I am concerned about anybody who does make the effort to read my submission, 'wasting their time'when a better version is available. So here are the first 22 paras rewritten.
The Logic of Physical Reality
Introduction
1 By establishing how, generically, physical existence is detected and must occur, a set of principles which underpins physics can be derived. Despite being the basis for any objective explanation of reality, these have not been defined formally, and when the subject is addressed, it tends to be characterised as philosophy, not physics. But reality, as in its independently detectable form, physically occurs, it is not an abstract concept, and its detection involves a discernable physical process.
2 Without such pre-conditions, which are determined by the fundamental nature of reality, theories can reflect their own beliefs, which can result in flaws, the apparent ability to substantiate an alternative existence, or the assertion that no preconceptions were deployed. The latter, while seeming intellectually valid, is unachievable since we are part of reality. Therefore, the issue for science is that any assumptions or representational devices utilised, must correspond with existent phenomena as independently manifest, and not reflect metaphysical conceptualisations thereof.
The logical absolute and physical reality
3 Any form of existence invokes the logical possibility of the alternative, (ie if A, there is always the logical possibility of not-A). But as this is inherently undetectable because we cannot transcend our own existence, and only has the status of a logical possibility anyway, it is irrelevant to any objective explanation of our physical reality. That analysis must involve only what is directly (or circumstantially) knowable (ie not belief or assertion), and is dependent solely on the sensory systems, since these mechanisms render information about reality available to us. Objective knowledge being conceptualisation abstracted from that which corresponds with that reality.
4 Since they exist, these sensory processes are closed systems. But they enable objectivity within that inescapable confine of physical existence, as that occurs independently of them. The senses receive physically existent phenomena (albeit the results of interactions between other existent phenomena, which is what is usually being referred to as reality), which are processed, thereby creating knowledge of reality, not reality. The sensory processes can have no influence on existence.
5 All this reflects the function of these processes, which evolved to enable awareness of reality, utilising certain physically existent phenomena. And is demonstrated by the fact that, irrespective of understanding, any given organism does not affect action which indicates that it was unaware of any given form of physical existence; unless its sensory systems are incapable of detecting it as their evolution did not involve it, or there is a flaw with that particular individual capability. Also, evidence shows that once certain aspects of the sensory process are discounted (eg individual sensory capabilities, specific prevailing physical conditions, and attributed meanings), all sentient organisms receive similar physical input from the same existent circumstance.
6 Dependence on sensory detection does not imply that objective knowledge must be limited to validated direct experience. Because there are known physical problems with those processes, ie instances where sensory detection either cannot be effected, or at least not completely accurately and/or comprehensively. In those circumstances, what occurred must be hypothesised, but still be based on, and assessment of consequent outcomes referenced to, validated direct experience, ie indirect experiential validation must be substantiated by direct experience. The crucial difference being what, while not directly validatable, is properly inferred from direct experience, and what is based on no substantiated experienceability (ie is belief/ assertion). In practice, as knowledge becomes complex and its derivation further removed from direct experience, the more likely it is that these will become conflated.
7 So, reality, for us, comprises those physically existent phenomena which are potentially sensorially detectable by any organism, and the existent phenomena which caused them. The caveat of potentiality referring to physical, not metaphysical, issues with the mechanics of the sensory processes.
8 Put the other way around, if we were endowed with all possible types of sensory system, and the processes functioned so that every detail was available, received, and processed, without alteration, then what was received by any given individual would be known objectively. Differences due to the varying physical circumstances of each recipient could then be reconciled, and what must have occurred originally inferred, based on knowledge as to how the phenomena involved behave physically.
The nature of physical existence
9 The scope of this analysis ceases immediately before a physical phenomenon is received by a sensory organ. That is, it is not concerned with the biological, physiological, psychological, etc, aspects of the sensory processes, nor sociological issues around meaning. Though to comprehend fully the entire sensory process, and hence facilitate the proper identification of reality, these need to be understood.
10 Apart from general complexity, the core analytical problems revolve around the following: that what is received by the sensory systems is only the result of an interaction between other phenomena, that this is then processed, and that that is effected by individuals. Thus objective knowledge has to be extricated from information which could have undergone several alterations, and that requires validated reverse-engineering, and cross-referencing to counteract individualism.
11 The generic analysis of our physical reality starts with two knowns: 1) existence is independent of sensory detection, 2) difference occurs. This means that physical existence must be sequence, and therefore only one physically existent state (ie a reality) can exist at a time, because for the successor to occur, its predecessor must cease. Furthermore, such states must occur in a definitive form, and cannot entail any form of change because that would involve more than one state.
12 It is comparison of these states which reveals difference. So change is concerned with how realities differ, not an attribute of any given reality. It is not existent, and neither is the difference. Only physically existent states are existent. Logically, it comprises: 1) substance (ie what changed), 2) order (ie the sequence of differences), 3) frequency (ie the rate at which change occurred). The latter being established by comparing numbers of changes occurring over the same duration. This could involve realities in any sequence (including different aspects of the same sequence), and have either occurred concurrently, or otherwise. This is timing.
13 Identification of any given physically existent state (a reality) involves establishing what existed at a point in time. The ultimate unit in the timing measuring system being that which equates with the duration elapsed whilst the fastest alteration in reality occurs. An analogy would be the identification of the still frames which comprise a film. Though in practice there must be significant doubt whether any reality could be deconstructed to this existential level.
14 Apart from sheer complexity, another factor which tends to obscure the actual nature of reality, and hence its understanding, is the way it is often conceptualised, which is ontologically incorrect. This may be an understandable reaction to practicalities, but that does not justify the reification of misconceptions. Generally, certain superficial physical traits are deemed to constitute any given 'it'. That is then considered to remain in existence, albeit with changes to 'it', until at least some of those defining characteristics are no longer manifest. However, this depicts physical reality at a higher level than what exists, though it could be a correct conception at that level. So there just appears to be less change than there is, resulting in the illusion of a level of persistence to existence which does not physically occur.
15 Furthermore, there can be a tendency to accept certain types of phenomena as being substantive, ie having some form of physical presence, while denying that for others. But there must always be physicality, there cannot be a circumstance where a phenomenon is deemed to have some form of physical presence, but not have some form of physical existence. Which means that the fact that there can only be one physically existent state at a time, in any given sequence, applies universally, ie any physical occurrence must be an existent state in a sequence of such states.
16 The above relates to the confusion between what constitutes the elementary substance of physical reality, and what constitutes a physically existent state, ie what is reality as at any given point in time. Often these are assumed to be the same, but they are not. Given that there is an independent physical existence, which alters, then it must comprise elementary substances, albeit probably different types. However, these are not reality, because physical existence involves alteration, and by definition, elementary substances as such do not change. What does change is their innate properties. Therefore, a physically existent state is a function of the condition of the properties of the elementary parts which comprise reality, at any given point in time.
17 There is no physically existent state commonly referred to as the future. It does not exist. Any concept which involves the notion of change to it, or that it can have some physical influence, is incorrect, because there is nothing in existence to affect, nor anything to invoke an effect. The notion of changing the future is properly expressed as the situation where a physically existent state occurred which is different to what which would otherwise have done so, had the causal factors been different. But this is meaningless physically, as by definition, any given state is a function of certain previously existent states.
18 Neither does the physically existent state commonly known as the past exist. It did have physical existence, unlike the future, but must have ceased to do so in order that the subsequent (ie current) reality occurs. There is only ever one physically existent state occurring at a time, in respect of any given sequence. In colloquial terms, only a present exists.
19 None of this should be confused with the sensory process whereby reality is detected. In that context, representations of any given reality, from the perspective of the sensory systems, exist as physically existent phenomena in themselves (eg light, noise, vibration, etc). One of their features being that their physical state, again from the perspective of the sensory systems at least, remains unchanged (or nearly so). In this circumstance, apart from other potential differences between these phenomena and the reality they represent, there is a timing delay. The point in time at which existence occurred being earlier than that at which sensory reception occurred, but that does not affect the former.
20 So notions such as oscillation, reaction, feedback, etc, are ontologically incorrect, unless they are expressed properly in terms of a sequence of occurrences. At most there is just a repetition of a previously physically existent state as the sequence progresses, but this is still different because it occurred separately. Although even that is likely to be superficial, ie due to the level of conceptualisation (but possibly correct at that level). Physically, it is probably impossible that a configuration of any given physically existent state, in its entirety, will re-occur.
21 Furthermore, the cause of any given physically existent state must be from amongst other previous such states which, when existent, were adjacent both spatially, and sequentially, to that which subsequently occurred. Because influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance. Any given physically existent state cannot potentially be the cause of its successor, if it is spatially remote from where that successor occurred, or if it is not the immediate predecessor in the sequence of occurrence.
22 It is probably always going to be impossible for humans to identify the precise physical constitution of any discrete physically existent state, especially if it involves any degree of complexity. Similarly, with respect to differentiating the precise physical interrelationship of cause in any given circumstance which involves some degree of complexity. However, this is a 'failure' in human capability, and the issue should not be attributed to innate characteristics in reality.