Recognising Top-Down Causation by George F. R. Ellis

Tom,

Equilibria get punctuated when there is a build up of stored energy, ie, static energy. It is that very stasis which creates the conditions for the avalanche. It is when the energy is more fluid/dynamic, ie. less static, that such situations do not occur. When there are many small bubbles constantly building up and popping, rather than a few, or one large one.

"You seem to think that system-changing ideas come in flashes of insight unrelated to anything that came before."

And where have I said that? The one point I keep making, that explaing time would be more effective if we think of it as the future becoming past as a consequence of dynamic processes, as opposed to treating it as a measure from prior to succeeding events, has endless precedence. To quote you, quoting Ellis, " with the potential of the future continually becoming the certainty of the past." That, in a nutshell, is what I keep saying we should examine. How can you say it has no precedent, simply because it is overlooked? There are lots of things that get overlooked. That is not the same as lacking precedence.

"Your naive idea of past events receding linearly, is far from George Ellis' nonlinear potential. In the latter, not only is the objectivity of time's arrow locally preserved; events are not spatially separated in the predictable way that you imagine. "

Where do you get that I'm arguing the past recedes linearly? I'm the one who keeps comparing it to temperature!!! From Ellis' paper: "We also can't retrodict to the past at the quantum level, because once the wave function has collapsed to an eigenstate we can't tell from its final state what it was before the measurement." I've basically argued the past decays. From my entry in this contest: "It is as though the thread of time is being woven from strands frayed off from what had previously been woven and the past becomes as unknowable as the future." How do you get "linear" from that?

"Would you prefer an M-16 over a flyswatter, when the object is to squash a fly?"

The point is that the math works, even if the assumptions on which it is based, such as absolute time and space, are in error. The extent of your proof of relativity is that the math works. No time traveling wormholes yet.

John, I know you have convinced yourself that we are talking about the same things. We're not. I'm satisfied that I have done my best to explain why the state of science is not as you claim. Further I am not willing to go.

Tom

James,

You wrote: "Perhaps it is helpful for me to point out that empirical evidence does not give us the answers about the natures of either cause or consciousness."

More than that, empirical evidence (observed phenomena) gives us no answers at all about *anything*, other than by means of a theory that incorporates the observation.

The relevant question is, where does one stop the infinite regress of cause? If I say that consciousness causes life, and you ask in turn what causes consciousness, the word "cause" loses all meaning entirely. On the other hand, because we know -- empirically -- that many forms of causality are hidden in the feedback between a system and its environment, we can form closed logical judgments by setting boundary conditions on the environment. As George Ellis has also allowed, no real physical phenomenon is infinite.

With what boundary conditions would you be satisfied, James? None? You might be right -- there may be no absolute standard by which we can understand "cause." I find that the capacity for infinite regress is a unique product of human imagination, however, in that no bounded system -- e.g., a scientist performing a quantum experiment or a computer performing a calculation -- contains in itself any information beyond the arbitrary boundary conditions assumed in the initial condition. There's a way out:

A self organized system is, in its definition, self-limiting; therefore, all cause-effect relations are local. Experiments aren't self organized, and computers aren't self organized -- so allowing a self organized universe, unless we include metaphysical realism we cannot even say what is real. A universe of infinitely regressive cause is not a real universe.

Tom

Tom,

No, as I've pointed out before, we are very definitely talking past each other. While it may frustrate you, I still find it enlightening for a number of reasons. Thanks for carrying on the conversation as long as you have.

Tom,

Me: "Perhaps it is helpful for me to point out that empirical evidence does not give us the answers about the natures of either cause or consciousness."

Tom: "More than that, empirical evidence (observed phenomena) gives us no answers at all about *anything*, other than by means of a theory that incorporates the observation."

Me: We don't need the theory. The information is in the empirical evidence. My point is that the empirical evidence always consists of effects. We do not know what cause is, but, empirical evidence tells us everything we can know about what it does. We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory. The theory is a constraint on ahieving understanding about the nature of the universe. Theory consists of adding guesses about the nature or natures of cause or causes onto physics equations. The damage done is that those invented causes represent artificial endpoinst in understanding the meaning conveyed to us by empirical evidence.

Tom: "The relevant question is, where does one stop the infinite regress of cause? If I say that consciousness causes life, and you ask in turn what causes consciousness, the word "cause" loses all meaning entirely. On the other hand, because we know -- empirically -- that many forms of causality are hidden in the feedback between a system and its environment, we can form closed logical judgments by setting boundary conditions on the environment. As George Ellis has also allowed, no real physical phenomenon is infinite."

Me: There is no infinite regress of cause. I understand that the common usage of the word cause gives that impression. When I speak of cause, I am referring to that which results in patterns in changes of velocity at the level of the foundation of physics. For example, a line of billiard balls is set up with small gaps between them. The first in line is hit with a cue stick and each ball hits the next ball causing all to move in turn. This example contains the common usage of the word cause. At the foundational level the cause for all those effects is the same one. It is called electric charge. Electric charge is a theory. Mass as the cause of gravity is a different theory. Those two theories restrict our understanding of cause by the role they play, due to the theorists, in introducing fundamental disunity onto physics equations.

Tom: "With what boundary conditions would you be satisfied, James? None? You might be right -- there may be no absolute standard by which we can understand "cause." I find that the capacity for infinite regress is a unique product of human imagination, however, in that no bounded system -- e.g., a scientist performing a quantum experiment or a computer performing a calculation -- contains in itself any information beyond the arbitrary boundary conditions assumed in the initial condition. There's a way out:

A self organized system is, in its definition, self-limiting; therefore, all cause-effect relations are local. Experiments aren't self organized, and computers aren't self organized -- so allowing a self organized universe, unless we include metaphysical realism we cannot even say what is real. A universe of infinitely regressive cause is not a real universe."

Me: The infinite regression of cause is actually an infinite regression of effects. Effects are not causes regardless of superficial appearances. One effect leads to another, but, no effect causes another. There are no self-organized systems except in appearance. All effects that have and will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from te beginning of the universe. That is the way it has to have been if we are to rule out allowing theorists to introduce later miracles. That first cause is unknown but it certainly was real. These theoretical causes, by their presence in physics equations, restrict and mislead us in learning about the original and truly foundational cause. It didn't go away. Theory helps to hide it, but, it is always the same cause behind all effects. That cause must account for what physics theory cannot account for. For example, intelligence. We receive all information from a constantly changing wildly mixed storm of photons. Intelligence makes sense out of that mess and it doesn't use theory to do it.

James Putnam

"We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory."

This is called inductive logic, James, and were it an honest standard of truth, we would be doing science according to Aristotle.

"There are no self-organized systems except in appearance."

Then there's at least one case for which your "empirical evidence" doesn't work, isn't there? Can't have it both ways.

Tom

Tom,

""We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory.""

"This is called inductive logic, James, and were it an honest standard of truth, we would be doing science according to Aristotle."

No it isn't. It is recognizing that before we do anything at all with information we discern it from that mess of photons. It is the first act of foundational intelligence. What one does with it afterwards depends upon their belief system and their acquired abilities.

""There are no self-organized systems except in appearance.""

"Then there's at least one case for which your "empirical evidence" doesn't work, isn't there? Can't have it both ways."

If you mean that my remark contradicts what I said about all effects that have occurred or will ever occur in the universe, no it doesn't. It wasn't intended to be applied to the evolution of the universe. It applied to any systems one brings forward as being self-organized along with the impression that a new miracle is occuring because of and within the system. I don't care what one wants to believe about the nature of the original and continuing single cause for all effects in the universe. I stress only that all effects that have ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from the beginning of the universe. And, I stress that later imagined miracles should not be tolerated in science. Complex systems do not accomplish anything that wasn't provided for from the beginning of the universe. Complex systems do not reveal to us what cause is. They reveal effects, effects, and more effects.

James Putnam

James,

"I stress only that all effects that have ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from the beginning of the universe."

I agree. So does George Ellis, as you can see from the post that started this thread.

"Complex systems do not reveal to us what cause is. They reveal effects, effects, and more effects."

Nothing else reveals to us what cause is, either. Science is not revelation -- religion is revelation. Science is a process of discovery, and for that, one needs a theory of what one expects to discover. It may be revelation-like to discover what one did not expect; however, without expectation we induce correct physics only by accident.

Tom

Tom,

Nothing else reveals to us what cause is, either. Science is not revelation -- religion is revelation. Science is a process of discovery, and for that, one needs a theory of what one expects to discover. It may be revelation-like to discover what one did not expect; however, without expectation we induce correct physics only by accident."

Science does put itself forward as revelation. It explains causes such as four fundamental forces.

The role of theory is to substitute for the unknown. Its role in physics equations is to fill in blanks with ideas that are not made known to us by empirical evidence.

"...one needs a theory of what one expects to discover."

And I say this is not true. I have enterred several eassays in the contests communicating why this is not true. All the useful meaning that one can gain is from the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence consists of patterns in changes of velocity. Those patterns make extrapolation and interpolation possible, not the theoretical add-ons. Those add-ons are subtract meaning from empirical evidence. It is possible and more revealing to learn what is available to be discovered by removing theory from physics equations. Making certain now that my meaning for theory here is: Theory is the practice of inventing causes.

James Putnam

James, the physical forces weren't revealed to us from a burning bush. They were theorized and tested by experiment.

Theory may indeed be the invention of causes -- or as I like to say, the art of good guessing -- however, any other way of abstracting meaning from phenomena is not science.

Tom

"It was necessary to theorize because the differences in patterns of changes of velocity appear so different that the physicist could not show that they were due to the same cause."

Maybe they weren't! One would not know unless the conjecture is tested.

"Science is that which empirical evidence communicates to us."

No it isn't. Science is an entirely rationalist enterprise -- the measured correspondence between theory and physical result. Empirical evidence does not communicate anything at all to us; phenomena are *always* intepreted in theory, no exception.

Tom

Tom,

""It was necessary to theorize because the differences in patterns of changes of velocity appear so different that the physicist could not show that they were due to the same cause.""

"Maybe they weren't! One would not know unless the conjecture is tested."

If it is understood how two or more patterns can be generated by a single cause, then, that is the choice to be made and ested. The idea that they actually may be due to unique separate causes, if adopted, continues the practice of forcing fundamental disunity onto the equations of physics. That practice starts at the beginning of the adoption of theory. Theory is not necessary if all properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence have units of measurement that are the same as the empirical evidence from which their existence is inferred. That evidence is patterns in chanes of velocity. The units of changes of velocity, in various combinations, are the ones in which all properties should be expressed. This act keeps all physics properties firmly rooted in their empirical evidence. Theory is not a part of this act. It is seen as not being a part of this act by the elimination of all artificially indefinable units added to those of empirical evidence. Only the units of empirical evidence are naturally indefinable units. That is because there are no other units before them by which to define them. All units of properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence are definable in the units that exist before them. Those units are combinations of the units of changes of velocity.

""Science is that which empirical evidence communicates to us.""

"No it isn't. Science is an entirely rationalist enterprise -- the measured correspondence between theory and physical result. Empirical evidence does not communicate anything at all to us; phenomena are *always* intepreted in theory, no exception."

You are correct that it isn't presently. That is because theory reigns supreme. Guesses are easier to come by than are some facts. The meaning of my statement was to define science as being the gathering of empirical evidence and learning the meanings which it conveys to us. The act of learning the meanings does not include a need for theory. Theory is needed to substitute for meaning that has not yet been made clear. There are times when finding meaning can be challenging.

Such a time occurred, when f=ma was discovered and its properties were in need of clarification. It was clear that acceleration was a naturally indefinable property. It was not clear how to define both mass and force with acceleration as the prior naturally indefinable property. It was guessed that one of them needed to be declared to be an indefinable property. Mass was chosen to be the new indefinable property. The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration.

James Putnam

"The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration."

James, one has to understand that neither force nor mass are defined by acceleration. These are measured effects of *relations* between states of motion, in a straight line (uniform), or curved (accelerated). Physics is fundamentally concerned only with space and time.

Tom

Tom,

""The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration.""

"One has to understand that neither force nor mass are defined by acceleration. These are measured effects of *relations* between states of motion, in a straight line (uniform), or curved (accelerated). Physics is fundamentally concerned only with space and time."

Theory is concerned with space and time as if they suffer changes of velocity. Theory-free physics is concerned with objects that do suffer changes of velocity. There are measured effects between such objects. Both force and mass must be defined by acceleration. There is no other way to define them. When theorists assumed that they could not be defined in terms of acceleration they recognized that one must then be theorized to be an indefinable property joining with length and duration.

The empirical evidence is acceleration. Acceleration is measured in length and duration. Both length and duration must be accepted as indefinables because there are no other properties before them by which they may be defined. However, since they are the only properties of empirical evidence, all properties inferred to exist from observation of that empirical evidence must be defined in terms of length and duration. Otherwise the theorist is freed to introduce their own 'after-creation' miracles. In other words, their imaginings become staples of physics.

It is possible to define mass and force in terms of acceleration. The act of doing so frees empirical evidence to reveal to us its fuller, if not full, meanings. The artificial restraints of theory are removed. The removal of kilograms in favor of units for mass that consist only of a combination of units of meters and seconds immediately reveals the nature of mass. We must know the nature of mass right from the beginning of its use if we are to understand the meanings of all the physics equations that follow after f=ma such as e=mc^2.

James Putnam

James Putnam

"Theory is concerned with space and time as if they suffer changes of velocity."

No it isn't, James.

Your starting assumptions of relativity are completely out of touch with what relativity actually says. Once you get your mind around Minkowski space, where space and time are not physical and space-time is, you will see that your conclusions cannot hold.

There is no simpler nor more meaningful way to say it than Wheeler already has: "Matter tells spacetime how to curve; spacetime tells matter how to move."

Tom

Tom,

"Your starting assumptions of relativity are completely out of touch with what relativity actually says. Once you get your mind around Minkowski space, where space and time are not physical and space-time is, you will see that your conclusions cannot hold."

Why are space and time not 'physical'? Space gives us room to move around in. Effects use time. Actually, I don't think that I have referred to space and time as being physical. I think that would require some empirical evidence from the patterns of changes of velocity of other objects. They are properties of the universe. However, either way spacetime is not physical either. It has never been demonstrated to exist. It is pure theory. There is no empirical evidence for it.

james Putnam

"Why are space and time not 'physical'?"

Because space and time independently have no physical effects of their own. They depend on physical conditions -- e.g., a meter stick measured locally to be one meter in length is foreshortened in its direction of travel(from the perspective of an outside observer) at a significant percentage of the speed of light.

James, length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime. So long as you deny the known science, I'm afraid we aren't going to get anywhere in this discussion.

Tom

Tom,

"length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime". This statement of you is definitely incorrect. Length contraction and time dilation were fabricated as crutches as to explain the null result of the experiment by Michelson and Morley. Minkowski's concept of spacetime arose on Einstein's reinterpretation, i.e. much later.

I found a perhaps decisive mistake in the adopted in 1887 by Michelson and Morley after suggestion by Potier and by Lorentz correction of Michelson's 1881 mistake. Besides this logical argument of mine there is experimental evidence too. You are repeating like a paternoster your belief that length contraction and time dilation were experimentally validated. What experiments do you refer to, and how can you refute my arguments and the experimental evidence e.g. by Feist and by Shtyrkov?

Eckard

Tom,

"... length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime. So long as you deny the known science, I'm afraid we aren't going to get anywhere in this discussion."

Length contraction of objects is a real physical effect. Time dilation is a misrepresentation of a change in cause that results in slower rates of change. Length contraction is validated. Space contraction is not validated. Time dilation is not validated. Slowing rates of operation are validated. What I am denying are theoretical guesses about the nature of the universe. Scinece for me is about the nature of the universe as it is presented to us by empirical evidence. Actually, I think that the discussion has wondered far enough away from Dr. Ellis' subject that the discussion should not be continued, at least not here. Thanks for taking the time to participate.

James Putnam