Hi Frank

dreams may well be important as to how the mind works; people like Freud and Mark Solms have investigated this. But dreams can't be significant for how physics operates:its the other way round, in the end physics underlies dreams somehow because physics underlies the brain.

Which physics? You claim "Gravity is at the heart of our feeling, vision, and touch." I side with biophyiscs in saying it is electromagnetism that plays this role. In fact the principle of equivalence supports this: our bodies function adequately for extended periods in free fall, where there is no effective gravitational force. So gravity can't underlie mind functioning.

I'll put some comment over there.

George

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    • Post #290

    Dear George,

    I am fascinated because the ideas you propose in your essay are essentially some insights I got some years ago. They were from a philosophical or spiritual point of view, and you brought the same ideas into the language of physics. I'm a physicist too, and I know how hard is to propose anything on this subject. But the connection you established with computer programming is perfect for it. Actually, I believe that once we could completely understand computation, programming and its relation with physics your ideas will be definitely proved right and also deeply clarified.

    I think looking to this problem as problem of language and can give us many insights. Continuing or repeating what you say, follow my line: The only way to describe a high level program is using a high level language. A high level program can be implemented in a low level language, but it is not described by it. That is, there are several different implementations of a high level program in a high level language; and it contains more information than the high level one; so, you cannot say that you are describing the same program in the low level language.

    To say that top-down causation happens is simply to say that physics can "run high level programs". I believe quantum computation is just like assembly programming, so it is the lowest level possible. Therefore, a high level quantum programming language might me the missing ingredient for understanding this. It would make your analogy formally valid in physics!

    I believe our mind and any other spiritual element would exist in high level layer and could only be described by high level languages. And then, as they exist, they would be able to provoke top-down causation in the lowest layer: physics. The interaction between mind and matter would be something of this form. That's why it is not described by current physics: actually our mathematics does not really support top-down causation. For sure it is the missing ingredient for a revolution in physics!

    In my essay, "The Final Theory and the Language of Physics", I discuss the relation between language and theory, and try to elucidate the nature of a physical theory. Please, give me some feedback. A computer language is just like a framework for writing physical theories. A high level language would be like a high level framework, with high level concepts and mathematics, and understanding top-down causation will at some time require this.

    Best Regards

    Frederico

      Hi George,

      You say: "...our bodies function adequately for extended periods in free fall, where there is no effective gravitational force. So gravity can't underlie mind functioning."

      Unless you are excluding the gravitomagnetic component of gravity, this is not necessarily true.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Hi Eugene

      It's a nice idea, but it won't work because those effects are so weak. For this to work, they'd have to be detected by physical systems on Earth. The most expensive and complex gravitational wave detectors have so far failed to detect the gravitomagnetic component of gravity, see Kip Thorne's discussion of the nature of these effects in two papers at http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/1208.3038 and http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/1208.3034. If those detectors can't detect them, then certainly our brains can't.

      George

      Hi Frederico,

      you say "The only way to describe a high level program is using a high level language. A high level program can be implemented in a low level language, but it is not described by it. That is, there are several different implementations of a high level program in a high level language; and it contains more information than the high level one; so, you cannot say that you are describing the same program in the low level language. " Exactly, nicely put.

      "I believe our mind [...] would exist in high level layer and could only be described by high level languages. And then, as they exist, they would be able to provoke top-down causation in the lowest layer: physics. The interaction between mind and matter would be something of this form." Exactly. " That's why it is not described by current physics: actually our mathematics does not really support top-down causation. " Well it's beginning to do so, see the papers By Walker and Davies I cited some way above, and particularly Karl Friston's article "A theory of cortical responses" (I gave the link a while back). We're getting there. Any help in sorting this out appreciated.

      I'll take a look at your essay.

      geporge

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      • Post #294

      The works of Gell-Mann and Anderson show that emergence is compatible with ordinary bottom-up causation. Anderson writes on the first page of the Science paper: "The elementary entities of science X obey the laws of science Y". He gives a table of X and Y. The first row says that the elementary entities of "solid state or many-body physics" obey the laws of "elementary particle physics", the second row says that the elementary entities of "chemistry" obeys the laws of "many-body physics", and so on. At the end of the table Anderson writes "But this hierarchy does not imply that science X is "just applied Y."" Gell-Mann offers a similar analysis in his famous book. Gell-Mann and Anderson criticize reductionism but defend the ordinary bottom-up causation. You confuse reductionism with bottom-up causation.

      Denis Noble is not a world authority on the molecular basis behind the physiology of the heart. This molecular basis obeys the laws of physics and chemistry. This is well-known. Superconductivity is a collective phenomenon for a large number of entities that obey the laws of particle physics. This is explained by Anderson in his Science paper. You confuse reductionism with bottom-up causation.

      The ideas of your "deepest thinkers in cosmology" about the second law are considered nonsense by all the experts. The reception at the Santa Cruz talk was one example. The proof of the increasing entropy due to Ludwig Boltzmann (who later committed suicide, being surrounded by people not unsimilar to your "deepest thinkers in cosmology" who were unable to appreciate the depth and validity of his key insights into thermodynamics) shows that the rest of the Universe and its history is irrelevant, because of the locality of the laws of Nature.

      Time-symmetry is an approximation to other fundamental symmetries of our universe. You consider this "Extraordinary" because you are not familiar with modern physics. What I find extraordinary is that you didn't know the Weinberg derivation before writing your amusing essay. The H-theorem (3.6.20) holds for both directions of time and Weinberg writes about the theorem: "so we may conclude that the entropy always increases". This is very easy to check. Your misunderstanding of the H-theorem is typical of the "deepest thinkers in cosmology".

      You repeat a wrong argument by Penrose, but the Weinberg derivation does not assume "time-reversal invariance, which would tell us that |M_{\beta\alpha}|^2 is unchanged if we interchange \alpha and \beta". This general derivation from quantum field theory does not need cosmological speculations.

      Your spurious citations to personal blogs and promotional websites of the "deepest thinkers in cosmology" do not change the conclusion: All the examples found in your amusing essay are compatible with ordinary bottom-up causation.

        Hi George,

        That is true if Martin Tajmar's measurement's are false, but no one has yet shown this to be the case. If instead his measurements are correct, then the coherence factor (kappa) is as I describe in my essay, the Nature of the Wave Function, with potential effects I have described in my earlier essays. The fact that everyone has decided to ignore his results is par for the course, but proves nothing. Yet if he is correct, it is the most revolutionary discovery of recent times. My own position is to treat it as correct and investigate the consequences, which are many. In fact, there are other hi-ranked essays here that propose something similar, ignoring what has already potentially been discovered.

        I don't expect to convince you, simply to record the fact that measurements exist that suggest an alternative.

        Best,

        Edwin Eugene Klingman

        Dear George,

        I found your essay to be the most interesting one here. I do think that the views expressed in your essay fit better in the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, though. One can then argue that the sector an observer is located in is not a precisely defined branch, rather it is in some superposition of states that are in the same functional equivalence class (as defined on page 9 of your essay).

        Such a superposition is a complicated entangled state of the system and the environment; such a state defines the computational state of the algorithm that the brain is executing. I explain this in my essay.

        The then means that the top-down causation is in principle visible from the microstate of the system as it exists at any given time (although you will in general have a superpositon of systems in different macrostates).

        You simply don't understand that at no point have I in any ways denied that the the laws of physics and chemistry apply at the lower levels. Of course they do. The point is that they do not by themselves determine what happens. That is determined by top down causation, as is abundantly clear for example in the case of the computer, which you conveniently continue to ignore.

        It is also clear in the case of superconductivity. Yes indeed it is a "collective phenomenon for a large number of entities that obey the laws of particle physics". It is precisely the collective nature of the phenomenon which means it cannot be accounted for except in terms of the entities that make it a collective phenomenon - that is, the specific crystal structure, which is a higher level of structuration (i.e. at a larger scale of description) than the Cooper pairs. Indeed those pairs do not exist without that higher level structure. That is why superconductivity depends for its existence on that specific higher level structure, and is why you cannot deduce superconductivity in a bottom up way from the behaviour of electrons and protons, as Laughlin points out. I continue to believe he underztands it better than you do.

        "Denis Noble is not a world authority on the molecular basis behind the physiology of the heart. This molecular basis obeys the laws of physics and chemistry" Of course it does, no one has ever denied that: that is a foundation he and I believe in. But by themselves they do not create a heart nor determine its functioning. Denis Noble is a world expert on the physiology of the heart, and it is when you study that physiology that you find it cannot be understood except in terms of the interplay of bottom up and top down causation, which determines which specific molecular interactions take place where and at what time. Bottom up physics alone cannot explain how a heart comes into being, nor what its design is, nor its regular functioning. Please take the trouble to read what Noble has written on this, instead of denying his understanding of the physics and biology involved.

        The very small weak interaction time asymmetry makes no difference to the arrow of time issue, which is the point I was making. "The ideas of your "deepest thinkers in cosmology" about the second law are considered nonsense by all the experts." Who appointed these nameless people as experts in what? I have agreed with you that the Weinberg derivation is a nice one. You still don't get the point. You say "The H-theorem (3.6.20) holds for both directions of time and Weinberg writes about the theorem: "so we may conclude that the entropy always increases" ". Increase in which direction of time? The second law has no content until this question is answered - and Weinberg's derivation can't give an answer to that question, as the first part of the quote above makes clear (that derivation unhelpfully says it increases in both directions of time). "This general derivation from quantum field theory does not need cosmological speculations" --- and it does not solve the arrow of time problem. The nameless "experts" you rely on do not trump Wheeler and Feynmann, who understood that the problem is real and is not solved by quantum field theory per se.

        "You confuse reductionism with bottom-up causation." Your continued repetition of this phrase shows you simply have not paid attention to the nature of my argument, nor the vary large number of examples confirming it, such as the whole subject of epigenetics. Here is a challenge for you. Explain to me in a purely bottom up way how state vector preparation is possible, as for example in the Stern Gerlach experiment. Quantum physics is unitary, as we all know: how does the non-unitary behaviour of state vector preparation emerge in a purely bottom up way from that unitary dynamics? You won't be able to explain this action without invoking the effect of the apparatus on the particles - which is a form of top down action form the apparatus to the particles.

        Why don't you change your pseudonym to something that is not so blatantly false? If you get that so wrong, why should we believe anything you say? And you don't do yourself any favours by the sneering tone you adopt. It just comes across as arrogant.

          This response was to the previous post. It somehow got displaced.

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          • Post #299

          I didn't know about these results. It is good to know we are making progress in this direction. I'm trying to understand these papers but they are not any simple for a first reading. I might work on this subject in the future; it is something that interests me. But first there are simpler things I would like to clarify. Our understanding of complex things may always be bounded by the clarity of simple things. Progress can be made, but is much harder than when the simple is already clearly understood.

          All the best!

          Dear Saibal

          that is an interesting perspective. Personally I think quantum theory is incomplete and that we need to find the mechanism that determines state vector projection; but I'll consider your proposal too. But I have never been able to understand what mechanism leads to splitting of the wave function, or what determines when it happens. Also as I understand it, this proposal can't account for the Born rule in any simple way. Deutsch's concept of uncountable infinities of fungible particles is hardly credible.

          George

            Edwin, Martin Tajmar's measurement's have been disowned by his co-investigator. But in any case they are solar system measurements, which do not relate to what happens here on earth, where the effect is not discernible.

            Frank, we simply have very different views of reality and causation. We will have to agree to disagree.

            George.

            I have replied just below to this comment: the reply somehow got displaced.

            Here is the kind of research you dismiss out of had. Must be amazing to live life with the ability to deny the validity of what so many other highly competent researchers are doing. I suppose you feel safer with your blinkers on. You should take note of the Feynmann quite I gave above (Jul. 21, 2012). Or do you look down on Fetnmann too?

            Experimental application of top-down control analysis to metabolic systems.

            (PMID:8438233)

            Quant PA

            Department of Biochemistry, University of Cambridge, UK.

            Trends in Biochemical Sciences [1993, 18(1):26-30]

            DOI: 10.1016/0968-0004(93)90084-Z

            Abstract Metabolic control analysis (MCA) has provided the language and framework for quantitative study of control over flux, or over metabolites, by individual enzymes of a pathway. By contrast, top-down control analysis (TDCA) yields an immediate overview of the control structure of the whole system of interest, giving information about the control exercised by large sections of complex pathways. Unlike MCA, TDCA does not rely on the use of specific inhibitors or genetic manipulation to determine control coefficients. The method and an application of TDCA to ketogenesis are described.

            Typos corrected:

            Here is the kind of research you dismiss out of hand. Must be amazing to live life with the ability to deny the validity of what so many other highly competent researchers are doing. I suppose you feel safer with your blinkers on. You should take note of the Feynmann quote I gave above (Jul. 21, 2012). Or do you look down on Feynmann too?

            George,

            You stated "Edwin, Martin Tajmar's measurement's have been disowned by his co-investigator. But in any case they are solar system measurements, which do not relate to what happens here on earth, where the effect is not discernible."

            Not sure what you're talking about George. I haven't heard this of his co-investigator, and his measurements were most **definitely** performed on Earth, *not* elsewhere in the solar system. I think you're confused. There is a link to his experiment in my essay -- it is performed in a lab on Earth's surface.

            Edwin Eugene Klingman

            Edwin,

            yes you are right, I'd remembered it wrong. It was indeed a laboratory experiment. But it remains the case that the experimental relativity community does not believe it. The problem is that gravity is such a weak force, and to generate the gravimagnetic effect requires large masses moving at high velocity; if they were there, they'd have other much more easily measurable effects. But I agree its a nice idea and you have developed it well. It is a good idea.

            Frank I have replied on your essay page. I simply don't agree that dreams can be the basis of any scientific theory of the way things are.

            George

            In case you miss the post below, here is a key element I point out there. In view of your statements, I think it needs spelling out.

            You state

            "The H-theorem (3.6.20) holds for both directions of time and Weinberg writes about the theorem: "so we may conclude that the entropy always increases". This is very easy to check. Your misunderstanding of the H-theorem is typical of the "deepest thinkers in cosmology". "

            So the key point is, if entropy always increases, in which direction of time does it increase? Weinberg's derivation has no answer. I'll explain step by step.

            Choose a time coordinate t. The theorem as developed by Weinberg, according to you says

            dS/dt > 0. (1)

            Now choose the opposite direction of time:

            t' = -t. (2)

            As you admit, "The H-theorem (3.6.20) holds for both directions of time" (I show why in my post of Sep. 12, 2012 @ 17:30). Hence it holds also for t'. Therefore the Theorem as developed by Weinberg also says

            dS/dt' > 0. (3)

            Is (1) true or (3) true, or are both true, or is neither true?

            Weinberg's derivation, like Boltzmann's says both are true. It does not pick out the preferred direction of time which underlies the 2nd law of macroscopic physics.

            So in which direction of time does entropy increase? Weinberg's equation (3.6.20) does not provide the answer. It can't explain the most elementary fact about everyday physics.

            So where is the misunderstanding in this elementary line of reasoning? Your sardonic comments are in tatters if you can't reply convincingly.

            Maybe if you look at this carefully you'll at last understand what Wheeler, Feynman, Sciama, Davies, Zeh, Penrose, and Carroll and others were on about.

            Dear George,

            Your essay casts a valuable light from Physics on the complex way in which causal interactions play out in systems. These complex causal networks make reductionistic interpretations inadequate. Although 'top-down' processes have been recognised in biology and social science (as you point out), this idea cannot find a secure footing in the paradigm until physicists take it on board. Such a foundational understanding is much needed for progress both within and beyond physics. For example, as you rightly point out, deep problems in philosophy of mind hinge on such conceptions of causation.

            As you suggested on our essay page, there is a significant overlap between the 'metaphysical drift' of your essay and ours, even though you and we target different problems in foundational knowledge. I think that we could contribute to the position that you are developing, in terms of conceptual clarifications we are developing in our work in Systems Philosophy, which we touch on in our essay. We are working on articulating conceptual understandings for terms such as 'existing thing', 'physical thing', 'concrete thing', 'abstract thing', 'property', 'causal power' and so on, in a way that is broadly consistent with their usage in metaphysical debates and (critically) mutually consistent. Formalizing the definitions you give in your essay in this way would make your point even stronger and clearer, and remove possible misinterpretations of your argument, such as assigning causal powers to 'patterns' rather than to the systems that realize them. This would enable important further distinctions to be made between the things you identify as "existing" and having causal consequences yet being "non-physical". For example, minds would be what they are whatever sense we make of them, but arguably computer programs exist only in terms of the sense we make of them. Such clarifications might be important in the future development of your argument.

            Meanwhile, congratulations on writing a clear essay about a perspective that will be important for how our fundamental understandings will develop. We're glad to see it doing so well in the rankings already, and will add our own positive rating!

            Best wishes,

            David

              Dear David

              Many thanks for that, I'm glad to know about your project.

              " Formalizing the definitions you give in your essay in this way would make your point even stronger and clearer, and remove possible misinterpretations of your argument, such as assigning causal powers to 'patterns' rather than to the systems that realize them. This would enable important further distinctions to be made between the things you identify as "existing" and having causal consequences yet being "non-physical"." Yes indeed. Any help in such clarification will be welcome.

              George