Dear Eckard

you are quite wrong to be hurt by my comment that the time would be much better spent reading the Feynman lectures. I often read them for elucidation.

You'll find the relativistic derivation of the transformation laws for electric and magnetic fields on pages 26-1 to 26-10 in Volume II, and that of the Lorentz equations of motion on pages 26-11 to 26-13. They clearly show (Table 26-3) both why motion of an electron generates a magnetic field, and motion past a magnetic field generates an electric field (and hence a current). Basic stuff for electrical engineers.

George Ellis

The theme of this essay and this thread is the existence of both bottom-up and top-down causation in science in general, and in physics in particular.

Some interesting issues have arisen from the postings on this thread that have addressed this theme. To avoid confusion I'll deal with them in separate postings. Here is the first.

Issue 1: Contextual Logic

Frederico Pfrimer's posting on September 14th at 17:18 GMT lead me to read his interesting essay, which contains the following statement:

".. the main wrong assumption of physics is not a physical assumption, but a millenary logical assumption: the principle of excluded middle .... This principle says that a proposition is either true or false, in other words, either the proposition or its negation is true"

I responded on September 24th at 19:23 GMT "I think that you might be saying that the truth or falsity of a proposition may depend on its context. That is very close to the concept of contextual effects that I discuss in my essay." I believe this is a key idea: that the way the logic at the lower level operates may depend on the higher level context within which it is imbedded. This is one way of cashing out Frederico's proposal.

At each level of the hierarchy, there is a set of logical and causal relations that operate. In first order logic , a predicate P(a) is a statement that may be true or false depending on the values of its variables a. The issue then is whether those variables can be determined purely at that level of the hierarchy, or whether they depend on variables defined at lower or higher levels. In the first case, the logic at the level considered is affected by bottom up causation, and hence is not determined purely by the variables at that level. In the latter case, it is affected by top-down causation, with the same outcome. Thus whether a specific proposition is true or not depends on parameters defined at other levels --- which means the principle of the excluded middle for logic at that level is in effect modified: truth or falsity is contingent on context.

The process is particularly clear in the case of conditional branching or looping in computer programs. The program continues on one path if a condition T(a) is true, and on another one if it is false. If T(a) is based on variables that are evaluated in other subroutines, it depends on criteria evaluated in the program as a whole rather than in the subroutine where the condition is evaluated. This logical difference then goes on to cause different flows of electrons at the physical gate level (cf.the discussion of computers in my essay). The underlying physics of course allows this, indeed it enables it to happen. Essentially the same conditional branching happens in many cases in molecular biology (see Gilbert and Epel: Ecological Developmental Biology for details).

Accordingly I believe Pfrimer's and my essays are in sympathy with each other in a profound way (even though this was not what he had in mind!)

George

Dear Professor Ellis,

Regarding the global aspects of causality and the connection with quantum mechanics, which I barely mentioned in my previous comment, I would like to submit to your attention the slides of a talk titled "Global and local aspects of causality", which I will deliver in 2-3 weeks at a conference. I think is that this has strong connections both with top-down causation and with your EBU. I would appreciate any feedback.

Best wishes,

Cristi Stoica

    In view of the interaction above, here is a note on how special relativity interacts with bottom up and top down causation in the case of electromagnetism:

    The electromagnetic field is described by an anti-symmetric tensor F, made up of electric and magnetic field components. The micro level laws are (i) Maxwell's equations for the electromagnetic field, including the Gauss law, with particles such as electron and protons as sources; (ii) the Lorentz force law for the effect of electric and magnetic fields on charged particles such as protons and electrons.

    The transformation laws for electric and magnetic fields under change of velocity v in the x-direction follow from the nature of Lorentz transformations, see Feynman Lectures in Physics Volume II, pages 26-5 to 26-10. They are

    [math]E'_x = E_x,\,\, B'_x = B_x,\,\,\\

    E'_y = \frac{E_y - v B_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_y = \frac{B_y vE_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, \\

    E'_z = \frac{E_z v B_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_z = \frac{B_z - vE_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}}.\,\,

    [/math]

    With the Gauss law, these show why an electron in motion generates a magnetic field. They also show why an electron moving in a magnetic field will experience a transverse electric field that will then affect its motion.

    The bottom level dynamics is the way the micro level electric and magnetic fields interact with each other according to Maxwell's equations, with the charged particles as sources, and these fields in turn exert forces on those particles via the Lorentz force law, that cause them to move if they are free to do so.

    Bottom up effects are the way that billions of electrons in motion at the micro level generate measurable electric currents at the macro level, such as in a generator, and the way that forces on billions of charged particles at the micro level can add up to generate macroscopic forces, such as in an electric motor.

    Top down effects are for example the way that electric coils (macro entities, not describable in terms of micro level variables) constrain the motion of electrons in specific directions. This is why the micro fields they generate add up to macro level fields (see for example Feynman Lectures in Physics Volume II pages 13-5 to 13-6); without the constraints exerted by the wires, no such macro fields would be generated. Similarly the constraints generated by the design of the electric motor ensure that the individual forces on electrons and protons are channelled so as to add up to measurable macro level forces. This constraning effect is top down action from the level of machine components to the level of protons and electrons.

    How does special relativity fit in? Magnets in the generator create magnetic fields. It is the motion of the generator coils in these fields that creates the local relative velocity v that (via the above equations) then causes an electric field to act on the electrons and make them move to form a current. In an electric motor, it is the motion of electrons in coils that generates local magnetic fields that are utilised to generate rotation. The above equations are at the heart of what happens in both cases. And they result because of the application of the full set of Lorentz Transformation laws --- the heart of special relativity --- to the electromagnetic field.

    It is for this reason that the daily operation of electric motors and generators, via their design (thanks to the good offices of electrical engineers - a top-down effect from the human mind into the physical world), is a demonstration of and confirmation of both special relativity theory, and the efficacy of the combination of bottom up and top down effects.

    George

      And I so carefully previewed those equations! Oh well, here they are:

      [math]E'_x = E_x,\,\, B'_x = B_x,\,\,\\

      E'_y = \frac{E_y - v B_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_y = \frac{B_y vE_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, \\

      E'_z = \frac{E_z v B_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_z = \frac{B_z - vE_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}}.[/math]

      I give details below in my posting of Sep. 28, 2012 @ 07:41

      The equations are

      [math]E'_x = E_x,\,\, B'_x = B_x,\,\,\\

      E'_y = \frac{E_y - v B_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_y = \frac{B_y vE_z}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, \\

      E'_z = \frac{E_z v B_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}},\,\, B'_z = \frac{B_z - vE_y}{\sqrt{1-v^2}}.

      [/math]

      [they probably won't display properly as there is a fault in the system; they preview correctly]

      George

      One further comment: hidden macro assumptions

      If one looks for example at the Feynman derivation of the magnetic field due to electrons flowing in a wire coil, the wire is represented as a structureless macro entity, even though it is made up of atoms and electrons. We just take this macro structure (the physical wire) for granted in all such derivations. This is analogous to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is the de facto way things are thought of by experimentalists: detectors and mirrors for example are indicated in their diagrams as structureless macro entities, because their nature and mode of operation is taken for granted. It's not what the experiment is about.

      Thus the causal effectiveness of macro entities is taken for granted in both cases (the way the wire channels the flow of electrons, the way the mirror transmits and reflects light and the detector records incoming photons). Yes of course they are made up of atoms and electrons at the micro level, but that is irrelevant to their role in the experiment, which role is due to the macro organisation embedded in these structures. These structural constraints act down to organise micro events (as is very clear in the case of the wire: its physical structure prevents electrons moving sideways out of the wire).

      This top-down aspect of what is going on is hidden because we take it for granted. It's just part of what we assume to be the case, so we don't notice it.

      George

      • [deleted]

      It would seem that to make mathematical sense the universe should exhibit strong patterns at the local level and in bulk, thus bottom up and top down - the Planck spectrum of the CBR being the most striking bulk pattern we know of - as if things must add up this way.

        Hi Joel

        Indeed. The calculations leading to understanding of this spectrum are basically the present day version of the resolution of Olber's paradox (why the is the night sky not as bright as the surface of the Sun): one of the oldest calculations of global to local effects. My paper here makes that link. The divergence underlying Olber's paradox is also essentially the divergence that prevented Newton from ever creating a cosmological model based on his gravitational theory. Ted Harrison's books Cosmology: The Science of the Universe is a great source on all this.

        Gworge

        • [deleted]

        Dear George Ellis,

        Thank you for urging me to reread Feynman vol. 2. When I looked into it for the last time several years ago, I was only interested in the question whether it shares lacking care with almost all other textbooks on electricity by introducing the complex calculus like an Ansatz as if it was a given fact instead of a step by step distinction between reality and different levels of modeling. While I may confirm that Feynman used complex calculus always correctly, I didn't find where he devoted the due attention to this issue.

        When I had earlier read Feynman I skipped his relativity related stuff for two reasons. I did not doubt that Einstein's relativity is correct, and I did know that it is irrelevant for electrical engineering.

        Feynman's lectures are distinguished by the author's readiness to frankly reveal the often speculative basis of his reasoning. So far I found in vol.1 only successful efforts to incorporate relativity into electromagnetism. Maybe, I will find in vol. 1 how Feynman dealt with the foundation of relativity.

        Anyway, I appreciate your hint and consider it more valuable than utterances of agreement with my essay.

        Thank you,

        Eckard

        • [deleted]

        Thanks much for the link to your paper. I was just thinking that a really annoying top down problem is how on earth a proton can have spin 1/2 with all this stuff going on with valence and sea quarks of all kinds, not to mention gluons and photons and weak bosons. It is just amazing that there could be any simple quark model at all. Some bigger symmetry must be herding these cats. And an even weirder symmetry must require that electrons hang around these messy protons - and this is supposed to be 'the simplest atom in the universe'. I bet that a crucial ingredient in hierarchy is being able to 'chunk' 3 quarks into 1 proton, and 4 fermions into 1 atom as a 2 body problem. Parentheses do that in a fairly natural way, at least at this elementary level. Hence to look at octonions. Now I must dig up my copy of Large Scale Structure - it has been quite a while.

          Dear Crisit

          your presentation is very nicely done. I agree completely with your emphasis on the importance of global conditions, which of course is fully in agreement with my essay. I also agree about quantum theory maybe having influences into the past.

          As to wave function collapse: you state "But we can assume that the interaction with the measurement device (and the environment, as the decoherence program requires) only disturbed the unitary evolution, and the collapse is only apparently discontinuous" This is pretty close to my concept of the apparatus acting down on the particles to cause an effective collapse. "The measurement of O1 in fact refi nes both the initial conditions of the system \psi, and those of the apparatus \eta". I think I agree: this is a case of what I call adaptive selection (which occurs in state vector preparation).

          Where we disagree is that you want to preserve unitarity: I think its clear you can't. The top down action from the apparatus causes non-unitary behavior at the particle level. I think that's clear in the case of state vector preparation.

          Best wishes

          George

          Frank

          "what do you think is the legitimate and true goal of modern physics and modern science?"

          It is to understand the mechanisms whereby physical things work (the natural sciences) and how livings beings exist and function (the life sciences), together with understanding the historical process whereby they came into being (the historical sciences.)

          Science cannot deal with issues of aesthetics, ethics, or meaning. This is because it deals either with issues that can be tested by replicable experiment that any community of scientists should be able to reproduce,or with observations of things that exist historically where any scientist can examine these historical remains and test the theories about them that others have proposed. The core of science is testability by observation or experiment of proposed theories.

          Things like television sets are the product of technology, which utilises science to create useful artefacts. They are the outcome of abstract thought, and exist because of top-down action from the human mind to the physical world. No scientific theory can either predict or explain the existence of television sets, because they are not predicted by Maxwell's equations, Newton's laws of motion, or any other set of fundamental equations that describe how physics works.

          George

            Yes interesting.

            To me the very important thing is how when you chunk things in this way you change their properties. Thus neutrons decay in 11 1/2 minutes when free, but are stable for billions of years when incorporated in a nucleus. Electrons interact by Thomson scattering when free but not when bound in an atom. A hydrogen atom is not longer a hydrogen atom when combined into water.

            If you believe that identity is described by patterns of behaviour or interaction of an entity, then context changes identity. That's why the billiard-ball model of bottom up interaction does not work in most cases.

            The Large Scale Structure book won't help much in all this. It's about gravity and does not deal with octonions. Actually rather than octonions I's go for geometric algebra

            George

            Hi George,

            You wrote, "If you believe that identity is described by patterns of behaviour or interaction of an entity, then context changes identity."

            Context or multi-scale variety? I think the former assumes independence of identity and context, while the latter assumes continuous functions over multiple scales. In other words, I think the model is not bounded by context implying arbitrarily chosen conditions; rather, self organized and implying self-limitation.

            "Actually rather than octonions I'd go for geometric algebra."

            Not sure what link you chose, because it doesn't work -- maybe Doran and Lazenby?

            Hestenes' spacetime algebra is fully relativistic.

            I for one am convinced that these extensions of Hamilton's seminal result do conclusively restore analysis to a primary role in physical models.

            Tom

            Hi Tom

            "Context or multi-scale variety? I think the former assumes independence of identity and context, while the latter assumes continuous functions over multiple scales. In other words, I think the model is not bounded by context implying arbitrarily chosen conditions; rather, self organized and implying self-limitation."

            Well it's hard to avoid the usual way of talking, where one says hydrogen is bonded with oxygen to give water, even though they are neither hydrogen nor oxygen once bonded. Your description is more accurate but also more difficult to follow intuitively. One hangs onto the idea that it is the components that make the object exist, even when, as your comments imply, they lose their identity when this occurs. It's a historical statement really, about where the combined entity came from.

            Yes I meant Doran and Lasenby, developing out of Hestenes' work.

            George

            George,

            I'm in complete agreement with your thesis... what's surprising is only that such a common-sense notion needs to be argued -- i.e. that higher-level structure can impose constraints on lower-level behavior.

            The underlying issue seems to be that while the rationale for reducing physics to a simple and compact set of principles is clear to everyone, there's no such understanding of how and why higher-level structures (and hence constraints) should arise. We know a great deal about the structure of atoms and molecules, but it's not clear why the lower-level physics should happen to support such stable complex systems. In our present intellectual environment that kind of question hardly seems a sensible one to ask.

            In biology, on the other hand, it's clear (at least in principle) where higher-level structures and constraints come from -- essentially, from the requirement that biological systems be able to replicate themselves within a given physical environment. This basic functional requisite underlies evolution and the vast range of diverse requirements that come to constrain living systems at many levels.

            In the conclusion of my essay, I suggest that a similar basic functional requisite might be able to account for the diversity of structural levels in physics, namely the requirement that physical information be measurable and communicable between systems. This does not depend on any specific definition of "observer" or "measurement", but on the argument that every way of observing or communicating anything requires a context in which other information is also observable. This suggests that there may be quite complex and very stringent structural constraints on any system of interaction in which information is physically definable and communicable.

            On reading your paper on contextuality in QM ("On the limits of quantum theory") I find your arguments once again eminently sensible, and I have the impression that our approaches are complementary. I've also appreciated your work on the problem of time, over the years, and you may find my essay of interest also from the standpoint of its (unfortunately abbreviated) discussion of Minkowski spacetime.

            In any event, congratulations on another meticulously clear and careful piece of work; it ought to be rated very high.

            Thanks -- Conrad

              Hi Conrad

              You say in your essay "The problem is that measurements are inherently contextual. They can't be analyzed into simple, self-contained elements without losing sight of what makes them work." Absolutely right!

              Just a comment on vision: you say "so it requires a huge amount of complex low processing to support the seemingly stable sensible view of the world you see as you glance around." Yes, but also it actually it requires a huge amount of *high level* information to interpret what we see, because the light striking our retina, even though it conveys a vast amount of information, does not convey enough information to unambiguously tell us what is there. Eric Kandel explains this in detail in his book The Age of Enlightenment: he emphasizes that it is only because of top-down processing form the cortex that we are able to form visual images.

              Yes I agree with you about time and information (you may have seen my new paper on time). And then you say "So it's conceivable that what we're looking at is an evolutionary process operating through a kind of natural selection, analogous to biological evolution. Instead of many organisms replicating themselves, reproducing their species, here we have many local systems contributing to the reproduction of their common environment, as a body of shared, self-defining information." Yes I agree - you will see in my quantum essay how I also emphasize this process of adaptive selection works in physics processes such as state vector preparation. It also lies at the heart of the difference between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian dynamics, as I comment elsewhere in this thread. I thinks it a key feature of how physics works, as well as of how biology works.

              Congratulations on a great essay.

              George

              Dear Professor Ellis,

              Thank you very much for commenting about my presentation.

              We can disagree about unitarity. At this point I find both unitary and discontinuous collapse explanations incomplete. I will take this opportunity to explain why it is not that clear there is a discontinuous collapse. For example, in the case of the experiment with Mach-Zehnder interferometer, with delayed choice. Our choice concerning the second beam splitter seems to affect what happened to the photon at the first beam splitter. Assuming there's a discontinuous collapse, it should happen somewhere between the first and the second beam splitter. But this means that a photon which was split and travels along both arms of the interferometer, suddenly collapses on one arm. This would be strange, and conservation laws would be violated. Assuming that the collapse happened before the photon entered the first beam splitter, then why not saying as well that it never happened, or that it happened at the Big-Bang.

              The case of preparation-measurement, which is generally considered the irrefutable proof of collapse, was explained at the slides you quote, "The measurement of O1 in fact refines both the initial conditions of the system \psi, and those of the apparatus \eta". Those slides present a possible unitary explanation of the collapse, by using the entanglement with the preparation device. It is very similar to the Mach-Zehnder interferometer experiment with delayed choice: what we choose to measure determines the way the system interacted with the preparation device.

              Another argument I find convincing is that of conservation laws. They normally follow from unitary evolution - from commutation with the Hamiltonian. Is there a method to obtain the conservation laws, method which holds even when there is a discontinuous collapse?

              I admit though that, besides these arguments and others I put in those slides, one can't find an irrefutable experimental evidence for or against discontinuous collapse. If there's discontinuous collapse, it will always hide no matter how we rearrange the experiment. If it takes place unitarily, locally appears like serendipity, as if a disturbance distributed between the preparation device and the measurement device "accidentally" puts the system in the observed state, so that it doesn't need to collapse. But, even if we allow discontinuous collapse, this kind of "accidents" happen. This is in fact what makes QM contextual. So, if we have anyway to accept strange contextual nonlocal backward in time behavior, then the worst about unitary collapse is already accepted when we accept discontinuous collapse.

              Best wishes,

              Cristi Stoica