjacent. They do not exist, yet. Intrinsic change &/or an interaction with other concurrent adjacent states results in a different configuration , the former having ceased to exist.

Anyway, I think the best thing to do now is to have a cup of coffee and then look at the various references.

Paul